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Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. Strategic communication as policy and strategy ways: An analysis of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic communication by Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract In states facing precarious power arrangements, strategic communication is critical to commanding the internal strategy and policy environment. Strategic communication is a strategic approach, a strategic way in which policy is conducted and advanced. This article accordingly undertakes an examination of this aspect of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic presidency - not the policies themselves. The paper looks at how Ramaphosa uses strategic communication to advance his policy and strategy interests. Ramaphosa’s challenge is to balance and lead two seemingly opposing centres of power. His leadership requires compromise and consensus; it also requires a creative approach. Ramaphosa embodies national values that inspire trust and persuade the citizens of South Africa to adopt his vision as theirs, forging a collective will to achieve national goals. This article examines Ramaphosa’s strategic approach to leadership, adding to the understanding of how strategic communication is exercised domestically in South Africa. Keywords—South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, domestic strategic communication, social compact, presidential style ‘Our 1994 Consensus risks unravelling precisely because we have failed to utilise the settlement for what it was—a vehicle of transition for far-reaching changes, not an end point in itself’ (Jonas, 2019). When Cyril Ramaphosa became president of South Africa on 15 February 2018, not only did he take office at a time of national distress, but he also assumed the presidency at a time when strategic communication (Hallahan, 2007) played a paramount role in shaping and commanding strategic environments (Bartholomees, 2012). Today, purposeful and persuasive communication performs a significant role in the form and procedure of presidential strategy. Strategic communication is an approach whereby ideas are mobilized through rhetorical agency. It presents a pathway to persuasion. The concept, while being used broadly and for varying applications, serves great practical use. It allows for a ‘holistic approach to communication, based on values and interests, that encompass everything an actor does to achieve objectives in a contested environment…there is often consensus around its operational components or processes of delivery: defining a message; identifying a specific audience; intending to achieve not simply an effect but real, measurable changes’ (Bolt, 2019). Strategic communication is a central tool of executive policymaking and power. In our increasingly interconnected world, the information environment has become more diffuse and human agency within it more widely distributed. This means that strategic communication, which is often seen as an exercise beyond national borders, is pertinent locally as well. ‘Strategic communication is as important to internal audiences as it is to external ones’ (Tathan, 2008); it is the means for ‘persuading the nation’s citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. In this context, strategic communication is an essential element of national leadership’ (Halloran, 2007). For an impressionable state such as South Africa, with its complex history and unconsolidated power base, enlisting the persuasive power of local beliefs and shaping the strategic environment, is of primary importance. The state leadership must establish authority through prevailing in the battle of ideas and crafting the national interest. In the modern hypermediated era of diffused communications, citizens have greater access to power; power has taken on an increasingly distributed form. It is incumbent upon leaders to obtain trust and legitimacy through the pursuit of policy that advances values and principles. Leadership gives strategic communication its internal form by crafting messages that serve this national purpose. It is here that strategy is served by policy, not vice versa. Where strategic communication serves as the ways to policy’s means. The strategic potential of communication has not been lost on Ramaphosa. He has used communication purposefully, advancing his claims to transcend the situation he inherited from his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s approach serves the pragmatic aim of restoring and inspiring faith in the national project. Following an initial period of Ramaphoria, a number of questions have emerged around his executive performance and methodology. Domestic and international observers have become frustrated by the slow pace of progress in dealing with Zuma-era misdemeanours, while noisy commentators with limited or adversarial agendas are confusing a complex narrative. This article examines Ramaphosa’s strategic approach, revealing the complexity of the situation he is facing. It offers insight by surveying and detailing Ramaphosa’s regime of persuasion; describing the ways, means, and ends of his strategic communication (Bartholomees, 2006). Historical background to South Africa’s current domestic strategic environment A brief history will help readers appreciate the complex strategic environment in which Ramaphosa’s administration is situated. A historical background shows how strategic communication, has iteratively served the policy orientation of the state. The National Party (Apartheid) government (1948–94) which was authoritarian, deeply ideological, and strictly hierarchical employed its own strategic communication. The Apartheid government had waged potent information warfare through its counter-insurgent Total Strategy for almost two decades (Kotzé, 2018). Its campaigns were based on control and it employed force to achieve persuasive ends. It was, consequently, unable to co-opt the credible, conservative black elite, whose support was necessary for maintaining the Apartheid government’s strategic position of ‘normalcy’. Eventually, the government accepted that it could not use the military to force compliance under Apartheid. In the late 1980s, under new leadership, the government’s strategy changed from repression to negotiation, from maintaining a divided country under Apartheid to co-installing democracy. In his speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990, De Klerk employed his strategic communication, using the kairotic[1] international moment to make the first move towards a just, new political order, embarking the nation on the transition from Apartheid to constitutional democracy. His rhetorical performance achieved its strategic ends, removing constraints to negotiations and laying the foundation for sweeping reforms. De Klerk engaged the African National Congress (ANC), the direct political rival of his own National Party. The agreement de Klerk negotiated, to pursue a united, democratic future for South Africa, critically shaped its politics and the presidencies that followed. Nelson Mandela understood this reality. The former militant did not meekly become the saint he is seen as now. Instead, Mandela acutely perceived and employed strategic communication. The ANC leader was pragmatic. He adapted, coaxed agreement from his adversaries, and waged a comprehensive battle for the hearts and minds of the public. He disabled his opponents tactically, through his strategic communication. Mandela famously encouraged his followers, that it is ‘precisely because Afrikaans is the language of the oppressor, we should encourage our people to learn it, its literature and history’ (Maharaj, 2010). Mandela built legitimacy, confidence, and gravitas into the South African presidency. Mandela’s communication served to advance the interests of the state and the policies of the government. He recognised all the country’s diverse people as one; instead of advancing the idea of separateness, he endorsed national unity and therefore sovereign legitimacy and stability. The ANC’s moral authority and popular support allowed the party to claim responsibility for forging democracy and ending Apartheid. This superior account captured the public imagination and won the confidence of the people. The ANC’s political project successfully limited the potency of domestic opposition; it has since held an absolute majority in all national elections by presenting itself as synonymous with the ideals of the South African state. By generating a rich conceptual story, which blurred the lines between party and state, it secured the political trust of the nation. With the ANC safe in its place as the national political force, the contest for power has shifted to take place within its ranks. While the state is constituted by ideals, the practice of politics hinges on political realities. In 2007, for the first time in more than 50 years, there was a radical contest for leadership of the ANC, initiating what has become the party’s new normal of factional rivalry. As had been the case at the ANC’s 38th National Conference in 1949, when Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and others challenged the moderate establishment, there was a bitter battle for the character of the ANC at the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane (Booysen, 2011). Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s immediate successor, who reigned as a philosopher-king, was pitted against Jacob Zuma’s leftist camp. Although Mbeki’s grand narratives continued Mandela’s appeal to ideals, his aloof intellectualism and detachment from the everyday lives of the poor were seen as neglect for their struggle, ripening the ground for Zuma’s populist declamation and radical aspirations. Zuma sang and danced to anti-Apartheid songs, comprehensively defeating his opponent with a 60% share of the vote. His argument was direct: ‘We have achieved political freedom and now we must achieve economic freedom (The Citizen, 2014).’ Jacob Zuma’s convincing election presented a shift from leading by aspirational ideals to pursuing specific, tangible ends. His strategic communication was materially motivated. Zuma’s ANC presidential acceptance speech made it clear that a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (ANC, 2007) would be the party’s guiding philosophy and the policy orientation of his leadership. He reiterated this centrality, of party policy vis-à-vis state interest, when he became national president. The NDR’s prescriptive measures, such as direct demographic representation, are at odds with the national Constitution. The often-contradictory pursuits of the ANC vis-à-visthose of the state is the axis whereupon South Africa’s strategic environment has tilted (ANC, 2012). Under Zuma, unlike Mbeki or Mandela, the national project would be subordinated to the policy orientation of the ANC, not to the prescripts of the national Constitution. Zuma explained: ‘[The ideal state] should not be confused with tactical positions that the liberation movement may adopt from time to time’ (ANC, 2007). Zuma’s advance of radicalism determined that the policy of the ANC, not that of government, would function as the authoritative guiding hand of national political power. Enter Ramaphosa Ramaphosa’s presidential strategy is determined by the complex challenge of leading two centres of power, the ANC and the state. His policy orientation and strategic actions are contingent on the tension between the policy of the ANC, and the strategic interests of the state. Whereas his position as state president is subject to his ability to preserve party unity. Any examination of Ramaphosa’s presidency must recognise the circumstances of his claim to power. He must balance state and party interests. His task of aligning ANC policies to fortify solidarity in support of his leadership determines the strategic environment. His approach is therefore founded on compromise and consensus. An examination of Ramaphosa’s path to power reveals these conditions to have shaped his character and his leadership style. Ramaphosa gained his political profile as the founder of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), an influential labour structure formed in 1982. The NUM was the first black union to achieve significant bargaining power. Ramaphosa played a pivotal role in South Africa’s transition to democracy. In 1994 he was appointed Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, the body responsible for drafting South Africa’s Constitution. In 2012, Ramaphosa returned as Zuma’s Deputy President, preparing to take power in 2017, as is the tradition of succession in the ANC. Ramaphosa would bide his time. As his previous track record had shown, he would act only once he was in charge. The organisational decay and system of patronage in the ANC constrain Ramaphosa’s political situation. Striking a balance between party and state depends on Ramaphosa’s ability to set the agenda and to persuade his party members to follow his lead. He must proclaim a set of ideals, without aggravating any vital constituency of the ANC. He must claim and situate his power, maintaining order while avoiding factional volatility. He must rely on strategic communication to advance his leadership, coordinating all the resources at his disposal in order to shape perceptions and build influence. Strategic communication is assessed here as a holistic practice — both a process and an approach. Given that ‘everything communicates’, the ‘key to an effective strategy is therefore to understand actors and audiences, then integrate policies, actions and words across government in a coherent way to build national resilience and leverage strategic influence’ (Heap, 2018). Today’s hyper-mediated and mediatised strategic environment empowers and obliges national leaders to direct perception in order to persuade. A president has the executive authority to create meaning according to his personal ethos — to shape the national story. We now consider Ramaphosa’s strategic communication, drawing on Harry Yarger’s understanding of strategy as the ways, means, and ends of power (Halloran, 2007). Ramaphosa’s strategic ends Pursuing South Africa’s aspirational Constitution Ramaphosa’s statements and actions establish him as a Constitutionalist (Swilling, 2019). His strategic communication pursues a vision of a capable South Africa as depicted in the country’s aspirational Constitution. As set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution, Ramaphosa’s government seeks to ‘heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and to build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations’ (RSA, 1996). As Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, Ramaphosa was one of the architects of what he has endearingly described as ‘the birth certificate of the nation’ (Smith, 2016). The Constitution ‘belongs to all of us [...]. We claim it as ours, it enshrines the rights that make us live as South Africans, and we will protect it because it belongs to us’ (Ramaphosa, 2012). ‘[I]t is the repository of everything, everything that I ever dreamt of, that I ever wanted in my life. It gives me strength, it gives me hope, it protects me. If anyone were ever to violate my rights, our Constitution is my shield (Seagal & Cort, 2012).’ Ramaphosa’s proclaimed allegiance to the Constitution gives clarity to his strategy of empowering the state while not alienating the ANC. This appears to be the inverse of Zuma’s approach; the former president’s legacy lives on through a contingent of senior party representatives who remain loyal to him. This reality prevents Ramaphosa from taking sides against factions within the party. Instead, he seeks to empower the state by encouraging confidence in his leadership of the ANC. Ramaphosa’s strategic communication purposefully crafts a consolidated national identity to advance the national interest. Given the constraints placed on him by the political legacy of his predecessor, Ramaphosa wants to demonstrate that he is advancing the national interest above that of the party. He prioritises strategic command of the nation over leadership of the party; he leads the party by leading the nation. These circumstances demand that strategic communication be employed beyond the marketing of party politics. With the evolution of power in the 21st century, where strategic communications play a critical role in shaping the domestic strategic environment, this inward-looking consolidation of the national interest is extremely valuable. As the world is opening up and power becomes diffused and takes on new, often irregular forms, the primary safeguard against information campaigns attacking sovereign states is the clear articulation and consolidation of the domestic ethos. The expression of local beliefs and values is primary. A state cannot effectively exercise foreign policy when there is local disorientation and confusion about the national interest. The State of the Nation Ramaphosa’s strategy emerges from his public speeches and political gestures. The day after he was elected, on 16 February 2018, Ramaphosa gave his first presidential address — the State of the Nation Address (SONA), South Africa’s version of America’s State of the Union address. There is no legislative requirement for this annual speech to be given at the opening of the new parliamentary session; it is a ritual introduced by Mandela. The address is a ceremonial reconstitution of the state’s values where, in ‘one gesture, in one voice, the nation finds itself being “stated”’ (Salazar, 2002). Parliament defines the SONA as ‘a political statement of the President that sets out a social contract that seeks to [...] constitute the fabric of our nation’ (Parliament, 2019). The SONA is a pomp-and-circumstance celebration—guns salute, children wave the national flag, and, in a manner unique to South Africa, a praise-singer, or Imbongi, introduces the President to a joint sitting of Parliament, usually to singing and clapping. Ramaphosa’s SONA speech was the ideal platform from which to launch his presidential strategic communication, to present a ‘non-partisan address that maps a holistic pathway to the future’ (Parliament, 2019). Ramaphosa clearly understood that he would be addressing a larger audience than those who had congregated in the House of Assembly to hear their newly elected president speak. The SONA is a national and international media event, and therefore an opportunity to claim national authority, embody the vision and the mission of the state, and thereby inspire in the public and South Africa’s business partners a sense of confidence. Departing from Zuma’s strategy of reciting his government’s plan of action for the upcoming year, Ramaphosa used the occasion to rally his audience around an alluring story of what South Africa could become. He appealed to his constituents to form a consensus around the adoption of civic responsibility—to adopt and exhibit the Constitutional values as their own. As Hans Kelsen (1967) pointed out, power does not follow from statements of fact, but from embodiments of norms. Such embodiment ‘epitomizes the republican identification of politics and persuasion, for embodiment is a rhetorical accomplishment that in turn fuses speech and action, speaker and subject’ (Hariman, 1995). Leadership, as an act of influence, does not simply subscribe to certain norms. It is through the embodiment of norms that leadership is claimed, and norms are redefined. Ramaphosa’s claim to power has been indirect; he does not assert himself personally as a great leader to be followed but embodies the norms and values enshrined in the Constitution he believes in. Ramaphosa’s inaugural SONA set his agenda. It opened a new chapter by marking the political transition that had taken place. The new president commenced his first public speech by cordially thanking the former president. Ramaphosa concludes and transcends the Zuma era by creating a bridge, over Zuma’s leadership, to that of Mandela. His words did not simply close the door on Zuma but sought to expunge his command by invoking Mandela’s moral authority: ‘Guided by his example, we will use this year to reinforce our commitment to ethical behaviour and ethical leadership. In celebrating the centenary of Nelson Mandela, we are not merely honouring the past, we are building the future […]. We should honour Madiba[2] by putting behind us the era of discord, disunity and disillusionment [...] because a new dawn is upon us. It is a new dawn that is inspired by our collective memory of Nelson Mandela’ (Ramaphosa, 2018a). Claiming the New Dawn Throughout his presidency, Ramaphosa has consistently promoted the idea of the New Dawn. This project represents his vision of South Africa overcoming the preceding dark episode, a period he later called the ‘nine lost years’ (Haffejee, 2019), and ushering in a new, revitalised era. Ramaphosa was elected to his first full term as President by the National Assembly on 22 May 2019. At his inauguration speech on 25 May, Ramaphosa claimed personal responsibility for the New Dawn by stating: ‘Through the irrefutable power of the ballot on 8 May,[3] South Africans declared the dawn of a new era (Ramaphosa, 2019a).’ Ramaphosa’s New Dawn rests on a number of pillars. First, it is premised on sovereign accord; stability and order must first be secured. On many occasions, including at the SONA, Ramaphosa has emphasised the need for national unity: ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, a diverse but united nation. Bound together by a common destiny […] we are a nation at one. We are one people […] while there are many issues on which we may differ, on these fundamental matters, we are at one (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ By reigniting a feeling of national solidarity, Ramaphosa is seeking to counter the ongoing fraying of the political settlement achieved by Mandela to advance the imperative of any national political arrangement: the preservation of stability. To inspire the people in a unified and common purpose, he draws on Mandela’s gravitas, reminding them of the covenant Madiba sought to build to advance a just and capable state. Ramaphosa affirms that the ‘defining thing about the new dawn must be our ability to govern well, to create a capable state [...] a state where we will know that everybody who is in the state is there to advance the interests of our people (Ramaphosa, 2018b).’ Second, the New Dawn is both the commencement and the realisation of renewal, both an end to the previous era and a forward-looking process. The new president claims that South Africa is ‘emerging from a period of stagnation and strife’ (Maromo, 2018). He seeks acceptance for reform from the same entities (the ANC and the ANC-led government) that caused the atrophy. The New Dawn promises to address the deficiencies of the previous regime, such as ‘policy uncertainty, the weakening of public institutions and high-level corruption [that] undermined investor confidence and public trust’. ‘We are now firmly on the path of renewal and rebuilding’, says Ramaphosa (Maromo, 2018). Furthermore, by recognising the failures of both the ANC and the government, the New Dawn stimulates a deliberative approach to creating a better South Africa. In bringing the deficiencies of the past to light, Ramaphosa has initiated renewal, inspiring the nation to recreate itself: ‘Fellow South Africans, our country has entered a period of change [...] Our task, as South Africans, is to seize this moment of hope and renewal, and to work together to ensure that it makes a meaningful difference in the lives of our people (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ Ultimately, Ramaphosa describes South Africa’s renewal as the resolve to ‘break with all that divides us, to embrace all that unites us’; to ‘cure our country of the corrosive effects of corruption’; to ‘restore the integrity of our institutions’; and ‘to advance the values of our Constitution’ (Ramaphosa, 2019b). Ramaphosa authoritatively communicates that he is capable of ensuring this longed-for renewal. Finally, Ramaphosa’s strategic narrative about the New Dawn advances his vision of South Africa as a fully transformed, democratic state, while simultaneously announcing that the journey toward democratic consolidation is yet to be completed. This path is presented as the natural continuation and maturation of the first transition. Herein, Ramaphosa presents an eloquent plan to neutralise the idea of the radical second transition; his vision counters the NDR’s millenarianism. Instead of moving society towards a pre-configured outcome, the New Dawn returns the national focus to the approach and tools used in the earlier transition led by Mandela. His approach was based on ideals and process, on inclusion, compromise, and reconciliation. By recalling to mind that unprecedented democratic transition out of Apartheid, Ramaphosa employs sentimentality and a sense of achievement to inspire belief that the promises of the New Dawn can indeed be accomplished (Parliament, 2018). Apartheid was finally dismantled in 1994; in 2019 Ramaphosa used the 25th anniversary of this remarkable achievement as a kairotic moment when South Africans could recognise the intervening failures of government and renew their energy and direction (Ramaphosa, 2019b). With his promise of a New Dawn he hoped to inspire the people to adopt his resolve and make this national project their own. For his vision to be realised, the government must have the necessary institutional capacity; the slogan—New Dawn—must be translated into state practice through effective administration. However, it is the people, not the politicians, who must achieve renewal and democratic consolidation, and the people have not been uniformly inspired and mobilised. Moreover, the limited nature of the reforms Ramaphosa has enacted so far is causing public frustration; analysts and public commentators are further constraining his political momentum by labelling Ramaphosa slow and indecisive (Mkhabela, 2019). To achieve his goals he must have the people behind him. Ramaphosa’s strategic ways ‘Politics is an art… By understanding how matters of style are crucial to the practice of politics, we discover not sham, but design, not decoration, but a world of meaning (Hariman, 1995).’ Cyril Ramaphosa’s style Ramaphosa’s strategy is expressed through his style; the way he employs the tools at hand to pursue his goals. Style gives dynamism to values, showing how ideals are expressed. Communication must always suit its purpose, setting, and audience. Style is not incidental but critical to how an argument is constructed. Style is the way in which a strategic environment is claimed; how alternative ideas and truths are displaced (Hariman, 1995).A leader’s claim to authority will be styled in a specific manner: Ramaphosa embodies the values of the Constitution to demonstrate the South African President’s belief in the sovereignty of those values. Ramaphosa’s use of the Constitution to mobilise a multi-faceted response to South Africa’s unique political and social problems best illustrates what biographer Anthony Butler (2007) calls his ‘visionary pragmatism’. Unlike many in the ANC, Ramaphosa ‘could not commit his imagination to Marxist revolutionary fantasies. He worked hard to create institutions of self-government [...] demonstrating an ingrained pragmatism’ (Butler, 2007). The roles Ramaphosa played in founding the National Union of Mineworkers, in negotiating the end of Apartheid, and in chairing the Constitutional Assembly all exemplify his conviction that properly-formed institutions can give momentum to the embodiment of ideals. As president, Ramaphosa facilitated negotiations regarding the National Minimum Wage Act. The Act presents a mechanism for stabilising the South African labour market but it has been criticised as both insufficient and untenable given the national labour-wage equation. However, the value of the Act is not about the introduction of a minimum wage; it is not intended as a simple fix. Instead, its value lies in the institutionalising purpose it serves. It provides a framework for addressing the complex and heady issues of labour relations and income inequality. The introduction of the minimum wage was preceded by four years of negotiations. ‘In the end’, said Business Unity’s Tanya Cohen, ‘we did manage to find a sweet spot, between what is socially acceptable and economically efficient’ (Nieselow, 2018). For the consensus-seeking Ramaphosa, ‘the national minimum wage represents the triumph of cooperation over conflict, of negotiation over confrontation [...] it could only be resolved through negotiation [...]. This national minimum wage is a stepping-stone towards having a living’ wage (Ramaphosa, 2018c). Ramaphosa’s leadership style can be seen in the way he managed the negotiations that ultimately led to the implementation of the National Minimum Wage Act. As is the case with the other offices he has held, Ramaphosa acts from a position of authority, corralling the various stakeholders involved in an issue into negotiating a settlement wherein all parties are afforded a portion of their claim. By accommodating some elements of everyone’s wishes, he binds them as members of a consensus decision. The collective process is superior to specific claims. The leader is bolstered by a united assembly. However, this increases the pressure on the President to act decisively, as expectations inevitably mount, and when they are not met with assiduousness and follow-through, can lead to increased public frustration. Ramaphosa’s strategic foundation is his ability to negotiate and achieve consensus. He maintains a dispassionate position regarding specific details; ‘the benefits of the compromise were greater than the costs’ (Butler, 2007). He brings together the various motions and only then decides which position to take; this allows him to frame a situation without overpowering it. It also affords the public a sense of agency and builds trust through broad inclusion. Ramaphosa is able to frame an issue so that others accept the way it is expressed, and then steer the resolution. Given South Africa’s diversity, a unified outcome is preferable to a one-sided decision. He maintains his advantage through inclusivity, by speaking for all South Africans; this tactic also aids him in surmounting the arguments of those who present partisan views.[4] In Ramaphosa’s words: ‘the strength of doing this is to be able to bring together South Africans who have a contribution to make, who have views to put across so that we engage everyone and come out with best solutions ever. And this is what I will say defines my style of leadership, which was Madiba’s style of leadership (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ Equating himself with Mandela is a tactical move on Ramaphosa’s part. It remains to be seen whether he can imitate Mandela’s executive decisiveness. Identification and servant leadership Engaging the diverse population in cooperation and consensus stimulates all parties to identify themselves as South Africans (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Drawing on Mandela’s pathos, Ramaphosa uses symbolism and metaphor to shape his image in line with the story he wishes to tell; by being a leader who identifies with national ideals he evokes solidarity. The skilful employment of this identification can be a powerful tool for forging a feeling of unity. The persuaded are guided by the persuader who appears as one of them, not apart or superior, assuming their interests as his and instituting specific forward-looking attitudes. Ramaphosa wants to be a leader who achieves his end by persuading the people to identify with the goals and visions of the state, engaging with their sense of civic responsibility. Slogans such as the ‘Rainbow Nation’ are programmatic injunctions that have been used to shape South Africa’s national identity. Inviting the public to identify with him, Ramaphosa employed another slogan. At the conclusion of his inaugural SONA, Ramaphosa strategically appealed to both public endorsement of his leadership and to popular participation in his vision for the country, saying: thuma mina [‘send me’]. These words are taken from a song by late South African jazz great, Hugh Masekela. At the end of his speech Ramaphosa quoted the lyrics: ‘I wanna be there when the people start to turn it around...I wanna lend a hand, send me (Masekela, 2002).’ Ramaphosa invoked one of South Africa’s greats to appeal to the people, in their own language, to take ownership of the state of their nation and to claim the New Dawn. Ramaphosa implores the people to follow him, saying: ‘now is the time to lend a hand...Now is the time for each of us to say, “send me” (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ ‘Thuma Mina’ is an inspirational call to each South African to answer Masekela’s charge to imagine and to build an inclusive, just, and equal society. Thuma Mina, in the spirit of John F. Kennedy’s 1961 appeal ‘ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country’, is a persuasive technique to inspire action. Here, Ramaphosa shows the appropriate route and then inspires others to follow. It is an approach that strives towards servant leadership, a biblical precept best illustrated by Jesus. A servant leader, says Kgatle (2018), is one who ‘must first be a model of credibility, diligence, and the spirit of servant leadership. The second role of leadership is pathfinding, wherein a vision is discerned. The third role is that of alignment; unless you institutionalise your values, they will not happen. The fourth role is to empower people; the fruit of the three other roles’. The outcome of servant leadership is the creation of communities that ascribe to the values of the leader. It is setting up a future that can easily be disconnected from memory and the past. It is in this way, similar to Mandelaism, as conceptualised by Mpofu and Chasi (2017), that Ramaphosa’s sign systems have a magically detached element akin to mythology without context. Ramaphosa’s lionising of Constitutional values, much in the way that Mandela was lionised, leads to a message or belief structure that is tied to ideals and not action and it is for his failure to act decisively that Ramaphosa’s tenure as President has come under severe pressure. Together with his broad consultation, his tendency to float above the nuts and bolts of the problems on the ground, has seen Ramaphosa being criticised for inaction. Without decisive action, it matters little what policy orientation is chosen. Towards a new social compact Throughout his communications, Ramaphosa returns to the urgency of re-establishing a national social compact. A social compact is an active agreement that enjoins all citizens of a country, as participants in the practice of democracy, to engage in nation-building and the creation of national accord. Given the intractable political situation that Ramaphosa inherited upon assuming the presidency, he chose to set the social compact as a cornerstone of his strategic communication. He implores: ‘If we are to achieve the South Africa we want, we need a new social compact’ (Ramaphosa, 2019d). A social compact is the glue that binds the members of a society to their leader and ensures their civic agency. It serves as a foundation for the process of forming a consensus among diverse players. The value of the social compact is that those involved are more willing to subordinate themselves to the public interest. Citizens are assured that they will not be weakened but empowered by the institutional capacity they are asked to help build from the bottom up. This approach brings the public into partnership with the government, which for its part reciprocates with a commitment to effective governance (Ramaphosa, 2019a). According to Ramaphosa: ‘Our task, as South Africans, is to seize this moment of hope and renewal and to work together […]. We will do this by getting social partners in our country to collaborate in building a social compact on which we will create drivers of economic recovery’ (Ramaphosa, 2018a). Ramaphosa advances the validity of the social compact by submitting that it was Mandela who first argued for its value. Mandela is quoted as saying: ‘None of us acting alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation-building’ (Ramaphosa, 2019e). The appeal of the new social compact draws on the success of the transition from Apartheid to democracy. It was the social compact, comprehensively entered into by the diversity of South Africans, when people recognised each other as equals, refusing to be forced apart, that broke down the walls of Apartheid. The government was forced to fundamentally change its strategy; it could not ‘centrally reform into one, a system which under Apartheid was distinctly two… [it could not] permanently include a majority it considered as other’ (Kotzé, 2018). To Ramaphosa the social compact is the path to renewal made possible by consensus: ‘The progress we have achieved over the last year—and the successes we need to register in the months and years ahead—ultimately depends on our ability to revitalise and strengthen the social compact between government, business, labour and civil society’ (Ramaphosa, 2019f). By establishing a new social compact Ramaphosa seeks to generate greater public endorsement of the Constitution as a transformative framework; the Constitution comprises an authoritative compendium of compacts, where the ‘body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people’ (National Humanities Institute, N.d.). The social compact is a pragmatic expression of the democratic project. South Africa’s aspirational Constitution fortifies Ramaphosa’s compelling vision of the ideal state; the people are encouraged to recognise the superiority of this goal and are asked to employ their civic agency in its pursuit. The inclusive approach invites participation, shaping the situation to build common ground and to deny and displace the radicalism of the Zuma era. The establishment of a social compact is also a remedial action taken in response to the increasing sentiment that Constitutionalism is under threat from civic atrophy and populism. This is the point of view held by former Deputy Finance Minister, Mcebisi Jonas, who was dismissed by Zuma after blowing the whistle on his corrupt activities. Jonas suggests that outright cynicism ‘which views the 1994 consensus as a carve-up among the elites’ has overtaken the nostalgic feeling of the ‘rainbow nation, emblematic of a time when South Africans broke out of their narrow ideological straitjackets and placed the national interest above all else’ (Jonas, 2019); ‘[T]he 1994 consensus has reached its sell-by date’, said Jonas. ‘In fact, it is unravelling (Jonas, 2019).’ As opposed to transformation through the Constitution, there has been a rise of those who see the Constitutional settlement as an obstacle to radical transformation. The institutionally destructive state capture of the Zuma period was facilitated by this very argument. It is not within the ambit of this paper to detail state capture in South Africa. It can, however, be described in brief as the improper and illegal restructuring of the state apparatus to pursue Zuma’s ‘radical transformation’, subordinating national institutions through deliberate strategy (Cairs, 2017). The legacy of state capture has left South Africa in a weakened condition, its confidence damaged and its national legitimacy crippled. Jonas supports using the social compact to repair the damaged state. The brokering of ‘a new consensus’, says Jonas, ‘will require new levels of leadership vigour across political formations as well as business, labour and civil society […]. Without a new vision of where we are going, [...] our new consensus will be stillborn’ (Jonas, 2018). Visionary approach Ramaphosa’s visionary approach is a central feature of his strategic communications; vision and the social compact are his ways of framing the national situation and they are key to countering the enchantment of radicalism. Vision is the path through which Ramaphosa connects the troubled present to the renewed future. His re-introduction of vision into modern South Africa’s political strategy and discourse has caught the public, and the political establishment, off guard. He has been criticised for the impalpable proposals he made in his post-election SONA. He departed from what had become the tradition, under Zuma, of listing multicomponent, short-term solutions to complex problems. Instead, Ramaphosa has invoked a visionary achieved state, a ‘dream we can all share and participate in building’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). His ‘performance of nation’, a reimagining of the state (Ramaphosa, 2019c), is an appeal to the people of South Africa to embrace the New Dawn and a renewed social compact; ‘I would like to invite South Africans to begin imagining this prospect’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Unlike the previous social compact, which reconciled the two sides of Apartheid’s divide, Ramaphosa commits to using his power to move the nation forward. Demonstrating belief in the future must be the first step towards overcoming the present political malaise. While empowering the people, it also makes room for criticism. Ramaphosa directs the nation’s gaze towards a visionary goal, realigning the hearts of the people with the aspirations of the struggle against Apartheid, transporting the power of the Freedom Charter and the Constitution to the present day. Asking the nation to dream is a strategic gamble: ‘We share a common future, and we need to forge a common path towards its realisation’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Given the constraints and national tensions with which they must contend, Ramaphosa’s dream seeks to embolden the public with a vision all South Africans can share. If he is able to capture the imaginations of the people, inspiring a feeling of solidarity, Ramaphosa’s dream has the chance to transcend party lines. Dreaming, as was the case with ‘the American Dream’, transcends policy or partisan lines. It liberates and empowers the individual to claim personal responsibility. The strategic use of vision not only shapes the aspirations of the nation, it is also a salve for desperation. By redirecting attention toward a positive future, he avoids being criticised when short term targets are not met. In a tactical move to motivate the people to open their hearts and minds to his vision, Ramaphosa concluded his response to the post-election SONA debate by quoting from Proverbs: ‘Where there is no vision, the people perish’ (Ramaphosa, 2019c). Strategically, the overture to vision stimulates both private and corporate initiative and responsibility to empower the framework and function of national institutions. Presently the public sector wage bill comprises an enormous 14% of national GDP (Head, 2019). South Africans are receiving some of the world’s worst value-for-money services. The bloated administration and welfare state (Mtantato, 2018), together with its failing state-owned companies, are in serious trouble, drowning the state in debt and are only being kept afloat for strategic reasons. This is taking place while the citizenry’s political fealty to the ANC and the influence of the far left impedes critical adjustment. The ANC is kept in power because, unlike under Apartheid, the majority of people have representation and the right to services. Regardless of its factionalism and poor service delivery, the ANC remains the only option for the majority of South Africans. This has once again been proven during the recent election when the ANC received 57.5% of the national vote. The troubled state of the nation, together with the delicate balance of power in the ANC, necessitate Ramaphosa’s desperate strategic approach. It’s an approach designed to inspire belief and renew the economic viability of the state through support for entrepreneurial activity (Ramaphosa, 2019d). Rather than turning to privatisation - a measure that may be blocked by the ruling alliance - Ramaphosa has entered into discussion with powerful unions to enlist their help in strategically restructuring the state-owned companies he calls ‘sewers of corruption’ (Kgosana, 2018). By combining his strategy of cooperative consensus-building and inspiring civic responsibility with increasing support offered to private initiatives, especially small businesses, Ramaphosa has commenced a new programme aimed at the entrepreneurial revitalisation of the state. Ramaphosa’s strategic means The state as a strategic resource Ramaphosa seeks to advance his strategy for renewing South Africa as a capable state through the agency of the state itself. The primacy of the state as a symbolic tool of power is clear to Ramaphosa. Observing the display of military resources at Mandela’s 1994 inauguration, he reflected on the potency of the state to tell a definitive story and thereby act as a legitimate facilitator. He wrote that, under Apartheid, ‘to the majority of South Africans these displays of military might were a grand symbol of nothing more than white minority aggression and terror [...]. [O]vernight their function—and the symbolism that we attach to them—had fundamentally and irreversibly changed. No longer were the jets instruments of oppression. Now they were guardians of democracy’ (Ramaphosa, 1996). The power of the state rests on an undisputed claim to sovereignty. To be legitimate, the state must be perceived as such — the regime must tell a convincing story. In order to achieve justice, the government must express justice through its institutions. Having assumed leadership of a compromised state, Ramaphosa must employ that same state to re-establish authority and stability. Renewal functions as a process whereby a vision is achieved through the deployment of resources. One means of doing this is to continue the tradition of establishing commissions of inquiry initiated by previous presidents. Commissions such as the Nugent Commission of Inquiry into Tax Administration and Governance investigate institutional propriety to restore credibility and improve capacity. The commission is a useful mechanism for telling an authoritative story about justice, for exercising national command. The power of these internal mechanisms lies in the strategic narrative they convey, in the exhibition of procedure and not in their findings, which are rarely binding and often neglected. Instead, these are performances of governance. They are aspirational stories that recognise irregularities rather than correcting them, making suggestions for how to proceed into the future. Commissions of inquiry, routinely overseen by senior justices, present an increasingly legal approach to governance concerns. Their prominence and the reliance placed on them indicate a recognition of the failure of political procedure. On the other hand, commissions perform the revitalisation of institutional capacity (Ramaphosa, 2018a); transcending the past by composing a picture of amelioration. To undo the state capture he inherited, a core concern of Ramaphosa’s programme has been to reclaim state policy instruments. Initially hamstrung by ineffective departments, he has freed resources and consolidated authority by streamlining his Cabinet from 36 to 28 ministers. Some credible, experienced candidates have been appointed to critical positions including the Head of the National Prosecuting Authority and the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service. Ramaphosa has focused on a careful, and therefore slow, clean-up of government institutions, while restraining political opponents in his party. Instead of imposing his authority, Ramaphosa’s strategy is to re-capacitate state institutions so they can both model and facilitate best practice and recover the goods lost as spoils tostate capture. He has charged panels comprised of experts with the task of selecting new heads of organisations. In so doing, he is distancing himself from the selection process and redressing the patronage system associated with Zuma’s appointments, targeting the populist cult of personality developed under Zuma. Ramaphosa has enacted a new, meritocratic precedent based on building consensus. This, among other actions, is directed at correcting the past by empowering institutions, instead of individuals, to lay the foundation for a capable state before implementing policies. However, this process has proven to be time-consuming, frustrating the public desire to see results.Ramaphosa is deliberate in his approach, instilling proper procedure from the top without allowing himself to be rushed, or the process to become politicised. In order to set an example of best practice, he needs to follow the book. By depoliticising the power of the state bureaucracy, he is subverting interests ulterior to the power of the state. In so doing, Ramaphosa discharges his responsibility — to both the party and to the electorate — to lead. This approach can be seen to be of little substance when it comes to policy breakthroughs and outcomes. Much of the espoused renewal remains deadlocked by political constraints. Whereas Ramaphosa may be recapacitating the presidency, the policy outputs of cabinet and a government maligned by factions are preventing real implementation. While the party remains divided and weak, so too policy implementation will be hamstrung. Tools for restructuring and renewal While it is too early to determine its effectiveness, the attention given to structural considerations strategically builds influence and confidence. In a particularly insightful speech delivered to the World Economic Forum in 2019, Ramaphosa announced South Africa’s plans to create an environment that is attractive for development: ‘We therefore come to Davos with a single message, and this year the message is that South Africa is on a path of growth and renewal’ (Ramaphosa, 2019f). To advance this charge, his government is leading investment into the state. The government has begun to reallocate public spending to strategic sectors such as agriculture and small business development and has launched a stimulus package and an infrastructure fund (Ramaphosa, 2019b) to advance economic growth and investment. Ramaphosa’s promotion of opportunities, such as the recently established African Continental Free Trade Agreement, is intended to bolster South Africa’s strategic attractiveness. He has, furthermore, personally launched an ambitious investment drive, aiming to raise USD100 billion in new investments during his administration. For this, he has appointed a team of business and finance experts that include Trevor Manuel, former Finance Minister, and current senior advisor to the investment bank and financial services company, Rothschild & Co. Ramaphosa has implemented targeted reforms to ensure that policies are enacted. These include new ‘visa regulations to encourage more visitors, as well as making it easier for investors and business people to visit South Africa’; a Mining Charter ‘that balances the need for transformation with the imperative for new investment’; the allocation of a ‘high-demand radio spectrum to accelerate broadband access and promote competition within the sector’; and the signing of ‘long-outstanding agreements with independent power producers’ to restart South Africa’s successful renewable energy projects (Ramaphosa, 2019f). All these are corrective measures to redress corrupt Zuma-era policies and bureaucratic stagnation. All have commenced but have not been completed. They are also all measures intended to diminish the government’s involvement, advancing South Africa’s strategic attractiveness for investment and growth. These reforms to consolidate and streamline regulatory processes aim to improve the ease of doing business in South Africa, which currently ranks 82nd in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index. Ramaphosa has targeted this instrument as a barometer for success, indicating that his ‘administration has set itself the ambitious goal of being in the top 50’ (Ramaphosa, 2019g). In another move to improve the functioning of his government, Ramaphosa has established the Policy Analysis and Research Service to improve the development and coordination of policies across government; a similar policy unit that performed as a clearinghouse for policy processes under President Mbeki, was disbanded under Zuma. A central means of Ramaphosa’s strategic communication has been the hosting of summits. Summits bring together various stakeholders to engage in diverse matters of interest. They are places where opportunities are discussed and where consensus can emerge dynamically. These are platforms to gather participants to engage with specific issues, share resources, and form compacts. At the inaugural South Africa Investment Conference in October 2018, Ramaphosa secured the first USD20 billion tranche of his projected USD100 billion in new investments. He also hosted a Jobs Summit: ‘to align the efforts of every sector and every stakeholder behind the imperative of job creation…[and] to come up with practical solutions and initiatives (Ramaphosa, 2018a).’ In 2019, Ramaphosa hosted the 1st South African Digital Economy Summit, addressing the opportunities provided by advanced technologies and the challenges of digital disruption. Both there and at the Presidential Health Summit, Ramaphosa asserted the need for establishing both a digital compact (Ramaphosa, 2019h) and a health compact (Ramaphosa, 2019i) with the people of South Africa. Ramaphosa’s dynamic approach to renewal can be seen in his government’s ongoing review of the National Development Plan — since it was adopted in 2012 not much of South Africa’s detailed long-term guide to prosperity has been implemented. The plan is currently being reviewed to offer clearer, more up-to-date policy guidelines. Here again, Ramaphosa has appealed for cooperation: ‘We want to work with you, and for you to challenge us, to bring added rigour to the work of government [...] this is a government that is not afraid of new ideas, and of new ways of thinking’ (ANA reporter, 2019). In showing that the government recognises its failures and by appealing to the public for participation, Ramaphosa uses the opportunity provided by the revision of the National Development Plan, not only as a signal of departure from the past, but also as a tactical approach to renewal. By restructuring the architecture of government, the new ANC is providing people and businesses with opportunities to take action. Some initial examples include the reduction of port and rail tariffs and the implementation of spatial interventions such as special economic zones. These ventures appeal to citizens’ ambitions and duties. These new policies represent the government’s first steps toward upholding its end of the promised social compact and an invitation to members of the public to engage in the business of renewing the state. Given the state’s level of depletion, these policy tools are structured to induce members of the public to employ their creativity and their assets in rebuilding the state. While it is too early to conclude whether it will be successful, the extent of Ramaphosa’s strategy demonstrates the desperation both he and his government feel. Conclusion Ramaphosa’s precarious leading of both a party in turmoil and a captured state requires communication that is clear and targeted. To avoid being drawn into political battles, he first aligns himself with the values of the state. By crafting his message in service of the national interest, he puts the building blocks of the state into place. Ramaphosa uses strategic communication to transcend Zuma’s legacy. He claims his leadership in the name of advancing the national project. He builds his strategic narrative around the values of the state, personifying the ideals of consensus and compromise. Ramaphosa’s embodiment of the national Constitution is a strategic approach to advancing ideals conducive to restoring order and to building a stable and capable state while countering radicalism. This alignment to the highest standard of legitimacy is strategic. It confounds his opposition. Yet, it is an indirect and therefore precarious approach that can fail if not adopted by the government and the citizenry. This failure will have a direct and devastating impact on policy implementation. Ramaphosa’s focus on ethos is a clear return to the era of Nelson Mandela. He thereby transcends the troubles of the recent past to remind the public of the early years of democracy when civic responsibility was strong. He employs the image of Mandela as the symbol of a nation reconciled. Mandela conceived South Africa’s national values by crafting the nation in word. Ramaphosa’s use of slogans such as the ‘New Dawn’ and ‘Thuma Mina’, harkens back to the moment South Africa changed its destiny, a time of overcoming hardship and of national purpose. Ramaphosa’s communication is a call to action. He uses the means at his disposal to construct a seductive, forward-looking story of a united and prosperous nation. His leadership is not simply laying down a plan of action. Instead, it is the embodiment of a vision that calls the people to action. It is a campaign to stimulate and persuade citizens to support his mission, to forge a collective will towards achieving the national ends. It is too early to tell whether Ramaphosa’s ethos-driven strategic communication, aimed at a long-term vision, has persuaded the nation. This vision is used as a means of restoring order and stimulating the public to endorse his pragmatic short-term efforts. Ramaphosa’s active drive for securing investments and restoring the confidence of the people shows that his dream is not merely a pipe dream. Instead, he uses his visionary approach strategically to engage stakeholders and elicit tangible commitments. His hands-on approach, not as a philosopher-king but a summit king, shows a concerted effort to drive his vision through pragmatic action. Ramaphosa’s leadership provides insight into a theory of domestic strategic communication that is useful in our hyper-mediated world. The increasingly diffuse nature of power in the 21st century requires leaders to use communication holistically to shape national realities and to deter adversarial foreign information campaigns. Domestic strategic communication expresses a leader’s national ideas and ideals; the national ethos is communicated through leadership style. Ramaphosa embodies national values and norms to persuade the nation, demonstrating his approach towards reaching his ends. His leadership does not impose but stimulates an ideal; the nation is constituted and territorialised in word. Ramaphosa uses domestic strategic communication to persuade his audience to trust his message and to identify with it. If he communicates successfully, the people will adopt their leader’s version of affairs, and their agency can be applied to realising the goals of the nation; the citizens are to be empowered and emboldened to adopt civic responsibility, and Ramaphosa will lead by doing. To achieve its end, strategic communication is used to cohere and guide the nation, pursuing a set of values and goals that is organic to the state and its cause. This approach will be critical as citizens of states around the world increasingly adopt a variety of identities, while facing foreign information campaigns. Strategic communication inspires the people to adopt the nation’s ends as their own. Ramaphosa’s approach has been illustrative. References African National Congress (ANC). 2007. Strategy and Tactics, adopted at the 52nd National Conference, 2007. Johannesburg: African National Congress. African National Congress (ANC). 2012. ‘The Second Transition?’, ANC discussion document towards national policy conference, Version 6.0, Politicsweb, 5 March 2012. African National Congress (ANC). 2017. Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress, discussion document of the 5th National Policy Conference, 30 June –5 July 2017. Johannesburg: African National Conference. 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The African National Congress, led by Cyril Ramaphosa won 57.5% of the vote. Ramaphosa was elected by the National Assembly two weeks later. [4] In an appeal to national unity, Ramaphosa shut down the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters’ call to drop a part of the Apartheid era Anthem from the compounded Anthem of the new South Africa. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. The next frontier: South Africa and participatory local governance in the Anthropocene By A Trevenen-Jones (BSc Agriculture, MSc Environment and Development, PhD) Abstract Living conditions for South Africans and the rest of the world are changing fast. This abrupt and radical shift has significant implications for people’s daily lives, their prosperity and the natural environment. We live in the Anthropocene – an era of unprecedented and accelerated change on planet earth due to human activity. The often-shocking phenomena associated with this, our new frontier, have become the norm. Today, we see multiple, non-linear challenges which typically intersect, thereby amplifying their impact. Challenges such as climate change, urbanisation, inequality, food insecurity and Covid-19. Those most vulnerable, like urban residents with low and variable incomes, are likely to suffer the most during these shocking events. But the transition to a resilient and just South Africa has already begun and new socio-economic and environmental opportunities are in the offing. The National Development Plan 2030’s vision of a low-carbon economy that ‘leaves no-one behind’ is evidence of South Africa’s track record of climate action commitments, which span almost 20 years. Similarly, the Paris agreement climate targets and, more recently, the Climate Change Bill. The efforts focus on mitigation of and adapting to climate change and its impacts, however, and must be seen alongside developing actions that can facilitate future-fit resilience. In practice, shortcomings in South Africa’s participatory democracy, the social contract (horizontal governance) and co-operative governance (vertical governance) compound a lack of policy coherence together with a lack of capacity and constrained public budgets in local government. Local government and citizens are key to South Africa’s efforts to mitigate, adapt and achieve just transformation in the Anthropocene. This paper critiques South Africa’s participatory democracy and co-operative governance in the Anthropocene. The areas of focus are action on climate change and the local governance of a ‘capable state’ in a social contract with its citizens. Introduction Life and the Anthropocene Life is about change. Not just momentary change, but a continual series of abrupt shifts that are, and will, profoundly impact humans on earth today and the generations yet to be born. This is a particularly acute characteristic of life in the era of the Anthropocene – anthropo for “man” and cene for “new” – and represents the first time that human activity is changing the state of the earth on a planetary scale (Stromberg, 2013). Human endeavours are accelerating climate change underscoring the urgency to act before it is too late. Efforts must be made to stabilise the predicted Hothouse Earth climate trajectory to a human-friendly earth system state (Steffen et al., 2018). The Hothouse Earth trajectory tracks when interconnected ecological tipping points will be breached resulting in irreversible change (Steffen et al., 2018). An example is the Greenland ice sheet’s 1.50C ecological tipping point threshold (as measured against pre-industrial temperatures), which is expected to be breached by 2030 with a consequential 7m addition to the sea level and a growing threat to coastline settlements (Lenton et al., 2019). The recent sixth assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has confirmed that global temperatures have now risen 1.10C above pre-industrial temperatures – only just shy of the 1.50C rise that will threaten the ‘safe operating space for humanity’ on this planet (Rockström et al., 2009). The United Nations Development 2020 Report aptly titled, The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene, declares that the: Warning lights - for our societies and the planet - are flashing red…A new normal is coming. Covid-19 is the tip of the spear. Human choices, shaped by values and institutions, have given rise to the interconnected planetary and social imbalances we face. (UNDP, 2020:3-4). As the Covid-19 pandemic has shown, in the Anthropocene multiple challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, public health and food security intersect in a complex manner, and everyone is vulnerable in some form. This is an existential crisis; possibly one too large to fully fathom in the routine of daily living and governance calamities. A radical mind shift is needed – one that alters every aspect of how we live, the choices we make, how we act as a society and how we survive. The participatory governance and legislative framework that underpins the way in which South Africans live and pursue their prosperity can no longer be viewed from a social perspective alone. An ecological perspective, which coherently engages people and the natural environment (Trevenen-Jones, 2011), is needed to frame South African governance and policy with local and global horizons. This encompasses the explicit and implicit notion of the social contract, which, for South Africans, was reinterpreted during the 1994 democratic elections and presented in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996). It’s an agreement between the government and the citizens as to who has what rights and duties. This contract is further detailed at the level of local government and in communities where, for example, the provision of basic services is a right and the payment of rates and taxes is a duty for local residents. Developmental State in the Anthropocene Since the first democratic elections in 1994, institutional and policy values have centred around the notion of South Africa as a developmental state. In practice, this notion has been defined by a legacy of programmes that aim to achieve the just socio-economic transformation goals inherent in the Constitution. The goals include the right to a safe and healthy environment (see section 24 of the Constitution) alongside the twin policy mandates of poverty eradication and economic growth and development. One such programme is the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) launched in 2006 to overcome barriers like inequalities, infrastructure constraints and deficiencies in government capacity standing in the way of achieving these mandates (Presidency, 2007). Essentially, the approach has been to deliver on basic rights and economically grow and develop all spheres of life to lift people out of poverty while crafting an inclusive, equitable socio-economic space for citizens to improve their wellbeing and live in prosperity. Progress has been imperfect with initial successes mostly in reducing poverty. Significant inequalities persist, poverty is still on the increase and employment is on a downward trajectory (World Bank Group, 2018). Furthermore, Covid-19 has amplified the number of people living in poverty and increased other existing inequalities such as access to food in urban communities. The combined impact of climate change is eroding the eradication of poverty even further (World Bank, 2021). Indeed, climate change is likely to make it particularly difficult to address poverty. Hotter temperatures, droughts and floods have a dire impact on well-being, nutritional security and homes. South Africa faces these challenges against the background of an ongoing lack of government capacity, local service delivery inefficiencies, urbanisation trends, tenacious spatial settlement disparities and a coal-based economy. However, its participatory democracy, with its framework of mandatory legislative instruments, has the potential to effectively navigate and address the challenges for present and future generations in the Anthropocene. Participatory Democracy, Cooperative Governance and Climate Action The mitigation of and adaption to climate change – especially the goal of a just transition to a local low-carbon economy as advocated for in the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) (National Planning Commission, 2011) – is supported by the participatory democracy (horizontal governance) and cooperative governance mechanisms (vertical governance) in South Africa. While governance mechanisms are in place and South Africa has made increasingly bold climate action commitments, locally and globally, survival in the Anthropocene for people and the planet demands immediate, urgent and wide-ranging transitions in the routine practices of governance and livelihoods. This paper critically explores the delivery context as well as the social contract relationship between local government and citizens since they routinely engage and are in close proximity to the impacts of a changed and hotter earth. Both are also important actors in mitigating, adapting and transforming to climate change. A just transition can arguably be viewed as a unique opportunity to strengthen the social contract between local government and communities to overcome inequalities and realise a more inclusive, equitable and resilient South Africa in the ‘new frontier’. Just Transition and Development in The New Frontier Democratic change in South Africa has focused on redressing the apartheid legacy and realising transformative and equitable socio-economic development. Integrated development planning with attention to realising a sustainable environment and settlements has been an important part of this. The former Minister of the National Department of Human Settlements, Lindiwe Sisulu, asserted that human settlements are ‘integral’ to the government’s efforts to change the lives of South Africans for the better. She aimed to ‘empower communities’ which ‘includes transforming the apartheid spatial planning and patterns of social exclusion’ (DHS, 2020:4-5). New freedoms and choices, mobility, economic development and access to education and health services have changed the way South Africans live (DHS, 2020). Yet, the choices faced by South Africans – with signposted years of 2030 and 2050 up ahead – are embedded in a rapidly changing Anthropocene delivery context. Poverty, inequality and achieving prosperity for all remain familiar challenges. The way in which vulnerabilities and freedoms are experienced, and responded to, on the new frontier is increasingly unfamiliar, complex and often counter-intuitive. The NDP astutely recognises that the state cannot achieve its constitutionally enshrined obligations and developmental mandate without more proactive citizen engagement in the social contract (National Planning Commission, 2011). Trevor Manuel, then chairperson of the National Planning Commission, stressed that: On the present trajectory, South Africa will not achieve the objectives of eliminating poverty and reducing inequality. There is a burning need for faster progress, more action and better implementation. The approach of the plan revolves around citizens being active in development; a capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct our historical inequities; and strong leadership throughout society working together to solve our problems… [a] need to enhance the capabilities of our people so that they can live the lives that they desire (National Planning Commission, 2011:1). Moreover, the NDP's vision of a just transition to a low-carbon economy by 2030 signals a dramatic shift to the traditional mandates (National Planning Commission, 2011). How poverty eradication is achieved, and what constitutes prosperity, needs to be re-envisioned in this new frontier. The challenges of and efforts to address poverty eradication and persistent inequalities, urbanisation, and the crafting of space for people to enjoy human rights and chart their routes to prosperity will all be exacerbated in this new frontier. South Africans are ill-prepared to realise this just transition. Historical settlement and planning disparities – which remain evident as reliance on fossil fuels and inadequacies – curtail the practice of participatory democracy and the cooperative governance model. To be climate active and achieve low-carbon lifestyles will require the full and urgent realisation of the potential inherent in the social contract between citizens and the government. Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy, underscored the need to ensure South Africans are climate literate so as to better equip them for the new choices that lie ahead locally and globally within the context of South Africa as a climate ‘responsible global citizen’ (Creecy, 2020). Climate literacy, climate targets and the NDP 2030 vision are, therefore, vital steps but they can also brush over the granular detail of what is involved in realising the just transition to low-carbon lifestyles. Climate Action and Governance in South Africa Climate Action Commitments Cognisant of the urgency to take immediate action, climate action is incorporated into South Africa’s NDP 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011) and the country is a signatory of the multilateral Paris Agreement committed to keeping global warming below 20C (preferably 1.50C) compared to pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015). The Paris Agreement is ambitious, yet the science shows a significant disparity in life on earth between the half-degree difference of its two targets. A 20C increase will lead to a breach of ecological tipping points followed by irreversible and cascading impacts that will cause a new planetary equilibrium referred to as Hothouse Earth (Steffen et al., 2018). South Africa aims to leave no-one behind while keeping greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) low. This will require strategic and widespread socio-economic transformation driven by regulation, innovation, mitigation and adaptation measures. It will require effective participation fostering commitment and shared responsibility, especially between local government and citizens (residents). In September 2021, the cabinet approved a comprehensive climate change bill to protect the environment for the well-being of present and future generations, thereby providing a bold and rigorous legal framework. Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy, was scheduled to table the bill in parliament in November 2021 after the local government elections. In addition, South Africa’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) was to be presented with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at COP26. The NDC represents South Africa's contribution to global efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to mitigate climate change. Governance National agreements, strategies and plans such as the NDP, the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and Goals and possible commitments to the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit in December 2021 have enormous implications for citizens and government. Cities and their local governments, especially, are viewed as essential to the implementation of programmes such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The intersection with other SDGs such as zero poverty, zero hunger, good health, and wellbeing climate action together with SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities is of specific significance. This is because of the link between citizens and local government (horizontal governance) and service delivery and participatory governance. Also of significance is the intersection between them and other spheres of government through cooperative governance (vertical governance) and global climate and other SDG commitments (UN, 2015). South Africa’s participatory democracy relies heavily on the social contract between citizens and the state. This contract stretches beyond voting to fully realising Constitutional rights, governance mechanisms and inclusive and equitable development. Participation is underpinned by a robust legislative framework that sets out the provisions for legislatures to establish constructive democratic tension between elected officials and administrations. This has primarily been a feature of the national and provincial government spheres rather than local government. In terms of its constitutional mandate (see section 42 (4) of the Constitution), the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) provides a participatory platform at the level of the province (RSA, 1996). It plays an important and unique role in facilitating coherent cooperative governance that respects the synergies and mandates of each sphere of government guided by the principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. While this is an effective vertical governance mechanism, which engages horizontal governance when it seeks communities’ feedback on policy and delivery, the question remains as to the readiness of these climate action and sustainable development institutions and mechanisms to give better effect to local governance across government spheres. Drawing on their case study of South Africa,Alina Averchenkova, a governance and legislation specialist, and her colleagues from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment assert that South Africa has the ‘most elaborate and consultative climate governance systems observable among developing and emerging economies’ (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019:3). Even so, they argue, that notwithstanding robust horizontal and vertical governance mechanisms, there are several barriers, including insufficient human and technical capacity as well as ‘ownership’ of the problem and solutions, tensions between the public and private sector, state capture, corruption and a distracted leadership, in the way. Of relevance to this paper is the critique that the ‘lack of alignment and policy coherence’ poses a systematic roadblock to South Africa’s climate objectives (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019). Active Citizens and Local Government The principle of public participation in all spheres of government is embedded in the Constitution to the extent that, in the local government sphere, the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998a) requires that municipalities review and address the needs of local communities and establish participatory mechanisms such as public participation forums. These forums include engaging citizens on the Integrated Development Planning process. Participatory governance is further directed by the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 2000). For reasons ranging from a lack of technical lay-person capacity to civic awareness to available time to finances and IT skills, public participation has lagged the legal framework designed to secure it. The expectation that basic service delivery should be provided by local government and citizens paying for these services tend to define the social contract between citizens and this sphere of government. This largely transactional relationship can obscure the full potential of the social contract in South Africa’s participatory democracy. Citizens from wider civil society encompassing the private and non-profit sectors and academia, could, for example, play a more proactive role in formal and informal partnering with local government. This will better realise a just transition within urgent Anthropocene-driven timeframes. Achieving climate and sustainability commitments like those set out in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (UN, 2015) and the NDP 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011), requires ‘active citizens’ and a capacitated ‘developmental state’. This is especially important in the routine of citizens’ daily lives – where and how they live – and in local government. Ramodula and Govender (2021) assert in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998b) that a developmental local government is to be aspired to as it facilitates socio-economic benefits and wider prosperity for local communities. Even so, these benefits, they contend,are undermined by well-intended public policies that are insufficiently interpreted into delivery (Ramodula & Govender, 2021). This inefficiency, together with a top-down flow of policy (vertical cooperative governance) rather than a two-way flow between local government and higher spheres of government, is compounded by a lack of policy coherence across all spheres (Averchenkova, Gannon & Patrick, 2019). Further hindrances are a lack of capacity and public budgets in local government. The result is an emphasis on local government function rather than an additional focus on the aforementioned potential of a pro-active local government and citizens who are proactively engaged in driving local agendas for consideration in international and national agreements, public policy and strategies. Coherent governance is critical considering the unique socio-economic and environmental context of cities and the importance of cities for the successful realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cities exert a profound and far-reaching influence on the environment and societies outside their boundaries as a result of population density, economic significance, affluence and ensuing global resource requirements. Cities are also centres of knowledge, technology and innovation (Wiedmann & Allen, 2021:1). The character of the Anthropocene era may leave local governments without sufficient capacity and budget to manage and serve communities. In a time of climate change and climate action, the traditional post-apartheid/new democracy rights and service delivery obligation arguments need to transform, particularly where the relationship between ‘capable state’ and ‘active citizen’ is about a future-fit mindset. The relationships between primary and secondary cities as well as multi-stakeholder engagement with both citizens and local government in rural communities underpin the resilience of today and tomorrow’s frontiers. These actions prompt participation, and with it, elevates citizens’ voices through vertical governance mechanisms such as cooperative governance. Everyone becomes an active citizen in this new world of the Anthropocene even if they don’t act, which in itself is action since a business-as-usual environment drives change on a local and planetary scale. Granularity of ‘Active Citizens’ and Hothouse Earth Population Trends Who are the ‘active citizens’ – those with constitutionally endowed rights that enable them the freedom to pursuing prosperity? The ones who are part of the social contract? South Africa’s population of about 60.3 million people is projected to be about 66 million in 2030 and 70.5 million by 2050 – reaching a plateau of 79.5 million in about 2070 (World Population Review, 2021). Projected trends show that South Africans are living longer – women (67.7 years) and men (61.5 years) – and that the youth is an important dimension. Additionally, population growth is beginning to slow (Stats SA, 2016; Stats SA, 2019). The Covid-19 pandemic may adjust this temporarily, but the overall trend has shown a consistent rise, which is likely to continue. In all likelihood, South Africa is at what former international public health professor, Hans Rosling, termed the global age of ‘peak child’ – a demographic trend where the number of children born today is unlikely to increase in future generations, which would ultimately lead to a population growth plateau (Rosling, Rosling & Rönnlund, 2018). Even so, the granularity of the data shows a youth bulge, with almost 30% of the population aged 0-14 years, and 50% under 25 years of age (Stats SA, 2019). The implications for local participatory governance, active citizens and climate action related to this population data are far-reaching. The youth bulge offers hope given the strong youth advocacy for climate action. Those of us presently active in the economy, and more broadly, ‘active citizens’, aged say 30 years would be 60 years old in 2050, and 80 in 2070. On this timeline you, your children and grandchildren will be the ‘active citizens’: the ‘present and future generations’ referenced in sustainable development including the National Climate Change Bill. From this view, generations collapse in time making this time and action about the almost-past, present and future generations. Cities and Urban Communities South Africa continues to rapidly urbanise. Urbanisation is typically associated with changing lifestyles, shifts towards unhealthy diets (Hawkes, Harris & Gillespie, 2017) and increasing socio-economic and environmental inequalities (Burdett, 2016). The spatial network of both primary cities – Cape Town, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Mangaung – and secondary cities – Emfuleni and Mbombela – is characteristic of a landscape unevenly interrupted by rural communities across South Africa’s provinces (South African Cities Network, 2020). Proactive, coherent policies together with participatory and cooperative governance are needed to: (a) Ensure the voices of cities and urban communities filter upwards and across governance spheres; and (b) Realise social inclusion and equity in cities and urban communities. Turok and Visagie illuminate the value of cities as having ‘considerable potential to combine prosperity with social inclusion, and thereby provide pathways out of poverty – but this is not automatic or inevitable’ (2018:3). According to current MEC for Economic Development and former mayor of Johannesburg, Parks Tau, writing in the State of South African Cities Report: ‘Cities are about people, first and foremost’ – a phrase that emphasises the importance of urban residents. South African cities should be safe, liveable, socially integrated, economically inclusive and globally competitive with an active citizenry (South African Cities Network, 2016:7). Urbanisation and pervasive inequalities underscore the importance of urban planning. Spatial connectivity between cities and rural communities is of similar import and be done in such a manner as to support socio-economic prosperity and food and nutrition security – and be attentive to localised interpretations of climate action, including the National Climate Change Bill. An Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) was developed which responded to the urbanisation trend and the 2030 vision outlined in the NDP (National Planning Commission, 2011). The framework encompassed the notion of inclusive, participatory governance in urban planning and spatial transformation (Integrated Urban Development Framework, 2022). South Africa’s IUDF is coordinated by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). This framework is a critical policy tool and a key to climate action in urban areas as it strives to give effect to both horizontal and vertical participatory governance through a “shared understanding” of what constitutes best urbanization management and how best to achieve ‘the goals of economic development, job creation and improved living conditions’ (IUDF, 2022). Just Transition, Low-Carbon Economy Proactive Legacy of Climate Commitments How prepared are local governments with regard to their governance mechanisms and active citizens for life on a hotter earth by 2030 and more so by 2050? Interestingly, South Africa has been a leading light in terms of climate awareness and policy, regardless of being under-capacitated and practicing poor participatory governance. In 2004, South Africa designed the National Climate Change Response Strategy, approved the National Climate Change Response White Paper in 2004 and, in 2011, climate action was included as an explicit element of the NDP. The NDP recognises the essential relationship between people and the non-human world, the impacts of South Africa’s largely fossil fuel economy and commits South Africa to a more sustainable ‘low-carbon economy’ development path (National Planning Commission, 2011). Just Transition to Low-Carbon Lifestyles The NDP envisions that by 2030 South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon, resilient economy and just society [should be] well underway. All sectors of society should be actively engaged in building a competitive, resource-efficient and inclusive future having undertaken the difficult steps to adjust. By then, the country will start to reap the benefits of the transition (National Planning Commission, 2011:179). Simply put, the NDP framework is replete with significant transformative leaps in the way South Africans live, address inequalities and envision what defines their own prosperity and expectations. Local government will shoulder a fair proportion of the responsibility of implementing the national climate policy. During the one-year consultative period there was a lack of widespread consensus amongst citizens – across many sectors – as to how a just transition and a low-carbon economy can and should be realised (National Planning Commission, 2011). However, there was consensus about key steps to mitigate and adapt to climate change. For example, new and existing technology, such as solar energy, will be important. Many jobs in the present economy are expected to be lost, while new jobs, requiring new skills sets, will emerge. A significant amount of public budget and personal household expenditure will be needed. Those most vulnerable now will become even more vulnerable during the transition (National Planning Commission, 2011). South Africa’s voluntary commitment made at COP15 (Copenhagen) in 2009 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below the ‘Business as Usual’ trajectory by 34 percent in 2020 and 42 percent in 2025 (conditional on support from developed nations) has been widely celebrated. Even greater commitments, with greater significance, have been made since then. In 2015, South Africa became a signatory to the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda with its 17 integrated goals including poverty eradication; zero hunger; affordable and clean energy; transformed industry-innovation and infrastructure; sustainable cities and communities; climate action and promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies; and strong institutions and access to justice (UN, 2015). The agreement directs complex intersections of global, yet local, commitments such as halving food waste by 2030 (Goal 12.3 under Sustainable Consumption and Production). The goal has enormous implications for the food systems such as retailers, households and local government waste management. Was food waste – defined as waste produced from point of retail to consumption – a country, it would hypothetically be the third-largest emitter of Greenhouse Gases (GHG), with only the USA and China ahead of it (Scialabba, 2015). Reducing food waste domestically is an example of a just transition being at the very heart of daily life and the social contract. The collection of household waste is a local government service paid for by residents. Reducing food waste is thus a local government and global sustainability commitment. In addition, the significance of reclaiming and redistributing food before it is wasted to citizens in need – especially to those most vulnerable in terms of food insecurity and those with low and/or variable incomes – underscores the social and wider ecological impact an effective social contract can have at the local government level. Reducing home food waste is also a crucial climate action that all active citizens can act on by partnering with local government: from the private sector to non-profits and community-based organisations to individuals. It will require more than ‘reduce, re-use and recycle’. It will require a mind shift to a circular or regenerative economy and lifestyles, that is, where almost nothing is wasted; where diversity of paths keep food (and other products) in use; and where organic ‘waste’ is used to nurture nature and support food production (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2021). Governance and Realising Low Carbon Commitments Given the volumes of GHGs already in the atmosphere causing the earth to overheat, urgent efforts are needed to further reduce emissions. This must happen alongside experimental geo-engineering solutions aimed at lowering the earth’s surface temperatures. For instance, painting roofs white to reflect back heat energy to manage existing GHG in the atmosphere (Wadhams, 2017). The 2021 local government election manifestos of ‘building back better’ and ‘growing together’ take on a deeper and critically nuanced significance in light of the social contract and low-carbon commitments. It is arguably misleading in the era of the Anthropocene to infer a sense of continuity with the past even if the intention is ‘building back better’. However, these slogans highlight the social contract of government and citizens doing things together to realise a better existence. Even so, there is a thread of normalcy – of more of the same but better – which detracts from the reality of the urgent, business unusual and wide-ranging demands of South Africa's local carbon transition strategy. Like the NDP, a consultative process was undertaken with South Africans to determine the country’s updated NDC ahead of the last annual climate conference, COP26 (Glasgow), held in November 2021. The NDC re-committed itself to the 1.50C preferred temperature threshold supported by GHG emissions targets of between 398-510 Mt of CO2-eq by 2025 and 350-420 Mt CO2-eq by 2030 (DFFE, 2021). Even for non-scientists, the magnitude of these targets would be evident. Large transformations in the practice of daily life will be expected from all citizens, and across all sectors, in a short space of time – and they are unlikely to be comfortable ones. To what extent do ‘consultations’ meet the principle of participatory governance given the challenges of participatory and cooperative governance is a further question. If consultation is to be an effective mechanism of collaborative governance, then, as Johnson and Howsam contend, they need to be ‘characterized by a degree of decision-making power, or, at least, the power to directly influence decisions’ (2018:253). The academics contrast this with the notion of ‘high intensity’ engagements with participants aimed at creating a shared understanding and goals. This is more akin to participatory governance. South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy (RSA, 2011) can be viewed as an evidence-based participatory policy development process. The document was developed on the basis of a mixture of emerging climate science evidence, government mandates and local and global climate engagements. The engagements include the successive Midrand events namely the National Climate Change Conference in 2005 and the Climate Change Summit in 2009 – both of which brought South Africans from multiple sectors together (in-person and later virtually) for consultation. Paradoxically, political will is evident while public participation is less evident based on the history of South Africa’s climate policy and strategy actions together with the recent September 2021 cabinet approval of the Climate Change Bill (scheduled to be tabled in parliament in November 2021). In addition, the cabinet also approved the revised NDCs and South Africa’s negotiating position for COP26. This new legislation points to South Africa’s dedication to keep GHG emissions well within the Paris targets and to pursue an ambitious strategy for doing so within shorter time spans. It will require the public and private sector and all active citizens to work together. To coordinate and provide integrated mitigation and adaption responses to climate change and the impacts thereof, as well as to realise future resilience. It will also involve significant financial cost as outlined by the Van Diemen (2021) reports in the Daily Maverick including the cost of an accelerated plan to close Eskom’s coal power plants as part of a systemic shift towards renewable energy – a project which will cost ZAR 750 billion. Climate action is unlikely to be driven at sufficient scale and intensity by South Africans – private and public – which makes the argument of consultation versus participation initially moot. The burden falls on government to consult and drive climate action through legislation and NDC targets. Beyond this argument is the need to be more participatory post legislation with a view to modifications and in relation to the practical needs of implementation. Such an approach will require bringing together all South Africans from cities and rural communities to business and community-based organisations. Particular attention must be given to those most vulnerable specifically applying a gender lens. Climate action demands technical proficiency, wide-reaching and just socio-economic transformation from local government – and all citizens. Therefore – if international and national commitments are to be met – capacitation, communication and outreach need to be an active and intense part of future participation and implementation. Government and citizens need to help each other rather than stand and wait on the boundary of expectation. They must re-evaluate expectations and act beyond the direct transactional view of the social contract. From Single Issue to Complex, Systematic Issues As is the case elsewhere, the challenges facing South Africa are immense. However, there are also new opportunities for the country on a climate resilient, just and transformed frontier. These opportunities are likely to emerge alongside a radical change in lifestyles; income and job creation; service delivery and interpretations of prosperity. As the Covid-19 pandemic showed, there is never just one global-local challenge. There is a complex, non-linear existence of multiple challenges including the pandemic + climate change + loss of biodiversity + urbanisation + existing public health + food and nutrition + security challenges – all of which amplify the impact on people and the planet and competes for immediate attention. Efforts to influence any single or multiple policy lever(s) to mitigate and adapt to a crisis, like the pandemic and/or climate change, is likely to have unintended and often unpredictable knock-on effects. For example, lockdowns to manage the spread of Covid-19 in South Africa not only impacted income and jobs, but as many as 9 million ‘extremely poor children’ lost access to free school meals and education (Roelf, 2020). The implications for local government and active citizens are that the traditional focus on single issues (and rights) – like water and sanitation, zoning for urban agriculture and road infrastructure – are outdated. Instead, there are complex, systemic issues. Addressing these issues requires technical understanding, sacrifices and trade-offs; multi-stakeholder participation with local government; coherent socio-economic, environmental and governance connectivity between urban and rural communities; in addition to energised, proactive and cooperative vertical governance. Although more is needed, an inspiring example of resilient planning in response to the shocking events of the Anthropocene was the situation in the City of Cape Town between 2015 and 2018. In this time, consecutive years of low rainfall resulted in an extreme drought that impacted water availability and services in the metropole. The severity thereof drove the city to develop a count-down clock to a D-day, called Day Zero, which was the day when the local government would ‘default’ on its social contract obligation to provide city residents with access to potable water. Day Zero was ultimately avoided – in part because sufficient rainfall eventually fell and in part because of the success of the Day Zero campaign – whereby Cape Town residents limited their daily water usage as per water provided by municipal services. Extreme droughts like this are expected to become the norm with similar impacts for the City of Cape Town and its residents. This experience has highlighted the importance of local government’s ability to partner with residents to face climate challenges and to develop a robust strategy to mitigate and adapt to shocking events like climate change and the pandemic (public health) (RSA2019). Cape Town’s resilient strategy with its 20 goals and 75 actions is defined by five pillars namely: a compassionate, holistically healthy city; a collaborative forward-looking city; a connected, climate adaptive city; a capable, job-creating city; and a collectively shock-ready city. Throughout these pillars, complex issues such as urban food systems, the economy, and health are systematically addressed and partnering with all ‘active’ resident citizens is prioritised (RSA, 2019). Conclusion The experience of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020/21) and that of the City of Cape Town during the drought of 2015-2018 illustrate how active citizens working with government to mitigate the realities of the Anthropocene is key to the survival of people and the planet. This is especially true in the local government sphere (state) since it is more coherently connected to local residents (citizens). In higher spheres of government, working together should be pursued through horizontal and vertical governance mechanisms. The social contract, South Africa’s participatory democratic framework and the cooperative governance structure underpin these mechanisms. South Africa has been undergoing socio-economic transformation since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. However, new challenges such as rapid urbanisation and shifts in population demographics – such as the youth bulge – together with climate change are emerging. Previously environmental changes were gradual and predictable. The changes seen in the Anthropocene, however, are not. The rapid environmental transformation of the era is now more than just anecdotal. The challenge of keeping global temperatures below 1.50C above pre-industrial levels is increasingly difficult as traditional lifestyles including wasteful food consumption and the use of fossil fuels like coal continue unabated. Similarly, traditional approaches to poverty eradication, income, and job creation need reviewing if prosperity for all is to be achieved on this new frontier. The new norm is about abrupt, unpredictable and extreme scale shocks that often amplify complex intersections of systems. Intersections include food and public health systems and challenges such as poverty and urban inequalities. How people live and define prosperity – and how they engage as active citizens with a ’capacitated state’ in South Africa’s participatory democracy especially at local government level – needs immediate attention and realignment with the climate, low-carbon vision. Without this, ambitious climate actions and GHG emission reduction targets such as those in the Paris Agreement’s NDC and the Climate Change Bill are unlikely to be reached within the short timeframes required. A sufficient scale to facilitate a just transformation towards the envisioned low-carbon economy and a resilient, sustainable, inclusive and equitable future for present and future generations will not be achieved. South Africa has a robust governance structure in place. However, the technical capacity for governance and active citizens and more coherent policy design and coordination across government spheres are needed. The voice of local horizontal governance needs to be given higher priority and legitimacy in provincial and national government spheres given the importance of local government’s role in effecting change in the routine of daily life, multi-stakeholder engagement and proactive citizenry. Equally, local governments can no longer afford to wait for direction from other spheres of government as how to solve their capacity and budget constraints. Local governments and citizens have the legislative mandate to act and should be doing so proactively, together as a community, and as one city. This will likely require an Anthropocene-driven evolution of the expectations and practice of the social contract. References Averchenkova, A., Gannon, K.E. & Patrick, C. 2019. Governance of climate change policy: A case study of South Africa. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#1 [Accessed: 30 December 2021]. World Bank Group. 2018. Overcoming poverty and inequality in South Africa: An assessment of drivers, constraints and opportunities. Washington: World Bank. World Population Review. 2021. South African population. [Online] Available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/south-africa-population [Accessed: 30 December 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Strategic communication as policy strategy ways: An analysis of Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic communication Dr Klaus Kotzé Confronting COVID-19 and health system inequalities in South Africa: Missed opportunities for inclusive health policies? Dr Laetitia Rispel, Ms Shennaz Munshi & Dr Candice Bailey Efficacy of the national housing policy in the provision of low-cost housing in the metropolitan municipalities of South Africa Mr Moloto Johannes Sekhobela The next frontier: South Africa and participatory local government in the Anthropocene Dr Annie Trevenen-Jones Ubuntu and the State Dr Motsamai Molefe

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originated from a dialogue on the Meaning of Social Democracy in the Modern World, which took place on 23 November 2021. Author: Dr Klaus Kotze Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Setting the scene On 23 November 2021, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted the first of a two-part international dialogue on social democracy. This first discussion asked what does social democracy mean in the modern world? The second, to be held in 2022, will reflect on what preconditions are required in a country for it to advance towards a welfare state? Recognising the need for social democratic solutions in the current unstable global political climate, the Institute invited an international group of social democrats to reflect on the positioning, role and effect of social democracy in contemporary politics. The dialogue sought to contribute to an important global discussion, while providing guidance to South Africans to advance social democracy in the domestic context. The discussion asked: Is social democracy still relevant today? What would it take to return it to its former influence over global politics? And to look forward, beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, which approaches would be necessary to expand its reach and impact? The discussion revealed several prisms through which to understand the unfolding discussion. It highlighted key areas for future collaboration among like-minded organisations. And from the discussion five themes are enumerated here to focus and advance the cause of social democracy. Participating panellists in the discussion included: Mr Johan Hassel, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, former South African Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs Lord Peter Hain, former UK Labour Cabinet Minister and anti-apartheid activist Dr David Masondo MP, South African Deputy Minister of Finance and Principal of the Oliver Tambo School of Leadership, South Africa Ms Dagmar Freitag, former SPD member of the German Bundestag Dr Lisa Pelling, head of Swedish Social Democratic think tank, Arena Idé Ms Katharina Hoffman, Head of Social Democracy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Prof Chris Mullard, Author, former Professor of Education and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam and Visiting Professor at the University of London and at the Royal Agricultural University. Co-founder of Focus Consultancy, UK Mr Mariano Schuster, Editor, Nueva Sociedad, Argentina Mr Sebastian Sperling, South Africa Country Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung The moderator to the discussion was Mr Roelf Meyer, former Minister of Constitutional Development and currently Director of the In Transformation Initiative. Establishing a forum on social democracy Remarks by the Inclusive Society Institute Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute & Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute of South Africa, after two years of its existence, has created this forum to reflect on what social democracy is today, and especially what it means in Africa. From these deliberations, the Institute seeks to gain an increased understanding of the conditions and policies that would lead to a more inclusive society. The discussion about the meaning of social democracy in the modern world is an important one. Many social democratic parties around the globe seem to be struggling to define their message in a way that establishes clear, blue water between themselves and the centre, centre-right. Could this be because many centre, centre-right governments have taken ownership of what would, traditionally, have been defined as typical social democratic programmes? Look at the National Health System in the UK for example, listening to a, typical, Tory MP, one could well believe that it is they that introduced it. But no, it wasn’t. It was the Labour Party in 1945. Aneurin Bevan, the then Labour Minister of Health, was given the task of introducing the service. Similarly, social grants and worker’s rights such as basic conditions of employment, have become the hallmark also of the centre, centre-right. Could it be that the centre, centre-left have systematically shifted to the economic right? Even here in South Africa, the line is being blurred between the centre-left and the centre-right. In the South African setting, the ruling party is committed to social and national democracy. At the same time, it prides itself on being a broad church capable of accommodating a wide spectrum of individuals from various ideological persuasions. This may be good from a support perspective, but does it promote policy cohesion? And how does it impact party messaging? There has recently been much talk about introducing a basic income grant, a national health insurance, and a social security fund, etc. All typical, social democratic ideas. But can these be effectively pursued when the message is not clear, and the pathway not spelt out clearly? To advance a progressive programme, one needs the right environment and resources. With a high unemployment, a small tax base and economic backlogs, this may prove quite challenging at this stage. A new pathway needs to be plotted. That said, in many countries centre-left parties now seem to be rediscovering a more progressive social economic agenda. The SPD of Germany is a prime example, albeit within a coalition environment. Social democrats should draw lessons from each other. To consider the lessons that can be learnt, the Inclusive Society Institute is hosting this two-part dialogue with the aim to contribute to the global discussion as well as provide guidance to the South African context. Executive summary Context The Inclusive Society Institute has identified that social democratic parties around the world appear to be struggling to put forward a coherent and persuasive message. That there is an existential struggle for the identity of social democratic parties. In the growing battle for influence, social democratic parties must rediscover and redefine their agenda and approach. While in some countries there appears to be re-discovery of progressive values, others struggle to define this for themselves. The case for international cooperation among progressives is clear. In this light the engagement between ideologically similar parties and organisations will allow for reciprocal learning and sharing. South Africa will particularly benefit from this engagement. While the ruling party pursues a socially equitable society, there are many areas where policy cohesion and implementation remain lacking. The engagement among other social democratic groupings will allow for insight and reflection that otherwise may remain constrained. For these reasons, these dialogues present significant opportunities. Strategic themes Social democracy requires a strategic definition To advance social democracy in the modern world, it is first necessary to clearly define the concept and its strategic pursuit. Social democracy is a broad term with its origins in socialism. Its adaptation to vis-à-vis rejection of capitalism ensures that the term is not static, but one of application. The following description offers a sturdy basis for expansion: “Social democracy is a variant of socialism distinguished by a conviction that democracy makes it both possible and desirable to take advantage of capitalism’s upsides while addressing its downsides by regulating markets and implementing social policies that insulate citizens from those markets’ most destabilizing and destructive consequences”[1]. For social democracy to be strategic in the contemporary era, it must establish with clarity its core 1) values; 2) pathways; and 3) goals. The values of social democracy are perhaps the more apparent. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in its document Basics on Social Democracy refer to freedom, solidarity, and equality and justice as the core values of social democracy. These values originate in the humanistic thoughts of the French Revolution and are reflected in the foundations of the United Nations. These values form the political compass of social democratic parties. Freedom refers both to positive (freedom to) and negative (freedom from) aspects. To social democrats, freedom has a broader foundation than the mostly negative freedom upheld by liberals. Freedom has social preconditions and aims. Some in society should not be able to be free while others are not. A free society is thus one where all have the possibility to be free. Freedom therefore entails a level of responsibility or solidarity to society at large. Solidarity is a wilful expression of relation or sympathy with others. The Southern African term Ubuntu, often translated as “I am because you are”, offers a fine understanding. Lastly, equality and justice are closely linked to freedom and solidarity. A society cannot be free if all its people do not have equality of opportunity and are treated as equals. To advance equality and justice, society should be ordered along a needs-based approach. The pathways or approach to social democracy was discussed in the dialogue by John Hassel as the state’s role in distributing, redistributing and regulating society across all its functions. To do so effectively the state must take a leading role in comprehensively working with all sectors of society. Together, a reasonable path forward must be planned. Lastly, the goals must not be defined abstractly or without context but should be based on what is clearly feasible and should follow careful consideration. While goals such as inequality, access and effective redress of injustices and inequalities are primary, it is first needed to enable a suitable environment. Social democracy is about people The values, pathways and goals of social democracy should all align towards a strategy that advances the society as a whole, while affording equity to those most in need. Social democracy is an approach which places people, and not profit, first. Strong, ethical politics that first consider society is primary, vis-à-vis an economic focus which places individuals and their interests first. The policies and actions of all spheres of society, including business, should be strategically aimed towards the benefit of people. The age of corporate dominance must be strategically ended through the imposition of appropriate mechanisms such as regulation. Social democracy also recognises that social agents, not simply management-oriented technocrats, run institutions and states. By restoring people as the end of government and by keeping people responsible for their actions, recognition and trust become highlighted. These features are foundational to a state with strong politics. One that places the direct improvement of the lives of people first. Social democracy requires an internationalist approach To be successful and persuasive, social democrats must actively realise an international solidarity among parties and like-minded organisations. With the world becoming increasingly connected and with people around the world facing similar challenges, there lies great strategic potential in joining forces. To rally towards an internationalist approach for social democracy in the modern world. Social democrats the world over share the same foundational beliefs and aspirations. Today’s social problems know no boundary. When considering inequality, migration and especially environmental degradation, these are all global concerns that can only be addressed when social democrats cooperate on a multilateral basis. Unlike during the late 20th-century decline of social democracy, where neo-liberalism gained the upper hand due to its pan-global reach and physically disconnected and unconstrained ways, today digital connectivity allows politics to again take an upper hand. This will require localised organisations and parties to partner in strategic, mutually beneficial ways so as to advance social programmes globally. These networks can find direction from the progressive solidarity of old (for example the international anti-apartheid movement), while drawing on successful social democratic parties, such as those in Germany, Portugal and New Zealand. Social democracy must advance a credible alternative to neo-liberalism Whereas centre-right parties appropriate leftist policies, the onus is on social democrats to put forward comprehensive alternatives and thereby win back popular support. This is slowly taking place in some countries already mentioned. It is now incumbent upon social democrats to put their stamp on the state, to return peoples’ interests to the core of the work of the state. To deal with corruption, with the regulation of mega corporations and with the inefficiencies of the state. As stressed in the dialogue by Lord Hain: “To retain taxpayer’s support the state needs to be efficient, effective, honest and responsive to public demand”. Reform cannot simply be the goal, instead the broader goals should be articulated appropriately. State interventionism would not only be tolerated but also be endorsed when people see that the state is clean and capable. That its actions put the interests of the people first, regardless of political affiliation, race or creed. That the state leads and tackles important questions such as land and economic development. Social democracy requires a persuasive narrative Communication is the more decisive discipline of the 21st century. All matters of public and private life are communicated for purpose. It is critical that social democrats assemble and persuasively propagate a credible and persuasive narrative. The propagation of this message must be comprehensive. It relies on all sectors of society to do their part. Whereas politics is about organisation, the modern world sees organisation largely taking place in the digital realm. Social democrats must develop an attractive digital narrative strategy. For the narrative to be effective, it should be clear and relatable. While stressing the failures of neo-liberalism is necessary, a strategic narrative cannot be arrogant in simply rejecting another narrative. It needs to put viable, attractive ideas forward. It needs to be constructive, compiling an alternative using examples. The narrative should bring people together rather than pull them apart. It should offer certainty in this time of great uncertainty. It should promote social mobility. It must be inclusive while recognising the diversity of people. In the dialogue, Professor Mullard stressed that today it is common for people to claim societies as heterogenous, as multicultural, whereas in fact they are not. These are societies that are descriptively heterogenous while structurally being far from it. A strategic social democratic narrative must be courageous in calling out these and other modern fictions. It must do so boldly. First, it must attend to the themes addressed above and particularly the need for strategic definition. Finally, for the narrative to be effective, it must be the product of conversation between leaders and the society at large. It must raise and address the real concerns of people while laying down a concise list of core interests and non-negotiables. Remarks by panellists “Social democrats should return to the basic principles of social democracy: distribute, redistribute and regulate” – Johan Hassel Johan Hassel, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party The insights regarding the development of social democracy in Sweden are relevant to South Africa’s case and the struggle ahead for the ANC. When its Social Democratic Party was founded 100 years ago, Sweden was a poor country fighting for the right for both genders to vote. It was a struggling society, but the first reforms of the social welfare state were already evident through social investment, which has been the approach behind the social democratic project within Sweden. To invest in people and human skills from a very young age, but also throughout life and throughout working life. In that regard, contributing to economic development and to producing and developing an economy which can be competitive on the global stage. And ensuring a contract between the state, society and individuals, with trade unions and parts of the labour market playing a crucial role together with the political parties. That trust is what has enabled the forums and managing of the crisis over the years. Sweden’s golden years of social democratic welfare expansion occurred during the fifties, sixties and seventies. This was a period of economic growth, of huge investments in social insurance, unemployment benefits, health insurance, but also in establishing a pension system, and childcare and universal education. This was thirty years of welfare state expansion in which people put their trust in society in order to advance economic prospects for not only society in general, but also for individuals. All citizens paid high taxes, a well-known fact about Sweden, but there was a very high return on those contributions. Trust in a working society was built over those thirty years. People’s expectations were met, and the state managed to deliver welfare, social improvement and social justice to the people. That could only happen because of the strong institutions that were free from corruption and based on the rule of law and fairness. There were no problems with nepotism or any other such issue. There was a very strong civic and civil society in which labour unions played a huge part, as well as education centres, institutions, the church, and all the sports communities. That created vigorous checks and balances. At that time, the Social Democratic Party’s electoral support was sitting at around 45%, something to be very proud of. But this period of success was followed by the years of retrenchments when, economically, neoliberalism took hold, not only in Sweden but in the rest of the world too. That proved to be the setting for the next three decades. When Sweden saw that it had an increase in the global financial markets, the country became more dependent on the financial system and the global economy. During the nineties, after Sweden had joined the European Union, the country was hit by a financial crisis, which paved the way towards Swedish welfare privatisation. Today, Sweden has one of the most privatised systems when it comes to education and, partly, when it comes to healthcare. Though Sweden stood as a bastion of social democracy, neoliberalism and the shift in economic policy took root, together with a social chasm, creating an exacerbated situation of ‘us and them’. The threat of terrorism was very real, and also the sense that prejudices and racism had grown in society. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 made it clear that the level of inequality had risen, and segregation gained a foothold within Swedish society. That opened the way for populist parties – the right-wing, populist, racist, nationalist, conservatives – in most of the European countries as well as in the US. This was during the surge of the Trump era, garnering a highly divided political landscape. Now, the pandemic has touched all corners of society. It has been a reminder of the importance of a strong society, of universal healthcare and of the need for resilient societies. It has emphasised that the ordinary workers in the hospitals, grocery stores, public transportation, are the ones carrying society. It is not the bankers and financial investors that society turns to in a crisis, but rather, it is the ordinary folk with ordinary – but important – jobs who keep a society working. The second crisis that needs our attention is the climate crisis – a structural crisis. Industry needs to change, together with commercial and consumer behaviour. Social life cannot continue to be based on the same level and kinds of consumption, which is killing the planet. This dilemma requires urgent social input. There is no company or industry that could alone take up the task of changing the way the business industry or the global playing field is currently functioning. This is why it was so important that the Paris Agreement was accepted and that there was a decent result at the Climate Change Conference in the UK. These crises are opportunities for social democracy because they are unlike those of the eighties and nineties, which lead to more privatisation, more involvement from the financial systems, more trickle-down economics. The dilemmas we face today can only be solved through international cooperation, multilateralism and global agreements, when changing the global playing field for business and industry. This can only be changed through infrastructure investment such as the ‘Build Back Better’ agenda put forward by President Joe Biden and the US Democrats, and through strong, resilient welfare societies taking care of people and instilling trust. We are standing at the forefront of a game-changing time in history which makes social democracy more relevant in the modern world than it has ever been during the last three decades. Social democrats should return to the basic principles of social democracy: regulate, redistribute and distribute. There is a need to regulate the business industry, to ensure that politics has the upper hand in the financial markets of the economy. That politics is the law, and not the economic system. However, regulations cannot work on a state-by-state basis; there need to be multilateral solutions. Secondly, there is a need to redistribute. Neoliberalism came to an end during the financial market crisis of 2007-2008, but it still lingers. Equality is good when more people have more to spend; and when people are making social investments, more long-term, sustainable growth is made possible. Higher taxes should be placed on the rich, on large corporations, and on pollution. But none of this can be achieved by any single country alone – the world has to work together and in collaboration with the global labour movements. The key principle, though, is distribution. Societies should invest in people, which increases human capital. This is what happened during the golden decades, when the principles of the welfare state were established. Using social investment with the added value of social democracy together with very targeted investments in infrastructure, builds inclusive societies where everybody can take part in the city. Today, most social democrats in Sweden talk about ordinary people, about increasing pensions, about universal healthcare. They are recognising that the division between people is based on increased inequality, that people no longer feel they have the same opportunities and, therefore, the same desire to strive for the future. Too much of the system has been individualised and there has been too little collective bargaining between the political parties, the state and the labour markets. One of the advantages of social democracy is that it is a broad, collaborative movement. COVID-19 is revealing the importance of a strong welfare society where every person has equal access to healthcare within their society. This is what creates trust in a society. When there is excessive privatisation, such as there is in Sweden, or rampant corruption, as is the case in South Africa, trust is broken. It is important that South Africa finds a long-term social democratic argument that benefits all which citizens can rally around to grow the economy. “Democracy is about social justice of the structure” – Buyelwa Sonjica Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, former South African Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs Social democracy is political ideology that originally advocated a peaceful evolutionary transition of society from capitalism to socialism using established political processes. In the second half of the twentieth century, there emerged a more moderate version of the doctrine which, generally, espoused state regulation rather than state ownership as the means of production and extensive social welfare programmes. It is important that while the ANC in the evolution of its policy was leaning more on an outfit that would change the capitalist system to a certain extent, that system had to be changed because it was more alienated and disenfranchised the black majority. The ANC did not define the actual outfit, but there was intention to change the status quo which was alienating society. The ANC gave power to the state to intervene on behalf of the people on matters of social and economic development. The ANC’s societal outlook is one that is born out of the Freedom Charter and the reconstruction and development programme and, ultimately, the Constitution of the new democratic order, which is hailed as one of the most democratic constitutions in the world. The Constitution of South Africa captures the aspirations of the people. It seeks to establish a society based on democratic values through fundamental human rights and social justice. All of these raised the expectations of the people of South Africa that the democratic state would end all ills of society. For example, they had hoped that it would eradicate poverty, it would end racism, and it would ensure that there were equal opportunities for all regardless of race, colour and creed. The Constitution envisages a peaceful and equal society in which all shall and will enjoy their human value and dignity, which was denied for some under apartheid. So, although there were some compromises during the writing of the Constitution, in its letter and spirit the ANC ensured that the Constitution tried to accommodate these sentiments. However, in order for any government to achieve and implement the Constitution, it needs power. Not only political power but also, and more importantly, economic power. Moreover, it needs the support and the will of the people. But neither power nor support were necessarily that possible to achieve, for two main reasons. Firstly, South Africa’s settlement was negotiated. In essence, as much as there was a protracted struggle to get its democracy to a particular point, in the end it was negotiated, or concluded through negotiations. In its governance, the ANC would have had to honour those agreements made between the parties at the time. Second, the economic power, which was also taken away or usurped when land was taken, was still in the hands of the few, leaving the majority of people homeless and impoverished and the state with insufficient resources to democratise society. But still, the people had hope. To a very large extent, the state has achieved a lot in its cause of democratising South Africa, in its attempt to restore economic power to the people. As a consequence, many progressive policies and much legislation has been developed. For example, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act, Land Reform Act, Human Settlements National Resources Act, and so on. Trade and industry also had its own policies that were meant to transform that part of the state, and to a certain extent, those policies have brought about significant changes. But to what extent has the state been able to meet the expectations of the people? That is the key question. To what extent has South Africa achieved equality or closed the gap between the rich and the poor? The Inequality Trends in South Africa report – a multidimensional diagnostic of inequality – produced by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) suggests that a huge amount of work still needs to be done. This report says that the financial value of all assets owned by an individual or household is a measure of the wealth of that individual or household. In South Africa, wealth inequality is considerably higher than income inequality. Furthermore, while the top 10% of the population has a 56-58% share of the income, they have, approximately, 95% of all the wealth. A number of questions regarding the national situation arise. Are these inequalities persisting because our policy framework is not relevant enough? Or if policies are relevant, are they being implemented? Ninety percent of land remains and is owned by just a few individuals, companies and trusts, according to the Land Audit Report 2017, produced by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. Is this situation also as a result of policy implementation? Or is it a challenge of policy not being developed enough to deal with the land issue? Resolving inequality also meant transforming business to end its monopoly and racial bias. Policy had to be developed to achieve this objective. During the post-1994 period, a number of policy instruments were initiated to help government hold business to account and, therefore, generate the revenue required to run government and provide quality public services for the struggling majority of South Africans. Such policy interventions include the Division of Revenue Act, intended to ensure an equitable division of fiscal resources amongst South Africans, to remedy the disparities of the apartheid era. Other important legislation and actions include the Employment Equity Act, the Labour Relations Act and affirmative action, which all became part of the instruments that were created and implemented to address the inequalities in the labour market. And all of this legislation was created in line with the provisions originally stipulated in the Freedom Charter, which was adopted in 1955. Past regimes accepted the national wealth of the country, stating that “the heritage of all South Africans shall be restored to the people”. Are we any closer to achieving the noble objectives of the Freedom Charter? It also states that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and the monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole”. Again, this begs the question, has this been achieved? The political and social environment partly changed as a result of the change brought about by a constitution that is embedded in human rights. But the majority of South Africans believe that democracy is not working and has no meaning for them. After all, they still live in poverty, and they are unemployed due to the social conditions under which they live: in squalor. If anything, democracy is about social justice of the structure, but you cannot achieve equality without the economic inclusion of the people in a meaningful and significant way. “A priority today should be, surely, to persuade the world that there is an alternative. A social democratic alternative for the suffocating embrace of global neoliberalism” – Lord Peter Hain Lord Peter Hain, former UK Labour Cabinet Minister and anti-apartheid activist Having been ascendant after World War II, especially in Europe, social democracy has been in retreat since the dawn of the neoliberal era, around 1980, even in Scandinavian countries where social democratic parties were dominant. Neoliberalism tolerates government regulation only where absolutely necessary, whatever the consequences for social justice. This has resulted in grotesque inequality, including in South Africa, in a system that seeks to shrink the size of the state by slashing the budgets that public services depend upon, and which pay for the pensions, child benefits and social security entitlements that cut poverty, encourage greater equality and promote social justice. In that cause, a priority today should surely be to persuade the world that there is an alternative. A social democratic alternative for the suffocating embrace of global neoliberalism infecting every country from South Africa to Namibia, from Britain to the United States, from China to Russia, from India to Brazil. Each country has different state and economic formations, but they all share a neoliberal imperative under this global context. Squeezed budgets have been the dominant feature of Britain’s neoliberal government policy since the conservatives reclaimed their seats in office by beating the Labour Party in 2010. For the next ten years, they took some 150 billion pounds of spending power out of the United Kingdom economy – 80% of it in the form of public spending cuts, proportionately bigger cuts than any in the rich world following the global banking crisis. That decade of savage cuts is the reason why 20,000 police jobs disappeared, why the National Health Service in England faced COVID-19 short of 10,000 doctors and 40,000 nurses and with over 100,000 unfilled vacancies for adult social care workers. It is why Britain has only two-and-a-half hospital beds per 1000 population, while France has six beds and Germany has eight. It is what shrinking the role of the state means in practice and why social justice and equality of opportunity remains well out of reach in neoliberal Britain today. Even die-hard neoliberal purists, who for a long time had screamed magic money tree at those advocating more and not less public investment, accepted that without massive state intervention decline will not be reversed. They accepted that borrowing heavily in order to spend record sums on support for business, for families and for the National Health Service and social care was the right thing to do. The very opposite of the neoliberalism they had so fervently preached. Yet there are still free-market fundamentalists and right-wing ideologues calling on Britain’s Finance Minister to reign it in and to return to austerity. They claim that with national debt now running at nearly 100% of national income in Britain, the country cannot afford to borrow more to pay for more public spending. But Britain’s national debt was over double current levels – nearly 250% of national income – after World War II, and the Labour Government then still managed to create a welfare state, a National Health Service and a fast-growing, fully-employed economy which built millions of publicly-funded houses. Turning to South Africa. Although there is a fervent debate on how to achieve essential economic transformation, that ambition cannot be achieved in isolation, because South Africa is not insulated from the globalisation or the financialisaton that has swept the world in parallel with the advance of neoliberalism, since 1980. Nor can it succeed without tackling corruption at the same time. The radical economic transformation faction is about self-enrichment for a chosen few, for themselves and their cronies, and not for greater equality for all. South Africa should not have to choose between a neoliberal small state and its current corruptly bloated state. To succeed, South African progressives of the left and the centre-left, in other words the social democrats, need to redefine their stamps on the state. Not least as a credible alternative to the neoliberals’ small state, which will otherwise continue to sweep the board. To retain taxpayers’ support, the state needs to be efficient, effective, honest and responsive to public demand. Not swollen, hopeless, corrupt and indifferent to citizens’ needs, as the South African state has now become, undermining Mandela’s legacy. It simply is not sustainable for 70% of tax revenues in South Africa to be spent on public sector wages and servicing the national debt. Private sector workers are suffering real wage declines and economic growth is stagnant to negative. The South African state needs to be radically transformed. There are around 900 state-owned enterprises, most of them inefficient, many bankrupt, leaching off the taxpayer, who should be funding other vital aspects such as better education, health, housing, infrastructure and scientific research and development. A neoliberal small state is not the answer in the modern age, if it ever was. In the most successful economies, the state plays a vital role. Not simply by providing high-quality public services, but also by encouraging economic growth, in part, by actively promoting innovation. A smarter interventionist, risk-taking, entrepreneurial state is therefore the answer for social democracy. The iPhone’s technology was not actually invented by Apple, rather, the internet, GPS, touchscreen displays, and Siri voice-activated facilities all originated from American state-funded research and development programmes, but a private risk-taking entrepreneurial company such as Apple was needed to bring them to market in a way that the state could never have done. Of course, an active entrepreneurial state needs to be well-financed, which also means ending the low tax obsessions of the neoliberalists. These are amongst the biggest challenges for social democracy today, which must be resolved successfully. “To achieve a social democracy, whilst reversing neoliberalism, South Africa requires a competitive as well as an inclusive economy. A social democracy is not just about distribution of social welfare. It is about developmental strategy” – Dr David Masondo Dr David Masondo MP, South African Deputy Minister of Finance and Principal of the Oliver Tambo School of Leadership, South Africa The Social Democratic Parties have shifted to the right. This has to do with stagflation. The economic framework which supported social democracy, particularly, after the Second World War, was a Keynesian model. This was predicated on what economists call the Phillips curve, where some inflation is tolerated as long as there is growing employment. With more employment, there is a growth in the demand for goods, resulting in more inflation. Inflation can thus be tolerated if there is growing employment. But the stagflation of the seventies landed the Keynesian model and the Social Democratic Parties in trouble. The Keynesian model could not provide a solution to stagflation, a situation where rising unemployment and rising inflation takes place at the same time. Social democrat macroeconomic policy has not provided an answer to this dilemma either. It was not by accident that the neoliberals, Friedman and others, provided a solution, which was to focus on inflation and forget about unemployment. An economic paradigm that the social democrats embraced. The problem of stagflation was not embedded; a social democratic solution was still needed. Furthermore, whilst neoliberalism was being implemented, the right-wing actually dealt with the real economic issues. They appropriated the economic solutions that were historically provided by the social democrats. In addition, the right-wing began to take seriously issues with regards to immigration, from a right-wing, racist point of view. Minorities were scapegoated. The right-wing did appropriate some economically left ways, but on cultural and social issues, they remained staunchly right-wing. South Africa can learn from social democracies like Sweden. One approach would be to develop and implement a development strategy that is not simply about welfare, but also about establishing a developmental state. Historically, in its pre-1914 origin, social democracy mainly dealt with the effects of capitalist development. As capitalism developed, it excluded people. This necessitated the development of a welfare state. So, in that regard, the origin of the social democracy welfare state emerges in the context of economic development. There is no doubt that the Industrial Revolution or the capitalist economy which started after the Black Death, and agrarian capitalism which first broke out in England, have generated enormous economic growth. But that economic growth also incurred great exclusion. Social democracy was a response by labour movements to that problem. Now, in the post-colonial situation, there exists not only the need to deal with the effects of capitalism, but also the effects of underdeveloped colonial capitalism, of low growth, the exclusion of black people, women and so on, as well as an undiversified industrial structure. In the South African context, in 1994 the manufacturing contribution to GDP was 24%. It is now down to around 11-12%. So, notwithstanding the fact that South Africa is relatively developed, it is not diversified. And the country imports a large portion of its goods, manufacturing, etc. The achievement of the developmental state first requires considerable catching up. There is no dichotomy between social democracy or a welfare state, and a developmental state. According to the ANC, both can exist simultaneously, while also addressing critical issues such as climate change. The lessons of post-Second World War planning and developmental strategy must be reconsidered, to address climate change and the concerns regarding just transitions. To achieve a social democracy, whilst reversing neoliberalism, South Africa requires a competitive as well as an inclusive economy. A social democracy is not just about distribution of social welfare. It is about developmental strategy, where labour, business and the state – not just the state – agree how they are going to compete. They need to critically engage on the best ways of being globally competitive using the principles of social democracy, which are pro-worker and pro-environment. In the South African context. the platform for this kind of conversation has been weakened over the years, with social democrats sometimes being accused of being sell-outs, reformists and the like. However, it is, from an historical perspective embedded in the Freedom Charter. Social democrats should be more open about their attachment to its ideals, come out of the closet and be counted. “For social democratic parties to create distinction from the centre-right, they must work on the communication between voters and parties” – Dagmar Freitag Dagmar Freitag, former SPD member of the German Bundestag After two decades of bad electoral losses, social democratic parties in Norway, Denmark and Germany appear to be staging a kind of comeback, although these institutions are not as popular as they used to be due to a fragmented party landscape. Of course, in a parliament with six parties ranging from the right-wing AFD all the way to the left, a large share of the so-called cake will always be hard to get. And it is self-evident that electoral results of about 35%-40% have become unrealistic. But that does not mean that social democracy has become irrelevant. In more and more diverse societies social democratic parties are still urgently needed. The basic values of a social democracy are sorely needed to allay the fears of worried citizens who feel they have lost their political compass. Every effort must be made to give people new direction in order to save and preserve societal solidarity in these challenging times. Social democratic parties, for a very long time, received strong support from the working-class and strong trade unions. For these voters, it was really important to have representatives from social democratic parties that spoke their language and knew about their specific problems. Many of them feared being left behind. This is the moment for a shift to parties that offer the simple, right answers. This situation is multi-layered. In Germany, however, the answer is somewhat complicated as the Conservative Party of acting Chancellor Angela Merkel has over the years become more and more socially democratic. Examples of this include minimum wage and climate change. For social democratic parties to create a distinction from the centre-right, they must work on the communication between voters and parties. Social democratic goals must be clear, comprehensible and apply to the everyday realities of the voters. For this purpose, the language together with the actions of social democrats must be seen as honest and understandable to the target groups. In addition, in some ways they need to be more emotional. Despite the developments already mentioned, and in spite of current difficulties, there are encouraging signs that social democracy is growing. Emerging cohorts of voters are more in favour of progressive positions and are persistently preferring parties that offer a clear and progressive profile in this dimension. Social democratic parties should build a new progressive political coalition that includes finding new ways of engaging and incorporating membership as well as strengthening ties with civil society actors. The appetite for social democracy is re-emerging. This can be seen from the latest election results in Germany. There are many signs that suggest success is possible if social democrats can reach the voters emotionally, and with clear positions and aims. Olaf Scholz, the new Social Democrat German Chancellor, had the word respect as central to his election repertoire. Respect for everybody. This was not only a word, but it was also an emotion and people could feel what he meant. There are many reasons why people are open to social democratic values. Social democrats are the ones tackling the credibility of the right-wing’s positions on issues such as racism, homophobia, antisemitism with progressive arguments. Furthermore, social democrats always think multilaterally and that means they know about the importance of a close and reliable cooperation between countries across the continents. The great Swedish social democratic leader, Olof Palme, and the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt both preferred multilateral approaches. They were the kind of leaders that could face up and defeat the right-wing in the Trump era. What happens when the right-wing populace rises to power? The era of President Trump in the United States is a good example of the consequences – a textbook case of how politics change when it switches from a bilateral approach to a multilateral approach. It is up to social democrats to ensure the values of social democracy prevail. “These political parties are part of one big family. They share a set of ideas, an alternative to neoliberalism, that defines them as social democrats” – Dr Lisa Pelling Dr Lisa Pelling, head of Swedish Social Democratic think tank, Arena Idé Social democrats and progressives alike form part of a huge movement. A movement of hundreds of political parties, organisations and trade unions. Great inspiration can be taken from all parts of this movement. Today, social democrats are gaining traction around the world. This is clear when one looks at election gains in Portugal, Germany, New Zealand and Italy. These are all inspiring stories. And they are interlinked. These political parties are part of one big family. They share a set of ideas, an alternative to neoliberalism, that defines them as social democrats. A focus that refuses that the market should be in the driving seat and instead places regulation, redistribution, democratisation first. Modern social democracy faces many challenges. First, the climate crisis. The big challenge of the climate crisis is to ensure that the transition from fossil fuels to green energy does not take place at the expense of workers - neither in the fossil fuel sectors, the oil sector, the coal sector, nor any other sectors. Arena Idé has published a book to guide this process, No Time for Illusions, a Travel Guide. The book is a travel guide on how social democrats can define an industrial policy that makes sure that this transition is made while securing jobs and increasing employment, and at the same time moving fast enough to make sure that the climate crisis is appropriately addressed. The second challenge is privatisation. The NHS is a great success of the British welfare state where health is seen as a right. It is provided based on people’s needs and not on the basis of people’s ability to pay for health services. In the last four decades any system that resembles the British National Health System, including the health system in Sweden, has been under attack by privatisation and fragmentisation of new public management methods. Arena Idé seeks to highlight examples where there has been a successful fight against privatisation. To show where there are alternatives to the so-called freedom of choice, which has meant the freedom of choice for private equity capital firms to buy bits and pieces of the commonwealth sector and not really the freedom of choice of citizens. It has been a great inspiration to see how Scotland has been able to choose a different path from the rest of the UK. A third challenge is housing policy. Defining housing as something that should be left to the market is one of the largest threats to social democratic welfare states and welfare models, and one of the greatest achievements of neoliberalism of the last few decades. Social democrats need to remake its politics, inspired by cities and countries where housing is not left to the market, but where housing is seen as something that should be taken care of by the community. Vienna is a great example. It is an affordable housing paradise which is partly why Vienna is voted year after year as the most liveable city in the world, the city with the highest quality of living. Vienna’s success started off as a social democratic vision, and ambition just after the First World War in 1918 when the city became the first capital in the world to be governed by a social democratic mayor. The first social democratic capital in the world inherited an alarming housing crisis and decided that they would solve the crisis through a massive construction programme. Sixty-five thousand flats were built in a little more than ten years. Social innovation was key, one being taxation. In Vienna, the idea was to design a tax per square metre per person, so that people living in huge imperial flats in the centre of the city would pay a high tax. And this tax would be used to provide more square metres of affordable housing for the working-class in Vienna. What is the Vienna model of today? It is one where both construction and housing is subsidised and the distribution of the flats that are the result of this policy, are distributed on the basis of needs, not economic demands. It’s not the one that has the largest purse, but the one that has the largest need who gets access to a flat first. It is built on strategic partnerships with not-for-profit construction companies – a crucial part of regulating markets. State debt should not be an obstacle. Welfare can be built even in indebted states. “Social democratic parties should reconnect. This is very urgent. Democracy is under attack and has to be defended and built globally” – Katharina Hofmann Katharina Hofmann from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung The topic of modern social democracy is important. According to The Economist, the biggest wealth class in the eighteenth century was farmland. In the nineteenth century it was factories. Today it is residential real estate. The magazine estimates that 170 thousand billion euros are invested in residential real estate worldwide. It is access to real estate, among other modern factors, that is driving up inequality. Inequality and especially the concentration of wealth does not help society. There is a real need worldwide to revitalise the spirit of internationalism. According to Kate Pickett from the UK, violence and physical and mental diseases are more prevalent in unequal societies. To reprove to people that they can still believe in social democracy given the disappointment of neoliberal globalisation, social democrats need to find and propagate solutions to global problems like poverty, climate change and democratic governance. This can only be achieved by reinventing multilateralism. The European Union is in crisis. Migration and climate change issues remain unsolved, and the right-wing and nationalistic groups are gaining power. Parties must reactivate the Socialist International 2.0 and bring socialists and social democrats from all over the world together. Social democratic parties should urgently reconnect. Democracy is under attack and has to be defended and reinforced globally. Hardly any Asian country has a social democratic or a democratic spirit. Even India with the biggest democracy in Asia is turning to Hindu nationalism. In Latin America, the military is growing and regaining power. In Chile, both political candidates are from the extremes. And one sees the same in the US and in many European countries. It all leads to growing polarisation. The need to rebalance the damage of thirty years of neoliberalism is acute. Social democrats must actively endeavour to rebalance the relationship between capital, work, welfare, health and education. In all these spheres the state must be empowered. People around the world must deal with the crisis of the legitimacy in democracies. Social democrats must regain trust in scientific institutions and sanction people who love writing false information on social media. It is very urgent, not only in other countries, but also in Germany and Europe. “There is a need to rearticulate the ethical base, not as an individual act of philanthropy, but as a collective one. A group act, a global act that separates from altruism and, in so doing, immediately moves into a new arena of equality and justice.” – Professor Chris Mullard Professor Chris Mullard, professor at the University of Amsterdam, and visiting professor at the University of London and the Royal Agricultural University. The assumptions of social democracy seen from a theoretical instead of empirical view opens them up to criticism, allowing the viewer to revisit the fundamental, ethical and moral basis thereof. It is easy to recite the history, to talk about Marx, to talk about Lassalle, to talk about all the great writers and thinkers and the development of the great German Social Democratic Party. Indeed, it is easy to document all the revolutions of the nineteenth century and how they dovetailed and related to an expanding capitalism, colonialism and, if you like, the growth of the state. What is not so easy, is to look at them critically. First, social democracy is based upon a set of assumptions which are, essentially, Western. That is, they have arisen, as we all know, out of the dilemmas, the inequalities, the injustices of peoples who have been exploited within Western society. Whether one looks at this historically or contemporaneously, these are Western ideals. Other perspectives, African or Asian are also required. Second, social democracy is based upon the modality of capitalism. Under capitalism hides, or can be seen, a myriad of inequalities of one kind or another. In fact, that is why social democracy found its rootage. A third assumption is that in some social democracies it is a racially constructed concept. This is not simply referring to South Africa, but in the world at large. The fourth assumption is institutional altruism, or institutional philanthropy, which has sprung from a Western voluntary movement of philanthropy and the concern about those who are worse off than those who are in control of a society. Be it a class group, a racial group or other. It has grown out of this notion of altruism. The fifth must be the rights of the individual. The rights of the individual, in both early and contemporary social democracies, give credence and legitimacy to capitalism against the rights of the group, or the community. Underneath these assumptions lies a very basic paradigm: the paradigm between the haves and the have nots. It is a paradigm between one race and another, between one class and another. One having power and one not having power. This is a very simple and well-worded paradigm. So, social democracy as an ideology, social democracy as a set of policies, has to wrestle with this paradigm. How should these assumptions be addressed? First, there is a need to rearticulate the ethical base, not as an individual act of philanthropy, but as a collective one. A group act, a global act, that separates from altruism. And, in so doing, immediately moves into a new arena of equality and justice. Secondly, there is a need to be courageous as a party or as a group or as a movement. To recognise that societies are heterogeneous, that they are multicultural. This is something that is clear in South Africa, but it isn’t recognised in Europe. There is talk about it, people describe these societies as plural, as multicultural. But that is a purely descriptive form of talking about society. It is not structural. Social democrats should start rejecting notions of multicultural society as simply a descriptor, and notions of homogenous societies. The third is to look at the distribution of power, or rather, to look at redistribution on a global basis. Inherent in the constitution and the constitutional thinking is the need to bring the economic, the social and the cultural together. Seen in South Africa and contemporary politics, it is, in fact, a disintegration. There are separate political and economic power structures. It is critical, therefore, to consider a new model of social democracy. An inclusive model. An inclusive social, ethical, structural and cultural one. COVID-19 has reminded the world that people are not simply individuals, but come from and belong to a community, a group. Group solidarity, group respect and group responsibility – that is what social democrats should focus on. “It is critical to not only have ideas, but to win elections. To put forward alternatives to the right-wing. To put forward a very strong criticism of neoliberalism.” – Mr Mariano Schuster Mr Mariano Schuster, Editor, Nueva Sociedad, Argentina Considering the past and future of social democracy only along Western lines is problematic. Such thinking excludes societies that are not Western, including all the non-Western actors of these societies. Doing so could lead to deficient thinking regarding race, gender and religion, while other topics might not be contemplated at all. In general, social democracy is freedom and equality. It strives for a model that will overcome capitalism. Many different movements, such as socialism, were founded upon the ideal of emancipation. Are social democrats today talking about socialism? Is socialism regarded as it was in previous centuries, where social democrats were excluded from power? Where were they excluded from social interventions and started to look at workers to see how they could put them in counter organisations? They talked about working-class literature, music that the workers could have access to. It was only after the Second World War that social democrats started to become governing parties. It was then that they started shifting from the role of education, of organisation, because now they had a responsibility to govern. In most cases, they did good work, especially in the fifties and sixties, at a time of great prosperity. The phenomena of African colonialism and the social outbursts in Latin America were not the making of social democracy, but rather, they were responses to previous power arrangements. Neoliberalism was imposed as an answer. Today, young social democrats and progressives are recovering what had been lost. They are finding pathways towards their ideals through social democracy. But it is critical to not only have ideas, they need also to win elections. To put forward alternatives to the right-wing. To put forward a very strong criticism of neoliberalism. To this end, great inspiration can be found in the strong ideas and ways demonstrated in the global south. Takeaways from the dialogue Sebastian Sperling, South Africa country representative: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung In reflecting upon the day’s dialogue, there are five key takeaways that can be summarised as follows: Social democracy is not static Social democracy is not cast in stone. It is not a textbook ideology that just needs to be implemented; it changes over time. While there are underlying values that remain, such as freedom, equality and solidarity, there are different ways and interpretations that depend on context and grouping. What has changed over time is the interpretation of these values and how to pursue them. This is why discussions like this one are so important. These discussions must, however, be more inclusive, including more young people. Social democratic consensus It is important that social democrats find consensus and work together towards a shared future. It has become clear from the discussion that while there are shared values, there is still some way to go. All societies grapple with inequality. COVID-19 and the climate crisis are deepening these inequalities, while the neoliberal zeitgeist with its agenda of privatisation, austerity, concentration of economic power, dismantling of public goods and the state, is still very much alive. Like a fish in water, social democrats around the world have sometimes not even noticed that they are also contributing to this neoliberal zeitgeist. To acknowledge past mistakes is part of this joint reading of the status quo that is needed. Inequalities have led to the crisis of democracy which we now face. To break the marriage between neoliberal policies and the liberal democracy is critical. Social democracy is about uniting people Social democrats make and implement policy with the broad majority in mind. It is not the politics of the few. Neoliberalism’s stroke of genius is packaging the interests of the few as that which makes common sense. This has seen them gaining majorities in elections. And a strong case was made for why economic and political power is needed to achieve our goals. We need to build broad alliances, and in evermore-fragmented societies, social democrats are the best placed to build these necessary alliances. And this needs a narrative under the banner of respect and unity, under a system that believes in people, in dialogue and in organisation. Social democracy is about showing that an alternative is possible What is this alternative? Well, it is the primacy of politics. It is an understanding of the role of the state, and not simply reducing it to a welfare state. There is more to social democracy than that. It is a developmental state, a state of social compacts. A state where there is regulation, redistribution, taxation of the rich, public investment in people, in critical infrastructure for all the necessary transformations. A state that is putting risk and innovation on the agenda, that is investing in public goods, transport and housing, etc. Social democracy is an international agenda Social democrats need to be more internationalist in their orientation. On the other side of the street, people are much more internationalist-orientated and better organised. Social democrats are fragmented at the international level. Internationalism has various dimensions: it is about how issues are addressed, how alliances are built. This dialogue, which was facilitated in an international fashion, is exemplary. More of this type of dialogue is needed to rebuild strong internationalism. [1] Sheri Berman, 2020. “Can Social Democrats save the world (again)?” Foreign Policy, January 15. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

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