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Dr Imtiaz Sooliman Copyright © 2021 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Olivia Main Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Introduction by Vusi Khanyile Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, economic development and equality, through a value system that embodies the national democratic principles of a democratic state. Noting the divided and oppressive past of our country, the institute undertakes a range of activities that seek to make a contribution to those processes that move South Africa towards being a more inclusive society, which promote development of its people, its economy, and contribute to national coherence. The ISI does this through a number of activities and programmes which it runs on an annual basis. These include policy research and analysis aimed at developing public policy and, more importantly, assessing its implementation. The institute also runs democracy training programmes, which focus on equipping political and civic society formations, so that they are empowered to fulfil their democratic responsibilities. In addition, it publishes a variety of peer-reviewed reports, occasional papers, academic papers, and a periodic journal under the professional guidance of a group of professors and academics. The institute has also established a vast network of relationships with similar bodies across the world in order to improve international solidarity. It arranges a series of dialogue events throughout the year, where people from civic society and political establishments, as well as policy experts and researchers, are drawn together to engage on policy development and democratic processes. The ISI’s annual lecture is one of the newest arrows in its quiver, having recently hosted only its second annual lecture. The keynote speaker at the first event was Judge Albie Sachs, who spoke on public ethics, morality, democracy, social cohesion, and how South Africa is measuring up to the 1994 vision. For the second, Dr Imtiaz Sooliman, the founder of the Gift of the Givers Foundation, spoke on the same topic, but from the perspective of a pragmatic approach that needed to underpin sustainable development. Annual Lecture presented by Dr Imtiaz Sooliman Founder of the Gift of the Givers Foundation The themes running throughout this lecture are spirituality, monarchy, and ethics and about the organisation being a microcosm of what South African society should be, and how it operates. The Gift of the Givers Foundation isn’t a conventional organisation; it came into being in a very spiritual manner, in 1986. I moved to Pietermaritzburg in 1985 when my internship working at a hospital ended – unfortunately, there were no posts to study further in the field of internal medicine – and opened a private practice in January 1986. The spirituality of Gift of the Givers, which would only be established six years later, began to flourish at that same point. An Afrikaner from Pretoria, William Muller, who had just returned from America on a scholarship, also moved to Pietermaritzburg that same year. This man, who speaks about 13 languages, accepted a post at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg, to teach French. He met a butcher in town and in conversation, Muller asked him if he knew of a good local doctor. Coincidentally – and in spirituality there is no coincidence – the butcher was my neighbour, and so I met Muller and over a period of time we developed a friendship. He insisted that I meet a spiritual teacher he knew from Istanbul who he’d stumbled across in America during a period when he was depressed. Muller was walking the streets when he noticed a man watching him. He says he felt an immediate connection with the man and decided to follow him. The man entered St John the Divine, a church in New York in which people of all religions – Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, among others – were following a spiritual teacher who was from Azhikkal, a celebration of God’s name, in India. Muller described it as an amazing sight. It showed an understanding, a maturity, calmness and respect between religions, very much out of line with what’s shown in the media, where great antagonism between religious groups is portrayed. In 1985, the holy man from Azhikkal passed away, but Muller met the new spiritual teacher, from Istanbul, who travels to America two or three times a year, just before he returned to South Africa. I joked with Muller about not even having the chance to see Cape Town in South Africa, let alone Istanbul in Turkey. To which Muller simply responded that the next spiritual point would occur when it was meant to; that point came five years later. Nelson Mandela was released. The government was having talks with the ANC. The country was trying to re-enter the global arena. At the same time, in 1991, a massive cyclone hit Bangladesh. I was fortunate enough, under no organisation name, to get permission for aid to be taken across into Bangladesh on a ship chartered by the South African Navy. And then out of the blue, I received a call from a trucking company in Pietermaritzburg asking whether I needed any trucks from Turkey on my mission to Bangladesh. At the end of a long journey, my wife and I landed up in Turkey. Not speaking a word of Turkish, we travelled to meet a spiritual teacher, on the other side of the Bosphoros, who was a disciple of the teacher in Istanbul. After a boat ride, we arrived on the other side and after struggling to hail a taxi, happened upon a man – in a city of 15 million people spread across Europe, Asia and the Middle East – who knew exactly where we needed to go. After a tour of the city, that evening we finally arrived at the spiritual place. And we were both stunned. This was a time post-Gulf War – a war which polarised civilisations. Senator Huntington spoke about the clash of civilisations. The Gulf War was perceived as a fight between Muslims and the rest of the world, between the East and the West. And coming from apartheid South Africa, it was even more shocking. We came from a place of prejudice, of stereotypes, of racial and religious conflict. And we found ourselves in a Muslim holy place where there were Jews, Russians, Hindus, Americans, where everybody was welcome and accepted. A spiritual teacher noticed the shock on our faces and, unlike the normal greeting from a stranger – How are you? Where do you come from? How was the trip? – he asked: “What do you see?” I responded: “People of all religions, all colours, all places where there is no friction, in a Muslim holy place.” The teacher then said: “That’s right. All [hu]mankind is one single nation. The God of all [hu]mankind is one. We just call him by different names. Any teacher, imam, priest, rabbi. Anybody else who promotes extremism, violence, terrorism, discord, conflict, is not a man of God. Do not follow him. Any person who preaches love, kindness, compassion, and mercy is a man of God. Follow him.” Such was the teaching. We witnessed the possibility of harmony, respect, and understanding between people. It opened our eyes to something totally new. Coming from a country with an apartheid past, we were prejudiced, steeped in stereotypes, and viewed other people as not like us and disliked certain people. But in that instant, all of that lifted away. There was no anger, no hate, no discord; there was nothing of that nature left. Our minds had been cleared. We returned to South Africa and a year later, the yearning arose to go back to that spiritual place. On 6 August 1992, on a Thursday night, when I was back in Istanbul at the spiritual gathering, the most incredible thing happened after the zikr. For those who aren’t Muslim, a zikr is a chanting of God’s name, which one would find in all scriptures, in a certain combination. In our case, in Arabic, we say to God one and only, kind compassionate, merciful, all knowing, wise, cherisher, sustainer, nourisher, greater, evolver, among others. When it was over, at 10pm, the spiritual teacher leading the chanting, sitting in a corner of the room, suddenly got up and looked at me, simultaneously making eye contact and looking heavenwards. And then he spoke to me in Turkish, saying: “My son, I’m not asking you, I’m instructing you to form an organisation.” He told me what the name in Arabic should be, which when translated, meant ‘Gift of the Givers’. He instructed me: “You will serve all people of all races, of all religions. All colours, all classes, all cultures. Of any geographical location and of any political affiliation. But you will serve them unconditionally. You will expect nothing in return, not even a thank you. “In fact, in what you are going to be doing for the rest of your life, expect to get a kick up your backside. If you don’t get a kick up your backside, regard it as a bonus. Serve people with love, kindness, compassion and mercy. And remember, the dignity of man is foremost.” A concept that is highly relevant to South Africa, where the dignity of man needs to be urgently addressed. In effect, if someone is down, do not push them further down, but instead hold them up, elevate them. “Caress the head of an orphan.” And there are thousands in our country. “Wipe the tear of a grieving child. Say words of good council to a widow. These things are free, they don’t cost anything. Clothe the naked. Feed the hungry. Provide water for the thirsty.” All relevant to South Africa. “And in everything that you do, be the best at what you do. But not because of ego, rather, because you are dealing with a human life, human dignity, and human emotion.” And then he continued to say in Arabic that the best among people are those who benefit [hu]mankind. He repeated this three times and said: “Listen very carefully. The emphasis is on the word [hu]mankind, not Muslim, not Arab, not Indian, but [hu]mankind. Unconditional.” And that is the motto you will see on all our shirts, trucks, and branding. That is the motto we have been following for 29 years. Then he imparted the most important message of all. He said: “My son, whatever you do, is done through you and not by you. Do not ever forget that.” That was the highest spiritual message. It made it clear that Gift of the Givers was going to be an organisation led by spirituality. It is not a conventional organisation. I didn’t simply get up one morning and start gathering people to form a committee, write a constitution and a founding principal, and start delivering water and food. I had no intention to form an organisation. I was called to Istanbul without warning, given an instruction, given the name, given the broad categories of what I had to do. And the broad category would be to serve all of [hu]mankind unconditionally. But one does need some kind of structure. So, first of all, I asked him how it was that even though I didn’t speak a word of Turkish, when he spoke Turkish, I was able to understand. He responded: “My son, when the hearts connect, and the souls connect, the words become understandable.” I then asked him what he meant by this instruction. After all, I was a doctor in private practice with three surgeries in a place called Pietermaritzburg in South Africa. When was I supposed to do what he was instructing me to do? He said, simply, that I would know. And for 29 years, I have known what to do, how to do it, when to do it, what not to do. The moment I walked out of there, the inspiration came: respond to the civil war in Bosnia. That same month, in August 1992, our first mission was not a basic one such as a feeding scheme, but instead we went headlong into an international war zone. We took in 31 containers of aid and another eight in the November after that. By February, we had started designing the world’s first containerised mobile hospital. In responding to that disaster, the message was clear that in essence, Gift of the Givers was going to be a disaster response agency which would work internationally, and also locally, with the understanding that all people should be treated equally with an open heart and an open mind. As a result, we connected with Johan and Gert Van de Wetering of Afrit Trailers in Rosslyn, Pretoria. They had already built three units – sterilisation, X-ray and a theatre – for the Defence Force. We thought, why not a whole hospital? So, we came together to design a containerised mobile hospital. We worked as a team, with no conflict and no race, colour, or religious bias. That hospital was then loaded onto the SAS Outeniqua, shipped to Trieste in Italy and from there across into Mostar. On 1 February 1994, CNN filmed the hospital, stating that the South African containerised mobile hospital was equal to any of the best hospitals in Europe. The world understood the engineering capabilities of South Africa back then. And South Africans believed in the capabilities and skills they had to offer. We built that hospital – 28 state-of-the-art units, each one totally independent – and it was taken across into Bosnia. In addition, we took a generator, a patient bus and an ambulance, and ten containers of back-up supplies. In my business, you always have to be prepared for any eventuality; you have to be forward-thinking. We provided enough supplies, sutures, IV fluids, medicines, swabs, and enough diesel fuel required to run a hospital for one whole year. If there was a lockdown for 365 days, that hospital would still have functioned. I encouraged them to move the equipment out of the container into a fixed hospital building when the time was right and when it would be more practical. In 2005, we were invited back to Mostar by the Bosnian president to visit the military hospital, to where all the equipment had been moved. And the same doctor we put in charge of the hospital in 1994 was still working there. The doctor reminded me that I had said they would be equipped to perform any operation in the theatre, except heart surgery. He then introduced me to a lady who had had shrapnel in her heart that was removed in the very same theatre that we had provided, and to her four children, who were delivered after that operation in the same hospital. The question is: Do we as South Africans understand that we have the skills, the Ubuntu, the spirituality to not only identify what it takes to save lives and offer help and healing to other nations, but we can also apply all this locally? Do we want friction, discord, and corruption or health, healing, and equality? That’s what my teams are all about. Until 2004, although we had designed the world’s first container mobile hospital, Gift of the Givers had not evolved yet to offer its own medical team, food, blankets, medicines, tents, water, etcetera. Then, on 26 December 2004, a tsunami struck about 13 countries including the wealthy resort area within Thailand, and Indonesia, which hosts a vast number of factories catering to the West. We responded with aid. India, however, remained totally independent. Although the Andaman Islands were affected, they didn’t want anyone to have access to the military base there and so, refused any aid from outside. The Sri Lankan president made an appearance on world TV pleading for assistance. At the same time, Harpoon, on the north-east coast of Somalia, in Africa, was also affected. A fishing village was destroyed, but nobody was interested in Africa at the time. So, we stepped in for both countries. In order to develop this continent, we as Africans have to work with each other. Inter-trade relationships, sharing of information, opening of our borders; we have to nurture that relationship. We can’t have rife xenophobia and widespread crime. It’s a fine balance – there are criminals in all societies, but we need to work on reducing it and increasing cooperation and collaboration. Within 48 hours we were the first team in the world that responded to the disaster in Sri Lanka. Within five days we delivered R7 million worth of aid, partnering with local corporates in the country. We flew planes with supplies from Dubai and India, and chartered planes from Colombo to fly aid across all the regions that were washed away by the tsunami. And we were the first agency in the world to be given land to rebuild houses in Sri Lanka. In Harpoon, the logistics were much more complicated. But for the first time in our organisation’s history, we had a primary health care team. We treated the people in Harpoon and built a medical centre for them, which is still functional. In 2005, after our trip to Bosnia in July where we met with the president, in August we received news of a famine in Niger. Children were dying in numbers. Gift of the Givers responded again with a primary health care team. When we arrived in Niger, an announcement was made that we were there, and thousands of people streamed in for treatment – because it was free, and it was a medical team from South Africa. Our teams are a microcosm of the country, a mix of Hindu, Christian, Muslim, black, white, whoever wants to take part. Everybody respects each other on the trip; everybody is professional. Religious dialogue for the purpose of understanding each other is encouraged. Not for conflict, or to point fingers and be hurtful, but to gain a better understanding of each other’s cultures in order to respect each other’s point of view. We noticed that it was only mothers with their babies that were coming for treatment. No adult males, no teenagers, no kids above the age of five. We couldn’t understand it. As we walked among the patients in the queues, we realised there were too many to treat them all, so we had to triage patients – only treating those in immediate need first. The amount of trust and faith these mothers had in our medical team, people they didn’t know, from a place faraway, was phenomenal. Eventually, they all had the same reaction; they understood what we were doing. That evening, sitting at the dinner table with people from the president’s office, from DIRCO, the media, Thulasizwe Simelane from eNCA started speaking about the three to five children that were dying in the village per day. I stopped him, saying I knew very well what was happening. When the teams arrived, the villagers knew we were limited in number, that the resources would be limited, so they made a personal sacrifice. They decided that no males, teenagers, or children above five would join the queue, only babies that they perceived to be sick would come. Those mothers in the queue who were turned away walked away, because they understood that their child may be fine or have another five to seven days, whereas another child may only have a few hours. And they did this with no guarantee that the team would be there beyond seven days or that a new team would show up to replace them. It was through that generosity of spirit, true spirituality, ethics, and sacrifice that they walked away from the queue to give us the space to deal with those that were extremely sick. And we saved every single child that day. Two months later, it was time for a new evolution: the Gift of the Givers added a trauma team for enforced trauma rehab. A monster of an earthquake hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005. It didn’t just hit one city, it hit right from Rawalpindi to Muzaffarabad, the entire north-west region, up to the Indian border, the Kashmir valley; it affected everybody. We worked very closely with DIRCO on this. They spoke to the Pakistan government. The First Secretary was there to meet us as we landed in Rawalpindi. As we landed – our mixed teams of all races and all religions working together to save lives – the Pakistan General came up to us and thanked us for coming to help his country. He said there was no point going to the site of the earthquake, that we could use the Cantonment Hospital in Rawalpindi as a base, but there were no helicopters available to reach the people in the mountains, the only way was by road. Our teams were in shock; they couldn’t understand what he was talking about, after all, they were there to help with the earthquake victims. I explained what the General was telling us: there was nothing left at the site of the earthquake. The hospitals were gone. The medical personnel, gone. There was no backup support, no infrastructure, water, generators or electricity. In essence, we couldn’t do anything to save anybody there. What we could do, was bring those people walking around injured into the hospital and stabilise them. But we had to make our own plan to get there. Which was fine – it’s better to steer clear of red tape and bureaucracy in any case. We checked out the airport and fortunately came across the American Air Force. There was a moment of hesitation – as we all know, Muslims carry a stigma in America, and in fact all over the world – but the meeting in Istanbul had opened my mind. So, I approached a big black guy standing at the base and struck up a conversation. It turned out he was also originally from Africa – we had a common thread. I explained that we needed a helicopter to send rescue teams into the mountains. Within minutes, he had three helicopters from the American military ready to leave. One team went to the mountains, while the other teams headed to the Cantonment Hospital in Rawalpindi. The moment we walked in, we were hit by the stench of death and chaos: gangrene, kids left alone, no parents, no IV lines, medication or disinfectant. We contacted the General and asked what was going on. We were told that the hospital was actually shutting down. The other teams from the northern countries who were walking around the hospital couldn’t understand who we were or where we’d come from, because of our diverse mix of colour, race and religion. We told them we were from South Africa, which they didn’t believe; they thought all South Africans were black. I assured them we were very much a rainbow nation. Then came the insults, that being from Africa we must be there to get something out of the situation because we are always on the lookout for a freebie, standing there with our begging bowls. I said to them: “My friends, you will eat your words!” I approached the Chief Officer with a medical shopping list and a promise that if he could get the items to me within 24 hours, the South African medical team could turn the situation around. In less than 24 hours, a hospital that was shutting down was converted into a functioning 400-bed emergency hospital, thanks to our medical team – doing seventy-five operations a day, saving lives. As a result, in 2006, the then president of Pakistan gave us a Presidential Award for our service to the people of Pakistan. We sure showed the north, who ended up having to use the same facilities that we set up. There was no anger in it, but we made our point – that South Africans are not to be underestimated, that we have the capabilities, the strength, the professionalism to offer quality services. This says a lot about our universities, medical schools, professors, academics, teachers, and about what we can achieve if given the opportunity. We’re very proud of that and what we achieved. It was the first time we had ever sent in five teams: we had family health care, trauma medicine, general surgeons, orthopaedic surgeons, anaesthetists, theatre nurses, ICU nurses. We had expanded our vision. The focus for Pakistan was to become an even better disaster rescue organisation. And we did it. Back in December 2005, during the time of the Pakistan earthquake rescue mission, Carina Eksteen, a spinal rehabilitation specialist from Pretoria University contacted me, wanting to help the people in Pakistan, offering to fly there over the Christmas period during her leave time. A white Afrikaans Christian women wanted to spend her Christmas holidays healing people in Pakistan; I was so surprised by that. But she came and she helped people to walk again and won the heart of every single Muslim man in that hospital – in fact, of every person, from the patients to the doctors, the nurses, and the military. When she left, they all cried, including the military men! She also brought a patient home to South Africa who would not have survived and healed otherwise. And she rehabilitated that patient. A month ago, I gave a talk in Durban. After telling Carina’s story, a woman sitting at my table on the opposite side said she had just called Carina. She said that the patient had stayed in her house, and she had looked after her while Carina had treated her. Now, 16 years later, I bump into this woman, who tells me that the child (the patient) recovered and got back to life. Was that just a coincidence? I think not. Once again it was spirituality at work. Fast forward to 2009, when we added a new division. We brought in trauma counsellors when we went into Gaza. We had all of the above – primary health care, trauma care, post-op rehab – but for the first time we had trauma counsellors. What were we doing? Expanding the skills, the capabilities, and the experiences of the South Africans in the teams that we were taking around the world. As I’ve said, they are mixed teams, everybody works together on an equal footing. The teams are gender and race balanced. We don’t choose the people in our teams on the basis of BEE, we don’t have to have a certain number of blacks, whites, coloureds, and Indians. I’m very blunt and clear about this; we simply don’t work like that. We work from a spiritual point of view: those who are drawn to us, come. They are chosen for having the best ethics and skills. If they are not a good fit, they’re out. It doesn’t matter what race, religion, or colour they are; we are a balanced charity, and we only accept the best. After the Pakistan earthquake rescue mission, we decided we needed our own search and rescue team. Medical intervention is not the first line, it’s search and rescue first. Over the next five years, we gathered together the right people for the team. On 12 January 2010, I had just returned home from Syria, walked in the front door, when I received a call about an earthquake hitting Haiti. An estimated 250 000 people died in that earthquake within 40 seconds. An unnecessary number of deaths purely down to greed, corruption, poor architectural drawings, slapdash building without proper engineering and construction. It was a domino effect; buildings fell on each other, and people died. Not because of the earthquake, but because of a lack of ethics. Within two hours our search and rescue team was ready to fly via France. DIRCO met with the French Consulate in Johannesburg and within ten minutes we had a Schengen Visa. We said we would give Air France the business, because the country had been good to us. We were concerned that they wouldn’t be able to get our teams to Port-au-Prince though, as we thought the airport would be closed. Air France gave us a written guarantee that they would be able to get us there. What airline in the world gives a guarantee in writing to get you to a certain place? But I knew they were going to have a problem, so I made a call to the Catholic Society in Johannesburg. Even though there was a religious discrepancy, there was no hesitation from their side. Three hours later, they had organised for Catholic Relief Services to meet our team at Dominican Republic, and take them across to the compound in Port-au-Prince, where they would be shown around, as our helpers knew the area well. My teams landed in Paris. The call came that there was a problem, Port-au-Prince airport was closed. My foresight was accurate. The teams then flew another two hours to the Dominican Republic – I had already made the arrangements with Air France. They arrived at the airport and were welcomed with accommodation, food, water, visas, and support across the border. What does this story tell us? That intercultural, inter-racial, inter-religious cooperation is highly possible. It’s not a pie in the sky idea. And it can be achieved anywhere in the world. It just requires the right mindset, the right spirituality, and the willingness to cooperate, understand, and share. On 20 January 2010, eight days into the earthquake, the South African team pulled out 64-year-old Anna Azizi from the rubble. She was alive – after eight days without food, water or medical attention for her fractured hip. The South African team achieved a first. No team in Africa had ever taken anybody out of an earthquake alive outside the African continent. And after eight days, another first. Most people had started to give up hope by that time. The first words Anna Azizi said after she was rescued were: “I love God almighty.” We instilled hope and faith in somebody several thousand kilometres away from our home country. The second words were for her rescuers: “I love you.” Spirituality is all about love, care, and compassion. These are all the values a spiritual teacher instilled in me that fateful night in 1992. And its people with those type of values that join our organisation. We don’t look for them. We don’t go around head hunting and searching for freebies. The medical teams from the northern countries on site at the church where the wounded were being taken didn’t believe we could become such a formidable force. We watched as certain organisations from the north operated on people, without ethics or morals. But as soon as our medical team entered the church, the paramedics got to work wiping the walls and washing the floors. When the patients started arriving to be treated by my team, for the first time ever, my team broke down. The South African team are a group of highly sensitive, compassionate, and caring people. And there were children who had to have amputations because of the careless medical care they had received – for example, botched medical attention on a cut on the ankle became an amputation above the knee, on an injury on the hand became an amputation above the elbow, and so on. Us South Africans had to fix the unethical work of others. All the medical teams ended up working together, and to their credit, the teams from the northern countries nicknamed us the “Dream Team” – the team you go to if you want truly professional help. A huge accolade to the professionalism, the skill, the Ubuntu of the people in our country. So, search and rescue were now added to our services. And we have all the equipment a person would need for medical intervention and search and rescue. It’s highly sophisticated and easily portable. We don’t need big trucks and aeroplanes, the equipment can be carried in the cargo hold of a normal passenger plane and slung over your shoulders, if needs be. Let’s fast forward to November 2016. In terms of how we operate I decided to kill all international marketing – not kill the projects but kill the marketing – because the media was too interested in the international projects. They were focussing all their attention on the excitement and sensationalism, and not on what we were doing as part of our own growth. I needed them to see that what we were doing locally was far more important than the international projects. In June 2017, there was a devastating fire in Knysna. For the first time in the country, corporates that had never supported us before, suddenly understood what we do. Checkers, Shoprite came forward and offered us the carpark to operate from. We had been in discussions with them earlier in the year and had started building a relationship. We were concerned about where their shoppers would park, but they just said that wasn’t important and to use the carpark. We sent in two female project managers to run the entire operation. The people of Knysna came with their bakkies, forklifts, and rich and poor all worked together. We delivered 20 000 food parcels. The support came from all over the country – truck after truck, DHL transported tonnes of goods. And for the first time in our history, corporates gave us support: R20 million in three weeks. We sent in our core fire teams, and our medical teams and specialists to help move patients from Knysna to George. We brought in advanced life support medics and ambulances. We fed 1 200 firefighters twice a day, also providing them with energy bars and drinks throughout. We delivered 20 000 food parcels, and blankets, diapers, etc. We brought in pet food, and fodder for the wild animals and farm animals. We even brought in sugar for the bees. The Cape honeybee is the most versatile and resilient bee globally. It has survived beyond the lives of most bees anywhere in the world. First there was a drought in the area, which dried up most of the vegetation they survive on. Then came the fire, which burnt out three hundred beehives. Each beehive holds between 75 000 and 80 000 bees, so we had lost twenty-two million bees. The fire also burnt out the remaining plants the bees needed to feed on. The next best substitute, which is very expensive and the worst-case scenario, is a sugar solution. We also ended up replacing the three hundred beehives that were lost to the fire and funding the growing of new crops and the pollen substitute needed. A research centre has been set up along the Garden Route that attracts a lot of students and professors. By saving the bees, people have the opportunity to gain experience more about them. Well, that was certainly something new, a new realm of rescue for us. Immediately after that, we were called by the Western Cape Disaster Management. There was a shortage of water in Beaufort West. The dam was empty; it had dried up. And after 21 days of drilling into the ground, they had only hit sand, no water. We immediately called in Dr Gideon Groenewald, a geologist who works with us. He was in Worcester at the time. When he arrived in Beaufort West, he assured us we would find water. Nobody believed him, but after only 24 to 48 hours later, we found it. It was a Friday, my Muslim prayer time. I sent him a message saying: “We will find water today!” From where he was standing, he looked up across the mountain to a white stone. He said to his assistant in Afrikaans: “Die wit berg [the white mountain]. There, we are going to find water there.” So, they took the rig up the mountain and managed to convince who the locals said was a very difficult person to give them the code on the gate to his property. The man had been waiting for their call. They drilled five boreholes that delivered 18 000 litres per hour. From there the water was pumped into the catchment area of the Gamka Dam and from there into the town’s municipal water storage and into the rest of the city. We also drilled boreholes for the schools and old age homes. Beaufort West became the first major disaster we assisted with in that part of the world. At the same time, we got a call to say Sutherland was in trouble. The sheep count was dropping drastically. They needed fodder. And suddenly out of nowhere, we became involved in fodder distribution. Millions of rand of fodder costing truck loads – transport costs were expensive then too. All the Afrikaner farmers in the country rallied together and started giving us free fodder, but we still had to pay for the transport, we had to find the money. One woman who helped us, Elizabeth Visage, arranged 160 coaches from Transnet to take free fodder from other parts of the country and bring it to Matjiesfontein, and from there all the way to Sutherland. In June 2018, the call came through that all the boreholes in Sutherland had dried up. The sheep count was also dropping drastically again. The sheep count had been 440 000, but by 21 January 2020 it had dropped to an alarming low of 31 000. With Dr Groenewald and Martin Langman at the helm, we drilled 238 boreholes in Sutherland at our own cost. Our coordinators, through Sybil Visage, organised a machine that produces fortified pellets, nutritionally enriched. We were supporting that project and at the cheapest cost in the country to the farmers, they now had access to pellets. For the first time that year, at the end of 2020, we were finally seeing the sheep count starting to rise. They were growing into big, healthy animals once more. Obviously, it would take more than just one year to get the numbers back up to where they were, but the turnaround had begun. And with the sheep numbers starting to rise, farmers started to employ one or two more farm workers, which means job creation. We may have saved an entire region of Sutherland in the next year or two, simply by putting in boreholes, bringing in fodder, and producing enriched pellets for the sheep. The province that has always terrified us is the Eastern Cape. It’s just such a vast expanse of land and the population is so spread out. In 2019, we received news from Makhanda that there was a water crisis. We got involved, and two and a half years later, we are still there trying to help sort out problems. We started by drilling boreholes in Graaff Reinet, Klipgat, Adelaide, Bedford, Middleburg, and a whole range of other areas in the Eastern Cape. As we were providing water, we were also spreading the water systems, and bringing in water tankers. Coca-Cola contributed a 34 000-litre super tanker. In 2020, Covid-19 arrived and, of course, we got involved in helping 210 hospitals. It was very difficult to work with the government hospital systems. We had to break all the rules – there was no paperwork, nothing in writing – because we were dealing with an emergency situation, a disaster. There was no time to waste on bureaucracy. We just brought in the aid and gave it to the people who needed it: PPEs, thermometers, scrubs, reusable surgical gowns, hi-flow oxygen machines, medicines, masks, visors, sanitiser, whatever they needed, we provided it. Then we started upgrading medical infrastructure, which is now our priority, because this brings dignity to people. You can’t go to a hospital that’s falling down and expect to heal. At the end of 2021, we injected another R30 million into infrastructure contracts and we opened up the Nkqubela TB Hospital, where the first upgrade was completed. We are also busy working on the Glen Grey and Butterworth Hospitals, among others. In addition, we have started drilling boreholes at the hospitals to remedy the water shortage. Another crisis brought on by the lockdown is hunger. To date, we’ve given out about 400 000 food parcels, specifically related to the lockdown. In July 2021, we also responded to the unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng with the delivery of another over 100 000 food parcels just to help remedy the fallout from that crisis. We’ve supported over one hundred schoolteachers, old age homes, and hospices for the physically and mentally challenged. Also, soup kitchens and gender-based violence structures – everybody has needed help. We provided counselling. We set up our own PCR testing teams. We had ten testing sites and mobile teams to help with PCR testing during the first wave. We have to put the message across that as part of our growth, as part of our spirituality, we can’t keep saying everything is bad. Yes, government has made mistakes and there is corruption, but not everything and everyone in government is bad. We need to focus on the good. And that’s what we try to emphasise and teach as we go about our work. Within government there are a lot of good people wanting to do a lot of good things. They need the support of corporates and the public. And they need the support of the media, not to constantly run everybody down. It’s the same story with the South African Police Service (SAPS). People say you judge a country by its education and by its health. I think that’s incorrect. Would you rather live in a country that has world-class education and health systems, but has uncontrollable crime, or one that doesn’t have the best education or health systems in the world but has no crime and is safe? Most people would be attracted to the second scenario. Which is why I keep emphasising to SAPS in our regular engagements that we need to fix the system. We work with them all the time – with the generals, the minister, the deputy minister, the provincial commissioners. As part of spirituality, we promote the good of the soul. Even if there is some blot on the soul, you don’t speak about the blot, you speak about the light. And as you keep speaking about the light, the light gets brighter, and the blot gets dimmer. From a spiritual perspective, when you send that message out into the universe, people start becoming better human beings. It has been seen to happen time and time again in life. With a focus on spirituality, morality, ethics, compassion, and serving unconditionally, Gift of the Givers promotes the good in people and situations and helps people change for the better, physically and spiritually. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Dr Imtiaz Sooliman, founder of Gift of the Givers, delivered the 2021 Annual Lecture of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) on 4 December 2021. The topic of the lecture was, “Public Accountability, Ethics, Morality and Social Cohesion – a pragmatic approach to underpin sustainable development.” Gift of the Givers is a non-governmental organisation that was established to offer disaster relief and response, together with other humanitarian work, with the aim to reach people worldwide. The organisation has worked in 43 countries, including South Africa. Dr Imtiaz Sooliman is a medical doctor. He was born in Potchefstroom, and completed his high school education at Sastri College in Durban. He qualified as a medical doctor by obtaining his MBChB at the then University of Natal. He ran a medical practise in Pietermaritzburg up to 1986. Dr Sooliman’s lecture centred on spirituality, morality, and ethics. In the lecture, Dr Sooliman made the following points among others: For the past 29 years, the motto of Gift of the Givers has been: “Best among people are those who benefit humankind”. Cooperation is possible across race, culture and religion. Spirituality is all about love. Serve all of humankind unconditionally. When the hearts connect, the words become understandable. Gift of the Givers designed the world’s first containerised mobile hospital in 1994; in 2005, the equipment was still being used in Bosnia. As South Africans, despite our problems, we have shown that we can respond to disasters in other countries. Do we believe in our own capabilities to solve our own problems? Everyone in government is not bad. We need to focus on the good. We need to fix the system. We promote the good of the soul. As the light gets brighter, the blot gets dimmer. We live in the context of urgency, emergency and disaster. Government and corporates are institutions. They are made up of people. They need to understand this. The 2021 Annual Lecture was the second time that the Annual Lecture was delivered. The first Annual Lecture was delivered by Justice Albie Sachs.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a dialogue with the ICT sector on 7 December 2021. This was part of a series of dialogues with various sectors, which will culminate in a comprehensive “Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy”. The dialogue with the ICT sector tried to answer two questions, primarily: What is South Africa doing wrong and how do we correct it? How do we accelerate our economic growth trajectory? The dialogue identified several challenges. These included: The World Bank has shown that the digital economy can stimulate South Africa’s GDP significantly. The demand for data is exploding, especially in the wake of the COVID19 pandemic. South Africa is lagging far behind other countries in terms of infrastructure deployment, especially in fibre (but also in wireless and mobile). Some other African countries are adapting faster. It is critical that we stimulate investment by not over-regulating. Government must facilitate digital infrastructure development and deployment through regulations that are not too prohibitive; for example, cell phone towers require town planning exercises, and regulatory approval even though government owns a lot of land. There is a plethora of old policies, developed more than a decade ago, which need review or are not being implemented. In spectrum release, we need to balance avoiding a free-for-all approach with allowing for small providers in rural areas to be innovative. Spectrum auction licence conditions must ensure that broadband can be accessible to all. There needs to be a review done mid-way. One of the biggest impediments is the state’s capacity and inclination for speed and urgency in a sector with rapidly changing technologies; particularly municipalities and SANRAL are difficult to access. ICASA takes 12 to 18 months to transfer licences. There is often a lack of political and managerial will within government to focus and to implement the processes which already exist. It is important to get the right people in government in the right positions, with the right skills, and to hold them accountable for delivery. Fuel shortages and the imminent job losses as a result of the fourth industrial revolution are key constraints in the sector. India, the UK and the USA all have their context-specific approaches to digital inclusion models but South Africa’s approach is still not clear. We need to be clear on how we can deliver affordable connectivity and also devices; and how platforms for local content can be developed to stimulate demand. Commercial and technological supply models need to be developed to extend infrastructure to peri-urban areas. These could be subsidised. This will also increase the market size. How do we service SMMEs in rural areas to stimulate growth? Security is another problem; for example, battery theft from cell phone towers. Some of the recommendations included: Government should benchmark against global standards because the view in South Africa is rather myopic. These benchmarking studies are often done but not implemented. Sub-Saharan Africa needs data centres, cell phone towers, etc. There are backlogs compared to other regions. Cloud computing can also offer opportunities given that there are supply constraints. Spectrum should be released without delay. There is a need to drive the platform economy because of the multiplier effect, for example, delivery businesses and SMMEs. We need to create platforms for non-specialists rather than just specialist IT companies. Regulatory certainty is important. Policies must be clarified and implemented. Government must streamline the way that it engages with industry, especially municipalities. Tech provision and rapid deployment must be written into legislation as soon as possible. Education trajectories need to be more agile. These can include short courses which are industry-aligned to generate skills, which can quickly be monitised and allow people to enter and exit the system at multiple points. It is important to look at the high-end data science needed for innovation. Reskilling is also important given imminent job losses due to new technology. We are not creating enough entrepreneurs. IT should not be seen as a specific sector only but rather a general-purpose technology that can pull innovation in all sectors together. It is important to look at reducing the cost of devices through tax breaks, etc. More intergovernmental collaboration and sectoral patriotic compacts were suggested that put broad public interest above sectoral interests. Regulations need to be better resourced. Over-regulation should be avoided. More self-regulation could be considered. A full report on the deliberations will be released in due course.

Copyright © 2021 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originated from a panel discussion on developing a new economic blueprint for South Africa, which took place November 2021. Author: Olivia Main Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Content Introduction Key growth constraints Government-business roles and relationships Floundering service delivery Rampant corruption The tax burden Red tape and legislation Biased competition Environmental unsustainability Skyrocketing insurance Slow vaccination slows economy Towards a new growth path Conclusion References Cover page image: www.lsretail.com Introduction The recent riots and looting in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng have starkly illuminated both the strengths and vulnerabilities in the retail sector, and that South Africans, by and large, depend on the smooth running of these supply chains for not only putting bread on the table but also for the survival of the economy. Over 40 000 formal and 50 000 informal businesses were affected by the catastrophe, many of which have not survived, putting a massive number of jobs at risk and hurting consumer and business confidence. The predicted impact of the unrest on the economy is estimated at R50 billion, not to mention the likely greater long-term damage. According to the National Treasury, this devastating event will result in almost 1% being shaved off South Africa’s GDP in 2021 (BizNews, 2021). Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) revealed that retail trade sales shrank 0.8% year-on-year in July – a steep decline compared to the 3.3% growth forecast by a Bloomberg poll of economists, and down from June's revised 10.5% expansion (Business Day, 2021b). In the biggest month-on-month drop since April 2020, July retail sales plunged 11.2% when the sector collapsed under the weight of a hard lockdown (Daily Maverick, 2021a). This comes at a crucial time in the retail sector’s – and the economy’s – attempted recovery from the ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic and the continuing bottlenecks created by electricity outages, service delivery failures, legislative roadblocks, rampant corruption, and insufficient insurance pay-outs. Now compounded by the threat of a fourth wave on the doorstep, the future looks, frankly, frightening. With a sense of urgency to address this bleak outlook, the Inclusive Society Institute has committed to an intensive three-phase research project, culminating in a blueprint for rescuing and reigniting South Africa’s flailing economy. This map will, ultimately, be shared with government representatives in the presidency and other important policy institutions and public bodies, such as Parliament, early in 2022. The research is being guided by three individuals: Theo Vorster, an economist, Professor Tania Ajam, an economics lecturer at the University of Stellenbosch and member of the president’s Economic Advisory Council, and Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the institute and a member of the president’s State-Owned Enterprises Council. A webinar discussion in November this year, hosted by the institute, brought together a few big players in the retail sector and the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (CGCSA), among other representatives – as part of the second phase, to interrogate what in terms of the generally accepted economic architecture of the world South Africa is doing wrong. And to explore fresh out-of-the-box ideas that could grow the economy beyond the expected 2-3% to the 4-5% trajectory that is needed to really start chipping away at unemployment and backlogs (National Treasury, 2021). Key growth constraints Government-business roles and relationships There is a growing lack of trust in government to deliver on their commitments and to implement the policies they have agreed upon. The view of the participants in the webinar was that it is not necessarily unwillingness of government to engage that is the problem, but rather that business is confronted with career civil servants who do not necessarily understand how business operates and what the specific challenges are because they have zero experience in running a business themselves. As a result, they do not fully appreciate their role in addressing these challenges to create an enabling environment. The State, too, is uncoordinated, lacks capacity, and rather paradoxically, while their personnel bill is quite huge, it coexists with too little skills, and often vacancies in critical positions. These issues slow down processes substantially, often making it near impossible to operate efficiently as a business. A participant in the discussion representing one of the larger-sized retail organisations also suggested that business needs to consider the situation in South Africa from a high-level perspective. Business needs to step back from politics and engage more on policy, especially since government operates in silos that puts sectoral interests above the big picture national interests. There are too many cases of vested interests being put on the table, and people not being prepared to move on them because it is not within their narrow sectarian interests to do so, where it could be in the long-term interests of the economy. President Ramaphosa himself acknowledged this one-dimensional approach after the ANC won the 2019 elections when he said, “We have slid into a pattern of operating in silos. This has led to lack of coherence in planning and implementation and has made monitoring and oversight of government’s programme difficult. It has become a significant deterrent to investment.” His promise to set up a reformed policy unit within his office as the central control room of coordination between government and business has yet to materialise (Business Day, 2021a). Floundering service delivery Municipal service delivery in South Africa is a blight on business productivity and a deterrent to investors. The incapacity of municipalities, particularly in small towns, to deliver, runs the gamut of services: from water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal to fire brigade services. As a consequence, small businesses, and even a few big corporates, are having to close their doors. A discomforting anecdote shared by one of the business owners during the discussion, occurring a few months ago, involved a fire in one of their stores in a town in the Eastern Cape. The local fire brigade was on strike and when the brigade from the next town 40km away eventually arrived and plugged in their hosepipes, there was no water. The store was burnt to the ground. There have been many cases in point recently where high-profile businesses have been backed into a corner by unreliable local services, with the only escape being to close or move operations – Dairy company Clover was forced to shut down South Africa’s biggest cheese factory in Lichtenburg due to massive losses from water and electricity supply problems. Chicken producer Astral is in a legal battle with the Lekwa Municipality for services not being rendered at its Standerton plant in Mpumalanga (Moneyweb, 2021). These are often the only employers in the more rural areas, meaning the locals bear the brunt of the weak infrastructure and delivery, and the municipality is stuck in a vicious circle of dwindling resources and capacity. Moreover, businesses are burdened by extra costs related to substituting for municipal service failures, for example, installing generators and water filtration and storage systems. Often, they also bypass the municipality and roll up their own sleeves to provide services to the communities in which they operate, fixing water plants and potholes. All of which amounts to a costly exercise which few businesses can sustain, and a right hook to the jaw of the economy. The auditor-general’s 2019/20 annual report on the financial state of municipalities makes for depressing reading. Not even a quarter of municipalities produced performance reports by the audit deadline, 22 councils had disclaimed audit outcomes – the worst kind – with almost R5.5 billion in unexplainable expenditure, and 27% indicated that they may not be able to continue. A mere 27 of the 257 municipalities in South Africa were given a clean bill of financial health. Then Finance Minister Tito Mboweni said in his Budget Vote debate in May this year that 163 municipalities were in financial distress and 40 in financial and service delivery crises – and 102 municipalities adopted budgets they could not fund (Daily Maverick, 2021b). In the majority of cases, the problem comes down to poor political leadership and skills deficits rather than vacancies in the finance department. In all cases, it is inexcusable and a total failure in government policy. The bottom line: if South Africa does not resolve particularly its power issues, the country will not resolve its economic issues. Rampant corruption Corruption continues to be a knife in the back of the South African economy, bleeding it dry. The news is filled with new cases every day, implicating high-profile officials and management personnel at every level within government and state-owned entities (SOEs), and with the lack of punishment in the majority of these instances. Aside from the obvious examples of state capture weakening SOEs, Covid-19 rules fuelling illicit trade, and the misappropriation of Covid-19 funds, let us look at a recent newsworthy example. Members of Parliament found that the sale of South Africa’s crude oil reserves by the Strategic Fuel Fund valued at about R6 billion had been illegal and would cost the fund billions. To date, the fund has withheld the information required to hold the guilty parties accountable and the person who ultimately signed the deal is the chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Police (Eyewitness News, 2021). This begs the question so frequently asked in connection with other probes: Is it any wonder that nobody has been arrested yet? But as a participant in the webinar dialogue pointed out, corruption is a two-way street; there needs to be supply and demand for it to exist. It is not just the government who is culpable, businesses also play their part by accepting the bribes and dirty deals. The truth is, corruption in South Africa is actually deeply rooted in the past, created over centuries. The widespread belief that it is both new and easy to fix is a fallacy. The blurring of the public and private sectors is a feature of the last years of apartheid which has continued into the new regime in many ways: the illicit networks between business and government, businesses offering “help” to officials with political affiliations in the way of cars and homes, shares and seats on boards (Friedman, 2020). Corruption today is also a symptom of another way in which the past was carried over into what was meant to be a new society. The groups which control the state use their power to ensure that they control the economy too, which makes it extremely difficult for new entrants to penetrate. This may explain why the corrupt networks are so entrenched, particularly at the local and provincial level. Reducing corruption in South Africa is not impossible, but to be successful it is going to take more than some high-profile convictions and continuous public railing; it will need thorough solutions that strike at the root causes. And plenty of time. The tax burden One of the consequences of allowing corruption and bribery to continue unchecked is continuously rising taxation and uncertainty with regards to what the efficiency and impact of this spending is. In a brief analysis done by a high-level executive in the discussion, it was estimated that currently approximately 17% of all income the average person in South Africa earns is paid in tax – in terms of duties, VAT, fuel taxes, road taxes, rates, etc. The most recent being sugar taxes, under the guise of health, and, of course, a massive increase in fuel levies. Although then Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s Budget Speech in February was more optimistic than expected, citizens still suffered an above-inflation increase of 5% in the personal income tax brackets, which was expected to provide relief of R2.2-billion (Allan Gray, 2021). Current Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana expressed his views at a recent ANC policy meeting, saying that South Africa cannot tax its way out of an economic crisis and pointed out that the recent tax increases did not yield substantial additional revenue (BusinessTech, 2021b). However, suspicions of skulduggery around tax funds were still a grave concern raised by several of the participants – gleaned from personal experience, in some cases. For one participant, an agreement with government to support reducing plastic bag use by charging customers for bags, with the objective of handing over the funds to government for use in environmental projects, has soured. There is no evidence that this promise is being carried out by government or of where the funds are going. And the same can be said of the sugar tax that is supposed to be a fund for health issues. Another widely reported concern is the accelerated exodus of so-called high net worth individuals out of South Africa of late, with one of the reasons being South Africa’s currently high tax rates for individuals and a threat of future increases, without the trend abating. Red tape and legislation South Africa was once an easy country with which to do business. But those days are over. For now, there is so much red tape that it is verging on impossible to start or run a business, let alone a successful one. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition and SARS are constantly putting up new barriers that are prohibitive, especially for small businesses. A number of cogent examples were highlighted during the discussion. One being that SARS requires certain start-ups to show R1 million in sales before qualifying for a VAT number (SARS, 2021). A business’ vendor registration can be put on hold for years due to the struggle to get a VAT number. Yet, their buyers need them to be VAT registered. Small enterprises simply do not have the capital to wait this out. In many instances, bigger organisations are having to step in to facilitate operations with small businesses or risk a faltering or stagnant supply chain. Evidenced recently during the unrest, where big business played a crucial role in food security and worked with law enforcement agencies to deploy more police to the area, keeping the supply chain moving and stilling the violence somewhat. This type of approach leaves enterprises between a rock and a hard place, with only two feasible choices: stick to the legal route and wait it out, risking liquidation in the process, or continue illegally – without certification or by greasing palms – until the resources are available. Other examples of red tape blocking the way include legislation around health levies, the recent Companies Amendment Bill, Agricultural Product Standards, SMME and labour legislation. There are horror stories of small businesses being taken to the CCMA by vindictive employees and then when the accusation is found to be false, the small business owner still incurs considerable costs, while the employee walks free without being sanctioned. The CCMA might be appropriate for larger corporates, but it is definitely not an appropriate forum for smaller businesses (Bendeman, 2006). Immigration is another stultifying issue. South Africa’s borders are quite porous, which allows unskilled labour to enter, and yet Home Affairs places visa restrictions on skilled immigration. For businesses to bring skills into the country, which benefits the economy in the long term, it can take months, if not years, to get visas and permission to enter. Biased competition South Africa’s competitions policy has gone totally haywire. It has moved away from issues of competition towards issues of interest, where the realm of the legal is being replaced with the realm of politics. This is a dangerous trend. The same can be said of BEE, which has become a big sacred cow. BEE is vital to our economy but blocking the way with middlemen raking off commissions without adding any value will only suffocate it. BEE should be about providing value and delivery, about being incentivised for production to increase employment, not just about race. Another sentiment which came through strongly during the discussions was that government needs to do proper rational assessments before they get involved in policy, as there are too many unintended consequences to very clever pieces of legislation that are put in place. For example, there are two issues in the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) which are negatively impacting the economy in South Africa. The first one involves small business. The legislation says that every single item that is sold in any store is effectively the personal responsibility of the store owner. The consequence is that every supplier and vendor is forced to provide a contract assuming the liability. Further to this, every food item has to go through a highly rigorous food safety audit process, which could cost a small business up to R30-40 000 per year. Most cannot afford it, which excludes their involvement in the big business environment (President of the Republic of South Africa, 2009). A further consequence of this is that there is a serious problem with food waste in South Africa. In fact, food waste is a global problem – the World Wide Fund for Nature South Africa found that 10 million tons of food gets thrown away annually. Retailers and restaurants and food producers are throwing away a huge amount of food every day that could be feeding starving people. But under the CPA legislation, the personal risk and liability involved in giving away food is prohibitive (IOL, 2021). Environmental unsustainability Environmental issues are becoming increasingly critical in South Africa, given the country’s huge carbon footprint. In fact, it is touted as being one of the biggest polluters in the world, with Eskom being the main culprit – a scandal which is hurting the economy. New research from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) revealed that Eskom is now the number one emitter of potentially deadly sulphur dioxide (SO2) in the world. Eskom’s 15 coal power plants (44 GW) emitted 2100 thousand tonnes (kt) of SO2 – more than the entire power sector of the European Union (EU) and United States (US), or the US and China, combined. The expert analysis concludes that only India’s entire power sector accounts for more SO2 emissions than Eskom (CER, 2021). When compared with the World Health Organisation’s recently updated guidelines on ambient air quality, it is clear that unless Eskom complies with domestic air pollution laws or decommissions its older plants, South Africa will be hard pressed to keep the country’s air quality safe. With an upcoming R131 billion injection into the country from the US, UK, France, Germany and the EU on the horizon – funds for transitioning to a low carbon economy by investing in renewable energy, green hydrogen and electric vehicles – there are no celebrations afoot just yet, not with the concern around holes in the government purse strings, causing apprehension about where the investment will land up in reality (BusinessTech, 2021a). Skyrocketing insurance The impact of the insurance industry’s increased costs due to the rioting in July has meant spiralling premiums for businesses, with some now not being able to access insurance at all. In July, the South African Special Risk Insurance Association (Sasria) – the state-owned civil commotion insurer, covering businesses and citizens against losses from rioting, strike action and public disorder – expected the damage would be in the region of R5 billion, but that figure ballooned to R32 billion. They are now considered the most expensive riots in the world (TimesLive, 2021). This has accrued considerable costs for businesses, even without the traditional rates increase of February 2022 just around the corner. According to a senior level participant in the forum, Sasria is talking about a 16-17% increase in its rates and cannot guarantee that it will be in the position to pay out all the claims from the recent unrest. Considering that businesses are already struggling to get their claims paid out timeously and straining against too high insurance rates, there is a real concern about surviving through another riot. Slow vaccination slows economy Covid-19 has put down roots, which means we need to rapidly speed up the pace of vaccination in South Africa, otherwise economic recovery will remain a distant target. In President Cyril Ramaphosa’s latest address on South Africa's response to the coronavirus pandemic, in November, he stated that only 35.6% of adult South Africans are fully vaccinated against Covid-19. He also said that while this is welcome progress, it is not enough to enable us to reduce infections, prevent illness and death and restore our economy (Ramaphosa, 2021). With the dreaded fourth wave on its way, business owners raised concerns apropos the potential for tighter restrictions being reintroduced. Under these circumstances, from both a local and international perspective, businesses will once again be unable to trade effectively and efficiently. And many will not survive. Towards a new growth path Suggestions for addressing growth constraints Bold leadership South Africa needs level-headed and bold leadership that will take a principled stand and act, rather than just spout policy rhetoric. There is also the need for visible accountability and consequences for malfeasance or neglect of duties. Political parties need to ensure that they build capacity in local government, appointing people on merit, irrespective of their political stripes, who can ensure real delivery. It would also be prudent to take the bold step to restore confidence and free up the economy to stimulate growth by reducing taxes and offering incentives to businesses to reinvest. Combat corruption and crime Corruption being a two-way street means the private sector also needs to stand up and be held accountable. Businesses need to walk away from dodgy deals and bribery. Government and business need to find a way to plug those holes where corruption is slipping through into the system. The Crime Risk Initiative of the Consumer Goods Council is identifying different police stations as centres that can be responsible for policing specific types of crimes, for example, a station which focuses on gender-based violence. This has the potential to increase State capacity to combat crime. Ease policy and regulations New policies and legislation need to go through rigorous rational assessments before being implemented, looking at the implications across the value chain, to avoid unintended consequences. Legislation needs to be streamlined in order to speed up business – by removing unnecessary red tape, freeing up small business, freeing up labour legislation. There are a number of regulations that could be nuanced to allow for existing mechanisms to be more effective, and to empower small businesses rather than to act as a one-size-fits-all, such as targeted exemptions for issues like food waste. The Department of Small Business needs to become more involved in advocating for the simplification of legislation, processes and taxes. Larger corporations should look at how they can improve their internal processes to make it easier for small businesses to be productive suppliers by, for example, having only one point of contact and one database to navigate. With an incoming fourth wave of Covid-19, it would be well advised to put regulations in place which allow for mandatory vaccination requirements within businesses, to speed up economic recovery from the pandemic. Incentivising localisation Localisation is not only about encouraging businesses to buy local, but also about incentivising people to become productive within their communities. Instead of just handing out social grants – one of the most constructive pieces of government legislation and still a vital resource – make it an incentive to get people productive, picking up litter, fixing potholes, completing useful tasks to earn their stipends. It would have a huge impact on their self-worth and skills development and on the economy. Government needs to encourage its partners, particularly in the unions, to look at piece-rate incentivisation. Which does not mean moving away from basic wages, but rather incentivising performance in a way that creates a basic wage that is not exploitative; there is a constructive way to reward good performance and sanction non-performance. Bolster partnerships with government There are huge benefits to creating a sustainable mutually beneficial relationship with government, for both business and the economy. Business needs to start working with government on projects such as the Extended Public Works Programme to figure out the best way to fix local authorities. One way would be to partner with government and with municipalities to fix infrastructure through an agreement where business takes on the responsibility and cost and then claims back from rates or other forms of municipal income streams. Also, partnering with government to create public works programmes that incentivise unemployed and unskilled people within their own communities to fix potholes, maintain schools, etc. In other words, workfare rather than welfare grants, with the intended outcome of increasing experience, skills transfer and economic access. Constructive skills transfer South Africa needs to get its teacher, nursing and artisan training colleges back up and running, and reintroduce internships to focus on skilling people to do the work, rather than just to get the qualifications. These are key skills that are in short supply and without people to do these jobs in the future, the economy will come unstuck. Big businesses should look at getting involved with programmes such as the Youth Employment Service (YES) programme, a joint initiative by the private sector and government with the aim of assisting South Africa's youth to gain work experience through employment placement. By offering internships to youths, they will be trained and developed, and their skills can then be utilised elsewhere within the economy. Backing small business Involving small business, the people on the ground, in government decision-making before these decisions become laws will go a long way to saving the time and money that gets waisted when these plans do not work in practice and need to be amended. Small business has valuable insight and input that could help to shortcut long, drawn out government policy processes. Another way to assist small business, and the economy, is to appoint government officials that have some understanding of or experience in the business world. Treasury needs to try to streamline taxation by putting in place a system used in the past that required a business to have a spending plan and a delivery plan in order to receive funds. This way, they all get the budget, but they do not get the money unless they can show how it will be spent. Reverting to these policies as a government could yield rapid results for the South African economy. Treasury could also look at tax incentives for businesses involved in environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) projects. This would be supportive of both small business budgets and a sustainable environment, which has become a critical aspect for the global economy. Independent service delivery Government needs to acknowledge that, in the medium term, it does not have the capacity to address the energy crisis in South Africa. It needs to move away from a monopoly energy/electricity provider and to embrace new technologies and independent electricity provision. Conclusion One can understand the frustration clouding the dialogue on what is to be done to revive South Africa’s ailing economy. ‘Why are we still throwing money at this question, given the vast expanse of research already done?’ and ‘The answers are already out there!’, are on the lips of many in the business space. Despite the appreciation that there is always an opportunity to engage and get more information, it is widely agreed that what needs to happen is clear. But this assumes that the politicians have read the research, and that is not necessarily the case. The Inclusive Society Institute is in agreement – it is time to wrap up the rhetoric and focus on the actions. Presenting an academic document would simply be flogging a dead horse. Instead, the institute will present a targeted ten-point plan to be implemented. The research will be available to read, but the ten-point plan will be the main focus. And it will be put into the right hands. The retail sector plays an important role in this plan, as it does in the greater South African economy. Retail trade accounts for a big slice of South Africa’s gross domestic product, at 15% of GDP, and employs 20% of the workforce. It has been targeted by the government as a pivotal component in the economy’s recovery (Daily Maverick, 2021c). With the Covid-19 fourth wave looming large as the busiest season of the year for the retail industry is about to kick off, there is no silver bullet to ensure businesses, or the economy, will not be affected. Retailers can take heart though that the supply chain and stock level challenges from last year will be less harrowing this time around. According to Stats SA, the change in retailers’ inventory levels for mid-2020 (from 2020Q2 to 2020Q3) showed a more than R200-billion drop in inventory levels as retailers let stocks run down because of uncertain expected demand and lockdown measures, resulting in suppliers not being able to secure sufficient stock. But the data for 2021 Q1 and Q2 shows far less volatility: June 2021 (2021Q2) data only shows a drop of R21.7-billion suggesting a significant recovery in the stability of inventory levels (FNB, 2021). Although there is an indication that customer spending will not be what it was prior to Covid-19, there is still hope within the retail industry that this season will see a more free-handed customer base than the last and a real uptick in its contribution to the economy. References Allan Gray. 2021. 2021 Budget speech update, February 25, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.allangray.co.za/latest-insights/personal-investing/2021-budget-speech-update/ [accessed November 26, 2021]. Bendeman, H. 2006. An analysis of the problems of the Labour Dispute Resolution System in South Africa. [Online]. Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCan-analysis-of-the-problems-of-the-labour-dispute-resolution-system-in-south-africa/ [accessed November 27, 2021]. BizNews. 2021. Retailers on the ropes as impact of July riots manifests, November 5, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.biznews.com/sa-investing/2021/11/05/retailers-july-riots [accessed November 25, 2021]. Business Day. 2021a. State’s silos will worsen mess, March 17, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/editorials/2021-03-17-editorial-states-silos-will-worsen-mess/ [accessed November 25, 2021]. Business Day. 2021b. Retail takes a knock in July due to Covid-19 restrictions and riots, September 15, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2021-09-15-retail-takes-a-knock-in-july-due-to-covid-19-restrictions-and-riots/ [accessed November 25, 2021]. BusinessTech. 2021a. 3 investments that will bring billions of rands to South Africa – and end load shedding: Ramaphosa, November 8, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/535180/3-investments-that-will-bring-billions-of-rands-to-south-africa-and-end-load-shedding-ramaphosa/ [accessed November 30, 2021]. BusinessTech. 2021b. New taxes on the cards for South Africa, November 8, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/535310/new-taxes-on-the-cards-for-south-africa/ [accessed November 26, 2021]. Centre for Environmental Rights. 2021. Deadly air: Eskom is now world’s most polluting power company, October 6, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://cer.org.za/news/deadly-air-eskom-is-now-worlds-most-polluting-power-company [accessed November 26, 2021]. Daily Maverick. 2021a. Carnage casualty: July retail trade sales fall 11.2% from June, September 15, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-15-carnage-casualty-july-retail-trade-sales-fall-11-2-from-june/ [accessed November 25, 2021]. Daily Maverick. 2021b. Local government failures: Another year, another inspection, another bad outcome — with a few exceptions, June 22, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-06-22-local-government-failures-another-year-another-inspection-another-bad-outcome-with-a-few-exceptions/ [accessed November 25, 2021]. Daily Maverick. 2021c. South African retail sales rise in May — but looting is set to dent GDP boost, July 14, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-african-retail-sales-rise-in-may-but-looting-is-set-to-dent-gdp-boost/ [accessed November 30, 2021]. Eyewitness News. 2021. MPs slam sale of SA's oil stocks as 'heinous acts' of corruption by ANC, November 24, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://ewn.co.za/2021/11/24/parliament-slams-sale-country-s-strategic-fuel-stock [accessed November 26, 2021]. First National Bank. 2021. Retailers ready for Black Friday, November 16, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.fnbcib.com/news/retailers-ready-for-black-friday [accessed December 1, 2021]. Friedman, S. 2020. The Conversation: How corruption in South Africa is deeply rooted in the country’s past and why that matters, August 28, 2020. [Online]. Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-corruption-in-south-africa-is-deeply-rooted-in-the-countrys-past-and-why-that-matters-144973 [accessed November 25, 2021]. IOL. 2021. While millions are starving, tons of cooked food get thrown away every day in SA, November 6, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/weekend-argus/news/while-millions-are-starving-tons-of-cooked-food-gets-thrown-away-every-day-in-sa-872a1e54-3f9b-44dd-907f-e26cfc5db567 [accessed November 29, 2021]. Moneyweb. 2021. Service delivery improvement vital to economic growth: Mavuso, November 2, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/service-delivery-improvement-vital-to-economic-growth-mavuso/ [accessed November 25, 2021]. National Treasury. 2021. Budget Review 2021. [Online]. Available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/Chapter%202.pdf [accessed November 25, 2021]. President of the Republic of South Africa. 2009. Consumer Protection Act, 68/2008. Government Gazette, 32186, 29 Apr. [Online]. Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/32186_467.pdf [accessed November 29, 2021]. Ramaphosa, C. 2021. Address on South Africa's response to Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic, November 28, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-address-south-africas-response-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-28 [accessed November 30, 2021]. South African Revenue Service. 2021. My business and tax: register for VAT. [Online]. Available at: https://www.sars.gov.za/businesses-and-employers/my-business-and-tax/register-for-vat/ [accessed November 27, 2021]. TimesLive. 2021. Claims soar to R32bn for the ‘world’s most expensive riots’ in July, November 16, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-11-16-claims-soar-to-r32bn-for-the-worlds-most-expensive-riots-in-july/ [accessed November 27, 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originated from a high-level discussion on the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa, which took place on 19 October 2021. Author: Stephen Langtry Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Content Setting the scene, Daryl Swanepoel & Roger Latchman Moderator’s remarks, Prof Bonang Mohale Executive summary Global background South African context Key takeaways Recommendations Input by panellists One body cannot defeat corruption on its own – Prof Evengelos Mantzaris Different types of anti-corruption agencies – Drago Kos Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured – Prof Andrew Spalding Conducting proper diagnosis – Dr Abiola Makinwa The effects of corruption – Prof Pregala Solosh Pillay Prevention is key – Mr Willie Hofmeyr Transitional arrangements and independence – Prof Gavin Woods Setting the scene By Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute & Roger Latchman, Convenor of the Inclusive Society Institute’s research into corruption On 19 October 2021, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted a high-level dialogue on the merits of establishing the National Anti-Corruption Agency announced by the State President earlier in 2021. The dialogue revealed areas of alignment and disparity between the esteemed members of the panel but what emerged was an important synthesis of key takeaways that will serve to underpin our ongoing research on this critical issue as the institute moves forward. Participating panelists included: Professor Evangelos Mantzaris, Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University (ACCERUS) Drago Kos, Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery and International Business Transactions, Co-Chair of MENA OECD Business Integrity Network, and a member of the International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board Professor Andrew Spalding, University of Richmond School of Law, Founding President of the American Society of International Law’s Anti-Corruption Interest Group and Chiar of the Olympics Compliance Task Force Dr Abiola Makinwa, Principal Lecturer of Commercial Law, Anti-Corruption Law and Policy at The Hague University of Applied Sciences Law Department Professor Solosh Pillay, Vice-Dean for Social and Impact Transformation at the Faculty of Management and Economic Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch, and a Director of ACCERUS Mr Willie Hofmeyr, former Head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority Professor Gavin Woods, ACCERUS and former Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) There is much promise in this country, which corruption has systematically been eating away at. In order to prosper as a nation, South Africa needs to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to reverse the damages that corruption has caused to the economy. And indeed, the very fibre of society. The Inclusive Society Institute acknowledges the current regime’s commitment to fighting the scourge, which fight is slowly but surely starting to turn the wheels of justice. That said, the powers that be, need to pick up the pace. In his State of the Nation Address President Ramaphosa proposed the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council that will report directly to Parliament. In principle, the institute will support any effort that aims to cause the demise of corruption in this country. However, as a research institute, it also wants to ensure that the most productive and effective path is followed, to address the social ills in society. There are currently some fourteen bodies of various shapes and sizes, involved in combatting crime and corruption in South Africa. Perhaps this is the reason for the dubious response by some when the President announced the initiative. It is from this departure that the institute has decided to get involved in the debate. To answer the questions: What will the specific mandate of the Council be? How will it differ from the other organs? How will the various bodies coordinate and communicate? These are the questions this high-level meeting of minds attempted to answer. Moderator’s remarks Professor Bonang Mohale, President of Business Unity South Africa and Chancellor of the University of the Free State Nothing could be more urgent, or more needed, than a National Anti-Corruption Agency in South Africa. Firstly, after twenty-seven years of democracy, even after three-and-a-half years into the sixth administration, it is very clear that State Capture continues to be a problem – despite the concerted efforts of the President. The thieves in Cabinet caught out for their corrupt activities have yet to be brought to book. And the President continues to include them in his new Cabinet. Furthermore, those in the Chapter Nine institutions who aided and abetted and who were themselves protagonists in state capture, also still hold their positions, thereby frustrating the actions of those who have chosen the right side of the law. Secondly, all the metrics for South Africa indicate that the country is in deep trouble. But if one looks at the numbers – there are 60.1 million people in South Africa and on average, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) collects R1.4 trillion annually – there is absolutely no reason why anybody in this country should go to bed hungry, because clearly there is more than enough to go around. South Africa is a middle-income country, not a poor country. Like the rest of the African continent, South Africa is not poor, but rather poorly managed, which is at the root of most of the country’s problems. In the nine wasted years of State Capture, it has taken just five years to steal R1.5 trillion. That is a fifth of what SARS Head Edward Kieswetter collects in a year in revenue. During those nine years, R200 billion a year was being syphoned off by two Zupta families alone – revenue which could have been used to provide health care, education, houses, toilets, and the list goes on, for countless poverty-stricken individuals and families. Or providing security – a recent report stated that 70% of South Africans live in fear, and yet South Africa has the best Constitution in the world. Its preamble, never mind the main body of the Constitution, talks about three principals: social justice, democratic values and fundamental human rights. It promises these freedoms but most importantly, it promises freedom from hunger. The fact that the people who call themselves South Africa’s leaders are literally stealing food out of their citizens’ mouths – R500 billion in social economic stimulus as a response to the pandemic, PPE that is meant for their colleagues and family members, funds meant for social grants and feeding schemes for the youth – says that South Africa still has a very long way to go to achieving these freedoms. Hence the need for a National Anti-Corruption Agency, and bodies such as the Inclusive Society Institute, to take up the challenge to do research and create dialogue around inclusion and what it means for South Africans. There is no doubt that the country needs to include black people, and women in particular, more in its dealings and decisions. After all, they constitute 90% and 51% of the population respectively. A final thought to ponder and perhaps take to heart, inspired by Martin Luther King Jr., is that our lives begin to end the day we become silent about the things that matter. It is time for South African leaders, and citizens, to stand up and be counted. Executive summary Global background At the dawn of the new millennium, there was a proliferation in the establishment of anti-corruption agencies. This was driven, in part, by the establishment of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and in part by the European Union mandating such agencies in a number of countries attempting to become part of the European Union. Unfortunately, despite progress made elsewhere in the world, there is still a great deal of work to be done in combatting the scourge of corruption on the African continent, where 25% of African GDP is lost to corruption. The developing nations are the most severely impacted by it. South African context In the South African context, the impact of many years of corruption has been devastating. It has resulted in significant economic losses whilst deterring foreign investment. It has deepened public service dysfunction, eroded institutional integrity and it has had a corrosive impact on the rule of law and our democratic processes. It has also served to further entrench poverty and inequality, and it has exacerbated the plight of our most vulnerable citizens. It therefore came as no surprise when President Ramaphosa announced, in his 2021 State of the Nation Address, the proposed establishment of a high-level National Anti-Corruption Council that would act in an advisory capacity and report directly to Parliament. Critics were, however, quick to point out that there are already fourteen law enforcement agencies operating in South Africa, all with a mandate to combat crime and corruption. The questions that then arose were why and how a fifteenth agency could be expected to make the kind of seismic difference all the other agencies have thus far failed to achieve? In the alternative, should government not allocate its resources to improving efficiencies in the existing agencies? These are the issues that were set before our panel for their learned consideration and here is what we learned. Key takeaways Analysis/Mapping is a critical foundational step Given that South Africa already has fourteen existing agencies to deal with crime and corruption, clear and careful gap analysis and mapping is essential to determine whether a fifteenth agency is in fact necessary at all, or whether the government would be more likely to succeed in their efforts by upgrading and retooling the existing agencies. Starting with a look at the country’s international obligations, South Africa is a member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), under which it has certain obligations. Article 6 of the Convention establishes the obligation of each State Party to guarantee the existence of a body or bodies tasked with the prevention of corruption. Article 36 provides that each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. This means that any fundamental gap analysis of South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts must start by asking to what extent the existing anti-corruption agencies are meeting the outcomes envisaged of such agencies under Article 6 and Article 36 of UNCAC. What must follow from this mapping exercise is a comprehensive and practical analysis of the domestic landscape, keeping in mind all the relevant constitutional, cultural, economic, political and social factors. As pointed out by Professor Andrew Spalding, anti-corruption measures must be culturally adapted to the context in which they are deployed. Careful consideration of the Nature and Functions of Anti-Corruption Agencies must be undertaken If comprehensive analysis should reveal that a fifteenth agency is indeed necessary in order to achieve South Africa’s anti-corruption objectives, it will be imperative to consider very carefully the proposed nature and structure of such agency, including the duties, functions and powers that it will enjoy under South African law, as well as the specific objectives it seeks to achieve. As Professor Gavin Woods emphasized, there are a number of complex legal considerations that would need to be dealt with in the South African context. In terms of our law, the establishment of an agency of the sort proposed would require some sort of Constitutional authority in order to carry out the mandate being proposed. In addition to the legal foundations, the structure of any such agency also requires careful consideration. In broad terms, there are four categories of anti-corruption agencies that have developed over time. These are as follows: Agencies of a preventative nature that have no law enforcement powers but typically include the promotion of standards that assist in guiding public and private actors and the facilitation of education at all levels of society. This type of agency is typically associated with active public participation and the mobilization of all citizens against corruption. Agencies that have law enforcement powers and act as such. Where existing law enforcement agencies like this already exist, the creation of new agencies should be avoided where the same result may be achieved by upgrading and retooling existing agencies to achieve the desired outcomes. The reason for this is that whilst the creation of a new agency invariably creates new solutions, it also creates new challenges and difficulties. Agencies that are of a hybrid nature – these agencies are composed of both national public officials, who contribute their local experience and knowledge, and international anti-corruption experts, who bring their broad expertise and independence to bear. This model is largely employed in countries where they are unable to fight corruption without external assistance. Examples include Afghanistan and Ukraine. Agencies of an advisory or coordinating nature. These bodies are typically referred to as Councils and are ordinarily driven by political will and founded at a high level. This is the kind of anti-corruption agency proposed by President Ramaphosa. Unfortunately, these bodies do not enjoy a successful track record as the efficacy of their role is entirely dependent on the degree of their authority. Agencies of this kind are theoretically tasked with ensuring a greater degree of coordination and cooperation between existing law enforcement agencies, thereby resulting in improved efficiencies. However, if such an agency lacks authority over the law enforcement bodies it is tasked with coordinating, its authority becomes little more than notional. This is a potential danger for South Africa in the adoption of this type of agency, unless such agency is indeed vested with the type of meaningful oversight authority which must then be constitutionally provided for. Adoption of Global Best Practice and Modelling must be deployed in combatting Corruption Whether South Africa elects to move forward with a coordinating Council to combat corruption or to deal with systemic challenges purely by way of upgrading the existing institutional framework and its implementing agencies, what is clear is that these efforts should be focused on three core functions: prosecutorial capacity and efficacy; standards – to guide public and private actors; and education – society wide In addressing these core functions, it is also critical that South Africa looks to global best practice and models agencies and tools that have been effective elsewhere in the world. In Brazil, for example, immense progress was made in the fight against corruption simply by equipping federal prosecutors with the prosecutorial tools they needed to address corruption, one of which was the non-trial resolution (NTR). This is also referred to as an out of court settlement. It is effectively a resolution that grants a measure of leniency that is, in turn, contingent upon the extent to which a wrongdoing entity self-reports and cooperates with prosecuting authorities. NTRs have incentivized the public sector to partner in anti-corruption enforcement and it is a growing trend in many countries and a significant and invaluable component of the global anti-corruption effort. In South Africa, a new regulatory framework of non-trial resolutions upon which a new or existing agency can develop policies and practices to develop this kind of public, private cooperation scheme is certainly worthy of consideration. In France, the government established an anti-corruption agency dedicated to promulgating standards for anti-corruption compliance and to assisting private actors, particularly corporations, in incorporating those standards. As Professor Andrew Spalding has pointed out, the nexus between corporations and the government is a big part of systemic corruption in South Africa. As such, an initiative of this kind also has great relevance here and is an example of the kind of programme that may well be worth modelling. In terms of education, the Anti-Corruption Commission Seychelles (ACCS) has mechanisms for fighting against corruption whilst simultaneously developing education programmes on ethics. These are the type of global best practices that must be modelled if South Africa is to decisively answer the question as to how to better structure and equip its agencies with the tools to decisively turn the tide in the fight against corruption. Barriers to Anti-Corruption efforts must be dealt with A variety of factors were identified by the panelists as impediments to the ongoing efforts to combat corruption: Contamination of Law Enforcement is a serious issue in South Africa with all but one of the country’s National Police Commissioners having been removed for corruption-related charges. It was suggested by Mr Willie Hofmeyr that a potential solution to this problem lies in the more widespread use of the Voice Stress Analysis technology. This technology has long been used by the Special Investigating Unit within the National Prosecuting Authority as part of their internal integrity process. It was suggested that it could, however, be more widely used to ensure that law enforcement personnel play no part in corrupt activity. Cronyism continues to be a problem in South Africa and it is imperative that the culture of mediocrity that accompanies it be aggressively dismantled. People cannot continue to be promoted in spite of doing a mediocre or even substandard job. The right people must simply be appointed for the right jobs based on their skill set. Once appointed, staff should be subject to integrity testing and lifestyle audits at regular intervals, although concerns were raised about the manner in which lifestyle audits may be lacking. Inadequate support for Whistleblowers has dissuaded many who may otherwise have come forward, from doing so. The support structure for whistleblowers has been identified as being inadequate and leaves them feeling unsafe and lacking the essential support they need. There must be adequate protection and security for them and it has also been suggested that they should receive financial support. Violent crime rates in South Africa have been high for a number of years and this has led to law enforcement agencies prioritizing violent crime over corruption, since this is understandably where the public expectation lies in terms of the allocation of limited resources. This exclusive focus argument is cited as one of the arguments in favour of a dedicated fifteenth agency devoted to the pursuit of crimes involving corruption. However, in order to fulfill such a role, the agency would need to fulfil the role of a law enforcement agency and not an advisory agency reporting to Parliament, as currently envisaged. Recommendations In conclusion the recommendations arising out of the panel discussion as to the way forward are to: Determine, via gap analysis and mapping, to what extent the existing anti-corruption agencies in South Africa are meeting the outcomes envisaged of such agencies under Article 6 and Article 36 of UNCAC. Determine, with reference to South Africa’s international obligations and the domestic landscape, keeping in mind all the relevant constitutional, cultural, economic, political and social factors, whether the nation would in fact be best served in proceeding with the establishment of the proposed fifteenth body. Determine, in the event that a fifteenth agency is indicated, what the structure, duties, functions and powers of such an agency will be under South African law. Determine, in the event that a fifteenth agency is contra-indicated, what the proposed upgrades to the existing agencies should be in order to ensure greater prosecutorial capacity and efficacy, the promulgation and enforcement of standards by public and private actors, and the promotion of broad-based education designed to reverse societal resignation to corruption. Research global best practices and determine specific models and practices for incorporation into new policy and/or regulatory frameworks for new or existing agencies in South Africa. Consider the barriers to anti-corruption efforts, as identified, and make preliminary proposals, as appropriate. Consider and supply draft responses to the following questions: Would South Africa be willing to offer Amnesty for past acts of corruption in order to ward off opposition to anti-corruption enforcement and to drive anti-corruption compliance? Would South Africa be willing to adopt a framework of Non-Trial Resolutions (NTRs) and if so, under what conditions might this take place? Input by panellists One body cannot defeat corruption on its own – Professor Evangelos Mantzaris Professor Mantzaris leads the Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) research into corruption. He is attached to ACCERUS and the School for Public Leadership at the University of Stellenbosch. One single body cannot defeat corruption on its own. Furthermore, no one body can fight against corruption without the full support of an entire society. It is a fight that requires the joint efforts of all communities throughout the country; civil society; government; and all of its institutions. The research that has thus far been conducted by ISI/ACCERUS into institutions that are effective in combatting corruption is based on primary and secondary sources. It is grounded, in particular, through research from institutions in Africa and internationally and is further informed by interviews with fifteen influential thought leaders in this field of interest. The final report arising from this research will be very comprehensive and it will contain several recommendations. In the interim, here is what is already clear: Firstly, the establishment of the proposed anti-corruption agency requires two stages. The first one is likely to take place over a period of approximately two years and it will prepare the basis, the structure, the functions and the processes of the agency. Only then, in the second stage, can the agency be established. The leadership of the agency should be composed of between seven and ten senior representatives from government, civil society and business. They will be responsible for monitoring the initial transitional arrangements and strategy implementation – including research, communication and conceptual debating. In order to achieve this, the agency will have to appoint a full-time Secretariat. The proposed agency must be based on established anti-corruption strategies and its establishment should follow the well-documented protocols for the establishment of all anti-corruption agencies. One of the functions of the proposed agency will also be to facilitate education about corruption at all levels of society. This is going to be a very important initiative given that it is associated with active public participation and the mobilisation of all citizens against corruption. To achieve this, it will, however, need two fundamentals: the first – and most important – is political will, and the second is the right personnel. Political will and selection of new people in this proposed agency has to be based on regular integrity testing and lifestyle audits. It is also critically important to upgrade what already exists in terms of the already established anti-corruption agencies. Achieving these steps will not be easy, but the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS) has achieved miracles in combatting corruption this way – precisely because it is completely independent. It has put in place mechanisms for actively fighting against corruption and developing education programmes on ethics. Another example to follow is the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime in Botswana, also a highly efficient institution with well-planned prevention-based programmes. It can be done; these are the kinds of programmes that South Africa needs to be looking at moving forward. Different types of anti-corruption agencies – Drago Kos Drago Kos is currently the Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery and International Business Transactions. He is also the Co-chair of MENA OECD Business Integrity Network and a member of the International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board. Slovenia gained its independence back in 1991 and has been down the long road of establishing an anti-corruption agency, which was then called the Anti-Corruption Commission. Drago Kos, a representative from Slovenia on the panel, has also participated in establishing anti-corruption bodies in many other countries. To date, Kos’s record is eight anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine and six in Montenegro. Kos believes that establishing a fifteenth anti-corruption agency in South Africa will not be a simple task, with possible difficulties in identifying its power relationships with other agencies. At the end of the previous millennium and the beginning of this one, there was a wave of establishing anti-corruption agencies all over the world. One reason for that was the adoption of the United Nations Commission Against Corruption. The second reason, especially in Eastern Europe, was the desire of countries to join the European Union (EU). In the beginning, there were no criteria that countries had to fulfill with regards to fighting corruption in order to join the EU. But the EU eventually jumped on the bandwagon and started requiring the establishment of such agencies. In Hong Kong and Indonesia, such agencies already existed, namely the ICC and the KPK. There are basically two different types of agencies. The first type are preventative agencies, which do not have any law enforcement powers. Countries that have established this type include Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Ukraine and, lately, France. The second type are law enforcement agencies, established by countries such as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Romania and Ukraine. The big question is: Should an agency have law enforcement powers or not? If a country controls its existing law enforcement agencies, it will not need to establish new institutions that will not only produce solutions but will also create new problems. A new institution will garner the resentment of existing institutions, because commonly the newest institution collects personnel from those already in existence, leaving the existing ones objectively weaker. Furthermore, it is easy for a new agency to boast that they will investigate and prosecute corruption, but to prosecute, there has to be the resources and technical equipment, etc., available to do so. This is a basic dilemma which all countries have to deal with when establishing anti-corruption agencies. After the first wave of enthusiasm, once many agencies had been established, came the first wave of disappointment. Suddenly countries started speaking about anti-corruption fatigue. Now, a few years later, the situation has settled down and a cool head can be used to think through the issues. There is now also a type of agency called a Council. This is the type of agency that was mentioned by South African President Ramaphosa and by a few speakers on the panel. Normally these are high-level agencies or anti-corruption institutions established by countries that want to show that they are giving the fight against corruption strong political emphasis. However, to be frank, there has never been such a body that has been effective. First of all, such a body cannot do any concrete work, because they cannot carry out law enforcement. In the case of South Africa, this is excluded by definition. The President has said that the council will report to Parliament. But law enforcement agencies cannot report directly to Parliament if they are to have executive power. Secondly, an agency at such a high level will be under pressure to impress on others. The tasks of institutions or councils at a very high level are to deal mostly with the coordination and cooperation of existing institutions. This can be done but it has yet to be seen, mainly due to the fact that the existing agencies already have their assigned powers and responsibilities; they are already responsible to another entity. Therefore, if the body cannot impose its position and its strength to force existing agencies to function as directed, then what will the council actually be able to do? It is not known what powers the council will have, but here is a basic analogy. There are anti-corruption agencies which simply fall into the strategy of the institutions as already set up in a country. And then there are agencies that act like sharks. Agency one cannot do much in the fight against corruption. However, an agency that is acting as a shark in a pool of big fish, being the existing agencies, can enforce them to do their jobs. Of course, this would immediately make the council very unpopular with the other agencies. But this should not be a sticking point, after all, the purpose of working in the public sector is not to make friends, it is to take care of communities. Therefore, if the agency has a coordinating task, it will need to be a shark, which will require it to have very strong powers. It is not enough to have general political will and good personnel. An agency also needs clearly defined boundaries, and resources. South Africa will have to decide on whether to form an agency or a council that will try to increase the level of cooperation, coordination and functioning of its existing bodies by acting as a shark. Otherwise, there is no real reason why South Africa should establish yet another agency, which is surely a recognition of the fact that not all of the existing fourteen are as effective as they could be, or even necessary. There is another way of going about it, but not a method that is recommended for South Africa. Within the last year there has been a new kind of anti-corruption agency established in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Moldova. Armenia and Tunisia are also thinking about taking this approach on board – an agency that is not only composed of national public officials but in which there are also a combination of national and international anti-corruption experts. The national public officials bring in their experience with regard to the local circumstances and their law, while the international experts bring in their anti-corruption experience and independent positions. This could very well be the future of anti-corruption agencies. This approach is not applicable to South Africa, but it is well suited to much more complicated countries that cannot fight corruption on their own. South Africa will need to do a thorough analysis of what the proposed new agency or council’s role should be. If this is not carefully thought through, then South Africa will simply be sitting with agency number fifteen. It is encouraging that the government is willing to take the issue on headfirst – this is most important. However, it would be ill advised to take shortcuts in fighting corruption, as this could cause more harm than good in the long term. Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured – Professor Andrew Spalding Professor Spalding, from the University of Richmond School of Law, is the Founding President of the American Society of International Law’s Anti-Corruption Interest Group and Chair of the Olympics Compliance Task Force. The emblem of the Inclusive Society Institute contains a flower, a Protea, which is a great metaphor for an effective anti-corruption movement. It has to be cultivated over some time and, at the same time, though it can take much effort to cultivate, it is itself very fragile. For an American, it is strange to be in a country that just a few years ago was part of the elite in terms of the global anti-corruption movement, and then suddenly, the political winds shifted so very quickly. Building an effective set of institutions, and norms and measures, takes time and must be safeguarded. Modern South Africa was born at about the same time as the modern anti-corruption movement. These both occurred in the 1990s, and both are still relatively young. There is still much to learn about how different measures fit in different countries and in different cultural contexts. Examples of countries that have made a significant pivot and have gone through the kind of rapid transition that South Africa now aspires to include Brazil and France. But, of course, when talking about commissions, Hong Kong is the example. These three countries make for an interesting comparison because they have very different institutional arrangements, very different approaches, and very different catalysing events that occurred in their countries. Sometimes an added commission is effective and sometimes it is not. Brazil is a country, for example, that made tremendous headway, in a short period of time, in addressing systemic government corruption without creating a commission. They did it just by giving the existing federal prosecutors, who were themselves capable people, the prosecutorial tools that they needed to address corruption. Brazil gave prosecutors two much needed tools to crack down on corruption. One was the obstruction of justice charge, which did not previously exist in Brazilian law and which the prosecutors could use to turn witnesses. The other was the non-trial resolution (NTR) – the out-of-court settlement. The NTRs have been a tremendous component of the global anti-corruption enforcement effort, but also a very controversial one. It cannot just be transplanted from one country to the next as it sits very differently in different contexts. With new institutional measures, whether it is a new commission or it is some other body, there are three core functions. Firstly, there is the prosecutorial function. In the South African context, when creating a new commission, first and foremost is its prosecutorial capacity – its ability to crack down on corruption by prosecuting both public and private actors. This is of utmost importance. That being said, a couple of other factors need attention. The second function is the standards issue: the function of a dedicated anti-corruption agency is to promulgate standards that help guide public and private actors. One really interesting example of this is France. In 2017, they passed new anti-corruption legislation and created a new agency that is dedicated to promulgating standards for anti-corruption compliance and for helping private actors, particularly corporations, incorporate those standards. Whereas, in South Africa the nexus between corporations and the government is a big part of systemic corruption and this is one of the greatest challenges to be tackled. To succeed in doing so, clear standards will need to be set and effective enforcement tools provided that will enable prosecutors to encourage, if not require, companies to adopt these standards. Therefore, standard-setting is going to be a critical part of this and South Africa needs to think about the broad function of any new commission, in robustly developing standards (particularly, standards of corporate compliance) and what that might look like in the South African context. Then finally, the third function, in addition to prosecution and standard-setting, is education. It is very important to think about what the educational mission of any anti-corruption commission is. In the early days of anti-corruption enforcement of the anti-corruption movement, it was often said that there are places in the world where corruption is cultural. That is incorrect. In fact, there is no country in the world, at least none that has been encountered, where the belief is genuinely held that a suitcase full of cash, exchanged under the table in return for illegal benefits, is a good thing – that it is such that it would not be reduced if it could. That corruption is an affirmative good that needs to be preserved as a part of the culture, as a part of the system of government. There are places where corruption is quite pervasive and there is a widespread sense of resignation to the necessity of corruption. There are certainly parts of the world where it is widely believed that corruption is just not something you can control, but that is a different problem. If that is the case, as it likely is in South Africa, then the educational mission is to convince people that corruption is actually not something they have to live with. It is not inherent in government. There are measures that have been learned, studied and experimented with that can be adopted to reduce corruption. Corruption is not like bad traffic on the highway – an issue that just has to be lived with. So, the educational mission of an anti-corruption commission must be to convince the public that there are measures that can be adopted, which have worked in other contexts and can be tethered to this context, and that way, corruption can be reduced. One last point about the educational effort. It is often said, with enthusiasm, that South Africa is trying to build a world in which corruption has been eliminated. But there is no guarantee that corruption can be eliminated in its entirety. However, that itself is not a strike against the anti-corruption movement. Anti-fraud laws, generally, even in jurisdictions where they are thought to be very effective, have not eliminated fraud. Then again, statutes prohibiting murder have not eliminated murder, but they reduce it to a point that it becomes the exception, not the norm. Where endemic corruption has been eliminated, systemic corruption has been eliminated and so, what is seen instead are isolated incidences. When these isolated incidents occur, it is not only disappointing, it is shocking, but measures can be put in place to address them very swiftly. That is the world to try to build. Convincing people that corruption is something we can reduce – and that reduction is itself the goal and is a realistic goal – is very important. In conclusion, there are a few questions remaining in relation to anti-corruption commissions: Firstly, if the commission is to have a prosecutorial function, and it is to collect money through fines and penalties, what should be done with that money? This is an issue the United States is also wrestling with. US companies will go into a foreign jurisdiction and pay bribes. A criminal penalty is attached to those bribes. That penalty is then collected from the US wrongdoers, and where does that money go? Into the US Treasury. How does that money help the victims of corruption? In that case, how, if penalty money is collected, could such funds be reinvested into initiatives or programmes that will benefit the victims of corruption in South Africa? This is important given that the victims are of course the citizens of South Africa, especially the most vulnerable ones. The second question, in relation to a prosecutorial function, is to what degree might negotiated settlements, in other words non-trial resolutions (NTRs) or out-of-court settlements, be used? In the US, they are called deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements. In Brazil, they are called leniency agreements. In France, they are called Public Interest Agreements. No matter what they are called, supporters believe that they increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of anti-corruption prosecution by settling charges with defendants out of court rather than going to trial. However, in order to incentivise defendants to settle out of court, they have to be given penalty reductions. Penalty reductions, though, can be highly controversial, because the public may believe that justice has not been done. In the South African cultural context, that could be a delicate issue. Might it be thought that people are being let off with unduly light penalties for the sake of prosecutorial convenience? This may be problematic in the South African context but non-trial resolutions have been essential to the effective global prosecution of corruption. Finally, an issue that arose in the Hong Kong context, which would be especially volatile in the South African context, is the issue of amnesty. Granting amnesty for past acts of corruption, not necessarily for the sake of reconciliation, but to ward off opposition to anti-corruption enforcement is another question that arises. If the anti-corruption movement in South Africa is going to stave off opposition to aggressive anti-corruption enforcement, are there past acts of corruption that will have to explicitly, or implicitly, be dealt with by way of amnesty? Hong Kong did this in the early days of its anti-corruption commission. It’s an extremely sensitive topic – as it ought to be, but it is something that South Africa will have to think about. Conducting proper diagnosis – Dr Abiola Makinwa Dr Makinwa is a Principal Lecturer of Commercial Law, Anti-Corruption Law and Policy at The Hague University of Applied Sciences Law Department. How can the anti-corruption enforcement institutional framework be made stronger? How can it be improved to better realise corruption prevention, and effective investigation and prosecution? There are three main points which need to be highlighted in answer to these questions. First, the need for a proper diagnosis. South Africa has been cautioned on the danger of the fifteenth agency. It has to think about that option very carefully. Second, on the question as to what is needed: a new agency or a new modus operandi. Thirdly, and very importantly, what lessons may be leveraged from what has been shepherded in by Western anti-corruption agencies which has led to increased enforcement and prevention focussed compliance. What lessons can South Africa glean from these best practices? It is useful to situate this discussion within the context of the Global Anti-Corruption architecture envisaged by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), of which South Africa is a member and under which South Africa has certain obligations. On the one hand, there are Article 6 type agencies that focus on establishing and promoting policies for the prevention of corruption. And on the other, we have Article 36 type agencies whose central focus is effective anti-corruption enforcement by way of specialised investigative and prosecutorial functions. They are very much outcome-driven agencies. Beyond the very important questions typical of discussions that relate to anti-corruption agencies, such as independence, adequately skilled and knowledgeable staff, the need for information sharing and coordination, the need to shield anti-corruption agencies from political interference and to ensure operational independence, there is an additional, but important line of enquiry that is needed. In this foundational two-year period, a mapping along the Article 6 and Article 36 axis is required. In other words, to what extent are existing agencies explicitly set up to realise the specific outcomes in Article 6 and Article 36 of UNCAC or will these objectives be ill-defined and spread across a variety of multi-purpose agencies? Is this a successful formula or will it lead to fragmentation and inefficiencies that serve to counter the realisation of corruption prevention and effective investigation enforcement? In the absence of such a gap analysis, it is difficult to robustly assess the possible benefit of an additional agency, or an additional layer of overview and supervision. Unless the underlying inefficiencies that have led to this discussion, and which have led to this proposal, are clearly mapped, the new agency may only add to the problem rather than being a part of the solution. This introduces the second question: Does South Africa need a new agency or a new modus operandi? To what degree does the existing anti-corruption institutional framework and its implementing agencies overcome some of the systemic challenges associated with traditional approaches to anti-corruption enforcement? Systemic challenges include profound information asymmetries, that present a critical lack of prosecutorial capacity to discover and establish a criminal burden of proof for cases that are deliberately structured to disguise ownership, and that present complex multi-layered structures. These are usually set up by the best lawyers, accountants and specialists that money can buy. They handicap the best efforts of any national agency to, for example, detect and establish accountability for acts of corruption by the elite and powerful multinationals. This lack of capacity, rather than acting as a deterrent to corruption, actually fuels impunity and undermines the role of any anti-corruption agency. Furthermore, traditional criminal prosecution is typically a time-consuming process. Ten or fifteen years can be spent on a single trial. It is also more susceptible to the machinations of power, or a lack of political will to act against influential people with deep pockets and connections at the highest levels. These are very difficult waters for any anti-corruption agency to navigate, regardless of how it is set up. Finally, the fact that corruption itself is a means to an end, and not an end in itself, means that even where traditional courts’ criminal prosecution is successful, it may fail to recover the money from the crime. The incentive remains intact, which may fail to redress the true costs of bribery, since the corruption has already undermined the rule of law, the governance structures and so on. The ISI project provides an opportunity to ascertain the position in South Africa by mapping the terrain. The outcome of such a line of inquiry may, for example, suggest that there is a need for a radical new approach that addresses many of the systemic challenges. At the very least there is an attempt to develop an agency that explicitly seeks to address some of these challenges modelled on an approach that has proven successful in many Western countries. What has informed the increased enforcement activity and prevention focused compliance observed in Western countries? Looking at the revelations of global bribery schemes perpetrated over the last ten to fifteen years by companies such as Goldman Sachs, Airbus, Petrobras, Ericsson, Atelier Mobile, Tele-Systems and Siemens, to name just a few, it highlights what has worked in anti-bribery enforcement activity. These corporations were all brought to book by way of US FCPA style non-trial resolution, otherwise referred to as negotiated settlement or out-of-court settlement, hereinafter referred to as NTRs. What are NTRs? Essentially, they are resolutions that grant a measure of leniency that is contingent, firstly, upon the extent to which a wrongdoing entity self-reports and cooperates with prosecuting authorities to provide usable evidence of acts of foreign bribery that the agency would not have discovered on its own. And secondly, leniency in NTRs is contingent upon the degree to which the wrongdoing entity, or corporation, or individual, can establish proof of efforts to prevent the acts of bribery prior to the discovery of the corrupt activity. This takes the focus away from punishment after the fact, to prevention, and is a radical and pragmatic departure from the traditional criminal prosecution that focuses on punishment. Rewarding cooperation by way of a settlement, or agreed resolution, leverages the self-interest of private sector entities through the introduction of new efficiencies, such as building the business case for compliance, and by so doing, the public sector is incentivised to partner in anti-corruption enforcement. This is a growing trend. Many countries are introducing NTR regimes that reward self-reporting, cooperation and corruption prevention. As a result, what we see is that NTRs have become the primary mechanism of anti-foreign bribery and bribery enforcement. NTRs have led to this increase in enforcement activities and since NTRs target the supply side of bribes, this development should be welcomed. Their use is dramatically changing the face of anti-corruption enforcement. It is therefore very important to consider how it may affect the role of the anti-corruption agency/council envisaged for South Africa. A country begins to perish when it continues to do the same thing and expects different results. Based on these best practices, this project may draw on lessons from the West and propose, as a pre-requisite step towards establishing a new agency or council, the need for such a framework. A new regulatory framework of non-trial resolutions upon which such a new agency/council, or an existing agency, can develop policies and practices to facilitate public, private cooperation that has proven to drive an increase in enforcement activity in the West. From having almost zero prosecutions, there are now dozens of cases at the very highest level in South Africa. There has been accountability for acts of grand-scale corruption which has undermined governments across the globe. It has certainly been a positive step forward. South Africa could also provide such a bespoke framework for its anti-corruption agency proposal, suitably adapted for the South African context. To recap. To what degree is South Africa meeting the outcomes envisaged for anti-corruption agencies under Article 6 and Article 36 of UNCAC? That has to be the starting point. The territory has to be mapped, the gaps seen and filled. To what degree is the current South African institutional and anti-corruption architecture succeeding in overcoming systemic challenges of anti-corruption agencies? And how can agencies be better structured and equipped with the tools to turn the tide in the fight against corruption? Doing more of the same is not likely to succeed. In closing, keep in mind that anti-corruption enforcement has moved squarely into the public-private cooperation space. NTRs have become the primary enforcement mechanism, and a new tool for prosecutors in the West. This project may well motivate the development of a South African non-trial resolution regime that can provide the framework needed to enable a truly robust new approach, either within existing agencies or for a new anti-corruption agency, and thereby improve prevention, investigation and prosecution in South Africa. The effects of corruption – Professor Pregala Solosh Pillay Professor Pregala Solosh Pillay is the Vice Dean for Social and Impact Transformation at the Faculty of Management and Economic Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch. She is also a Director of ACCERUS. Corruption has had long-lasting effects. It has deterred investment in our country, created huge economic losses, exacerbated poverty and inequality, engendered public sector dysfunctionality, service delivery protests and unrest, resulted in human rights violations, and fanned public frustrations. Corruption has led to a continuous erosion of institutional integrity, transparency, and a lack of trust, both towards the political and administrative institutions of the State. Corruption has also eroded South African citizens’ confidence in public institutions. It undermines social trust and the legitimacy of State institutions, and ultimately, it has had a corrosive impact on the rule of law and democratic processes. Policies, however well intended, lack credibility, and fail to secure citizen, business and civil society buy-in, if there is a perception that government is corrupt. In addition, the allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt system has led to a lower quality of infrastructure and public services. Corruption has also tempted government officials to prioritise projects that present opportunities for bribes and kickbacks at the expense of projects that have a positive impact in terms of societal welfare. The effect is that the poor must pay an additional tax in the form of bribes for access to overpriced and inefficient State services. In addition, as looting intensifies, service provision and service delivery declines. This means that the poor must pay bribes to get access to resources in an environment characterized by shrinking capacity; and violent service delivery protests inevitably escalate. The literature shows that corruption robs the poor. The corrupt have taken advantage of existing opportunities, and there is a lack of will on the part of State institutions, including the absence of sufficient deterrents and punishment, the absence of accountability and transparency, as well as a lack of ethical leadership, to achieve their ends. Whilst corruption is a global phenomenon, it has the most destructive effects in developing countries, where it is most prevalent. In Africa, it is estimated that 25% of States’ GDP is lost to corruption annually. The prevalence of corruption in South Africa is a source of grave concern, as shown by several corruption scandals and cases, including those highlighted by the Zondo Commission of inquiry into State capture. Many studies have established that corruption has discouraged investment and that it acts as an additional cost of doing business, thus reducing the profitability of investment projects. It is one of the major disincentives for foreign investment. Investors who seek a fair, competitive business environment will avoid investing in countries where there is a high level of corruption. Furthermore, if people are not willing to invest in the country, it is almost impossible to generate new jobs. The recent unrest and looting in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng has also had a devastating impact on our economy. Added to this is the fact that during the period of time since the Covid-19 pandemic began – one of the most challenging and distressing periods for the whole of humanity, especially for the poor, the vulnerable and marginalised – unscrupulous people have found opportunities to either abuse or misappropriate the funds set aside for social relief – right down to food parcels. There has also been a plethora of financial and supply chain maladministration, bribery and nepotism, including political and administrative interference. Our former Minister of Health was implicated in the looting of R150 million of public funds in the Digital Vibes scandal. The South African Revenue Services publicly announced that it has been focusing on 52 non-compliant companies that received R1 billion in contracts for the supply of PPEs and other Covid-related services, and that 11 companies have been convicted. Seven cases are currently on the court roll and a total of 29 cases are currently with the National Prosecuting Authority. Five case dockets are being processed by the SAPS. An amount of R170 million in unpaid taxes linked to PPE contracts has already been recovered while a further R500 million in assets, including cash, under preservation orders, has been recovered. The South African Revenue Service has also investigated 33 entities linked to “politically exposed persons” – this is presumably code for companies that have links to politicians, senior government officials and politically connected businesspeople. On 1 November, South Africa saw local government elections. President Ramaphosa called upon all registered voters to use the opportunity to exercise their democratic right and to exercise their civic duty to vote. Take note, however, that public trust in elected representatives is particularly low, and only a quarter of South Africans have expressed trust in either the ruling or the opposition parties. So, the question remains, how do we fight this scourge? Firstly, it is imperative that only the best, most qualified candidates, who are best suited for their roles and responsibilities, should hold office. Those found guilty of unlawful activities and misconduct should not be appointed into public positions. Consequence management should serve as a deterrent. South Africa must put a stop to a culture where we promote people and recycle them into better positions, despite poor performance. Basically, the more people mess up, the better jobs they get. This must stop. There must also be protection, security and financial compensation for whistleblowers. Just recently, South Africans witnessed the unfortunate events leading to the untimely death of Mrs Babita Deokaran, and others before her. In today’s world, the increasing availability and access to information and online tools can also help in anti-corruption efforts across all sectors. For instance, there is the potential for technology-based tools that can be designed to cut out traditional approaches that may more readily be compromised. These questions also need to be asked: How has South Africa become so morally bankrupt? How does it reinforce ethical cultures in public and private sectors? Instead of just focusing on ethics training, perhaps there should also be a focus on reinforcing the model of Ubuntu and human values, where the emphasis is on returning to the basics – a values-based approach, the development of individuals in a holistic manner, in the home, at school, at university and at societal level. The media, civil society organisations and communities throughout the country, must continue with and intensify their peaceful campaigns to fight corruption. Chapter 9 Institutions, such as the Public Protector, the Auditor General, the Human Rights Commission, the Electoral Commission, must remain independent because they are the cornerstones to sustain democracy and enhance democratic principles, such as accountability, respect, the rule of law and human rights. More importantly, anti-corruption agencies must not become more powerful; they must become more functional. It is the collective responsibility of South Africans to curb this scourge. The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who watch them without doing anything. Prevention is key – Mr Willie Hofmeyr Willie Hofmeyr is the Former Head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority. Amnesty is not possible under our Constitution. The only amnesty that there is, that South Africa can use, is for people who are willing to plead guilty and be a witness against their fellow thieves. However, for this to be applicable, a court has to find that their evidence was honest and truthful. Law enforcement has been severely contaminated over the years. The latest suspension of the National Commissioner of Police means that apart from the first Commissioner of Police, every other Commissioner of Police has been removed for corruption-related charges. That is a very serious issue, and much thought needs to go into how those appointments are made. Prevention is also something that is not getting enough attention. The Special Investigating Unit developed quite a sophisticated internal integrity process. They used a technology called Voice Stress Analysis, which is similar to a lie detector. All staff went through these internal integrity tests on appointment, and regularly after their appointment. If South Africa is to combat crime and corruption, it needs to know that its soldiers’ hands are clean. This technology is a very useful tool – a vital tool in fact – to ensure that that is the case. This technology has been used by the Special Investigating Unit for over ten years. It has been challenged in court, so there is really no reason why it cannot be used elsewhere. It should be used for all senior law enforcement appointments in the country. However, it should also be used for everybody in the supply chain management process: all accounting officers, chief financial officers, heads of procurement – they should all go through this process regularly. Prevention is a much less politically costly way of cleaning things up than sending powerful politicians to jail, when their supporters may react violently, as has been witnessed in the recent past. There needs to be a lot more attention given to using technology as an advantage. It is also important to recognise that the focus of law enforcement agencies has typically been on violent crime, sexual offences and the type of crimes that cause public outrage. The public has every reason to be outraged and law enforcement has to answer for these types of offences. It does, however, mean that very often, where only money is at stake – rather than people’s lives – the non-violent crimes get less attention. That is one of the reasons why South Africa should be supporting an anti-corruption agency whose only job is to focus on corruption and that does not have to deal with rapes and murders and all the other issues that the public demand action on from the other law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, if the country is looking at an anti-corruption agency similar to the old Scorpions (also known as the Directorate of Special Operations or DSO), it should have the same kinds of powers, including the power to compel suspects to answer self-incriminating questions during an investigation. This is vital for law enforcement officers who are investigating complex economic crimes and corruption. It is an example of the type of investigative powers that are very common to law enforcement agencies in other democracies, where you can compel suspects to answer self-incriminating questions during the investigative process, and while the answers suspects give cannot be used against them in their own criminal trials, they can be used against their accomplices. In addition, this serves to prevent suspects from changing their version of events when more evidence comes to light and dragging investigations on for extended periods of time. South Africa has this power but is currently using it very little. So, while the recent establishment of the Investigating Directorate within the NPA – which has those kinds of powers – is certainly a good start, an investigating directorate with 30 or 40 people is not going to make the kind of difference that is needed. South Africa needs a national anti-corruption agency, or body, whose only focus is corruption, and it should probably be separate from the NPA and the South African Police Service. The last point to make is that there needs to be much more serious thought about how whistleblowing is encouraged. There have been many whistleblowers coming forward over the last few years. Most of them are too scared to talk to anybody because they do not know whether they will be protected or whether they will be kept safe after it becomes known that they are the whistleblowers. There should be a proper whistleblowing mechanism set up under the control of retired judges from the Constitutional Court. That is the one institution in the country that still enjoys public confidence and where whistleblowers will feel safe to go and tell their stories and be confident that they will be properly protected. Finally, issues such as lifestyle audits have been raised. Frankly, that is useless. The main reason being because it is easy to hide assets in family trusts, and there is no way of easily identifying whether a person has an interest in a trust, which may have millions of rands in it. Transitional arrangements and independence – Professor Gavin Woods Professor Woods is from ACCERUS. He was the Chairperson, for many years, of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). Firstly, much of the discussion has covered whether another agency is a necessity or not. Professor Gavin Woods is not in favour of there being one. Woods’s experience, from having been in Parliament, chairing SCOPA, chairing the committee that wrote the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), which incorporates many anti-corruption measures, experience at Stellenbosch as Professor of Public Finance, as a director of ACCERUS, and a stint with the Public Service Commission, has given him some insights into what really happens regarding corruption within government institutions and organisations. This is where there has been a vague failure to implement the preventative measures that South Africa has in law, and which people are obligated to take up. In terms of the investigative side, the problems are basically about capacity and resourcing. Hence the backlogs. And so, the failure is on both the preventative and the after-the-fact side. There are two stages to the proposal for setting up an anti-corruption council. The first phase of this new council is to set up an interim structure. That might seem like quite a simple task, but when looking at the detail, and the proposals contained in the National Strategy document, there is clearly a huge amount of complexity there. For this initiative, there will be a great many complexities that will need to be worked through in devising the proposals. For example, it is about more than just deciding on the role of the Secretariat and who should be the seven to ten members of this interim council, it is a matter of looking at the legalities that are going to be involved. There is a myriad of laws here, going right up to the Constitution. This body that is being proposed, the ultimate body, is going to require Constitutional backing, whether as a Chapter 9 organisation or some other way. Nonetheless, it will need to have those powers and that authority, and the independence to really have an effect on and carry out the mandate that is being proposed. South Africa also needs to gather a group of very special people. It is not just a matter, according to the strategy, of getting a few people from business and a few from government on board; they will have to be people who really understand the nature of corruption in this country, the philosophical and sociological underpinning of this corruption. South Africa will have to look carefully at the composition, the powers, how this body will operate, the budget, and the institutional arrangements. Before it can go ahead with its work, this envisaged interim structure will have to make arrangements to action its final proposals, once accepted by the President, and possibly the Cabinet. They will have to enable the ultimate structure – the final structure – in phase two of the proposals, to hit the ground running. Inevitably, certain laws will need to be in place and others will need to be made. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. Confronting COVID-19 and health system inequalities in South Africa: Missed opportunities for inclusive health policies? by Dr Laetitia Rispel [BSc(Cur), PG Dip, BScHons, MSc(Med), Phd], Ms Shehnaz Munshi [BSc(OT), MPH] and Dr Candice Bailey [B.Tech(Journalism), MA (Political Studies), Phd(Political Studies)] Abstract Amidst South Africa’s socio-economic inequalities, by 27 September 2021, the country reported around 2, 9 million confirmed COVID-19 cases and more than 87 000 deaths. In this article, we use a systems perspective to explore the health system inequalities exposed and amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the missed opportunities for the development or implementation of inclusive health policies. In the first section of the paper, we present our framework of analysis and selected features of the South African health system before the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second section, we summarise the government’s policy response to the pandemic and present the cumulative COVID-19 statistics in South Africa. In the third section, we use our analytical framework to illustrate that COVID-19 exposed or amplified inequalities in the health system. We also highlight the missed opportunities in the development and/or implementation of more inclusive health policies. We conclude the paper with four recommendations to move towards a more equitable and inclusive health system in South Africa. Firstly, strong and competent leadership, a capable state and public health service are critical for equity. Secondly, investment in human resources for health and thirdly, the involvement of civil society and communities in the COVID-19 response, both to advance social justice, prevent corruption, and to ensure the right to health care services. Lastly, we recommend the development and publication of select equity indicators to assist us in moving towards an equitable health system. Introduction The novel Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is a global public health emergency. By 27 September 2021, there were more than 200 million confirmed cases globally and around 4.8 million deaths were reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO 2021). Apart from the suffering and devastation, COVID-19 has laid bare and amplified the pre-existing social and economic injustices both within and among countries and regions (Abrams and Szefler, 2020; Adebisi et al., 2020; Chiriboga et al., 2020). In South Africa, by 27 September 2021, around 2, 9 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and more than 87 000 deaths were reported to the WHO (WHO, 2021). These statistics should be seen in the context of the pre-existing socio-economic inequalities in the country. Notwithstanding a rights-based constitution, South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a 2020 Gini coefficient of 63.0 (UNDP, 2020). The pandemic has widened pre-existing socio-economic inequalities between urban and rural areas (Visagie & Turok, 2021) and within cities between townships and suburbs (Turok & Visagie, 2021), thus exacerbating the glaring spatial inequalities created by apartheid (Todes & Turok, 2018). In the context of these spatial and infrastructure inequalities, De Groot and Lemanski (2021) have criticized the universality of public health measures such as self-isolation and social distancing that make it almost impossible for poor people in dense, overcrowded areas to comply with COVID-19 regulations. The 2020 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM) has demonstrated that the impact of the measures used to combat the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. the lockdown) has been uneven, exacerbating socio-economic inequities by race, gender and geography (Spaull et al., 2020). The pandemic has also exacerbated gender inequalities, with women experiencing two-thirds of the net job losses between February and April 2020 and a larger decrease in working hours compared to men (Casale & Posel, 2021). Furthermore, women assumed greater responsibility for childcare resulting from the school closures during the pandemic (Casale & Posel, 2021), and dramatic spikes in the number of gender-based violence cases reported to the police during lockdown (Nduna & Tshona, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic also worsened income-related health inequalities, which were higher among women, black Africans and households that experience hunger (Nwosu & Oyenubi, 2021). We recognise that the health system is both a social determinant and affected by other social determinants such as education and employment. However, in this article, we use a systems perspective to explore the health system inequalities exposed and amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the missed opportunities for the development or implementation of inclusive health policies. In the first section of the paper, we present our analytical framework and selected features of the South African health system before the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second section, we summarise the government’s policy response to the pandemic and present the cumulative COVID-19 statistics in South Africa. In the third section, we use our analytical framework to illustrate that COVID-19 exposed or amplified inequalities in the health system. We also highlight the missed opportunities in the development and/or implementation of more inclusive health policies. We conclude the paper with four recommendations to move towards a more equitable and inclusive health system in South Africa. Analytical framework In 2000, the seminal World Health Report placed a spotlight on the performance of health systems, underscoring their fundamental goals of improving population health outcomes, and ensuring community responsiveness and efficiency of resource utilisation (WHO, 2000). A health system is defined as “all organisations, people, and actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore, or maintain health, including the organisation of people, institutions, and resources that deliver health care services, as well as intersectoral action to address the determinants of health” (WHO, 2007). The WHO health systems framework describes six core components or “building blocks”, namely service delivery; human resources for health (HRH) or the health workforce; health information systems; medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing; and leadership and governance (WHO, 2007). The building block of leadership and governance combines the existence of strategic policy frameworks, effective oversight, coalition-building, regulation, system design and accountability (WHO, 2007). It is considered the most important component because it is a critical enabler of the other building blocks and the achievement of the health systems goals (WHO, 2000; WHO, 2007). Several authors have highlighted the importance of government leadership and governance (or stewardship) for policy direction, regulating the behaviours of policy actors, health intelligence, management of health crises, and/or resource allocation (Marchildon & Bossert, 2018; WHO, 2000; WHO, 2007). Building on the WHO health systems building blocks, in 2012 Van Olmen and colleagues introduced the health system dynamics framework (HSDF) (van Olmen et al., 2012). The HSDF draws on the notion of complex adaptive systems and underscores the importance of values in shaping the actions and behaviours of health policy actors (van Olmen et al., 2012). The framework also highlights the dynamic interactions among the context, the various policy actors, values, health system building blocks, levels and goals, and population health outcomes (van Olmen et al., 2012). In 2019, the South African Lancet National Commission adapted van Olmen’s HSDF (Figure 1) to define a high-quality health system as one that achieves equity, longevity and population health outcomes (South African Lancet National Commission 2019). In concert with both WHO (WHO, 2007) and the HSDF (van Olmen et al., 2010), the Lancet Commission’s framework underscores the criticality of leadership and governance for a high-quality health system, while the anticipated impact is a healthy South African population, equity in the level and distribution of health outcomes, and social and financial risk protection (South African Lancet National Commission, 2019). We use this framework of the South African Lancet National Commission (Figure 1) to illustrate the health system inequalities, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure 1: Conceptual framework for a high-quality South African health system (Source: South African Lancet National Commission, 2019). South Africa’s health care system before COVID-19 The historical context of South Africa’s health care system is the legacy of apartheid with its deep roots of structural and systemic inequalities (Coovadia et al., 2009; Mooney & McIntyre, 2008; The Presidency, 2019). Apartheid created a highly fragmented and racially divided health care system, with huge inequities in the distribution and allocation of resources, bias towards curative and hospital-based services, lack of prioritisation of primary health care (PHC), neglect of the diseases of poverty, and of the health of the black majority (The Presidency, 2019). The 1997 White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System envisioned a: “Unified health system capable of delivering quality health care to all our citizens efficiently and in a caring environment. The strategic approach guiding us in this endeavour is that of Comprehensive Primary Health Care” (Department of Health, 1997). The National Health Act provides the legal framework for health sector transformation (RSA, 2004), while the Constitution makes provision for the progressive realisation of the right to health care services, including reproductive health care (RSA, 1996). Since 1994, the South African government has implemented a raft of legal, structural and policy changes and various priority health programmes, boasting the highest anti-retroviral treatment programme in the world (The Presidency, 2019). Although South Africa’s progress since the end of apartheid is reflected in an increased life expectancy, reductions in mortality rates, policy prioritisation of PHC, and improved access to health care, the democratic government continues to face significant challenges in providing high-quality health care (Rispel et al., 2019). Progress is marred by the quadruple burden of disease, weaknesses in leadership and management, corruption, as well as the pre-existing health system inequities among provinces, between urban and rural areas, and between the public and private health sectors (Rispel et al., 2019; The Presidency, 2019). Table 1 shows selected features of the health care system prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 1: Selected features of South Africa’s health care system before COVID-19 (Sources: National Department of Health, 2020; Republic of South Africa, 1996; Rispel et al., 2019; The Presidency, 2019; World Bank, 2018). COVID-19 and government policy responses South Africa is widely praised for its quick response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Hale & Webster, 2020). In March 2020, South Africa declared a national state of disaster, followed by a stringent lockdown that involved restrictions on movement, a travel ban, and the halting of all non-essential economic activity (COGTA, 2020). Guided by the WHO, the National Department of Health (NDoH) developed a multi-sectoral approach to contain and mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Table 2 summarises the key elements of the national COVID-19 response (Abdool Karim, 2020; Moonasar et al., 2021). Table 2: Key elements of the national COVID-19 response (Sources: Adapted from Abdool Karim, 2020; Moonasar et al., 2021). On 28 September 2021, South Africa entered day 551 of lockdown, with the country experiencing three epidemic waves between March 2020 and September 2021, and administering close to 17 million vaccines. Figure 2 presents an overview the COVID-19 statistics as of 27 September 2021. Figure 2: Covid 19 statistics in South Africa as of 27 September 2021 (Source: NDoH, 2021). COVID-19, the health system, inequities and missed opportunities Context The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fault-lines of South Africa’s health system, especially the vulnerabilities of the public health sector (Burger et al., 2021; Nyasulu and Pandya, 2020; Oxfam South Africa, 2020; Pillay et al., 2021; Rispel, 2021; TAC, 2021). The overwhelming, negative effects of the pandemic on the public health system have been due to a combination of pre-existing system weaknesses, leadership failures, corruption, the diversion of financial and human resources, suspension of routine services and a deterioration in information collection and management (Hofman & Madhi, 2020; Nyasulu & Pandya, 2020; Oxfam South Africa, 2020; TAC, 2021). In this section, we use the South African Lancet Commission’s Framework, described in the previous section, to illustrate that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed or amplified inequalities in the South African health system (Figure 3). We also highlight the missed opportunities in the development and/or implementation of more inclusive health policies. Figure 3: Illustration of health system vulnerabilities, inequalities and missed opportunities in the Covid-19 response Leadership and governance Section 27(2) of the Disaster Management Act makes provision for the state to make regulations or issue directions for the purpose of assisting and protecting the public, providing relief to the public and/or dealing with the effects of a disaster (COGTA, 2020). Although regulations were passed to strengthen public health measures (e.g., masking, sanitation, gatherings), the NDoH missed an opportunity to ensure a unified and integrated national response to the pandemic. As shown in Table 2, the NDoH developed a national COVID-19 response (Table 2) (Abdool Karim, 2020; Moonasar et al., 2021). However, in practice, each provincial health department and metropolitan local government health department developed and/or implemented its own response. There were differences between the public and private health sectors in COVID-19 hospital admission criteria and treatment and care. We argue that the NDoH missed an opportunity to provide strong central leadership (Rispel, 2021), with equity as a core value and principle of the COVID-19 pandemic response. Consequently, the sub-optimal leadership negatively affected the health system building blocks such as HRH, service delivery and the outcomes (Figure 3). The lack of leadership was particularly evident when reports of corruption in the procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE) emerged within three months of the pandemic being declared in the country (SIU, 2021a). Almost a year after the PPE corruption scandal, the SIU presented a report to the president of further irregularities and corruption in the procurement processes in respect of the COVID-19 media campaign, referred to as the Digital Vibes scandal (SIU, 2021b). Subsequently, the then Minister of Health resigned (Khoza & Skiti, 2021), while the National Health Director-General was suspended on 26 September 2021 (Molosankwe, 2021). This reported corruption is a reflection of failed leadership, management and governance, exacerbated by a culture of poor accountability and unethical behaviours. Health service delivery The COVID-19 response has revealed how the [in]action of those in power and governance has the potential to impact positively or negatively on the health and livelihoods of citizens (Cooper & Kramers-Olen, 2021). The response has largely centred on hospitals, with relative neglect of PHC, and resultant reductions in utilisation of PHC services (Adelekan et al., 2020; Burger et al., 2021; Pillay et al., 2021). Burger and colleagues illustrated a reduction in PHC utilisation across almost all districts in the country irrespective of the actual district-level incidence risk of COVID-19 (Burger et al., 2021). They highlighted that COVID-19 fears among communities negatively affected access to preventive services, such as HIV testing and maternal and child health services (Burger et al., 2021). In a survey among uninsured people, almost a quarter (23%) reported that they did not seek care for acute conditions when needed, mostly due to fear of contracting the virus (Burger et al., 2020). Furthermore, this reduced access to preventive services disproportionately affecting the poorest and most vulnerable groups, thus exacerbating health care and other socio-economic inequities (Burger et al., 2021). Pillay and colleagues also found that antenatal visits before 20 weeks, access to contraceptives, and HIV and TB testing were adversely affected, with variations by province and district (Pillay et al., 2021). They highlighted the increases in maternal and neonatal mortality in many provinces that reflect both the direct and indirect impact of COVID-19 (Pillay et al., 2021). These increases in mortality of women and neonates are of concern, reversing the gains made in the preceding 27 years since democracy (Bamford et al., 2018; Moodley, Fawcus & Pattinson, 2018). Furthermore, the long-term negative consequences of the reduced or lack of access to sexual and reproductive health services might only be seen in future (Adelekan et al., 2020; Pillay et al., 2021). Given South Africa’s HIV burden, 24% of people living with HIV said that they were unable to access their antiretroviral medications (TAC, 2021). We argue that the government missed the opportunity to strengthen PHC, which is the foundation of South Africa’s health system. Furthermore, the relatively top-down approach with highly centralised decision-making structures failed to involve communities and draw on their wisdom and experience in the COVID-19 pandemic response. Health system building blocks/inputs A lack of leadership in relation to the health system building blocks is another missed opportunity, with the COVID-19 pandemic exposing the negative consequences of the chronic under-investment in HRH, especially in frontline health workers (Cooper & Kramers-Olen, 2021; Rispel et al., 2018). HRH are central to a responsive and well-functioning health system. However, the COVID-19 response has missed the opportunity to engage with health workers or facilitate their participation in the evolution or design of the response. A 2020 Oxfam report noted that “ignoring the wellbeing of healthcare workers has left a healthcare system on its knees, with front line workers stretched while in a battle to restore health” (Oxfam South Africa, 2020). By 17 February 2021, 40 000 South African health workers had contracted COVID-19 (NDoH, 2021). Tragically, by the end of August 2021, 1 297 health workers had lost their lives due to the pandemic (Heywood, 2021a). Among the risk factors for in-hospital Covid-19 mortality among health workers are: age 40 years and older, male sex, black African and Indian race, the presence of comorbidities, and being admitted in the rural provinces of Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Northern Cape (Heywood, 2021a). These rural provinces can least afford to lose health workers, given the inequitable distribution of health workers. Female health workers are also affected disproportionately by the pandemic, as they constitute the vast majority of those on the frontline. This is illustrated by a 2021 study that examined COVID-19 infections among PHC service providers of an NGO in five South African districts. The study found that 14% of the 4 000 staff members had been diagnosed with confirmed COVID-19 between April and September 2020 (Rees et al., 2021). The majority of infections (78%) were among women (Rees et al., 2021). The authors highlighted the higher risk of COVID-19 infection among community health workers because of their gender, poor infrastructure, limited training and experience of infection prevention and control, and insufficient power to negotiate good working conditions (Rees et al., 2021). Importantly, we argue that the chronic under-investment in HRH was worsened by the failure of the initial COVID-19 response to prioritise the needs, concerns and fears of frontline health workers and to plan for or provide psychosocial support (Rispel, 2021). Encouragingly, Phase 1 of the vaccine programme prioritised health workers (NDoH, 2021). However, we argue that a dedicated focus on HRH and state capacity to implement HRH interventions must be central to the pandemic response. Outcomes There are vast inequities in spending between the public and private health sectors, which in turn influence health care access and quality of care. The NDoH has both failed and missed an opportunity to introduce equity-oriented regulations and to ensure greater collaboration between the public and private health sectors in South Africa. COVID-19 highlighted the stark realities of inequity in access to testing, treatment and care between the public and private health sectors. Even though the private health sector provides care to less than 20% of the South African population, this sector accounts for 54% of the more than 17 million COVID-19 tests conducted since March 2020 (NICD, 2021). Furthermore, evidence suggests that there is a lower threshold for admission to private hospitals, thus exacerbating inequities in access to COVID-19 treatment and care (Jassat et al., 2021). Conclusion We have shown evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare and/or worsened the pre-existing health system inequalities. Furthermore, the State in general, and the NDoH in particular, has missed an opportunity to steer an integrated, equity-oriented response to the pandemic. However, the pandemic provides the opportunity to move towards a socially just, inclusive and equitable health system. Firstly, as highlighted in our health systems framework, strong and competent leadership is critical to equity, the success of the other health system building blocks, and the achievement of population health outcomes. Drawing on the experience of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, other scholars have underscored the importance of leadership and governance to achieving a resilient health system that is able to deal with the shocks of various health crises (Hanefeld et al., 2018). In South Africa, activists have pointed to the criticality of a capable state and public service to ensure social justice and equality (Heywood, 2021b). We recommend that the new Minister of Health should strive to revitalise and stabilise senior management in the NDoH, capable of steering and achieving the vision of a unified, responsive health system envisaged in South Africa’s Constitution (RSA, 1996) and relevant health legislation (RSA, 2004). Secondly, we propose that the pandemic provides the opportunity to invest in HRH, in line with the recommendations of the 2030 HRH Strategy (NDoH, 2020). This is because health workers are vital and the personification of the health system. Furthermore, the loss of more than 1 000 health workers due to the pandemic is detrimental to the notion of a resilient, responsive health system. Our third recommendation centres on the involvement of civil society in general, and communities in particular in the COVID-19 response, both to advance social justice, prevent corruption, and to ensure the right to health care services. Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the power of information systems, and of harnessing digital technology. In a manner similar to the selected COVID-19 statistics published on a daily basis, indicators on [in]equity by geography, public vs private sector, and race and gender, should all become a standard feature to assist us in moving towards an equitable health system. References Abdool Karim, S. S. 2020. The South African response to the pandemic. New England Journal of Medicine, 382(24):e95. Abrams, E.M., & S. J. Szefler. 2020. COVID-19 and the impact of social determinants of health. 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It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2021 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originate from a panel discussion on developing a new economic blueprint for South Africa, which took place on 7 December 2021 Author: Olivia Main Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Content Introduction Key barriers to growth Slow-paced infrastructure development Prohibitive regulation and policy Floundering government capacity Global benchmarking Market-related skills shortages Digital exclusion Security breaches Breaking the barriers to economic growth Regulatory certainty Fix backlogs Public-private collaboration Release spectrum Inclusivity is key Infrastructure development Responsible investment Conclusion References Cover page image: www.commercialict.co.za Introduction Unlike most other sectors across the globe, the ICT sector has flourished during the Covid-19 crisis. The pandemic has completely upended the way people function in the world, with an acceleration in the uptake of digital platforms and services. In South Africa, the total sector revenue (telecommunications, broadcasting and postal) increased by 2% from R238 billion in 2019 to R243 billion in 2020 (ICASA, 2021). South African e-commerce alone grew by 66% in 2020, from R14 billion in 2018 to R30 billion. The industry’s value more than doubled within just two years. Although this trend seems to have taken a foothold in emerging markets, post-pandemic growth rates are expected to be more subdued (Business Insider, 2021). The sudden massive transition from largely in-person meetings and transactions to the current trend of online engagement has unleashed a tsunami of Covid-19-fuelled digitalisation. Government, business and individuals have scrambled to implement and streamline digital processes, moving towards a “blended” approach including both in-person and online operating methods. From work-from-home requirements and online schooling and payments, to e-commerce, we have been forced to speed up the pace of technology growth and regulation. Digital looks set to be the new normal. These trends have brought with them many benefits such as economic growth and improved health care systems, opportunities for investment and public-private collaboration. According to the South Africa E-Commerce Market Size, Forecast 2022-2027, Industry Trends, Share, Growth, Impact of COVID-19, Opportunity Company Analysis report, the South African e-commerce market will reach US$7.9 billion by 2027 from US$4.5 billion in 2021 (Research and Markets, 2021). However, they have also shone a spotlight on the many limitations and gaps within the existing information technology framework in the country – key among them being slow-paced infrastructure development, over-regulation, human capital and skills shortages, and digital exclusion. Unlike most metropolitan middle-class homes in the country, more than 10 million households falling within the low disposable income bracket of under R12 000 per month still require access to high-quality Internet fibre, in order to bridge the digital divide (Stumpf and Hassan, 2022). In a quest to free South Africa from these growth barriers, while taking into consideration the needs of all its citizens, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is gathering evidence to support a new blueprint for boosting the economy. This research is being undertaken in three phases. The first, where the institute looked to methods adopted by Germany, Japan, South Korea and Rwanda for inspiration on how to rapidly turn around an ailing economy, is complete. Phase two is currently in action and involves engaging the various sectors in discussions, comparing how South Africa is holding up in terms of the generally accepted global economic rules. It also asks questions about how to surpass the expected 2-3% GDP growth for middle-income developing countries, to reach at least the 4-5% mark. This is vital to chipping away at the huge unemployment and backlogs, which requires fresh ideas and radical concepts. And, of course, rapid implementation. In the ultimate phase, this comprehensive map will be consolidated into a concise, accessible document, which will then be presented to government representatives and other important policy institutions and public bodies, such as Parliament, later this year. Key barriers to growth Slow-paced infrastructure development South Africa is lagging far behind other countries globally in terms of infrastructure deployment, especially with regards to fibre, cell phone towers and, to a lesser degree, wireless networks and mobile devices. In the Huawei Global Connectivity Index 2020 report, South Africa ranked 56th, down from 46th in 2018. The GCI ranks 79 countries annually according to their scores on ICT investment, ICT maturity, and digital economic performance (Tech Financials, 2021). Despite a devastating year, South Africa improved in its development of AI and IOT technology enablers in 2020. Broadband and Cloud, however, showed no movement in the overall scoring. Technology enablers being the digital infrastructure and modus operandi which underpin the kind of digital transformation that allows countries to take giant leaps in performance, production efficiency, competitiveness and innovation (Tech Financials, 2021). It has been found globally that broadband plays a substantial role in increasing job creation, stimulating economic growth, broadening educational opportunities, enhancing public service delivery, and rural development, among others (Gillwald, Mothobi and Rademan, 2018). Digital technologies have the ability to multiply access to markets and opportunities and reduce poverty and inequality. South Africa investing in digital development is a no-brainer. According to The World Bank, the numbers speak for themselves: the digital economy represents 15.5% of global GDP, growing two and a half times faster than global GDP over the past 15 years. Furthermore, a 10% increase in mobile broadband penetration in Africa would result in an increase of 2.5% of GDP per capita. But most developing countries, including South Africa, lack the infrastructure and tools to reach those numbers (The World Bank, 2020). Although in certain areas of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) there has been a wave of investments in data centre infrastructure, there is still a dearth of centres generally in the region. The Africa Digital Infrastructure Market Analysis 2021 report found that the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) zone has a meagre 79 co-location data centres in 14 countries, as opposed to the global figure of 4 854 co-location data centres in 129 countries. In another comparison, globally there are 4.94 million towers, whereas in the SSA there are only 169 000, with 34 000 of those in South Africa (WCO East and Southern Africa, 2021). We are limping behind. South Africa will also have to really look at how it extends the reach of infrastructure beyond just the metropolitan areas. The country is faced with large levels of urbanisation, without the infrastructure capacity to support that. Government needs to invest in infrastructure not only for the urban population, but also for the peri-urban and rural communities. It needs to look at demand-driven supply chain models, technology models, and the vehicles – whether it is subsidisation or investment – that extend infrastructure and inclusivity beyond those areas. This will attract a bigger marketplace, which means higher volume and, in turn, will drive more revenue, increasing economic growth. Prohibitive regulation and policy Government needs to facilitate digital infrastructure development and stimulate investment through regulation that is not too prohibitive, that permits a short time to market. As it stands, there is a massive mismatch between what the country needs to do in order to deliver increased broadband connectivity for all, and what the government requirements are. Participants at the dialogue offered a few examples of excessive regulation. Cell phone towers still require laborious town planning exercises. The regulatory approval process for land is extremely restrictive. Even though government, through its many organisations, owns most of the land in the country, it can take three to five years just to secure access to land for a cell phone tower. Further regulations and approval requirements mean it could take up to six or seven years to finalise an application. And even with permission to dig a trench, to lay fibre, then there is the ‘construction mafia’ to contend with – people are getting shot and killed – and extortion by private landowners. Another obstacle is high access fees – government asks for R10 000 per month at 8% escalation. This is completely unsustainable for most businesses. And sight should not be lost of access to the road networks. This is the easiest and quickest way to deploy fibre infrastructure without having to go to great lengths. It is well known that municipalities, and particularly SANRAL, have been very difficult to deal with on this matter. The Digital Council Africa has been trying to solve this problem for many years. Yet, since the Electronic Communications Act came into being in 2005, the Rapid Deployment Guidelines have not been published (RSA, 2005). In addition, when new buildings are constructed, there are no regulations in place to ensure that conduits are installed in the initial construction, and fixed-line penetration such as fibre is still lagging. All of these issues ultimately contribute to the cost of communication and therefore the cost to the economy. The ICT sector, particularly big business, is hit hard by the government on a continuous basis. There are simply too many hands trying to grab a slice of the pie. There is also a plethora of old policies, developed more than a decade ago, which either need review or, the ones that are acceptable, are not being executed. For example, with South Africa Connect, it was noted that it should be easy to connect every school, library, police station, community centre, etcetera, but this has yet to come to fruition. The feeling at the dialogue was one of “South Africa should stop writing policies and strategies for 2050, if it cannot even get the strategy for 2025 in place and executed”. Another growth blocker is the spectrum debacle. Spectrum is the lifeblood of wireless networks, the invisible radio frequencies allocated to the mobile industry and other sectors for communication over the airwaves. It is key to economic growth and job creation, and yet, South African mobile operators are horridly spectrum constrained. Releasing more spectra would result in a better-quality service for consumers, with fewer dropped calls and faster download speeds. As a crucial part of President Ramaphosa’s structural reform programme, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) will be auctioning spectrum for 4G and 5G broadband services. However, it is taking an unnecessarily protracted amount of time to carry through with this process – which has been on the cards for many years now – due to legal action against ICASA initiated by high-level mobile operators. And while government and business in South Africa continue to delay industry momentum, more developed nations such as the United States and China are already charging off in the direction of high-speed data services such as 6G (Mhlaka, 2021). Floundering government capacity One of the biggest impediments within the ICT sector in South Africa is the State’s incapacity and disinclination to move with speed and urgency in a sector with rapidly changing technologies. Particularly municipalities and SANRAL, are difficult to access, but also, for example ICASA can take 12-18 months simply to transfer ownership of licences. There are major technology and service backlogs in South Africa compared to other countries and continents, and in a competitive sector such as this, these delays are unplayable, and they retard the economy. For example, while the bigger metropolitan municipalities like Tshwane, Johannesburg and Cape Town are leading single trenching, in other municipalities they often still lack the capacity to do so effectively and the appreciation of the benefits this would bring. There is also often a lack of political and managerial will within government to focus on and implement the processes which already exist. One example that the participants raised was the Rapid Deployment Guidelines which still have not been finalised. In addition, it is important to have the right people in government in the right positions and with the right skills, and they must be held accountable for delivery. Alarming levels of corruption, politically based hiring, insufficient education around best practice, and skills deficiencies in government results in infrastructure not being maintained, and slow, or stalled, service delivery, creating a domino effect of massive revenue and business losses. Trust between business and government is on shaky ground. There is a big lack of taking ownership. Looking to the future and the new opportunities that 5G will bring in terms of employment and digital economies, there needs to be a conversation about the fundamentals. And about timeline specific service level agreements, especially from government institutions, to ensure that the operators can effectively deploy the networks in the most profitable and most efficient ways. There is a push towards smart cities, which have wide-ranging benefits for a broad spectrum of industries as well as for the day-to-day lives of citizens. However, the dire undersupply of basic municipal services, insufficient infrastructure and maintenance, and years of corruption within government – local, provincial and national – stands in the way of any progress in this regard (ITA, 2021). Global benchmarking Government is not constructively benchmarking the ICT industry against global standards, and as a result, South Africa is left with a myopic view of the world, with thinking that it is unique in many respects, and with no real high-water mark to measure against. But South Africa is not unique in the challenges it faces. Other middle-income economies are facing the same difficulties in working out how to incorporate digital disruption into their existing policy instruments. That said, South Africa does face a few obstacles specific to the country which hinder the technology industry’s move towards automation, such as unreliable sources of electricity and the stubborn idea that work needs to be done in a tradition manner. A caveat to the idea of doing more benchmarking studies is that they are often done and then simply not implemented. These studies should not be used to delay the implementation of existing policies and laws. South Africa is part of a global community, where the Internet ensures access to mega amounts of data and information. Government would do well to acknowledge that the country is indeed plugged into the rest of the world and needs to conform to universal, acceptable standards in order to keep up with global progress. Market-related skills shortages Skills shortages are a key constraint in South Africa. The imminent job losses as a result of the radically changing nature of work – due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution – is a scary prospect considering the already untenable unemployment figures and the fact that technology touches on every aspect of the economy. If South Africa wants to compete in the global digital economy, it will need to make education a primary concern and beef up the digital skills of its workforce. In other words, it will need to invest in people (The World Bank, 2021). Businesses need skills at all levels: programming, web and application development, digital design, data management, visualisation and analytics. The 2021 ICT Skills Survey showed that significant digital skills gaps remain and that the future is about building solid foundations, including encouraging people – of both genders – to learn STEM subjects; ensuring that they have a strong literacy, numeracy, and information and communication technology base and that they gain practical experience (University of the Witwatersrand, 2021). Continuing professional development, or reskilling, and creating sufficient entrepreneurs, to pre-empt the job losses coming will also remain critical. Education trajectories need to be more agile and must move away from a traditional focus and towards teaching technical ability – not only about how to use the devices, but also about what to do with the content that lives on those devices. This can include short courses that teach more market-related skills including micro credentials. Skills that are aligned with the dynamic nature of the ICT industry and which can quickly be monetised and allow people to enter and exit the system at multiple points. In addition, more use should be made of informal learning such as using YouTube and other free platforms. In order to respond to skills requirements, there is a need to package teams of individuals to fulfil the variety of expertise necessary to get the job done, which may not be present in a single individual. It is also important to look at the high-end data science, AI, machine learning, and robotics skills needed for innovation and for creating digital marketplaces and hubs. Digital exclusion The digital revolution is playing out unevenly across South Africa, which has consequences for the competitiveness, inclusiveness and sustainability of the economy. Without connectivity, people are excluded from participating in the economic and social networks that are necessary for human development in contemporary society, which is a human right. This narrative is highlighted in the United Nations’ Social Development Goals to ‘enhance the use of enabling technologies, in particular ICT, to promote women’s empowerment’ and ‘significantly increase access to ICT and strive to provide universal and affordable access to Internet in LDCs by 2020’ (Gillwald, Mothobi and Rademan, 2018). India, the United Kingdom and the United States all have their own context specific approaches to digital inclusion. South Africa’s approach is still not clear. But if the country wants to see a broader economic impact, it will have to drive an inclusive agenda. It urgently needs to clarify how it will deliver affordable connectivity and devices, and how platforms for local content can be developed to stimulate demand. Furthermore, commercial and technological supply models need to be developed to extend infrastructure to peri-urban and rural areas. Most low-income households are forced to use expensive pay-as-you-go data bundles to access the Internet, whereas most middle-class homes and suburbs now have access to high-quality Internet fibre. This infrastructure feat, however impressive, just further exposes the endemic fault lines of inequality that keep South Africa from real economic and social transformation. To remedy this effectively and thoroughly, capital will need to be invested cleverly in rolling out high-quality, unlimited Internet to lower income households (Stumpf and Hassan, 2022). For example, relying on established local operators rather than trying to build fresh infrastructure, would make the exercise much more affordable. Using funding models such as open-access infrastructure and infrastructure sharing increases competition at the retail level, which can drive affordability of end-user tariffs and take-up by customers in the low-income market. There is also a growing trend where infrastructure is shared between competitors to drive down the cost of Internet connectivity by cutting out the building costs of towers and data centres. There is evidence of an increasing divide between those who have the means and skills to utilise the Internet connection they have optimally and those who do not. And a concern that digital technologies will increase the existing divide between large and small businesses, inflating the existing concentration in the economy. In particular, black investors and entrepreneurs will need access to funding solutions for equitable ownership within the ICT industry. A digital industrial policy must therefore ensure that benefits are distributed across different types of businesses, their employees, and broader society (Andreoni & Avenyo, 2021). Security breaches Security in this industry has not grown at a fast enough pace to keep up with the constant innovations. In South Africa, the issue is compounded by the rampant theft – driven by demand on the black market – of back-up batteries used to power cellphone towers during electricity disruptions. Without these batteries, load shedding leads to network outages, which disrupts the economy and the daily lives of South Africa’s citizens. MTN – one of South Africa's biggest telecommunications providers – has reported that they lose an astounding 200 batteries every month. Vodacom recorded ‘several hundred cases of battery theft and base station vandalism per month’. Telkom has also had to deal with theft during power outages, reporting about 650 battery and base station incidents per month. And while MTN said that incidents of battery theft dropped to 52 in May, it reported a 50% increase in copper cable theft. Other telecommunications providers report having the same issues. Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal are hardest hit by the drop in network coverage (Business Insider, 2021). The other concern is cybersecurity. There has been a steady increase in high-profile cyberattacks and hacks in South Africa as a result of a rise in internet traffic. In fact, cyber incidents are one of the top three worries of businesses in South Africa, according to the Allianz Risk Barometer 2022, with business interruption and critical infrastructure blackouts being the other two worries. However, the country is not unique in this. Threats of ransomware attacks, data breaches or major IT outages concern companies globally (BusinessTech, 2022). Breaking the barriers to economic growth Regulatory certainty Policies need to be clarified and then implemented in order to create an enabling environment. And government, especially municipalities, needs to streamline the way it engages with industry. It was suggested that tech provisioning and rapid deployment should be written into legislation as soon as possible. Regulation needs to improve. ICASA must be better resourced and funded and needs to come up with more evidence-based regulation, to avoid excessive litigation. Over-regulation should be avoided, and more self-regulation – prevalent in Europe and other parts of the world – could be considered with audits of codes of conduct. There should also be identification of the specific market failure and a response with structured regulation. Furthermore, it should not crowd out private sector investment, but rather, it should create incentives to invest. Fix backlogs Cloud computing can act as a stopgap for digital infrastructure backlogs, given that there are supply constraints and that data centres are quite expensive to establish and maintain. Another theme which came up regularly throughout the discussions was that spectrum should be released without delay. From a service delivery perspective, key to improving this is enhancing government capacity to implement and enforce industrial policy through qualifications vetting and upskilling and reskilling. And ensuring more effective cooperation with the private sector. Public-private collaboration There is a mutual lack of trust between business and government, but the pandemic was an example of where collaboration could be successful. Government should gather all the relevant stakeholders together, ask advice, and most importantly, action their policies and plans. Government institutions should also adopt timeline specific service level agreements, to ensure that the operators can effectively deploy the networks in the most profitable and most efficient ways. They should use mechanisms such as rapid deployment and pre-provisioning. Speeding up the process of building smart cities will improve operational efficiency, share information with the public, and provide a better quality of government service to citizens. Government asserts that the two smart city concepts identified, for KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, will accelerate economic transformation with particular benefit to rural communities. Release spectrum In releasing spectrum, South Africa needs to avoid a free-for-all approach, while at the same time allowing for small providers in rural areas to innovate and expand the network without too many regulatory constraints. Furthermore, spectrum auction licence conditions must ensure that broadband is accessible to all. And there needs to be a review done mid-way. SA Connect’s e-rate – which divides the cost of data between schools or colleges, and service providers at a ratio of approximately 50/50 – should be scrapped and it should just be made a licence condition. When small SMMEs are given access to spectrum, they might not be able to honour these conditions at scale, so it is important to incentivise the bigger providers to do so. There needs to be a plan, implement and monitor process that is time bound. Huge amounts of spectrum are going to be auctioned, to the existing operators and also to the whole access network. There needs to be a framework attached to that process to ensure that everybody in the sector has access to the broadband that they require. The suggestion is to look at a two- to five-year programme to making that undertaking tangible. Inclusivity is key Affordability is crucial to offering an inclusive technological environment. Dividing the cost of broadband between schools and operators has not worked. There should rather be a standing obligation to roll out the network to schools. The provincial departments then need to provide the necessary laptops or other devices required by schools to make broadband a reality, instead of a spoken aspiration. Reducing the cost not only of connectivity, but also of devices, specifically handsets, is something that can be looked at in terms of government tax incentives, subsidies, etc. Again, this will require strong collaboration between government, the vendors, the operators, all the stakeholders. Infrastructure development In some countries, infrastructure for fibre is built into the framework of buildings when they are first erected. In other words, just as there would be electrical cables and water pipes included in a new building, so too there would be a conduit for the running of fibre. Furthermore, some countries even include zoning for Edge infrastructure in the building quote. Building standards relating to digital infrastructure need to be urgently implemented, to reduce the artificial impediment that arises from wanting to roll out infrastructure. The prolonged problem of load shedding has changed South Africa's – and telecommunication providers’ – approach to the energy mix, with both looking to renewables. MTN has 30 off-grid renewable energy sites to keep the power on in remote areas, but metropolitan options remain limited. As the world becomes more digital, it is more important than ever to develop secure, reliable digital systems. Government needs to strengthen capacity in areas like cybersecurity and data protection. Responsible investment The country needs responsible growth; it cannot just be a free for all, especially in terms of spectrum assignments. Government has to create an enabling environment where the big capital investors can participate with certainty, if it hopes to achieve sustainable growth. Firstly, government needs to get the basics right and then there also needs to be a strict reactionary policy approach of responsible investment. Another investment opportunity involves South Africa driving the digital platform economy to capitalise on its multiplier effects. It also needs to create platforms for non-specialists, rather than just specialist IT people and companies. The effect will be a higher employment rate, one of the country’s biggest sustainability concerns, and giving the unemployed better access to market. Conclusion The demand for data is exploding. The pandemic has ignited a frenzy of digitisation and the industry is no longer the quiet engine of the economy it once was, ticking over in the background. The World Bank has shown that the digital economy could stimulate South African GDP significantly and drive employment levels in the right direction. It seems clear from the webinar discussion that the ICT sector have got their game plan in place. And they are not asking for miracles, but rather for a few basic steps to be taken, and taken properly. Government needs to roll out a more enabling infrastructure such as high-speed broadband that reaches beyond the metros to the rural areas. It needs better resourced education and training institutions and more digital upskilling and reskilling. It also needs a coherent digital industry regulation and policy framework that enables healthy competition and rapid progress. International automation is a US$221 billion business, whereas in South Africa, automation has only reached the US$130 million mark. Despite the massive difference in revenue generation, South Africa is expected to see a 50% growth rate per annum in ICT automation. Globally, the growth rate is approximately 7% (Telesa, 2021). There are no low-hanging fruits that can be seized to quickly catapult South Africa into a new growth trajectory. But even though South Africa’s structural constraints have limited the development and diffusion of skills and capabilities beyond some scattered islands of innovation, the country does have the potential to fast track into the new digital era. With the expected massive growth in the ICT industry, it is safe to say that automation is leading the way on the global stage and is destined to become king in South Africa’s digital and economic revolution. References Andreoni, A. & Avenyo, E. 2021. South Africa is failing to ride the digital revolution wave. What it needs to do. [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-failing-to-ride-the-digital-revolution-wave-what-it-needs-to-do-171515 [accessed January 22, 2022]. Business Insider. 2021. SA’s online retail has more than doubled in two years – but the best is probably over. [Online]. Available at: httpt://www.businessinsider.co.za/sas-online-retail-has-more-than-doubled-in-two-years-but-the-best-is-probably-over-2021-5 [accessed January 12, 2022]. Business Tech. 2022. What businesses in South Africa are most worried about in 2022, January 21, 2022. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/551342/what-businesses-in-south-africa-are-most-worried-about-in-2022/ [accessed January 24, 2022]. Daniel, L. 2021. Cellphone towers are crippled by load shedding – and theft of at least 200 batteries each month. [Online] Available at: https://www.businessinsider.co.za/no-cell-phone-signal-during-load-shedding-due-to-battery-theft-2021-11#:~:text=our%20terms%20%26%20conditions.-,Cellphone%20towers%20are%20crippled%20by%20load%20shedding%20%E2%80%93%20and%20theft%20of,least%20200%20batteries%20each%20month&text=The%20rampant%20theft%20of%20back,prolonged%20periods%20of%20load%20shedding [accessed January 24, 2022]. Gillwald, A., Mothobi, O. & Rademan B. 2018. The State of ICT in South Africa, July 2018. [Online] Available at: https://researchictafrica.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/after-access-south-africa-state-of-ict-2017-south-africa-report_04.pdf [accessed January 22, 2022]. ICASA. 2021. The State of the ICT Sector Report in South Africa 2021. [Online] Available at: https://www.icasa.org.za/uploads/files/State-of-the-ICT-Sector-Report-March-2021.pdf [accessed January 12, 2022]. International Trade Administration (ITA). 2021. South Africa - Country Commercial Guide: Information Technology. [Online] Available at: https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/south-africa-information-technology [accessed January 20, 2022]. Mahlaka, R. 2021. Thumbs up: South Africa’s largest mobile operators accept Icasa’s second attempt at auctioning spectrum. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-12-14-thumbs-up-south-africas-largest-mobile-operators-accept-icasas-second-attempt-at-auctioning-spectrum/ [accessed January 20, 2022]. Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2005. Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/electronic-communications-act [accessed January 20, 2022]. Research and Markets. 2021. South Africa E-Commerce Market Size, Forecast 2022-2027, Industry Trends, Share, Growth, Impact of COVID-19, Opportunity Company Analysis. [Online] Available at: https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5504330/south-africa-e-commerce-market-size-forecast?utm_source=BW&utm_medium=PressRelease&utm_code=bdf8wk&utm_campaign=1639746+-+The+South+Africa+E-Commerce+Industry+is+Projected+to+Reach+%247.9+Billion+by+2027&utm_exec=jamu273prd [accessed January 12, 2022]. Stumpf, E. & Hassan, M. 2022. Ways must be found to bring real Internet to South Africa’s poor [Online] Available at: https://techcentral.co.za/ways-must-be-found-to-bring-real-internet-to-south-africas-poor/206734/ [accessed January 20, 2022]. Tech Financials. 2021. SA Ranks 56th With a 1 Point Increase in Global Connectivity Index 2020, February 16, 2021. [Online]. Available at: https://www.techfinancials.co.za/2021/02/16/sa-ranks-56th-with-a-1-point-increase-in-global-connectivity-index-2020/ [accessed January 20, 2022]. Telesa. 2021. Our Predictions For The SA ICT industry in 2021. [Online] Available at: https://telesa.co.za/what-predictions-do-you-have-for-the-ict-industry-in-sa-in-2021/ [accessed January 12, 2022]. The World Bank. 2020. Overview: Digital Development. [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment/overview#1 [accessed January 20, 2022]. University of the Witwatersrand. 2021. SA ICT sector navigates pandemic unscathed but skills gaps remain. [Online] Available at: https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2021/2021-09/sa-ict-sector-navigates-pandemic-unscathed-but-skills-gaps-remain.html [accessed January 22, 2022]. WCO East and Southern Africa. 2021. Africa Digital Infrastructure Market Analysis 2021 Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.wcoesarpsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/juanita-clark-africas-evolving-digital-landscape.pdf [accessed January 20, 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. Strategic communication as policy and strategy ways: An analysis of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic communication by Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract In states facing precarious power arrangements, strategic communication is critical to commanding the internal strategy and policy environment. Strategic communication is a strategic approach, a strategic way in which policy is conducted and advanced. This article accordingly undertakes an examination of this aspect of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic presidency - not the policies themselves. The paper looks at how Ramaphosa uses strategic communication to advance his policy and strategy interests. Ramaphosa’s challenge is to balance and lead two seemingly opposing centres of power. His leadership requires compromise and consensus; it also requires a creative approach. Ramaphosa embodies national values that inspire trust and persuade the citizens of South Africa to adopt his vision as theirs, forging a collective will to achieve national goals. This article examines Ramaphosa’s strategic approach to leadership, adding to the understanding of how strategic communication is exercised domestically in South Africa. Keywords—South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, domestic strategic communication, social compact, presidential style ‘Our 1994 Consensus risks unravelling precisely because we have failed to utilise the settlement for what it was—a vehicle of transition for far-reaching changes, not an end point in itself’ (Jonas, 2019). When Cyril Ramaphosa became president of South Africa on 15 February 2018, not only did he take office at a time of national distress, but he also assumed the presidency at a time when strategic communication (Hallahan, 2007) played a paramount role in shaping and commanding strategic environments (Bartholomees, 2012). Today, purposeful and persuasive communication performs a significant role in the form and procedure of presidential strategy. Strategic communication is an approach whereby ideas are mobilized through rhetorical agency. It presents a pathway to persuasion. The concept, while being used broadly and for varying applications, serves great practical use. It allows for a ‘holistic approach to communication, based on values and interests, that encompass everything an actor does to achieve objectives in a contested environment…there is often consensus around its operational components or processes of delivery: defining a message; identifying a specific audience; intending to achieve not simply an effect but real, measurable changes’ (Bolt, 2019). Strategic communication is a central tool of executive policymaking and power. In our increasingly interconnected world, the information environment has become more diffuse and human agency within it more widely distributed. This means that strategic communication, which is often seen as an exercise beyond national borders, is pertinent locally as well. ‘Strategic communication is as important to internal audiences as it is to external ones’ (Tathan, 2008); it is the means for ‘persuading the nation’s citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. In this context, strategic communication is an essential element of national leadership’ (Halloran, 2007). For an impressionable state such as South Africa, with its complex history and unconsolidated power base, enlisting the persuasive power of local beliefs and shaping the strategic environment, is of primary importance. The state leadership must establish authority through prevailing in the battle of ideas and crafting the national interest. In the modern hypermediated era of diffused communications, citizens have greater access to power; power has taken on an increasingly distributed form. It is incumbent upon leaders to obtain trust and legitimacy through the pursuit of policy that advances values and principles. Leadership gives strategic communication its internal form by crafting messages that serve this national purpose. It is here that strategy is served by policy, not vice versa. Where strategic communication serves as the ways to policy’s means. The strategic potential of communication has not been lost on Ramaphosa. He has used communication purposefully, advancing his claims to transcend the situation he inherited from his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s approach serves the pragmatic aim of restoring and inspiring faith in the national project. Following an initial period of Ramaphoria, a number of questions have emerged around his executive performance and methodology. Domestic and international observers have become frustrated by the slow pace of progress in dealing with Zuma-era misdemeanours, while noisy commentators with limited or adversarial agendas are confusing a complex narrative. This article examines Ramaphosa’s strategic approach, revealing the complexity of the situation he is facing. It offers insight by surveying and detailing Ramaphosa’s regime of persuasion; describing the ways, means, and ends of his strategic communication (Bartholomees, 2006). Historical background to South Africa’s current domestic strategic environment A brief history will help readers appreciate the complex strategic environment in which Ramaphosa’s administration is situated. A historical background shows how strategic communication, has iteratively served the policy orientation of the state. The National Party (Apartheid) government (1948–94) which was authoritarian, deeply ideological, and strictly hierarchical employed its own strategic communication. The Apartheid government had waged potent information warfare through its counter-insurgent Total Strategy for almost two decades (Kotzé, 2018). Its campaigns were based on control and it employed force to achieve persuasive ends. It was, consequently, unable to co-opt the credible, conservative black elite, whose support was necessary for maintaining the Apartheid government’s strategic position of ‘normalcy’. Eventually, the government accepted that it could not use the military to force compliance under Apartheid. In the late 1980s, under new leadership, the government’s strategy changed from repression to negotiation, from maintaining a divided country under Apartheid to co-installing democracy. In his speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990, De Klerk employed his strategic communication, using the kairotic[1] international moment to make the first move towards a just, new political order, embarking the nation on the transition from Apartheid to constitutional democracy. His rhetorical performance achieved its strategic ends, removing constraints to negotiations and laying the foundation for sweeping reforms. De Klerk engaged the African National Congress (ANC), the direct political rival of his own National Party. The agreement de Klerk negotiated, to pursue a united, democratic future for South Africa, critically shaped its politics and the presidencies that followed. Nelson Mandela understood this reality. The former militant did not meekly become the saint he is seen as now. Instead, Mandela acutely perceived and employed strategic communication. The ANC leader was pragmatic. He adapted, coaxed agreement from his adversaries, and waged a comprehensive battle for the hearts and minds of the public. He disabled his opponents tactically, through his strategic communication. Mandela famously encouraged his followers, that it is ‘precisely because Afrikaans is the language of the oppressor, we should encourage our people to learn it, its literature and history’ (Maharaj, 2010). Mandela built legitimacy, confidence, and gravitas into the South African presidency. Mandela’s communication served to advance the interests of the state and the policies of the government. He recognised all the country’s diverse people as one; instead of advancing the idea of separateness, he endorsed national unity and therefore sovereign legitimacy and stability. The ANC’s moral authority and popular support allowed the party to claim responsibility for forging democracy and ending Apartheid. This superior account captured the public imagination and won the confidence of the people. The ANC’s political project successfully limited the potency of domestic opposition; it has since held an absolute majority in all national elections by presenting itself as synonymous with the ideals of the South African state. By generating a rich conceptual story, which blurred the lines between party and state, it secured the political trust of the nation. With the ANC safe in its place as the national political force, the contest for power has shifted to take place within its ranks. While the state is constituted by ideals, the practice of politics hinges on political realities. In 2007, for the first time in more than 50 years, there was a radical contest for leadership of the ANC, initiating what has become the party’s new normal of factional rivalry. As had been the case at the ANC’s 38th National Conference in 1949, when Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and others challenged the moderate establishment, there was a bitter battle for the character of the ANC at the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane (Booysen, 2011). Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s immediate successor, who reigned as a philosopher-king, was pitted against Jacob Zuma’s leftist camp. Although Mbeki’s grand narratives continued Mandela’s appeal to ideals, his aloof intellectualism and detachment from the everyday lives of the poor were seen as neglect for their struggle, ripening the ground for Zuma’s populist declamation and radical aspirations. Zuma sang and danced to anti-Apartheid songs, comprehensively defeating his opponent with a 60% share of the vote. His argument was direct: ‘We have achieved political freedom and now we must achieve economic freedom (The Citizen, 2014).’ Jacob Zuma’s convincing election presented a shift from leading by aspirational ideals to pursuing specific, tangible ends. His strategic communication was materially motivated. Zuma’s ANC presidential acceptance speech made it clear that a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (ANC, 2007) would be the party’s guiding philosophy and the policy orientation of his leadership. He reiterated this centrality, of party policy vis-à-vis state interest, when he became national president. The NDR’s prescriptive measures, such as direct demographic representation, are at odds with the national Constitution. The often-contradictory pursuits of the ANC vis-à-visthose of the state is the axis whereupon South Africa’s strategic environment has tilted (ANC, 2012). Under Zuma, unlike Mbeki or Mandela, the national project would be subordinated to the policy orientation of the ANC, not to the prescripts of the national Constitution. Zuma explained: ‘[The ideal state] should not be confused with tactical positions that the liberation movement may adopt from time to time’ (ANC, 2007). Zuma’s advance of radicalism determined that the policy of the ANC, not that of government, would function as the authoritative guiding hand of national political power. Enter Ramaphosa Ramaphosa’s presidential strategy is determined by the complex challenge of leading two centres of power, the ANC and the state. His policy orientation and strategic actions are contingent on the tension between the policy of the ANC, and the strategic interests of the state. Whereas his position as state president is subject to his ability to preserve party unity. Any examination of Ramaphosa’s presidency must recognise the circumstances of his claim to power. He must balance state and party interests. His task of aligning ANC policies to fortify solidarity in support of his leadership determines the strategic environment. His approach is therefore founded on compromise and consensus. An examination of Ramaphosa’s path to power reveals these conditions to have shaped his character and his leadership style. Ramaphosa gained his political profile as the founder of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), an influential labour structure formed in 1982. The NUM was the first black union to achieve significant bargaining power. Ramaphosa played a pivotal role in South Africa’s transition to democracy. In 1994 he was appointed Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, the body responsible for drafting South Africa’s Constitution. In 2012, Ramaphosa returned as Zuma’s Deputy President, preparing to take power in 2017, as is the tradition of succession in the ANC. Ramaphosa would bide his time. As his previous track record had shown, he would act only once he was in charge. The organisational decay and system of patronage in the ANC constrain Ramaphosa’s political situation. Striking a balance between party and state depends on Ramaphosa’s ability to set the agenda and to persuade his party members to follow his lead. He must proclaim a set of ideals, without aggravating any vital constituency of the ANC. He must claim and situate his power, maintaining order while avoiding factional volatility. He must rely on strategic communication to advance his leadership, coordinating all the resources at his disposal in order to shape perceptions and build influence. Strategic communication is assessed here as a holistic practice — both a process and an approach. Given that ‘everything communicates’, the ‘key to an effective strategy is therefore to understand actors and audiences, then integrate policies, actions and words across government in a coherent way to build national resilience and leverage strategic influence’ (Heap, 2018). Today’s hyper-mediated and mediatised strategic environment empowers and obliges national leaders to direct perception in order to persuade. A president has the executive authority to create meaning according to his personal ethos — to shape the national story. We now consider Ramaphosa’s strategic communication, drawing on Harry Yarger’s understanding of strategy as the ways, means, and ends of power (Halloran, 2007). Ramaphosa’s strategic ends Pursuing South Africa’s aspirational Constitution Ramaphosa’s statements and actions establish him as a Constitutionalist (Swilling, 2019). His strategic communication pursues a vision of a capable South Africa as depicted in the country’s aspirational Constitution. As set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution, Ramaphosa’s government seeks to ‘heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and to build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations’ (RSA, 1996). As Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, Ramaphosa was one of the architects of what he has endearingly described as ‘the birth certificate of the nation’ (Smith, 2016). The Constitution ‘belongs to all of us [...]. We claim it as ours, it enshrines the rights that make us live as South Africans, and we will protect it because it belongs to us’ (Ramaphosa, 2012). ‘[I]t is the repository of everything, everything that I ever dreamt of, that I ever wanted in my life. It gives me strength, it gives me hope, it protects me. If anyone were ever to violate my rights, our Constitution is my shield (Seagal & Cort, 2012).’ Ramaphosa’s proclaimed allegiance to the Constitution gives clarity to his strategy of empowering the state while not alienating the ANC. This appears to be the inverse of Zuma’s approach; the former president’s legacy lives on through a contingent of senior party representatives who remain loyal to him. This reality prevents Ramaphosa from taking sides against factions within the party. Instead, he seeks to empower the state by encouraging confidence in his leadership of the ANC. Ramaphosa’s strategic communication purposefully crafts a consolidated national identity to advance the national interest. Given the constraints placed on him by the political legacy of his predecessor, Ramaphosa wants to demonstrate that he is advancing the national interest above that of the party. He prioritises strategic command of the nation over leadership of the party; he leads the party by leading the nation. These circumstances demand that strategic communication be employed beyond the marketing of party politics. With the evolution of power in the 21st century, where strategic communications play a critical role in shaping the domestic strategic environment, this inward-looking consolidation of the national interest is extremely valuable. As the world is opening up and power becomes diffused and takes on new, often irregular forms, the primary safeguard against information campaigns attacking sovereign states is the clear articulation and consolidation of the domestic ethos. The expression of local beliefs and values is primary. A state cannot effectively exercise foreign policy when there is local disorientation and confusion about the national interest. The State of the Nation Ramaphosa’s strategy emerges from his public speeches and political gestures. The day after he was elected, on 16 February 2018, Ramaphosa gave his first presidential address — the State of the Nation Address (SONA), South Africa’s version of America’s State of the Union address. There is no legislative requirement for this annual speech to be given at the opening of the new parliamentary session; it is a ritual introduced by Mandela. The address is a ceremonial reconstitution of the state’s values where, in ‘one gesture, in one voice, the nation finds itself being “stated”’ (Salazar, 2002). Parliament defines the SONA as ‘a political statement of the President that sets out a social contract that seeks to [...] constitute the fabric of our nation’ (Parliament, 2019). The SONA is a pomp-and-circumstance celebration—guns salute, children wave the national flag, and, in a manner unique to South Africa, a praise-singer, or Imbongi, introduces the President to a joint sitting of Parliament, usually to singing and clapping. Ramaphosa’s SONA speech was the ideal platform from which to launch his presidential strategic communication, to present a ‘non-partisan address that maps a holistic pathway to the future’ (Parliament, 2019). Ramaphosa clearly understood that he would be addressing a larger audience than those who had congregated in the House of Assembly to hear their newly elected president speak. The SONA is a national and international media event, and therefore an opportunity to claim national authority, embody the vision and the mission of the state, and thereby inspire in the public and South Africa’s business partners a sense of confidence. Departing from Zuma’s strategy of reciting his government’s plan of action for the upcoming year, Ramaphosa used the occasion to rally his audience around an alluring story of what South Africa could become. He appealed to his constituents to form a consensus around the adoption of civic responsibility—to adopt and exhibit the Constitutional values as their own. As Hans Kelsen (1967) pointed out, power does not follow from statements of fact, but from embodiments of norms. Such embodiment ‘epitomizes the republican identification of politics and persuasion, for embodiment is a rhetorical accomplishment that in turn fuses speech and action, speaker and subject’ (Hariman, 1995). Leadership, as an act of influence, does not simply subscribe to certain norms. It is through the embodiment of norms that leadership is claimed, and norms are redefined. Ramaphosa’s claim to power has been indirect; he does not assert himself personally as a great leader to be followed but embodies the norms and values enshrined in the Constitution he believes in. Ramaphosa’s inaugural SONA set his agenda. It opened a new chapter by marking the political transition that had taken place. The new president commenced his first public speech by cordially thanking the former president. Ramaphosa concludes and transcends the Zuma era by creating a bridge, over Zuma’s leadership, to that of Mandela. His words did not simply close the door on Zuma but sought to expunge his command by invoking Mandela’s moral authority: ‘Guided by his example, we will use this year to reinforce our commitment to ethical behaviour and ethical leadership. In celebrating the centenary of Nelson Mandela, we are not merely honouring the past, we are building the future […]. We should honour Madiba[2] by putting behind us the era of discord, disunity and disillusionment [...] because a new dawn is upon us. It is a new dawn that is inspired by our collective memory of Nelson Mandela’ (Ramaphosa, 2018a). Claiming the New Dawn Throughout his presidency, Ramaphosa has consistently promoted the idea of the New Dawn. This project represents his vision of South Africa overcoming the preceding dark episode, a period he later called the ‘nine lost years’ (Haffejee, 2019), and ushering in a new, revitalised era. Ramaphosa was elected to his first full term as President by the National Assembly on 22 May 2019. At his inauguration speech on 25 May, Ramaphosa claimed personal responsibility for the New Dawn by stating: ‘Through the irrefutable power of the ballot on 8 May,[3] South Africans declared the dawn of a new era (Ramaphosa, 2019a).’ Ramaphosa’s New Dawn rests on a number of pillars. First, it is premised on sovereign accord; stability and order must first be secured. On many occasions, including at the SONA, Ramaphosa has emphasised the need for national unity: ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, a diverse but united nation. Bound together by a common destiny […] we are a nation at one. We are one people […] while there are many issues on which we may differ, on these fundamental matters, we are at one (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ By reigniting a feeling of national solidarity, Ramaphosa is seeking to counter the ongoing fraying of the political settlement achieved by Mandela to advance the imperative of any national political arrangement: the preservation of stability. To inspire the people in a unified and common purpose, he draws on Mandela’s gravitas, reminding them of the covenant Madiba sought to build to advance a just and capable state. Ramaphosa affirms that the ‘defining thing about the new dawn must be our ability to govern well, to create a capable state [...] a state where we will know that everybody who is in the state is there to advance the interests of our people (Ramaphosa, 2018b).’ Second, the New Dawn is both the commencement and the realisation of renewal, both an end to the previous era and a forward-looking process. The new president claims that South Africa is ‘emerging from a period of stagnation and strife’ (Maromo, 2018). He seeks acceptance for reform from the same entities (the ANC and the ANC-led government) that caused the atrophy. The New Dawn promises to address the deficiencies of the previous regime, such as ‘policy uncertainty, the weakening of public institutions and high-level corruption [that] undermined investor confidence and public trust’. ‘We are now firmly on the path of renewal and rebuilding’, says Ramaphosa (Maromo, 2018). Furthermore, by recognising the failures of both the ANC and the government, the New Dawn stimulates a deliberative approach to creating a better South Africa. In bringing the deficiencies of the past to light, Ramaphosa has initiated renewal, inspiring the nation to recreate itself: ‘Fellow South Africans, our country has entered a period of change [...] Our task, as South Africans, is to seize this moment of hope and renewal, and to work together to ensure that it makes a meaningful difference in the lives of our people (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ Ultimately, Ramaphosa describes South Africa’s renewal as the resolve to ‘break with all that divides us, to embrace all that unites us’; to ‘cure our country of the corrosive effects of corruption’; to ‘restore the integrity of our institutions’; and ‘to advance the values of our Constitution’ (Ramaphosa, 2019b). Ramaphosa authoritatively communicates that he is capable of ensuring this longed-for renewal. Finally, Ramaphosa’s strategic narrative about the New Dawn advances his vision of South Africa as a fully transformed, democratic state, while simultaneously announcing that the journey toward democratic consolidation is yet to be completed. This path is presented as the natural continuation and maturation of the first transition. Herein, Ramaphosa presents an eloquent plan to neutralise the idea of the radical second transition; his vision counters the NDR’s millenarianism. Instead of moving society towards a pre-configured outcome, the New Dawn returns the national focus to the approach and tools used in the earlier transition led by Mandela. His approach was based on ideals and process, on inclusion, compromise, and reconciliation. By recalling to mind that unprecedented democratic transition out of Apartheid, Ramaphosa employs sentimentality and a sense of achievement to inspire belief that the promises of the New Dawn can indeed be accomplished (Parliament, 2018). Apartheid was finally dismantled in 1994; in 2019 Ramaphosa used the 25th anniversary of this remarkable achievement as a kairotic moment when South Africans could recognise the intervening failures of government and renew their energy and direction (Ramaphosa, 2019b). With his promise of a New Dawn he hoped to inspire the people to adopt his resolve and make this national project their own. For his vision to be realised, the government must have the necessary institutional capacity; the slogan—New Dawn—must be translated into state practice through effective administration. However, it is the people, not the politicians, who must achieve renewal and democratic consolidation, and the people have not been uniformly inspired and mobilised. Moreover, the limited nature of the reforms Ramaphosa has enacted so far is causing public frustration; analysts and public commentators are further constraining his political momentum by labelling Ramaphosa slow and indecisive (Mkhabela, 2019). To achieve his goals he must have the people behind him. Ramaphosa’s strategic ways ‘Politics is an art… By understanding how matters of style are crucial to the practice of politics, we discover not sham, but design, not decoration, but a world of meaning (Hariman, 1995).’ Cyril Ramaphosa’s style Ramaphosa’s strategy is expressed through his style; the way he employs the tools at hand to pursue his goals. Style gives dynamism to values, showing how ideals are expressed. Communication must always suit its purpose, setting, and audience. Style is not incidental but critical to how an argument is constructed. Style is the way in which a strategic environment is claimed; how alternative ideas and truths are displaced (Hariman, 1995).A leader’s claim to authority will be styled in a specific manner: Ramaphosa embodies the values of the Constitution to demonstrate the South African President’s belief in the sovereignty of those values. Ramaphosa’s use of the Constitution to mobilise a multi-faceted response to South Africa’s unique political and social problems best illustrates what biographer Anthony Butler (2007) calls his ‘visionary pragmatism’. Unlike many in the ANC, Ramaphosa ‘could not commit his imagination to Marxist revolutionary fantasies. He worked hard to create institutions of self-government [...] demonstrating an ingrained pragmatism’ (Butler, 2007). The roles Ramaphosa played in founding the National Union of Mineworkers, in negotiating the end of Apartheid, and in chairing the Constitutional Assembly all exemplify his conviction that properly-formed institutions can give momentum to the embodiment of ideals. As president, Ramaphosa facilitated negotiations regarding the National Minimum Wage Act. The Act presents a mechanism for stabilising the South African labour market but it has been criticised as both insufficient and untenable given the national labour-wage equation. However, the value of the Act is not about the introduction of a minimum wage; it is not intended as a simple fix. Instead, its value lies in the institutionalising purpose it serves. It provides a framework for addressing the complex and heady issues of labour relations and income inequality. The introduction of the minimum wage was preceded by four years of negotiations. ‘In the end’, said Business Unity’s Tanya Cohen, ‘we did manage to find a sweet spot, between what is socially acceptable and economically efficient’ (Nieselow, 2018). For the consensus-seeking Ramaphosa, ‘the national minimum wage represents the triumph of cooperation over conflict, of negotiation over confrontation [...] it could only be resolved through negotiation [...]. This national minimum wage is a stepping-stone towards having a living’ wage (Ramaphosa, 2018c). Ramaphosa’s leadership style can be seen in the way he managed the negotiations that ultimately led to the implementation of the National Minimum Wage Act. As is the case with the other offices he has held, Ramaphosa acts from a position of authority, corralling the various stakeholders involved in an issue into negotiating a settlement wherein all parties are afforded a portion of their claim. By accommodating some elements of everyone’s wishes, he binds them as members of a consensus decision. The collective process is superior to specific claims. The leader is bolstered by a united assembly. However, this increases the pressure on the President to act decisively, as expectations inevitably mount, and when they are not met with assiduousness and follow-through, can lead to increased public frustration. Ramaphosa’s strategic foundation is his ability to negotiate and achieve consensus. He maintains a dispassionate position regarding specific details; ‘the benefits of the compromise were greater than the costs’ (Butler, 2007). He brings together the various motions and only then decides which position to take; this allows him to frame a situation without overpowering it. It also affords the public a sense of agency and builds trust through broad inclusion. Ramaphosa is able to frame an issue so that others accept the way it is expressed, and then steer the resolution. Given South Africa’s diversity, a unified outcome is preferable to a one-sided decision. He maintains his advantage through inclusivity, by speaking for all South Africans; this tactic also aids him in surmounting the arguments of those who present partisan views.[4] In Ramaphosa’s words: ‘the strength of doing this is to be able to bring together South Africans who have a contribution to make, who have views to put across so that we engage everyone and come out with best solutions ever. And this is what I will say defines my style of leadership, which was Madiba’s style of leadership (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ Equating himself with Mandela is a tactical move on Ramaphosa’s part. It remains to be seen whether he can imitate Mandela’s executive decisiveness. Identification and servant leadership Engaging the diverse population in cooperation and consensus stimulates all parties to identify themselves as South Africans (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Drawing on Mandela’s pathos, Ramaphosa uses symbolism and metaphor to shape his image in line with the story he wishes to tell; by being a leader who identifies with national ideals he evokes solidarity. The skilful employment of this identification can be a powerful tool for forging a feeling of unity. The persuaded are guided by the persuader who appears as one of them, not apart or superior, assuming their interests as his and instituting specific forward-looking attitudes. Ramaphosa wants to be a leader who achieves his end by persuading the people to identify with the goals and visions of the state, engaging with their sense of civic responsibility. Slogans such as the ‘Rainbow Nation’ are programmatic injunctions that have been used to shape South Africa’s national identity. Inviting the public to identify with him, Ramaphosa employed another slogan. At the conclusion of his inaugural SONA, Ramaphosa strategically appealed to both public endorsement of his leadership and to popular participation in his vision for the country, saying: thuma mina [‘send me’]. These words are taken from a song by late South African jazz great, Hugh Masekela. At the end of his speech Ramaphosa quoted the lyrics: ‘I wanna be there when the people start to turn it around...I wanna lend a hand, send me (Masekela, 2002).’ Ramaphosa invoked one of South Africa’s greats to appeal to the people, in their own language, to take ownership of the state of their nation and to claim the New Dawn. Ramaphosa implores the people to follow him, saying: ‘now is the time to lend a hand...Now is the time for each of us to say, “send me” (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ ‘Thuma Mina’ is an inspirational call to each South African to answer Masekela’s charge to imagine and to build an inclusive, just, and equal society. Thuma Mina, in the spirit of John F. Kennedy’s 1961 appeal ‘ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country’, is a persuasive technique to inspire action. Here, Ramaphosa shows the appropriate route and then inspires others to follow. It is an approach that strives towards servant leadership, a biblical precept best illustrated by Jesus. A servant leader, says Kgatle (2018), is one who ‘must first be a model of credibility, diligence, and the spirit of servant leadership. The second role of leadership is pathfinding, wherein a vision is discerned. The third role is that of alignment; unless you institutionalise your values, they will not happen. The fourth role is to empower people; the fruit of the three other roles’. The outcome of servant leadership is the creation of communities that ascribe to the values of the leader. It is setting up a future that can easily be disconnected from memory and the past. It is in this way, similar to Mandelaism, as conceptualised by Mpofu and Chasi (2017), that Ramaphosa’s sign systems have a magically detached element akin to mythology without context. Ramaphosa’s lionising of Constitutional values, much in the way that Mandela was lionised, leads to a message or belief structure that is tied to ideals and not action and it is for his failure to act decisively that Ramaphosa’s tenure as President has come under severe pressure. Together with his broad consultation, his tendency to float above the nuts and bolts of the problems on the ground, has seen Ramaphosa being criticised for inaction. Without decisive action, it matters little what policy orientation is chosen. Towards a new social compact Throughout his communications, Ramaphosa returns to the urgency of re-establishing a national social compact. A social compact is an active agreement that enjoins all citizens of a country, as participants in the practice of democracy, to engage in nation-building and the creation of national accord. Given the intractable political situation that Ramaphosa inherited upon assuming the presidency, he chose to set the social compact as a cornerstone of his strategic communication. He implores: ‘If we are to achieve the South Africa we want, we need a new social compact’ (Ramaphosa, 2019d). A social compact is the glue that binds the members of a society to their leader and ensures their civic agency. It serves as a foundation for the process of forming a consensus among diverse players. The value of the social compact is that those involved are more willing to subordinate themselves to the public interest. Citizens are assured that they will not be weakened but empowered by the institutional capacity they are asked to help build from the bottom up. This approach brings the public into partnership with the government, which for its part reciprocates with a commitment to effective governance (Ramaphosa, 2019a). According to Ramaphosa: ‘Our task, as South Africans, is to seize this moment of hope and renewal and to work together […]. We will do this by getting social partners in our country to collaborate in building a social compact on which we will create drivers of economic recovery’ (Ramaphosa, 2018a). Ramaphosa advances the validity of the social compact by submitting that it was Mandela who first argued for its value. Mandela is quoted as saying: ‘None of us acting alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation-building’ (Ramaphosa, 2019e). The appeal of the new social compact draws on the success of the transition from Apartheid to democracy. It was the social compact, comprehensively entered into by the diversity of South Africans, when people recognised each other as equals, refusing to be forced apart, that broke down the walls of Apartheid. The government was forced to fundamentally change its strategy; it could not ‘centrally reform into one, a system which under Apartheid was distinctly two… [it could not] permanently include a majority it considered as other’ (Kotzé, 2018). To Ramaphosa the social compact is the path to renewal made possible by consensus: ‘The progress we have achieved over the last year—and the successes we need to register in the months and years ahead—ultimately depends on our ability to revitalise and strengthen the social compact between government, business, labour and civil society’ (Ramaphosa, 2019f). By establishing a new social compact Ramaphosa seeks to generate greater public endorsement of the Constitution as a transformative framework; the Constitution comprises an authoritative compendium of compacts, where the ‘body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people’ (National Humanities Institute, N.d.). The social compact is a pragmatic expression of the democratic project. South Africa’s aspirational Constitution fortifies Ramaphosa’s compelling vision of the ideal state; the people are encouraged to recognise the superiority of this goal and are asked to employ their civic agency in its pursuit. The inclusive approach invites participation, shaping the situation to build common ground and to deny and displace the radicalism of the Zuma era. The establishment of a social compact is also a remedial action taken in response to the increasing sentiment that Constitutionalism is under threat from civic atrophy and populism. This is the point of view held by former Deputy Finance Minister, Mcebisi Jonas, who was dismissed by Zuma after blowing the whistle on his corrupt activities. Jonas suggests that outright cynicism ‘which views the 1994 consensus as a carve-up among the elites’ has overtaken the nostalgic feeling of the ‘rainbow nation, emblematic of a time when South Africans broke out of their narrow ideological straitjackets and placed the national interest above all else’ (Jonas, 2019); ‘[T]he 1994 consensus has reached its sell-by date’, said Jonas. ‘In fact, it is unravelling (Jonas, 2019).’ As opposed to transformation through the Constitution, there has been a rise of those who see the Constitutional settlement as an obstacle to radical transformation. The institutionally destructive state capture of the Zuma period was facilitated by this very argument. It is not within the ambit of this paper to detail state capture in South Africa. It can, however, be described in brief as the improper and illegal restructuring of the state apparatus to pursue Zuma’s ‘radical transformation’, subordinating national institutions through deliberate strategy (Cairs, 2017). The legacy of state capture has left South Africa in a weakened condition, its confidence damaged and its national legitimacy crippled. Jonas supports using the social compact to repair the damaged state. The brokering of ‘a new consensus’, says Jonas, ‘will require new levels of leadership vigour across political formations as well as business, labour and civil society […]. Without a new vision of where we are going, [...] our new consensus will be stillborn’ (Jonas, 2018). Visionary approach Ramaphosa’s visionary approach is a central feature of his strategic communications; vision and the social compact are his ways of framing the national situation and they are key to countering the enchantment of radicalism. Vision is the path through which Ramaphosa connects the troubled present to the renewed future. His re-introduction of vision into modern South Africa’s political strategy and discourse has caught the public, and the political establishment, off guard. He has been criticised for the impalpable proposals he made in his post-election SONA. He departed from what had become the tradition, under Zuma, of listing multicomponent, short-term solutions to complex problems. Instead, Ramaphosa has invoked a visionary achieved state, a ‘dream we can all share and participate in building’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). His ‘performance of nation’, a reimagining of the state (Ramaphosa, 2019c), is an appeal to the people of South Africa to embrace the New Dawn and a renewed social compact; ‘I would like to invite South Africans to begin imagining this prospect’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Unlike the previous social compact, which reconciled the two sides of Apartheid’s divide, Ramaphosa commits to using his power to move the nation forward. Demonstrating belief in the future must be the first step towards overcoming the present political malaise. While empowering the people, it also makes room for criticism. Ramaphosa directs the nation’s gaze towards a visionary goal, realigning the hearts of the people with the aspirations of the struggle against Apartheid, transporting the power of the Freedom Charter and the Constitution to the present day. Asking the nation to dream is a strategic gamble: ‘We share a common future, and we need to forge a common path towards its realisation’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Given the constraints and national tensions with which they must contend, Ramaphosa’s dream seeks to embolden the public with a vision all South Africans can share. If he is able to capture the imaginations of the people, inspiring a feeling of solidarity, Ramaphosa’s dream has the chance to transcend party lines. Dreaming, as was the case with ‘the American Dream’, transcends policy or partisan lines. It liberates and empowers the individual to claim personal responsibility. The strategic use of vision not only shapes the aspirations of the nation, it is also a salve for desperation. By redirecting attention toward a positive future, he avoids being criticised when short term targets are not met. In a tactical move to motivate the people to open their hearts and minds to his vision, Ramaphosa concluded his response to the post-election SONA debate by quoting from Proverbs: ‘Where there is no vision, the people perish’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Strategically, the overture to vision stimulates both private and corporate initiative and responsibility to empower the framework and function of national institutions. Presently the public sector wage bill comprises an enormous 14% of national GDP (Head, 2019). South Africans are receiving some of the world’s worst value-for-money services. The bloated administration and welfare state (Mtantato, 2018), together with its failing state-owned companies, are in serious trouble, drowning the state in debt and are only being kept afloat for strategic reasons. This is taking place while the citizenry’s political fealty to the ANC and the influence of the far left impedes critical adjustment. The ANC is kept in power because, unlike under Apartheid, the majority of people have representation and the right to services. Regardless of its factionalism and poor service delivery, the ANC remains the only option for the majority of South Africans. This has once again been proven during the recent election when the ANC received 57.5% of the national vote. The troubled state of the nation, together with the delicate balance of power in the ANC, necessitate Ramaphosa’s desperate strategic approach. It’s an approach designed to inspire belief and renew the economic viability of the state through support for entrepreneurial activity (Ramaphosa, 2019d). Rather than turning to privatisation - a measure that may be blocked by the ruling alliance - Ramaphosa has entered into discussion with powerful unions to enlist their help in strategically restructuring the state-owned companies he calls ‘sewers of corruption’ (Kgosana, 2018). By combining his strategy of cooperative consensus-building and inspiring civic responsibility with increasing support offered to private initiatives, especially small businesses, Ramaphosa has commenced a new programme aimed at the entrepreneurial revitalisation of the state. Ramaphosa’s strategic means The state as a strategic resource Ramaphosa seeks to advance his strategy for renewing South Africa as a capable state through the agency of the state itself. The primacy of the state as a symbolic tool of power is clear to Ramaphosa. Observing the display of military resources at Mandela’s 1994 inauguration, he reflected on the potency of the state to tell a definitive story and thereby act as a legitimate facilitator. He wrote that, under Apartheid, ‘to the majority of South Africans these displays of military might were a grand symbol of nothing more than white minority aggression and terror [...]. [O]vernight their function—and the symbolism that we attach to them—had fundamentally and irreversibly changed. No longer were the jets instruments of oppression. Now they were guardians of democracy’ (Ramaphosa, 1996). The power of the state rests on an undisputed claim to sovereignty. To be legitimate, the state must be perceived as such — the regime must tell a convincing story. In order to achieve justice, the government must express justice through its institutions. Having assumed leadership of a compromised state, Ramaphosa must employ that same state to re-establish authority and stability. Renewal functions as a process whereby a vision is achieved through the deployment of resources. One means of doing this is to continue the tradition of establishing commissions of inquiry initiated by previous presidents. Commissions such as the Nugent Commission of Inquiry into Tax Administration and Governance investigate institutional propriety to restore credibility and improve capacity. The commission is a useful mechanism for telling an authoritative story about justice, for exercising national command. The power of these internal mechanisms lies in the strategic narrative they convey, in the exhibition of procedure and not in their findings, which are rarely binding and often neglected. Instead, these are performances of governance. They are aspirational stories that recognise irregularities rather than correcting them, making suggestions for how to proceed into the future. Commissions of inquiry, routinely overseen by senior justices, present an increasingly legal approach to governance concerns. Their prominence and the reliance placed on them indicate a recognition of the failure of political procedure. On the other hand, commissions perform the revitalisation of institutional capacity (Ramaphosa, 2018a); transcending the past by composing a picture of amelioration. To undo the state capture he inherited, a core concern of Ramaphosa’s programme has been to reclaim state policy instruments. Initially hamstrung by ineffective departments, he has freed resources and consolidated authority by streamlining his Cabinet from 36 to 28 ministers. Some credible, experienced candidates have been appointed to critical positions including the Head of the National Prosecuting Authority and the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service. Ramaphosa has focused on a careful, and therefore slow, clean-up of government institutions, while restraining political opponents in his party. Instead of imposing his authority, Ramaphosa’s strategy is to re-capacitate state institutions so they can both model and facilitate best practice and recover the goods lost as spoils tostate capture. He has charged panels comprised of experts with the task of selecting new heads of organisations. In so doing, he is distancing himself from the selection process and redressing the patronage system associated with Zuma’s appointments, targeting the populist cult of personality developed under Zuma. Ramaphosa has enacted a new, meritocratic precedent based on building consensus. This, among other actions, is directed at correcting the past by empowering institutions, instead of individuals, to lay the foundation for a capable state before implementing policies. However, this process has proven to be time-consuming, frustrating the public desire to see results.Ramaphosa is deliberate in his approach, instilling proper procedure from the top without allowing himself to be rushed, or the process to become politicised. In order to set an example of best practice, he needs to follow the book. By depoliticising the power of the state bureaucracy, he is subverting interests ulterior to the power of the state. In so doing, Ramaphosa discharges his responsibility — to both the party and to the electorate — to lead. This approach can be seen to be of little substance when it comes to policy breakthroughs and outcomes. Much of the espoused renewal remains deadlocked by political constraints. Whereas Ramaphosa may be recapacitating the presidency, the policy outputs of cabinet and a government maligned by factions are preventing real implementation. While the party remains divided and weak, so too policy implementation will be hamstrung. Tools for restructuring and renewal While it is too early to determine its effectiveness, the attention given to structural considerations strategically builds influence and confidence. In a particularly insightful speech delivered to the World Economic Forum in 2019, Ramaphosa announced South Africa’s plans to create an environment that is attractive for development: ‘We therefore come to Davos with a single message, and this year the message is that South Africa is on a path of growth and renewal’ (Ramaphosa, 2019f). To advance this charge, his government is leading investment into the state. The government has begun to reallocate public spending to strategic sectors such as agriculture and small business development and has launched a stimulus package and an infrastructure fund (Ramaphosa, 2019b) to advance economic growth and investment. Ramaphosa’s promotion of opportunities, such as the recently established African Continental Free Trade Agreement, is intended to bolster South Africa’s strategic attractiveness. He has, furthermore, personally launched an ambitious investment drive, aiming to raise USD100 billion in new investments during his administration. For this, he has appointed a team of business and finance experts that include Trevor Manuel, former Finance Minister, and current senior advisor to the investment bank and financial services company, Rothschild & Co. Ramaphosa has implemented targeted reforms to ensure that policies are enacted. These include new ‘visa regulations to encourage more visitors, as well as making it easier for investors and business people to visit South Africa’; a Mining Charter ‘that balances the need for transformation with the imperative for new investment’; the allocation of a ‘high-demand radio spectrum to accelerate broadband access and promote competition within the sector’; and the signing of ‘long-outstanding agreements with independent power producers’ to restart South Africa’s successful renewable energy projects (Ramaphosa, 2019f). All these are corrective measures to redress corrupt Zuma-era policies and bureaucratic stagnation. All have commenced but have not been completed. They are also all measures intended to diminish the government’s involvement, advancing South Africa’s strategic attractiveness for investment and growth. These reforms to consolidate and streamline regulatory processes aim to improve the ease of doing business in South Africa, which currently ranks 82nd in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index. Ramaphosa has targeted this instrument as a barometer for success, indicating that his ‘administration has set itself the ambitious goal of being in the top 50’ (Ramaphosa, 2019g). In another move to improve the functioning of his government, Ramaphosa has established the Policy Analysis and Research Service to improve the development and coordination of policies across government; a similar policy unit that performed as a clearinghouse for policy processes under President Mbeki, was disbanded under Zuma. A central means of Ramaphosa’s strategic communication has been the hosting of summits. Summits bring together various stakeholders to engage in diverse matters of interest. They are places where opportunities are discussed and where consensus can emerge dynamically. These are platforms to gather participants to engage with specific issues, share resources, and form compacts. At the inaugural South Africa Investment Conference in October 2018, Ramaphosa secured the first USD20 billion tranche of his projected USD100 billion in new investments. He also hosted a Jobs Summit: ‘to align the efforts of every sector and every stakeholder behind the imperative of job creation…[and] to come up with practical solutions and initiatives (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ In 2019, Ramaphosa hosted the 1st South African Digital Economy Summit, addressing the opportunities provided by advanced technologies and the challenges of digital disruption. Both there and at the Presidential Health Summit, Ramaphosa asserted the need for establishing both a digital compact (Ramaphosa, 2019h) and a health compact (Ramaphosa, 2019i) with the people of South Africa. Ramaphosa’s dynamic approach to renewal can be seen in his government’s ongoing review of the National Development Plan — since it was adopted in 2012 not much of South Africa’s detailed long-term guide to prosperity has been implemented. The plan is currently being reviewed to offer clearer, more up-to-date policy guidelines. Here again, Ramaphosa has appealed for cooperation: ‘We want to work with you, and for you to challenge us, to bring added rigour to the work of government [...] this is a government that is not afraid of new ideas, and of new ways of thinking’ (ANA reporter, 2019). In showing that the government recognises its failures and by appealing to the public for participation, Ramaphosa uses the opportunity provided by the revision of the National Development Plan, not only as a signal of departure from the past, but also as a tactical approach to renewal. By restructuring the architecture of government, the new ANC is providing people and businesses with opportunities to take action. Some initial examples include the reduction of port and rail tariffs and the implementation of spatial interventions such as special economic zones. These ventures appeal to citizens’ ambitions and duties. These new policies represent the government’s first steps toward upholding its end of the promised social compact and an invitation to members of the public to engage in the business of renewing the state. Given the state’s level of depletion, these policy tools are structured to induce members of the public to employ their creativity and their assets in rebuilding the state. While it is too early to conclude whether it will be successful, the extent of Ramaphosa’s strategy demonstrates the desperation both he and his government feel. Conclusion Ramaphosa’s precarious leading of both a party in turmoil and a captured state requires communication that is clear and targeted. To avoid being drawn into political battles, he first aligns himself with the values of the state. By crafting his message in service of the national interest, he puts the building blocks of the state into place. Ramaphosa uses strategic communication to transcend Zuma’s legacy. He claims his leadership in the name of advancing the national project. He builds his strategic narrative around the values of the state, personifying the ideals of consensus and compromise. Ramaphosa’s embodiment of the national Constitution is a strategic approach to advancing ideals conducive to restoring order and to building a stable and capable state while countering radicalism. This alignment to the highest standard of legitimacy is strategic. It confounds his opposition. Yet, it is an indirect and therefore precarious approach that can fail if not adopted by the government and the citizenry. This failure will have a direct and devastating impact on policy implementation. Ramaphosa’s focus on ethos is a clear return to the era of Nelson Mandela. He thereby transcends the troubles of the recent past to remind the public of the early years of democracy when civic responsibility was strong. He employs the image of Mandela as the symbol of a nation reconciled. Mandela conceived South Africa’s national values by crafting the nation in word. Ramaphosa’s use of slogans such as the ‘New Dawn’ and ‘Thuma Mina’, harkens back to the moment South Africa changed its destiny, a time of overcoming hardship and of national purpose. Ramaphosa’s communication is a call to action. He uses the means at his disposal to construct a seductive, forward-looking story of a united and prosperous nation. His leadership is not simply laying down a plan of action. Instead, it is the embodiment of a vision that calls the people to action. It is a campaign to stimulate and persuade citizens to support his mission, to forge a collective will towards achieving the national ends. It is too early to tell whether Ramaphosa’s ethos-driven strategic communication, aimed at a long-term vision, has persuaded the nation. This vision is used as a means of restoring order and stimulating the public to endorse his pragmatic short-term efforts. Ramaphosa’s active drive for securing investments and restoring the confidence of the people shows that his dream is not merely a pipe dream. Instead, he uses his visionary approach strategically to engage stakeholders and elicit tangible commitments. His hands-on approach, not as a philosopher-king but a summit king, shows a concerted effort to drive his vision through pragmatic action. Ramaphosa’s leadership provides insight into a theory of domestic strategic communication that is useful in our hyper-mediated world. The increasingly diffuse nature of power in the 21st century requires leaders to use communication holistically to shape national realities and to deter adversarial foreign information campaigns. Domestic strategic communication expresses a leader’s national ideas and ideals; the national ethos is communicated through leadership style. Ramaphosa embodies national values and norms to persuade the nation, demonstrating his approach towards reaching his ends. His leadership does not impose but stimulates an ideal; the nation is constituted and territorialised in word. Ramaphosa uses domestic strategic communication to persuade his audience to trust his message and to identify with it. If he communicates successfully, the people will adopt their leader’s version of affairs, and their agency can be applied to realising the goals of the nation; the citizens are to be empowered and emboldened to adopt civic responsibility, and Ramaphosa will lead by doing. To achieve its end, strategic communication is used to cohere and guide the nation, pursuing a set of values and goals that is organic to the state and its cause. This approach will be critical as citizens of states around the world increasingly adopt a variety of identities, while facing foreign information campaigns. Strategic communication inspires the people to adopt the nation’s ends as their own. Ramaphosa’s approach has been illustrative. References African National Congress (ANC). 2007. Strategy and Tactics, adopted at the 52nd National Conference, 2007. Johannesburg: African National Congress. African National Congress (ANC). 2012. ‘The Second Transition?’, ANC discussion document towards national policy conference, Version 6.0, Politicsweb, 5 March 2012. African National Congress (ANC). 2017. Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress, discussion document of the 5th National Policy Conference, 30 June –5 July 2017. Johannesburg: African National Conference. 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The African National Congress, led by Cyril Ramaphosa won 57.5% of the vote. Ramaphosa was elected by the National Assembly two weeks later. [4] In an appeal to national unity, Ramaphosa shut down the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters’ call to drop a part of the Apartheid era Anthem from the compounded Anthem of the new South Africa. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. The next frontier: South Africa and participatory local governance in the Anthropocene By A Trevenen-Jones (BSc Agriculture, MSc Environment and Development, PhD) Abstract Living conditions for South Africans and the rest of the world are changing fast. This abrupt and radical shift has significant implications for people’s daily lives, their prosperity and the natural environment. We live in the Anthropocene – an era of unprecedented and accelerated change on planet earth due to human activity. The often-shocking phenomena associated with this, our new frontier, have become the norm. Today, we see multiple, non-linear challenges which typically intersect, thereby amplifying their impact. Challenges such as climate change, urbanisation, inequality, food insecurity and Covid-19. Those most vulnerable, like urban residents with low and variable incomes, are likely to suffer the most during these shocking events. But the transition to a resilient and just South Africa has already begun and new socio-economic and environmental opportunities are in the offing. The National Development Plan 2030’s vision of a low-carbon economy that ‘leaves no-one behind’ is evidence of South Africa’s track record of climate action commitments, which span almost 20 years. Similarly, the Paris agreement climate targets and, more recently, the Climate Change Bill. The efforts focus on mitigation of and adapting to climate change and its impacts, however, and must be seen alongside developing actions that can facilitate future-fit resilience. In practice, shortcomings in South Africa’s participatory democracy, the social contract (horizontal governance) and co-operative governance (vertical governance) compound a lack of policy coherence together with a lack of capacity and constrained public budgets in local government. Local government and citizens are key to South Africa’s efforts to mitigate, adapt and achieve just transformation in the Anthropocene. This paper critiques South Africa’s participatory democracy and co-operative governance in the Anthropocene. The areas of focus are action on climate change and the local governance of a ‘capable state’ in a social contract with its citizens. Introduction Life and the Anthropocene Life is about change. Not just momentary change, but a continual series of abrupt shifts that are, and will, profoundly impact humans on earth today and the generations yet to be born. This is a particularly acute characteristic of life in the era of the Anthropocene – anthropo for “man” and cene for “new” – and represents the first time that human activity is changing the state of the earth on a planetary scale (Stromberg, 2013). Human endeavours are accelerating climate change underscoring the urgency to act before it is too late. Efforts must be made to stabilise the predicted Hothouse Earth climate trajectory to a human-friendly earth system state (Steffen et al., 2018). The Hothouse Earth trajectory tracks when interconnected ecological tipping points will be breached resulting in irreversible change (Steffen et al., 2018). An example is the Greenland ice sheet’s 1.50C ecological tipping point threshold (as measured against pre-industrial temperatures), which is expected to be breached by 2030 with a consequential 7m addition to the sea level and a growing threat to coastline settlements (Lenton et al., 2019). The recent sixth assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has confirmed that global temperatures have now risen 1.10C above pre-industrial temperatures – only just shy of the 1.50C rise that will threaten the ‘safe operating space for humanity’ on this planet (Rockström et al., 2009). The United Nations Development 2020 Report aptly titled, The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene, declares that the: Warning lights - for our societies and the planet - are flashing red…A new normal is coming. Covid-19 is the tip of the spear. Human choices, shaped by values and institutions, have given rise to the interconnected planetary and social imbalances we face. (UNDP, 2020:3-4). As the Covid-19 pandemic has shown, in the Anthropocene multiple challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, public health and food security intersect in a complex manner, and everyone is vulnerable in some form. This is an existential crisis; possibly one too large to fully fathom in the routine of daily living and governance calamities. A radical mind shift is needed – one that alters every aspect of how we live, the choices we make, how we act as a society and how we survive. The participatory governance and legislative framework that underpins the way in which South Africans live and pursue their prosperity can no longer be viewed from a social perspective alone. An ecological perspective, which coherently engages people and the natural environment (Trevenen-Jones, 2011), is needed to frame South African governance and policy with local and global horizons. This encompasses the explicit and implicit notion of the social contract, which, for South Africans, was reinterpreted during the 1994 democratic elections and presented in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996). It’s an agreement between the government and the citizens as to who has what rights and duties. This contract is further detailed at the level of local government and in communities where, for example, the provision of basic services is a right and the payment of rates and taxes is a duty for local residents. Developmental State in the Anthropocene Since the first democratic elections in 1994, institutional and policy values have centred around the notion of South Africa as a developmental state. In practice, this notion has been defined by a legacy of programmes that aim to achieve the just socio-economic transformation goals inherent in the Constitution. The goals include the right to a safe and healthy environment (see section 24 of the Constitution) alongside the twin policy mandates of poverty eradication and economic growth and development. One such programme is the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) launched in 2006 to overcome barriers like inequalities, infrastructure constraints and deficiencies in government capacity standing in the way of achieving these mandates (Presidency, 2007). Essentially, the approach has been to deliver on basic rights and economically grow and develop all spheres of life to lift people out of poverty while crafting an inclusive, equitable socio-economic space for citizens to improve their wellbeing and live in prosperity. Progress has been imperfect with initial successes mostly in reducing poverty. Significant inequalities persist, poverty is still on the increase and employment is on a downward trajectory (World Bank Group, 2018). Furthermore, Covid-19 has amplified the number of people living in poverty and increased other existing inequalities such as access to food in urban communities. The combined impact of climate change is eroding the eradication of poverty even further (World Bank, 2021). Indeed, climate change is likely to make it particularly difficult to address poverty. Hotter temperatures, droughts and floods have a dire impact on well-being, nutritional security and homes. South Africa faces these challenges against the background of an ongoing lack of government capacity, local service delivery inefficiencies, urbanisation trends, tenacious spatial settlement disparities and a coal-based economy. However, its participatory democracy, with its framework of mandatory legislative instruments, has the potential to effectively navigate and address the challenges for present and future generations in the Anthropocene. Participatory Democracy, Cooperative Governance and Climate Action The mitigation of and adaption to climate change – especially the goal of a just transition to a local low-carbon economy as advocated for in the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) (National Planning Commission, 2011) – is supported by the participatory democracy (horizontal governance) and cooperative governance mechanisms (vertical governance) in South Africa. While governance mechanisms are in place and South Africa has made increasingly bold climate action commitments, locally and globally, survival in the Anthropocene for people and the planet demands immediate, urgent and wide-ranging transitions in the routine practices of governance and livelihoods. This paper critically explores the delivery context as well as the social contract relationship between local government and citizens since they routinely engage and are in close proximity to the impacts of a changed and hotter earth. Both are also important actors in mitigating, adapting and transforming to climate change. A just transition can arguably be viewed as a unique opportunity to strengthen the social contract between local government and communities to overcome inequalities and realise a more inclusive, equitable and resilient South Africa in the ‘new frontier’. Just Transition and Development in The New Frontier Democratic change in South Africa has focused on redressing the apartheid legacy and realising transformative and equitable socio-economic development. Integrated development planning with attention to realising a sustainable environment and settlements has been an important part of this. The former Minister of the National Department of Human Settlements, Lindiwe Sisulu, asserted that human settlements are ‘integral’ to the government’s efforts to change the lives of South Africans for the better. She aimed to ‘empower communities’ which ‘includes transforming the apartheid spatial planning and patterns of social exclusion’ (DHS, 2020:4-5). New freedoms and choices, mobility, economic development and access to education and health services have changed the way South Africans live (DHS, 2020). Yet, the choices faced by South Africans – with signposted years of 2030 and 2050 up ahead – are embedded in a rapidly changing Anthropocene delivery context. Poverty, inequality and achieving prosperity for all remain familiar challenges. The way in which vulnerabilities and freedoms are experienced, and responded to, on the new frontier is increasingly unfamiliar, complex and often counter-intuitive. The NDP astutely recognises that the state cannot achieve its constitutionally enshrined obligations and developmental mandate without more proactive citizen engagement in the social contract (National Planning Commission, 2011). Trevor Manuel, then chairperson of the National Planning Commission, stressed that: On the present trajectory, South Africa will not achieve the objectives of eliminating poverty and reducing inequality. There is a burning need for faster progress, more action and better implementation. The approach of the plan revolves around citizens being active in development; a capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct our historical inequities; and strong leadership throughout society working together to solve our problems… [a] need to enhance the capabilities of our people so that they can live the lives that they desire (National Planning Commission, 2011:1). Moreover, the NDP's vision of a just transition to a low-carbon economy by 2030 signals a dramatic shift to the traditional mandates (National Planning Commission, 2011). How poverty eradication is achieved, and what constitutes prosperity, needs to be re-envisioned in this new frontier. The challenges of and efforts to address poverty eradication and persistent inequalities, urbanisation, and the crafting of space for people to enjoy human rights and chart their routes to prosperity will all be exacerbated in this new frontier. South Africans are ill-prepared to realise this just transition. Historical settlement and planning disparities – which remain evident as reliance on fossil fuels and inadequacies – curtail the practice of participatory democracy and the cooperative governance model. To be climate active and achieve low-carbon lifestyles will require the full and urgent realisation of the potential inherent in the social contract between citizens and the government. Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy, underscored the need to ensure South Africans are climate literate so as to better equip them for the new choices that lie ahead locally and globally within the context of South Africa as a climate ‘responsible global citizen’ (Creecy, 2020). Climate literacy, climate targets and the NDP 2030 vision are, therefore, vital steps but they can also brush over the granular detail of what is involved in realising the just transition to low-carbon lifestyles. Climate Action and Governance in South Africa Climate Action Commitments Cognisant of the urgency to take immediate action, climate action is incorporated into South Africa’s NDP 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011) and the country is a signatory of the multilateral Paris Agreement committed to keeping global warming below 20C (preferably 1.50C) compared to pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). The Paris Agreement is ambitious, yet the science shows a significant disparity in life on earth between the half-degree difference of its two targets. A 20C increase will lead to a breach of ecological tipping points followed by irreversible and cascading impacts that will cause a new planetary equilibrium referred to as Hothouse Earth (Steffen et al., 2018). South Africa aims to leave no-one behind while keeping greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) low. This will require strategic and widespread socio-economic transformation driven by regulation, innovation, mitigation and adaptation measures. It will require effective participation fostering commitment and shared responsibility, especially between local government and citizens (residents). In September 2021, the cabinet approved a comprehensive climate change bill to protect the environment for the well-being of present and future generations, thereby providing a bold and rigorous legal framework. Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy, was scheduled to table the bill in parliament in November 2021 after the local government elections. In addition, South Africa’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) was to be presented with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at COP26. The NDC represents South Africa's contribution to global efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to mitigate climate change. Governance National agreements, strategies and plans such as the NDP, the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and Goals and possible commitments to the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit in December 2021 have enormous implications for citizens and government. Cities and their local governments, especially, are viewed as essential to the implementation of programmes such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The intersection with other SDGs such as zero poverty, zero hunger, good health, and wellbeing climate action together with SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities is of specific significance. This is because of the link between citizens and local government (horizontal governance) and service delivery and participatory governance. Also of significance is the intersection between them and other spheres of government through cooperative governance (vertical governance) and global climate and other SDG commitments (UN, 2015). South Africa’s participatory democracy relies heavily on the social contract between citizens and the state. This contract stretches beyond voting to fully realising Constitutional rights, governance mechanisms and inclusive and equitable development. Participation is underpinned by a robust legislative framework that sets out the provisions for legislatures to establish constructive democratic tension between elected officials and administrations. This has primarily been a feature of the national and provincial government spheres rather than local government. In terms of its constitutional mandate (see section 42 (4) of the Constitution), the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) provides a participatory platform at the level of the province (RSA, 1996). It plays an important and unique role in facilitating coherent cooperative governance that respects the synergies and mandates of each sphere of government guided by the principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. While this is an effective vertical governance mechanism, which engages horizontal governance when it seeks communities’ feedback on policy and delivery, the question remains as to the readiness of these climate action and sustainable development institutions and mechanisms to give better effect to local governance across government spheres. Drawing on their case study of South Africa,Alina Averchenkova, a governance and legislation specialist, and her colleagues from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment assert that South Africa has the ‘most elaborate and consultative climate governance systems observable among developing and emerging economies’ (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019:3). Even so, they argue, that notwithstanding robust horizontal and vertical governance mechanisms, there are several barriers, including insufficient human and technical capacity as well as ‘ownership’ of the problem and solutions, tensions between the public and private sector, state capture, corruption and a distracted leadership, in the way. Of relevance to this paper is the critique that the ‘lack of alignment and policy coherence’ poses a systematic roadblock to South Africa’s climate objectives (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019). Active Citizens and Local Government The principle of public participation in all spheres of government is embedded in the Constitution to the extent that, in the local government sphere, the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a) requires that municipalities review and address the needs of local communities and establish participatory mechanisms such as public participation forums. These forums include engaging citizens on the Integrated Development Planning process. Participatory governance is further directed by the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 2000). For reasons ranging from a lack of technical lay-person capacity to civic awareness to available time to finances and IT skills, public participation has lagged the legal framework designed to secure it. The expectation that basic service delivery should be provided by local government and citizens paying for these services tend to define the social contract between citizens and this sphere of government. This largely transactional relationship can obscure the full potential of the social contract in South Africa’s participatory democracy. Citizens from wider civil society encompassing the private and non-profit sectors and academia, could, for example, play a more proactive role in formal and informal partnering with local government. This will better realise a just transition within urgent Anthropocene-driven timeframes. Achieving climate and sustainability commitments like those set out in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (UN, 2015) and the NDP 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011), requires ‘active citizens’ and a capacitated ‘developmental state’. This is especially important in the routine of citizens’ daily lives – where and how they live – and in local government. Ramodula and Govender (2021) assert in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b) that a developmental local government is to be aspired to as it facilitates socio-economic benefits and wider prosperity for local communities. Even so, these benefits, they contend,are undermined by well-intended public policies that are insufficiently interpreted into delivery (Ramodula & Govender, 2021). This inefficiency, together with a top-down flow of policy (vertical cooperative governance) rather than a two-way flow between local government and higher spheres of government, is compounded by a lack of policy coherence across all spheres (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019). Further hindrances are a lack of capacity and public budgets in local government. The result is an emphasis on local government function rather than an additional focus on the aforementioned potential of a pro-active local government and citizens who are proactively engaged in driving local agendas for consideration in international and national agreements, public policy and strategies. Coherent governance is critical considering the unique socio-economic and environmental context of cities and the importance of cities for the successful realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cities exert a profound and far-reaching influence on the environment and societies outside their boundaries as a result of population density, economic significance, affluence and ensuing global resource requirements. Cities are also centres of knowledge, technology and innovation (Wiedmann & Allen, 2021:1). The character of the Anthropocene era may leave local governments without sufficient capacity and budget to manage and serve communities. In a time of climate change and climate action, the traditional post-apartheid/new democracy rights and service delivery obligation arguments need to transform, particularly where the relationship between ‘capable state’ and ‘active citizen’ is about a future-fit mindset. The relationships between primary and secondary cities as well as multi-stakeholder engagement with both citizens and local government in rural communities underpin the resilience of today and tomorrow’s frontiers. These actions prompt participation, and with it, elevates citizens’ voices through vertical governance mechanisms such as cooperative governance. Everyone becomes an active citizen in this new world of the Anthropocene even if they don’t act, which in itself is action since a business-as-usual environment drives change on a local and planetary scale. Granularity of ‘Active Citizens’ and Hothouse Earth Population Trends Who are the ‘active citizens’ – those with constitutionally endowed rights that enable them the freedom to pursuing prosperity? The ones who are part of the social contract? South Africa’s population of about 60.3 million people is projected to be about 66 million in 2030 and 70.5 million by 2050 – reaching a plateau of 79.5 million in about 2070 (World Population Review, 2021). Projected trends show that South Africans are living longer – women (67.7 years) and men (61.5 years) – and that the youth is an important dimension. Additionally, population growth is beginning to slow (Stats SA, 2016; Stats SA, 2019). The Covid-19 pandemic may adjust this temporarily, but the overall trend has shown a consistent rise, which is likely to continue. In all likelihood, South Africa is at what former international public health professor, Hans Rosling, termed the global age of ‘peak child’ – a demographic trend where the number of children born today is unlikely to increase in future generations, which would ultimately lead to a population growth plateau (Rosling, Rosling & Rönnlund, 2018). Even so, the granularity of the data shows a youth bulge, with almost 30% of the population aged 0-14 years, and 50% under 25 years of age (Stats SA, 2019). The implications for local participatory governance, active citizens and climate action related to this population data are far-reaching. The youth bulge offers hope given the strong youth advocacy for climate action. Those of us presently active in the economy, and more broadly, ‘active citizens’, aged say 30 years would be 60 years old in 2050, and 80 in 2070. On this timeline you, your children and grandchildren will be the ‘active citizens’: the ‘present and future generations’ referenced in sustainable development including the National Climate Change Bill. From this view, generations collapse in time making this time and action about the almost-past, present and future generations. Cities and Urban Communities South Africa continues to rapidly urbanise. Urbanisation is typically associated with changing lifestyles, shifts towards unhealthy diets (Hawkes, Harris & Gillespie, 2017) and increasing socio-economic and environmental inequalities (Burdett, 2016). The spatial network of both primary cities – Cape Town, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Mangaung – and secondary cities – Emfuleni and Mbombela – is characteristic of a landscape unevenly interrupted by rural communities across South Africa’s provinces (South African Cities Network, 2020). Proactive, coherent policies together with participatory and cooperative governance are needed to: (a) Ensure the voices of cities and urban communities filter upwards and across governance spheres; and (b) Realise social inclusion and equity in cities and urban communities. Turok and Visagie illuminate the value of cities as having ‘considerable potential to combine prosperity with social inclusion, and thereby provide pathways out of poverty – but this is not automatic or inevitable’ (2018:3). According to current MEC for Economic Development and former mayor of Johannesburg, Parks Tau, writing in the State of South African Cities Report: ‘Cities are about people, first and foremost’ – a phrase that emphasises the importance of urban residents. South African cities should be safe, liveable, socially integrated, economically inclusive and globally competitive with an active citizenry (South African Cities Network, 2016:7). Urbanisation and pervasive inequalities underscore the importance of urban planning. Spatial connectivity between cities and rural communities is of similar import and be done in such a manner as to support socio-economic prosperity and food and nutrition security – and be attentive to localised interpretations of climate action, including the National Climate Change Bill. An Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) was developed which responded to the urbanisation trend and the 2030 vision outlined in the NDP (National Planning Commission, 2011). The framework encompassed the notion of inclusive, participatory governance in urban planning and spatial transformation (Integrated Urban Development Framework, 2022). South Africa’s IUDF is coordinated by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). This framework is a critical policy tool and a key to climate action in urban areas as it strives to give effect to both horizontal and vertical participatory governance through a “shared understanding” of what constitutes best urbanization management and how best to achieve ‘the goals of economic development, job creation and improved living conditions’ (IUDF, 2022). Just Transition, Low-Carbon Economy Proactive Legacy of Climate Commitments How prepared are local governments with regard to their governance mechanisms and active citizens for life on a hotter earth by 2030 and more so by 2050? Interestingly, South Africa has been a leading light in terms of climate awareness and policy, regardless of being under-capacitated and practicing poor participatory governance. In 2004, South Africa designed the National Climate Change Response Strategy, approved the National Climate Change Response White Paper in 2004 and, in 2011, climate action was included as an explicit element of the NDP. The NDP recognises the essential relationship between people and the non-human world, the impacts of South Africa’s largely fossil fuel economy and commits South Africa to a more sustainable ‘low-carbon economy’ development path (National Planning Commission, 2011). Just Transition to Low-Carbon Lifestyles The NDP envisions that by 2030 South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon, resilient economy and just society [should be] well underway. All sectors of society should be actively engaged in building a competitive, resource-efficient and inclusive future having undertaken the difficult steps to adjust. By then, the country will start to reap the benefits of the transition (National Planning Commission, 2011:179). Simply put, the NDP framework is replete with significant transformative leaps in the way South Africans live, address inequalities and envision what defines their own prosperity and expectations. Local government will shoulder a fair proportion of the responsibility of implementing the national climate policy. During the one-year consultative period there was a lack of widespread consensus amongst citizens – across many sectors – as to how a just transition and a low-carbon economy can and should be realised (National Planning Commission, 2011). However, there was consensus about key steps to mitigate and adapt to climate change. For example, new and existing technology, such as solar energy, will be important. Many jobs in the present economy are expected to be lost, while new jobs, requiring new skills sets, will emerge. A significant amount of public budget and personal household expenditure will be needed. Those most vulnerable now will become even more vulnerable during the transition (National Planning Commission, 2011). South Africa’s voluntary commitment made at COP15 (Copenhagen) in 2009 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below the ‘Business as Usual’ trajectory by 34 percent in 2020 and 42 percent in 2025 (conditional on support from developed nations) has been widely celebrated. Even greater commitments, with greater significance, have been made since then. In 2015, South Africa became a signatory to the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda with its 17 integrated goals including poverty eradication; zero hunger; affordable and clean energy; transformed industry-innovation and infrastructure; sustainable cities and communities; climate action and promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies; and strong institutions and access to justice (UN, 2015). The agreement directs complex intersections of global, yet local, commitments such as halving food waste by 2030 (Goal 12.3 under Sustainable Consumption and Production). The goal has enormous implications for the food systems such as retailers, households and local government waste management. Was food waste – defined as waste produced from point of retail to consumption – a country, it would hypothetically be the third-largest emitter of Greenhouse Gases (GHG), with only the USA and China ahead of it (Scialabba, 2015). Reducing food waste domestically is an example of a just transition being at the very heart of daily life and the social contract. The collection of household waste is a local government service paid for by residents. Reducing food waste is thus a local government and global sustainability commitment. In addition, the significance of reclaiming and redistributing food before it is wasted to citizens in need – especially to those most vulnerable in terms of food insecurity and those with low and/or variable incomes – underscores the social and wider ecological impact an effective social contract can have at the local government level. Reducing home food waste is also a crucial climate action that all active citizens can act on by partnering with local government: from the private sector to non-profits and community-based organisations to individuals. It will require more than ‘reduce, re-use and recycle’. It will require a mind shift to a circular or regenerative economy and lifestyles, that is, where almost nothing is wasted; where diversity of paths keep food (and other products) in use; and where organic ‘waste’ is used to nurture nature and support food production (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2021). Governance and Realising Low Carbon Commitments Given the volumes of GHGs already in the atmosphere causing the earth to overheat, urgent efforts are needed to further reduce emissions. This must happen alongside experimental geo-engineering solutions aimed at lowering the earth’s surface temperatures. For instance, painting roofs white to reflect back heat energy to manage existing GHG in the atmosphere (Wadhams, 2017). The 2021 local government election manifestos of ‘building back better’ and ‘growing together’ take on a deeper and critically nuanced significance in light of the social contract and low-carbon commitments. It is arguably misleading in the era of the Anthropocene to infer a sense of continuity with the past even if the intention is ‘building back better’. However, these slogans highlight the social contract of government and citizens doing things together to realise a better existence. Even so, there is a thread of normalcy – of more of the same but better – which detracts from the reality of the urgent, business unusual and wide-ranging demands of South Africa's local carbon transition strategy. Like the NDP, a consultative process was undertaken with South Africans to determine the country’s updated NDC ahead of the last annual climate conference, COP26 (Glasgow), held in November 2021. The NDC re-committed itself to the 1.50C preferred temperature threshold supported by GHG emissions targets of between 398-510 Mt of CO2-eq by 2025 and 350-420 Mt CO2-eq by 2030 (DFFE, 2021). Even for non-scientists, the magnitude of these targets would be evident. Large transformations in the practice of daily life will be expected from all citizens, and across all sectors, in a short space of time – and they are unlikely to be comfortable ones. To what extent do ‘consultations’ meet the principle of participatory governance given the challenges of participatory and cooperative governance is a further question. If consultation is to be an effective mechanism of collaborative governance, then, as Johnson and Howsam contend, they need to be ‘characterized by a degree of decision-making power, or, at least, the power to directly influence decisions’ (2018:253). The academics contrast this with the notion of ‘high intensity’ engagements with participants aimed at creating a shared understanding and goals. This is more akin to participatory governance. South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy (RSA, 2011) can be viewed as an evidence-based participatory policy development process. The document was developed on the basis of a mixture of emerging climate science evidence, government mandates and local and global climate engagements. The engagements include the successive Midrand events namely the National Climate Change Conference in 2005 and the Climate Change Summit in 2009 – both of which brought South Africans from multiple sectors together (in-person and later virtually) for consultation. Paradoxically, political will is evident while public participation is less evident based on the history of South Africa’s climate policy and strategy actions together with the recent September 2021 cabinet approval of the Climate Change Bill (scheduled to be tabled in parliament in November 2021). In addition, the cabinet also approved the revised NDCs and South Africa’s negotiating position for COP26. This new legislation points to South Africa’s dedication to keep GHG emissions well within the Paris targets and to pursue an ambitious strategy for doing so within shorter time spans. It will require the public and private sector and all active citizens to work together. To coordinate and provide integrated mitigation and adaption responses to climate change and the impacts thereof, as well as to realise future resilience. It will also involve significant financial cost as outlined by the Van Diemen (2021) reports in the Daily Maverick including the cost of an accelerated plan to close Eskom’s coal power plants as part of a systemic shift towards renewable energy – a project which will cost ZAR 750 billion. Climate action is unlikely to be driven at sufficient scale and intensity by South Africans – private and public – which makes the argument of consultation versus participation initially moot. The burden falls on government to consult and drive climate action through legislation and NDC targets. Beyond this argument is the need to be more participatory post legislation with a view to modifications and in relation to the practical needs of implementation. Such an approach will require bringing together all South Africans from cities and rural communities to business and community-based organisations. Particular attention must be given to those most vulnerable specifically applying a gender lens. Climate action demands technical proficiency, wide-reaching and just socio-economic transformation from local government – and all citizens. Therefore – if international and national commitments are to be met – capacitation, communication and outreach need to be an active and intense part of future participation and implementation. Government and citizens need to help each other rather than stand and wait on the boundary of expectation. They must re-evaluate expectations and act beyond the direct transactional view of the social contract. From Single Issue to Complex, Systematic Issues As is the case elsewhere, the challenges facing South Africa are immense. However, there are also new opportunities for the country on a climate resilient, just and transformed frontier. These opportunities are likely to emerge alongside a radical change in lifestyles; income and job creation; service delivery and interpretations of prosperity. As the Covid-19 pandemic showed, there is never just one global-local challenge. There is a complex, non-linear existence of multiple challenges including the pandemic + climate change + loss of biodiversity + urbanisation + existing public health + food and nutrition + security challenges – all of which amplify the impact on people and the planet and competes for immediate attention. Efforts to influence any single or multiple policy lever(s) to mitigate and adapt to a crisis, like the pandemic and/or climate change, is likely to have unintended and often unpredictable knock-on effects. For example, lockdowns to manage the spread of Covid-19 in South Africa not only impacted income and jobs, but as many as 9 million ‘extremely poor children’ lost access to free school meals and education (Roelf, 2020). The implications for local government and active citizens are that the traditional focus on single issues (and rights) – like water and sanitation, zoning for urban agriculture and road infrastructure – are outdated. Instead, there are complex, systemic issues. Addressing these issues requires technical understanding, sacrifices and trade-offs; multi-stakeholder participation with local government; coherent socio-economic, environmental and governance connectivity between urban and rural communities; in addition to energised, proactive and cooperative vertical governance. Although more is needed, an inspiring example of resilient planning in response to the shocking events of the Anthropocene was the situation in the City of Cape Town between 2015 and 2018. In this time, consecutive years of low rainfall resulted in an extreme drought that impacted water availability and services in the metropole. The severity thereof drove the city to develop a count-down clock to a D-day, called Day Zero, which was the day when the local government would ‘default’ on its social contract obligation to provide city residents with access to potable water. Day Zero was ultimately avoided – in part because sufficient rainfall eventually fell and in part because of the success of the Day Zero campaign – whereby Cape Town residents limited their daily water usage as per water provided by municipal services. Extreme droughts like this are expected to become the norm with similar impacts for the City of Cape Town and its residents. This experience has highlighted the importance of local government’s ability to partner with residents to face climate challenges and to develop a robust strategy to mitigate and adapt to shocking events like climate change and the pandemic (public health) (RSA2019). Cape Town’s resilient strategy with its 20 goals and 75 actions is defined by five pillars namely: a compassionate, holistically healthy city; a collaborative forward-looking city; a connected, climate adaptive city; a capable, job-creating city; and a collectively shock-ready city. Throughout these pillars, complex issues such as urban food systems, the economy, and health are systematically addressed and partnering with all ‘active’ resident citizens is prioritised (RSA, 2019). Conclusion The experience of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020/21) and that of the City of Cape Town during the drought of 2015-2018 illustrate how active citizens working with government to mitigate the realities of the Anthropocene is key to the survival of people and the planet. This is especially true in the local government sphere (state) since it is more coherently connected to local residents (citizens). In higher spheres of government, working together should be pursued through horizontal and vertical governance mechanisms. The social contract, South Africa’s participatory democratic framework and the cooperative governance structure underpin these mechanisms. South Africa has been undergoing socio-economic transformation since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. However, new challenges such as rapid urbanisation and shifts in population demographics – such as the youth bulge – together with climate change are emerging. Previously environmental changes were gradual and predictable. The changes seen in the Anthropocene, however, are not. The rapid environmental transformation of the era is now more than just anecdotal. The challenge of keeping global temperatures below 1.50C above pre-industrial levels is increasingly difficult as traditional lifestyles including wasteful food consumption and the use of fossil fuels like coal continue unabated. Similarly, traditional approaches to poverty eradication, income, and job creation need reviewing if prosperity for all is to be achieved on this new frontier. The new norm is about abrupt, unpredictable and extreme scale shocks that often amplify complex intersections of systems. Intersections include food and public health systems and challenges such as poverty and urban inequalities. How people live and define prosperity – and how they engage as active citizens with a ’capacitated state’ in South Africa’s participatory democracy especially at local government level – needs immediate attention and realignment with the climate, low-carbon vision. Without this, ambitious climate actions and GHG emission reduction targets such as those in the Paris Agreement’s NDC and the Climate Change Bill are unlikely to be reached within the short timeframes required. A sufficient scale to facilitate a just transformation towards the envisioned low-carbon economy and a resilient, sustainable, inclusive and equitable future for present and future generations will not be achieved. South Africa has a robust governance structure in place. However, the technical capacity for governance and active citizens and more coherent policy design and coordination across government spheres are needed. The voice of local horizontal governance needs to be given higher priority and legitimacy in provincial and national government spheres given the importance of local government’s role in effecting change in the routine of daily life, multi-stakeholder engagement and proactive citizenry. Equally, local governments can no longer afford to wait for direction from other spheres of government as how to solve their capacity and budget constraints. Local governments and citizens have the legislative mandate to act and should be doing so proactively, together as a community, and as one city. This will likely require an Anthropocene-driven evolution of the expectations and practice of the social contract. References Averchenkova, A., Gannon, K.E. & Patrick, C. 2019. Governance of climate change policy: A case study of South Africa. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1 [Accessed: 30 December 2021]. World Bank Group. 2018. Overcoming poverty and inequality in South Africa: An assessment of drivers, constraints and opportunities. Washington: World Bank. World Population Review. 2021. South African population. [Online] Available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/south-africa-population [Accessed: 30 December 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Strategic communication as policy strategy ways: An analysis of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic communication Dr Klaus Kotzé Confronting COVID-19 and health system inequalities in South Africa: Missed opportunities for inclusive health policies? Dr Laetitia Rispel, Ms Shennaz Munshi & Dr Candice Bailey Efficacy of the national housing policy in the provision of low-cost housing in the metropolitan municipalities of South Africa Mr Moloto Johannes Sekhobela The next frontier: South Africa and participatory local government in the Anthropocene Dr Annie Trevenen-Jones Ubuntu and the State Dr Motsamai Molefe

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originated from a dialogue on the Meaning of Social Democracy in the Modern World, which took place on 23 November 2021. Author: Dr Klaus Kotze Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Setting the scene On 23 November 2021, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted the first of a two-part international dialogue on social democracy. This first discussion asked what does social democracy mean in the modern world? The second, to be held in 2022, will reflect on what preconditions are required in a country for it to advance towards a welfare state? Recognising the need for social democratic solutions in the current unstable global political climate, the Institute invited an international group of social democrats to reflect on the positioning, role and effect of social democracy in contemporary politics. The dialogue sought to contribute to an important global discussion, while providing guidance to South Africans to advance social democracy in the domestic context. The discussion asked: Is social democracy still relevant today? What would it take to return it to its former influence over global politics? And to look forward, beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, which approaches would be necessary to expand its reach and impact? The discussion revealed several prisms through which to understand the unfolding discussion. It highlighted key areas for future collaboration among like-minded organisations. And from the discussion five themes are enumerated here to focus and advance the cause of social democracy. Participating panellists in the discussion included: Mr Johan Hassel, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, former South African Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs Lord Peter Hain, former UK Labour Cabinet Minister and anti-apartheid activist Dr David Masondo MP, South African Deputy Minister of Finance and Principal of the Oliver Tambo School of Leadership, South Africa Ms Dagmar Freitag, former SPD member of the German Bundestag Dr Lisa Pelling, head of Swedish Social Democratic think tank, Arena Idé Ms Katharina Hoffman, Head of Social Democracy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Prof Chris Mullard, Author, former Professor of Education and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam and Visiting Professor at the University of London and at the Royal Agricultural University. Co-founder of Focus Consultancy, UK Mr Mariano Schuster, Editor, Nueva Sociedad, Argentina Mr Sebastian Sperling, South Africa Country Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung The moderator to the discussion was Mr Roelf Meyer, former Minister of Constitutional Development and currently Director of the In Transformation Initiative. Establishing a forum on social democracy Remarks by the Inclusive Society Institute Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute & Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute of South Africa, after two years of its existence, has created this forum to reflect on what social democracy is today, and especially what it means in Africa. From these deliberations, the Institute seeks to gain an increased understanding of the conditions and policies that would lead to a more inclusive society. The discussion about the meaning of social democracy in the modern world is an important one. Many social democratic parties around the globe seem to be struggling to define their message in a way that establishes clear, blue water between themselves and the centre, centre-right. Could this be because many centre, centre-right governments have taken ownership of what would, traditionally, have been defined as typical social democratic programmes? Look at the National Health System in the UK for example, listening to a, typical, Tory MP, one could well believe that it is they that introduced it. But no, it wasn’t. It was the Labour Party in 1945. Aneurin Bevan, the then Labour Minister of Health, was given the task of introducing the service. Similarly, social grants and worker’s rights such as basic conditions of employment, have become the hallmark also of the centre, centre-right. Could it be that the centre, centre-left have systematically shifted to the economic right? Even here in South Africa, the line is being blurred between the centre-left and the centre-right. In the South African setting, the ruling party is committed to social and national democracy. At the same time, it prides itself on being a broad church capable of accommodating a wide spectrum of individuals from various ideological persuasions. This may be good from a support perspective, but does it promote policy cohesion? And how does it impact party messaging? There has recently been much talk about introducing a basic income grant, a national health insurance, and a social security fund, etc. All typical, social democratic ideas. But can these be effectively pursued when the message is not clear, and the pathway not spelt out clearly? To advance a progressive programme, one needs the right environment and resources. With a high unemployment, a small tax base and economic backlogs, this may prove quite challenging at this stage. A new pathway needs to be plotted. That said, in many countries centre-left parties now seem to be rediscovering a more progressive social economic agenda. The SPD of Germany is a prime example, albeit within a coalition environment. Social democrats should draw lessons from each other. To consider the lessons that can be learnt, the Inclusive Society Institute is hosting this two-part dialogue with the aim to contribute to the global discussion as well as provide guidance to the South African context. Executive summary Context The Inclusive Society Institute has identified that social democratic parties around the world appear to be struggling to put forward a coherent and persuasive message. That there is an existential struggle for the identity of social democratic parties. In the growing battle for influence, social democratic parties must rediscover and redefine their agenda and approach. While in some countries there appears to be re-discovery of progressive values, others struggle to define this for themselves. The case for international cooperation among progressives is clear. In this light the engagement between ideologically similar parties and organisations will allow for reciprocal learning and sharing. South Africa will particularly benefit from this engagement. While the ruling party pursues a socially equitable society, there are many areas where policy cohesion and implementation remain lacking. The engagement among other social democratic groupings will allow for insight and reflection that otherwise may remain constrained. For these reasons, these dialogues present significant opportunities. Strategic themes Social democracy requires a strategic definition To advance social democracy in the modern world, it is first necessary to clearly define the concept and its strategic pursuit. Social democracy is a broad term with its origins in socialism. Its adaptation to vis-à-vis rejection of capitalism ensures that the term is not static, but one of application. The following description offers a sturdy basis for expansion: “Social democracy is a variant of socialism distinguished by a conviction that democracy makes it both possible and desirable to take advantage of capitalism’s upsides while addressing its downsides by regulating markets and implementing social policies that insulate citizens from those markets’ most destabilizing and destructive consequences”[1]. For social democracy to be strategic in the contemporary era, it must establish with clarity its core 1) values; 2) pathways; and 3) goals. The values of social democracy are perhaps the more apparent. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in its document Basics on Social Democracy refer to freedom, solidarity, and equality and justice as the core values of social democracy. These values originate in the humanistic thoughts of the French Revolution and are reflected in the foundations of the United Nations. These values form the political compass of social democratic parties. Freedom refers both to positive (freedom to) and negative (freedom from) aspects. To social democrats, freedom has a broader foundation than the mostly negative freedom upheld by liberals. Freedom has social preconditions and aims. Some in society should not be able to be free while others are not. A free society is thus one where all have the possibility to be free. Freedom therefore entails a level of responsibility or solidarity to society at large. Solidarity is a wilful expression of relation or sympathy with others. The Southern African term Ubuntu, often translated as “I am because you are”, offers a fine understanding. Lastly, equality and justice are closely linked to freedom and solidarity. A society cannot be free if all its people do not have equality of opportunity and are treated as equals. To advance equality and justice, society should be ordered along a needs-based approach. The pathways or approach to social democracy was discussed in the dialogue by John Hassel as the state’s role in distributing, redistributing and regulating society across all its functions. To do so effectively the state must take a leading role in comprehensively working with all sectors of society. Together, a reasonable path forward must be planned. Lastly, the goals must not be defined abstractly or without context but should be based on what is clearly feasible and should follow careful consideration. While goals such as inequality, access and effective redress of injustices and inequalities are primary, it is first needed to enable a suitable environment. Social democracy is about people The values, pathways and goals of social democracy should all align towards a strategy that advances the society as a whole, while affording equity to those most in need. Social democracy is an approach which places people, and not profit, first. Strong, ethical politics that first consider society is primary, vis-à-vis an economic focus which places individuals and their interests first. The policies and actions of all spheres of society, including business, should be strategically aimed towards the benefit of people. The age of corporate dominance must be strategically ended through the imposition of appropriate mechanisms such as regulation. Social democracy also recognises that social agents, not simply management-oriented technocrats, run institutions and states. By restoring people as the end of government and by keeping people responsible for their actions, recognition and trust become highlighted. These features are foundational to a state with strong politics. One that places the direct improvement of the lives of people first. Social democracy requires an internationalist approach To be successful and persuasive, social democrats must actively realise an international solidarity among parties and like-minded organisations. With the world becoming increasingly connected and with people around the world facing similar challenges, there lies great strategic potential in joining forces. To rally towards an internationalist approach for social democracy in the modern world. Social democrats the world over share the same foundational beliefs and aspirations. Today’s social problems know no boundary. When considering inequality, migration and especially environmental degradation, these are all global concerns that can only be addressed when social democrats cooperate on a multilateral basis. Unlike during the late 20th-century decline of social democracy, where neo-liberalism gained the upper hand due to its pan-global reach and physically disconnected and unconstrained ways, today digital connectivity allows politics to again take an upper hand. This will require localised organisations and parties to partner in strategic, mutually beneficial ways so as to advance social programmes globally. These networks can find direction from the progressive solidarity of old (for example the international anti-apartheid movement), while drawing on successful social democratic parties, such as those in Germany, Portugal and New Zealand. Social democracy must advance a credible alternative to neo-liberalism Whereas centre-right parties appropriate leftist policies, the onus is on social democrats to put forward comprehensive alternatives and thereby win back popular support. This is slowly taking place in some countries already mentioned. It is now incumbent upon social democrats to put their stamp on the state, to return peoples’ interests to the core of the work of the state. To deal with corruption, with the regulation of mega corporations and with the inefficiencies of the state. As stressed in the dialogue by Lord Hain: “To retain taxpayer’s support the state needs to be efficient, effective, honest and responsive to public demand”. Reform cannot simply be the goal, instead the broader goals should be articulated appropriately. State interventionism would not only be tolerated but also be endorsed when people see that the state is clean and capable. That its actions put the interests of the people first, regardless of political affiliation, race or creed. That the state leads and tackles important questions such as land and economic development. Social democracy requires a persuasive narrative Communication is the more decisive discipline of the 21st century. All matters of public and private life are communicated for purpose. It is critical that social democrats assemble and persuasively propagate a credible and persuasive narrative. The propagation of this message must be comprehensive. It relies on all sectors of society to do their part. Whereas politics is about organisation, the modern world sees organisation largely taking place in the digital realm. Social democrats must develop an attractive digital narrative strategy. For the narrative to be effective, it should be clear and relatable. While stressing the failures of neo-liberalism is necessary, a strategic narrative cannot be arrogant in simply rejecting another narrative. It needs to put viable, attractive ideas forward. It needs to be constructive, compiling an alternative using examples. The narrative should bring people together rather than pull them apart. It should offer certainty in this time of great uncertainty. It should promote social mobility. It must be inclusive while recognising the diversity of people. In the dialogue, Professor Mullard stressed that today it is common for people to claim societies as heterogenous, as multicultural, whereas in fact they are not. These are societies that are descriptively heterogenous while structurally being far from it. A strategic social democratic narrative must be courageous in calling out these and other modern fictions. It must do so boldly. First, it must attend to the themes addressed above and particularly the need for strategic definition. Finally, for the narrative to be effective, it must be the product of conversation between leaders and the society at large. It must raise and address the real concerns of people while laying down a concise list of core interests and non-negotiables. Remarks by panellists “Social democrats should return to the basic principles of social democracy: distribute, redistribute and regulate” – Johan Hassel Johan Hassel, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party The insights regarding the development of social democracy in Sweden are relevant to South Africa’s case and the struggle ahead for the ANC. When its Social Democratic Party was founded 100 years ago, Sweden was a poor country fighting for the right for both genders to vote. It was a struggling society, but the first reforms of the social welfare state were already evident through social investment, which has been the approach behind the social democratic project within Sweden. To invest in people and human skills from a very young age, but also throughout life and throughout working life. In that regard, contributing to economic development and to producing and developing an economy which can be competitive on the global stage. And ensuring a contract between the state, society and individuals, with trade unions and parts of the labour market playing a crucial role together with the political parties. That trust is what has enabled the forums and managing of the crisis over the years. Sweden’s golden years of social democratic welfare expansion occurred during the fifties, sixties and seventies. This was a period of economic growth, of huge investments in social insurance, unemployment benefits, health insurance, but also in establishing a pension system, and childcare and universal education. This was thirty years of welfare state expansion in which people put their trust in society in order to advance economic prospects for not only society in general, but also for individuals. All citizens paid high taxes, a well-known fact about Sweden, but there was a very high return on those contributions. Trust in a working society was built over those thirty years. People’s expectations were met, and the state managed to deliver welfare, social improvement and social justice to the people. That could only happen because of the strong institutions that were free from corruption and based on the rule of law and fairness. There were no problems with nepotism or any other such issue. There was a very strong civic and civil society in which labour unions played a huge part, as well as education centres, institutions, the church, and all the sports communities. That created vigorous checks and balances. At that time, the Social Democratic Party’s electoral support was sitting at around 45%, something to be very proud of. But this period of success was followed by the years of retrenchments when, economically, neoliberalism took hold, not only in Sweden but in the rest of the world too. That proved to be the setting for the next three decades. When Sweden saw that it had an increase in the global financial markets, the country became more dependent on the financial system and the global economy. During the nineties, after Sweden had joined the European Union, the country was hit by a financial crisis, which paved the way towards Swedish welfare privatisation. Today, Sweden has one of the most privatised systems when it comes to education and, partly, when it comes to healthcare. Though Sweden stood as a bastion of social democracy, neoliberalism and the shift in economic policy took root, together with a social chasm, creating an exacerbated situation of ‘us and them’. The threat of terrorism was very real, and also the sense that prejudices and racism had grown in society. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 made it clear that the level of inequality had risen, and segregation gained a foothold within Swedish society. That opened the way for populist parties – the right-wing, populist, racist, nationalist, conservatives – in most of the European countries as well as in the US. This was during the surge of the Trump era, garnering a highly divided political landscape. Now, the pandemic has touched all corners of society. It has been a reminder of the importance of a strong society, of universal healthcare and of the need for resilient societies. It has emphasised that the ordinary workers in the hospitals, grocery stores, public transportation, are the ones carrying society. It is not the bankers and financial investors that society turns to in a crisis, but rather, it is the ordinary folk with ordinary – but important – jobs who keep a society working. The second crisis that needs our attention is the climate crisis – a structural crisis. Industry needs to change, together with commercial and consumer behaviour. Social life cannot continue to be based on the same level and kinds of consumption, which is killing the planet. This dilemma requires urgent social input. There is no company or industry that could alone take up the task of changing the way the business industry or the global playing field is currently functioning. This is why it was so important that the Paris Agreement was accepted and that there was a decent result at the Climate Change Conference in the UK. These crises are opportunities for social democracy because they are unlike those of the eighties and nineties, which lead to more privatisation, more involvement from the financial systems, more trickle-down economics. The dilemmas we face today can only be solved through international cooperation, multilateralism and global agreements, when changing the global playing field for business and industry. This can only be changed through infrastructure investment such as the ‘Build Back Better’ agenda put forward by President Joe Biden and the US Democrats, and through strong, resilient welfare societies taking care of people and instilling trust. We are standing at the forefront of a game-changing time in history which makes social democracy more relevant in the modern world than it has ever been during the last three decades. Social democrats should return to the basic principles of social democracy: regulate, redistribute and distribute. There is a need to regulate the business industry, to ensure that politics has the upper hand in the financial markets of the economy. That politics is the law, and not the economic system. However, regulations cannot work on a state-by-state basis; there need to be multilateral solutions. Secondly, there is a need to redistribute. Neoliberalism came to an end during the financial market crisis of 2007-2008, but it still lingers. Equality is good when more people have more to spend; and when people are making social investments, more long-term, sustainable growth is made possible. Higher taxes should be placed on the rich, on large corporations, and on pollution. But none of this can be achieved by any single country alone – the world has to work together and in collaboration with the global labour movements. The key principle, though, is distribution. Societies should invest in people, which increases human capital. This is what happened during the golden decades, when the principles of the welfare state were established. Using social investment with the added value of social democracy together with very targeted investments in infrastructure, builds inclusive societies where everybody can take part in the city. Today, most social democrats in Sweden talk about ordinary people, about increasing pensions, about universal healthcare. They are recognising that the division between people is based on increased inequality, that people no longer feel they have the same opportunities and, therefore, the same desire to strive for the future. Too much of the system has been individualised and there has been too little collective bargaining between the political parties, the state and the labour markets. One of the advantages of social democracy is that it is a broad, collaborative movement. COVID-19 is revealing the importance of a strong welfare society where every person has equal access to healthcare within their society. This is what creates trust in a society. When there is excessive privatisation, such as there is in Sweden, or rampant corruption, as is the case in South Africa, trust is broken. It is important that South Africa finds a long-term social democratic argument that benefits all which citizens can rally around to grow the economy. “Democracy is about social justice of the structure” – Buyelwa Sonjica Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, former South African Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs Social democracy is political ideology that originally advocated a peaceful evolutionary transition of society from capitalism to socialism using established political processes. In the second half of the twentieth century, there emerged a more moderate version of the doctrine which, generally, espoused state regulation rather than state ownership as the means of production and extensive social welfare programmes. It is important that while the ANC in the evolution of its policy was leaning more on an outfit that would change the capitalist system to a certain extent, that system had to be changed because it was more alienated and disenfranchised the black majority. The ANC did not define the actual outfit, but there was intention to change the status quo which was alienating society. The ANC gave power to the state to intervene on behalf of the people on matters of social and economic development. The ANC’s societal outlook is one that is born out of the Freedom Charter and the reconstruction and development programme and, ultimately, the Constitution of the new democratic order, which is hailed as one of the most democratic constitutions in the world. The Constitution of South Africa captures the aspirations of the people. It seeks to establish a society based on democratic values through fundamental human rights and social justice. All of these raised the expectations of the people of South Africa that the democratic state would end all ills of society. For example, they had hoped that it would eradicate poverty, it would end racism, and it would ensure that there were equal opportunities for all regardless of race, colour and creed. The Constitution envisages a peaceful and equal society in which all shall and will enjoy their human value and dignity, which was denied for some under apartheid. So, although there were some compromises during the writing of the Constitution, in its letter and spirit the ANC ensured that the Constitution tried to accommodate these sentiments. However, in order for any government to achieve and implement the Constitution, it needs power. Not only political power but also, and more importantly, economic power. Moreover, it needs the support and the will of the people. But neither power nor support were necessarily that possible to achieve, for two main reasons. Firstly, South Africa’s settlement was negotiated. In essence, as much as there was a protracted struggle to get its democracy to a particular point, in the end it was negotiated, or concluded through negotiations. In its governance, the ANC would have had to honour those agreements made between the parties at the time. Second, the economic power, which was also taken away or usurped when land was taken, was still in the hands of the few, leaving the majority of people homeless and impoverished and the state with insufficient resources to democratise society. But still, the people had hope. To a very large extent, the state has achieved a lot in its cause of democratising South Africa, in its attempt to restore economic power to the people. As a consequence, many progressive policies and much legislation has been developed. For example, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act, Land Reform Act, Human Settlements National Resources Act, and so on. Trade and industry also had its own policies that were meant to transform that part of the state, and to a certain extent, those policies have brought about significant changes. But to what extent has the state been able to meet the expectations of the people? That is the key question. To what extent has South Africa achieved equality or closed the gap between the rich and the poor? The Inequality Trends in South Africa report – a multidimensional diagnostic of inequality – produced by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) suggests that a huge amount of work still needs to be done. This report says that the financial value of all assets owned by an individual or household is a measure of the wealth of that individual or household. In South Africa, wealth inequality is considerably higher than income inequality. Furthermore, while the top 10% of the population has a 56-58% share of the income, they have, approximately, 95% of all the wealth. A number of questions regarding the national situation arise. Are these inequalities persisting because our policy framework is not relevant enough? Or if policies are relevant, are they being implemented? Ninety percent of land remains and is owned by just a few individuals, companies and trusts, according to the Land Audit Report 2017, produced by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. Is this situation also as a result of policy implementation? Or is it a challenge of policy not being developed enough to deal with the land issue? Resolving inequality also meant transforming business to end its monopoly and racial bias. Policy had to be developed to achieve this objective. During the post-1994 period, a number of policy instruments were initiated to help government hold business to account and, therefore, generate the revenue required to run government and provide quality public services for the struggling majority of South Africans. Such policy interventions include the Division of Revenue Act, intended to ensure an equitable division of fiscal resources amongst South Africans, to remedy the disparities of the apartheid era. Other important legislation and actions include the Employment Equity Act, the Labour Relations Act and affirmative action, which all became part of the instruments that were created and implemented to address the inequalities in the labour market. And all of this legislation was created in line with the provisions originally stipulated in the Freedom Charter, which was adopted in 1955. Past regimes accepted the national wealth of the country, stating that “the heritage of all South Africans shall be restored to the people”. Are we any closer to achieving the noble objectives of the Freedom Charter? It also states that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and the monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole”. Again, this begs the question, has this been achieved? The political and social environment partly changed as a result of the change brought about by a constitution that is embedded in human rights. But the majority of South Africans believe that democracy is not working and has no meaning for them. After all, they still live in poverty, and they are unemployed due to the social conditions under which they live: in squalor. If anything, democracy is about social justice of the structure, but you cannot achieve equality without the economic inclusion of the people in a meaningful and significant way. “A priority today should be, surely, to persuade the world that there is an alternative. A social democratic alternative for the suffocating embrace of global neoliberalism” – Lord Peter Hain Lord Peter Hain, former UK Labour Cabinet Minister and anti-apartheid activist Having been ascendant after World War II, especially in Europe, social democracy has been in retreat since the dawn of the neoliberal era, around 1980, even in Scandinavian countries where social democratic parties were dominant. Neoliberalism tolerates government regulation only where absolutely necessary, whatever the consequences for social justice. This has resulted in grotesque inequality, including in South Africa, in a system that seeks to shrink the size of the state by slashing the budgets that public services depend upon, and which pay for the pensions, child benefits and social security entitlements that cut poverty, encourage greater equality and promote social justice. In that cause, a priority today should surely be to persuade the world that there is an alternative. A social democratic alternative for the suffocating embrace of global neoliberalism infecting every country from South Africa to Namibia, from Britain to the United States, from China to Russia, from India to Brazil. Each country has different state and economic formations, but they all share a neoliberal imperative under this global context. Squeezed budgets have been the dominant feature of Britain’s neoliberal government policy since the conservatives reclaimed their seats in office by beating the Labour Party in 2010. For the next ten years, they took some 150 billion pounds of spending power out of the United Kingdom economy – 80% of it in the form of public spending cuts, proportionately bigger cuts than any in the rich world following the global banking crisis. That decade of savage cuts is the reason why 20,000 police jobs disappeared, why the National Health Service in England faced COVID-19 short of 10,000 doctors and 40,000 nurses and with over 100,000 unfilled vacancies for adult social care workers. It is why Britain has only two-and-a-half hospital beds per 1000 population, while France has six beds and Germany has eight. It is what shrinking the role of the state means in practice and why social justice and equality of opportunity remains well out of reach in neoliberal Britain today. Even die-hard neoliberal purists, who for a long time had screamed magic money tree at those advocating more and not less public investment, accepted that without massive state intervention decline will not be reversed. They accepted that borrowing heavily in order to spend record sums on support for business, for families and for the National Health Service and social care was the right thing to do. The very opposite of the neoliberalism they had so fervently preached. Yet there are still free-market fundamentalists and right-wing ideologues calling on Britain’s Finance Minister to reign it in and to return to austerity. They claim that with national debt now running at nearly 100% of national income in Britain, the country cannot afford to borrow more to pay for more public spending. But Britain’s national debt was over double current levels – nearly 250% of national income – after World War II, and the Labour Government then still managed to create a welfare state, a National Health Service and a fast-growing, fully-employed economy which built millions of publicly-funded houses. Turning to South Africa. Although there is a fervent debate on how to achieve essential economic transformation, that ambition cannot be achieved in isolation, because South Africa is not insulated from the globalisation or the financialisaton that has swept the world in parallel with the advance of neoliberalism, since 1980. Nor can it succeed without tackling corruption at the same time. The radical economic transformation faction is about self-enrichment for a chosen few, for themselves and their cronies, and not for greater equality for all. South Africa should not have to choose between a neoliberal small state and its current corruptly bloated state. To succeed, South African progressives of the left and the centre-left, in other words the social democrats, need to redefine their stamps on the state. Not least as a credible alternative to the neoliberals’ small state, which will otherwise continue to sweep the board. To retain taxpayers’ support, the state needs to be efficient, effective, honest and responsive to public demand. Not swollen, hopeless, corrupt and indifferent to citizens’ needs, as the South African state has now become, undermining Mandela’s legacy. It simply is not sustainable for 70% of tax revenues in South Africa to be spent on public sector wages and servicing the national debt. Private sector workers are suffering real wage declines and economic growth is stagnant to negative. The South African state needs to be radically transformed. There are around 900 state-owned enterprises, most of them inefficient, many bankrupt, leaching off the taxpayer, who should be funding other vital aspects such as better education, health, housing, infrastructure and scientific research and development. A neoliberal small state is not the answer in the modern age, if it ever was. In the most successful economies, the state plays a vital role. Not simply by providing high-quality public services, but also by encouraging economic growth, in part, by actively promoting innovation. A smarter interventionist, risk-taking, entrepreneurial state is therefore the answer for social democracy. The iPhone’s technology was not actually invented by Apple, rather, the internet, GPS, touchscreen displays, and Siri voice-activated facilities all originated from American state-funded research and development programmes, but a private risk-taking entrepreneurial company such as Apple was needed to bring them to market in a way that the state could never have done. Of course, an active entrepreneurial state needs to be well-financed, which also means ending the low tax obsessions of the neoliberalists. These are amongst the biggest challenges for social democracy today, which must be resolved successfully. “To achieve a social democracy, whilst reversing neoliberalism, South Africa requires a competitive as well as an inclusive economy. A social democracy is not just about distribution of social welfare. It is about developmental strategy” – Dr David Masondo Dr David Masondo MP, South African Deputy Minister of Finance and Principal of the Oliver Tambo School of Leadership, South Africa The Social Democratic Parties have shifted to the right. This has to do with stagflation. The economic framework which supported social democracy, particularly, after the Second World War, was a Keynesian model. This was predicated on what economists call the Phillips curve, where some inflation is tolerated as long as there is growing employment. With more employment, there is a growth in the demand for goods, resulting in more inflation. Inflation can thus be tolerated if there is growing employment. But the stagflation of the seventies landed the Keynesian model and the Social Democratic Parties in trouble. The Keynesian model could not provide a solution to stagflation, a situation where rising unemployment and rising inflation takes place at the same time. Social democrat macroeconomic policy has not provided an answer to this dilemma either. It was not by accident that the neoliberals, Friedman and others, provided a solution, which was to focus on inflation and forget about unemployment. An economic paradigm that the social democrats embraced. The problem of stagflation was not embedded; a social democratic solution was still needed. Furthermore, whilst neoliberalism was being implemented, the right-wing actually dealt with the real economic issues. They appropriated the economic solutions that were historically provided by the social democrats. In addition, the right-wing began to take seriously issues with regards to immigration, from a right-wing, racist point of view. Minorities were scapegoated. The right-wing did appropriate some economically left ways, but on cultural and social issues, they remained staunchly right-wing. South Africa can learn from social democracies like Sweden. One approach would be to develop and implement a development strategy that is not simply about welfare, but also about establishing a developmental state. Historically, in its pre-1914 origin, social democracy mainly dealt with the effects of capitalist development. As capitalism developed, it excluded people. This necessitated the development of a welfare state. So, in that regard, the origin of the social democracy welfare state emerges in the context of economic development. There is no doubt that the Industrial Revolution or the capitalist economy which started after the Black Death, and agrarian capitalism which first broke out in England, have generated enormous economic growth. But that economic growth also incurred great exclusion. Social democracy was a response by labour movements to that problem. Now, in the post-colonial situation, there exists not only the need to deal with the effects of capitalism, but also the effects of underdeveloped colonial capitalism, of low growth, the exclusion of black people, women and so on, as well as an undiversified industrial structure. In the South African context, in 1994 the manufacturing contribution to GDP was 24%. It is now down to around 11-12%. So, notwithstanding the fact that South Africa is relatively developed, it is not diversified. And the country imports a large portion of its goods, manufacturing, etc. The achievement of the developmental state first requires considerable catching up. There is no dichotomy between social democracy or a welfare state, and a developmental state. According to the ANC, both can exist simultaneously, while also addressing critical issues such as climate change. The lessons of post-Second World War planning and developmental strategy must be reconsidered, to address climate change and the concerns regarding just transitions. To achieve a social democracy, whilst reversing neoliberalism, South Africa requires a competitive as well as an inclusive economy. A social democracy is not just about distribution of social welfare. It is about developmental strategy, where labour, business and the state – not just the state – agree how they are going to compete. They need to critically engage on the best ways of being globally competitive using the principles of social democracy, which are pro-worker and pro-environment. In the South African context. the platform for this kind of conversation has been weakened over the years, with social democrats sometimes being accused of being sell-outs, reformists and the like. However, it is, from an historical perspective embedded in the Freedom Charter. Social democrats should be more open about their attachment to its ideals, come out of the closet and be counted. “For social democratic parties to create distinction from the centre-right, they must work on the communication between voters and parties” – Dagmar Freitag Dagmar Freitag, former SPD member of the German Bundestag After two decades of bad electoral losses, social democratic parties in Norway, Denmark and Germany appear to be staging a kind of comeback, although these institutions are not as popular as they used to be due to a fragmented party landscape. Of course, in a parliament with six parties ranging from the right-wing AFD all the way to the left, a large share of the so-called cake will always be hard to get. And it is self-evident that electoral results of about 35%-40% have become unrealistic. But that does not mean that social democracy has become irrelevant. In more and more diverse societies social democratic parties are still urgently needed. The basic values of a social democracy are sorely needed to allay the fears of worried citizens who feel they have lost their political compass. Every effort must be made to give people new direction in order to save and preserve societal solidarity in these challenging times. Social democratic parties, for a very long time, received strong support from the working-class and strong trade unions. For these voters, it was really important to have representatives from social democratic parties that spoke their language and knew about their specific problems. Many of them feared being left behind. This is the moment for a shift to parties that offer the simple, right answers. This situation is multi-layered. In Germany, however, the answer is somewhat complicated as the Conservative Party of acting Chancellor Angela Merkel has over the years become more and more socially democratic. Examples of this include minimum wage and climate change. For social democratic parties to create a distinction from the centre-right, they must work on the communication between voters and parties. Social democratic goals must be clear, comprehensible and apply to the everyday realities of the voters. For this purpose, the language together with the actions of social democrats must be seen as honest and understandable to the target groups. In addition, in some ways they need to be more emotional. Despite the developments already mentioned, and in spite of current difficulties, there are encouraging signs that social democracy is growing. Emerging cohorts of voters are more in favour of progressive positions and are persistently preferring parties that offer a clear and progressive profile in this dimension. Social democratic parties should build a new progressive political coalition that includes finding new ways of engaging and incorporating membership as well as strengthening ties with civil society actors. The appetite for social democracy is re-emerging. This can be seen from the latest election results in Germany. There are many signs that suggest success is possible if social democrats can reach the voters emotionally, and with clear positions and aims. Olaf Scholz, the new Social Democrat German Chancellor, had the word respect as central to his election repertoire. Respect for everybody. This was not only a word, but it was also an emotion and people could feel what he meant. There are many reasons why people are open to social democratic values. Social democrats are the ones tackling the credibility of the right-wing’s positions on issues such as racism, homophobia, antisemitism with progressive arguments. Furthermore, social democrats always think multilaterally and that means they know about the importance of a close and reliable cooperation between countries across the continents. The great Swedish social democratic leader, Olof Palme, and the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt both preferred multilateral approaches. They were the kind of leaders that could face up and defeat the right-wing in the Trump era. What happens when the right-wing populace rises to power? The era of President Trump in the United States is a good example of the consequences – a textbook case of how politics change when it switches from a bilateral approach to a multilateral approach. It is up to social democrats to ensure the values of social democracy prevail. “These political parties are part of one big family. They share a set of ideas, an alternative to neoliberalism, that defines them as social democrats” – Dr Lisa Pelling Dr Lisa Pelling, head of Swedish Social Democratic think tank, Arena Idé Social democrats and progressives alike form part of a huge movement. A movement of hundreds of political parties, organisations and trade unions. Great inspiration can be taken from all parts of this movement. Today, social democrats are gaining traction around the world. This is clear when one looks at election gains in Portugal, Germany, New Zealand and Italy. These are all inspiring stories. And they are interlinked. These political parties are part of one big family. They share a set of ideas, an alternative to neoliberalism, that defines them as social democrats. A focus that refuses that the market should be in the driving seat and instead places regulation, redistribution, democratisation first. Modern social democracy faces many challenges. First, the climate crisis. The big challenge of the climate crisis is to ensure that the transition from fossil fuels to green energy does not take place at the expense of workers - neither in the fossil fuel sectors, the oil sector, the coal sector, nor any other sectors. Arena Idé has published a book to guide this process, No Time for Illusions, a Travel Guide. The book is a travel guide on how social democrats can define an industrial policy that makes sure that this transition is made while securing jobs and increasing employment, and at the same time moving fast enough to make sure that the climate crisis is appropriately addressed. The second challenge is privatisation. The NHS is a great success of the British welfare state where health is seen as a right. It is provided based on people’s needs and not on the basis of people’s ability to pay for health services. In the last four decades any system that resembles the British National Health System, including the health system in Sweden, has been under attack by privatisation and fragmentisation of new public management methods. Arena Idé seeks to highlight examples where there has been a successful fight against privatisation. To show where there are alternatives to the so-called freedom of choice, which has meant the freedom of choice for private equity capital firms to buy bits and pieces of the commonwealth sector and not really the freedom of choice of citizens. It has been a great inspiration to see how Scotland has been able to choose a different path from the rest of the UK. A third challenge is housing policy. Defining housing as something that should be left to the market is one of the largest threats to social democratic welfare states and welfare models, and one of the greatest achievements of neoliberalism of the last few decades. Social democrats need to remake its politics, inspired by cities and countries where housing is not left to the market, but where housing is seen as something that should be taken care of by the community. Vienna is a great example. It is an affordable housing paradise which is partly why Vienna is voted year after year as the most liveable city in the world, the city with the highest quality of living. Vienna’s success started off as a social democratic vision, and ambition just after the First World War in 1918 when the city became the first capital in the world to be governed by a social democratic mayor. The first social democratic capital in the world inherited an alarming housing crisis and decided that they would solve the crisis through a massive construction programme. Sixty-five thousand flats were built in a little more than ten years. Social innovation was key, one being taxation. In Vienna, the idea was to design a tax per square metre per person, so that people living in huge imperial flats in the centre of the city would pay a high tax. And this tax would be used to provide more square metres of affordable housing for the working-class in Vienna. What is the Vienna model of today? It is one where both construction and housing is subsidised and the distribution of the flats that are the result of this policy, are distributed on the basis of needs, not economic demands. It’s not the one that has the largest purse, but the one that has the largest need who gets access to a flat first. It is built on strategic partnerships with not-for-profit construction companies – a crucial part of regulating markets. State debt should not be an obstacle. Welfare can be built even in indebted states. “Social democratic parties should reconnect. This is very urgent. Democracy is under attack and has to be defended and built globally” – Katharina Hofmann Katharina Hofmann from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung The topic of modern social democracy is important. According to The Economist, the biggest wealth class in the eighteenth century was farmland. In the nineteenth century it was factories. Today it is residential real estate. The magazine estimates that 170 thousand billion euros are invested in residential real estate worldwide. It is access to real estate, among other modern factors, that is driving up inequality. Inequality and especially the concentration of wealth does not help society. There is a real need worldwide to revitalise the spirit of internationalism. According to Kate Pickett from the UK, violence and physical and mental diseases are more prevalent in unequal societies. To reprove to people that they can still believe in social democracy given the disappointment of neoliberal globalisation, social democrats need to find and propagate solutions to global problems like poverty, climate change and democratic governance. This can only be achieved by reinventing multilateralism. The European Union is in crisis. Migration and climate change issues remain unsolved, and the right-wing and nationalistic groups are gaining power. Parties must reactivate the Socialist International 2.0 and bring socialists and social democrats from all over the world together. Social democratic parties should urgently reconnect. Democracy is under attack and has to be defended and reinforced globally. Hardly any Asian country has a social democratic or a democratic spirit. Even India with the biggest democracy in Asia is turning to Hindu nationalism. In Latin America, the military is growing and regaining power. In Chile, both political candidates are from the extremes. And one sees the same in the US and in many European countries. It all leads to growing polarisation. The need to rebalance the damage of thirty years of neoliberalism is acute. Social democrats must actively endeavour to rebalance the relationship between capital, work, welfare, health and education. In all these spheres the state must be empowered. People around the world must deal with the crisis of the legitimacy in democracies. Social democrats must regain trust in scientific institutions and sanction people who love writing false information on social media. It is very urgent, not only in other countries, but also in Germany and Europe. “There is a need to rearticulate the ethical base, not as an individual act of philanthropy, but as a collective one. A group act, a global act that separates from altruism and, in so doing, immediately moves into a new arena of equality and justice.” – Professor Chris Mullard Professor Chris Mullard, professor at the University of Amsterdam, and visiting professor at the University of London and the Royal Agricultural University. The assumptions of social democracy seen from a theoretical instead of empirical view opens them up to criticism, allowing the viewer to revisit the fundamental, ethical and moral basis thereof. It is easy to recite the history, to talk about Marx, to talk about Lassalle, to talk about all the great writers and thinkers and the development of the great German Social Democratic Party. Indeed, it is easy to document all the revolutions of the nineteenth century and how they dovetailed and related to an expanding capitalism, colonialism and, if you like, the growth of the state. What is not so easy, is to look at them critically. First, social democracy is based upon a set of assumptions which are, essentially, Western. That is, they have arisen, as we all know, out of the dilemmas, the inequalities, the injustices of peoples who have been exploited within Western society. Whether one looks at this historically or contemporaneously, these are Western ideals. Other perspectives, African or Asian are also required. Second, social democracy is based upon the modality of capitalism. Under capitalism hides, or can be seen, a myriad of inequalities of one kind or another. In fact, that is why social democracy found its rootage. A third assumption is that in some social democracies it is a racially constructed concept. This is not simply referring to South Africa, but in the world at large. The fourth assumption is institutional altruism, or institutional philanthropy, which has sprung from a Western voluntary movement of philanthropy and the concern about those who are worse off than those who are in control of a society. Be it a class group, a racial group or other. It has grown out of this notion of altruism. The fifth must be the rights of the individual. The rights of the individual, in both early and contemporary social democracies, give credence and legitimacy to capitalism against the rights of the group, or the community. Underneath these assumptions lies a very basic paradigm: the paradigm between the haves and the have nots. It is a paradigm between one race and another, between one class and another. One having power and one not having power. This is a very simple and well-worded paradigm. So, social democracy as an ideology, social democracy as a set of policies, has to wrestle with this paradigm. How should these assumptions be addressed? First, there is a need to rearticulate the ethical base, not as an individual act of philanthropy, but as a collective one. A group act, a global act, that separates from altruism. And, in so doing, immediately moves into a new arena of equality and justice. Secondly, there is a need to be courageous as a party or as a group or as a movement. To recognise that societies are heterogeneous, that they are multicultural. This is something that is clear in South Africa, but it isn’t recognised in Europe. There is talk about it, people describe these societies as plural, as multicultural. But that is a purely descriptive form of talking about society. It is not structural. Social democrats should start rejecting notions of multicultural society as simply a descriptor, and notions of homogenous societies. The third is to look at the distribution of power, or rather, to look at redistribution on a global basis. Inherent in the constitution and the constitutional thinking is the need to bring the economic, the social and the cultural together. Seen in South Africa and contemporary politics, it is, in fact, a disintegration. There are separate political and economic power structures. It is critical, therefore, to consider a new model of social democracy. An inclusive model. An inclusive social, ethical, structural and cultural one. COVID-19 has reminded the world that people are not simply individuals, but come from and belong to a community, a group. Group solidarity, group respect and group responsibility – that is what social democrats should focus on. “It is critical to not only have ideas, but to win elections. To put forward alternatives to the right-wing. To put forward a very strong criticism of neoliberalism.” – Mr Mariano Schuster Mr Mariano Schuster, Editor, Nueva Sociedad, Argentina Considering the past and future of social democracy only along Western lines is problematic. Such thinking excludes societies that are not Western, including all the non-Western actors of these societies. Doing so could lead to deficient thinking regarding race, gender and religion, while other topics might not be contemplated at all. In general, social democracy is freedom and equality. It strives for a model that will overcome capitalism. Many different movements, such as socialism, were founded upon the ideal of emancipation. Are social democrats today talking about socialism? Is socialism regarded as it was in previous centuries, where social democrats were excluded from power? Where were they excluded from social interventions and started to look at workers to see how they could put them in counter organisations? They talked about working-class literature, music that the workers could have access to. It was only after the Second World War that social democrats started to become governing parties. It was then that they started shifting from the role of education, of organisation, because now they had a responsibility to govern. In most cases, they did good work, especially in the fifties and sixties, at a time of great prosperity. The phenomena of African colonialism and the social outbursts in Latin America were not the making of social democracy, but rather, they were responses to previous power arrangements. Neoliberalism was imposed as an answer. Today, young social democrats and progressives are recovering what had been lost. They are finding pathways towards their ideals through social democracy. But it is critical to not only have ideas, they need also to win elections. To put forward alternatives to the right-wing. To put forward a very strong criticism of neoliberalism. To this end, great inspiration can be found in the strong ideas and ways demonstrated in the global south. Takeaways from the dialogue Sebastian Sperling, South Africa country representative: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung In reflecting upon the day’s dialogue, there are five key takeaways that can be summarised as follows: Social democracy is not static Social democracy is not cast in stone. It is not a textbook ideology that just needs to be implemented; it changes over time. While there are underlying values that remain, such as freedom, equality and solidarity, there are different ways and interpretations that depend on context and grouping. What has changed over time is the interpretation of these values and how to pursue them. This is why discussions like this one are so important. These discussions must, however, be more inclusive, including more young people. Social democratic consensus It is important that social democrats find consensus and work together towards a shared future. It has become clear from the discussion that while there are shared values, there is still some way to go. All societies grapple with inequality. COVID-19 and the climate crisis are deepening these inequalities, while the neoliberal zeitgeist with its agenda of privatisation, austerity, concentration of economic power, dismantling of public goods and the state, is still very much alive. Like a fish in water, social democrats around the world have sometimes not even noticed that they are also contributing to this neoliberal zeitgeist. To acknowledge past mistakes is part of this joint reading of the status quo that is needed. Inequalities have led to the crisis of democracy which we now face. To break the marriage between neoliberal policies and the liberal democracy is critical. Social democracy is about uniting people Social democrats make and implement policy with the broad majority in mind. It is not the politics of the few. Neoliberalism’s stroke of genius is packaging the interests of the few as that which makes common sense. This has seen them gaining majorities in elections. And a strong case was made for why economic and political power is needed to achieve our goals. We need to build broad alliances, and in evermore-fragmented societies, social democrats are the best placed to build these necessary alliances. And this needs a narrative under the banner of respect and unity, under a system that believes in people, in dialogue and in organisation. Social democracy is about showing that an alternative is possible What is this alternative? Well, it is the primacy of politics. It is an understanding of the role of the state, and not simply reducing it to a welfare state. There is more to social democracy than that. It is a developmental state, a state of social compacts. A state where there is regulation, redistribution, taxation of the rich, public investment in people, in critical infrastructure for all the necessary transformations. A state that is putting risk and innovation on the agenda, that is investing in public goods, transport and housing, etc. Social democracy is an international agenda Social democrats need to be more internationalist in their orientation. On the other side of the street, people are much more internationalist-orientated and better organised. Social democrats are fragmented at the international level. Internationalism has various dimensions: it is about how issues are addressed, how alliances are built. This dialogue, which was facilitated in an international fashion, is exemplary. More of this type of dialogue is needed to rebuild strong internationalism. [1] Sheri Berman, 2020. “Can Social Democrats save the world (again)?” Foreign Policy, January 15. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

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