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Copyright © 2023 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2023 Accounting for social value in funding public colleges in Higher Education in South Africa by Dr Cornelia C September (DaVinci Institute) Co-contributors: Dr S Lloyd and Professor P Singh Abstract The need has become imperative to look not only at the effect on the public purse of the South African government, but also a need to focus on the long-term change achieved by government through funding public education. The aim of this research was to investigate the use of a social-return-on-investment (SROI) as a benefit to the public college sector. The research undertaken followed a qualitative design, using inductive reasoning. The study revealed that a disjuncture exists between the funding framework and policies that govern the public colleges. As a result of public pressures to demonstrate financial prudence, many government policy and program evaluation has, historically, been conducted through a monetary or financial lens. Social-returns-on-investment refers to a framework for measuring and accounting for the concept of value and seeks to reduce inequality, degradation as well as bringing about improvements. The study concluded with development of a social-return-on-investment framework as a means to measure a social-return-on-investment in the public college sector in South Africa. Key words: Social-return-on-investment, frameworks, measuring, social value. Introduction It appears that government’s show an interest to adopt and adapt Vocational Education and Training (VET) programmes worldwide. While skills development receives important attention internationally, requisite funding of the TVET sector appears internationally to be a challenge. Developing financing systems as well as transforming the TVET system remains a daunting task as TVET systems tend to be more expensive than general education and therefore remain underfinanced according to Majumdar (2017). There has been growing interest by governments and other agencies of rate-of-returns from investment in education along with research to guide macro-policy decisions and financing education reforms (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2010). They have also been keen to use the rate-of-return studies innovatively to set overall policy guidelines while acknowledging that more research on social benefits needs to be undertaken (ibid). The effective measurement requires an evaluative shift towards measuring the outcome experienced by Higher Education in general but into public college funding in particular. This shift is in tandem with the emerging concept of ‘social value’ and it is proposed that social impact valuation methods could fill the desired developmental agenda of an improved socio-economic outcome needed. A review of the social impact sector identifies SROI as the most developed method with a robust framework for implementation. SROI generates monetized results, anticipated to enhance transferability compared with typical educational funding evaluation summaries and facilitate the dissemination and usefulness of findings within Higher Education. This paper uses SROI methodology to analyse the social impact of the ‘public colleges in Higher Education in South Africa. The research explored the broadening of an evaluation technique that lends itself to understand the value a social understanding in the lives of the beneficiaries and government alike. A literature review and a documentary analysis as methods were undertaken for the research. The conclusion offers practical recommendations for future applications of SROI to the public sector environment. Background The history of Further Education and Training (FET) colleges in South Africa can be traced back to the Technical Colleges that supported the apprenticeship system for certain racial groups only in South Africa. In the view of Thompson (2002), vocational education aims to address the development of human abilities in terms of knowledge and skills. This approach meant that TVET is instrumental in providing the human capital to industry (Tikly, 2013), as an investment. The philosophy ascribed to vocational education in various literature sources describes the vocational technical education as any kind of education which has a purpose. The main purpose of vocational education is to prepare people for employment. The philosophy according to the human capital theory (Borjas, 2004), ascribes education as an investment, with the return being an increase in skills and individual productivity. South Africa has been increasing its budgetary allocation for both Basic and Higher Education and Training since 1994 (OECD, 2018). However, poverty has not been reduced in South Africa and according to (Galal, 2022), by 2025 around 18.5 million South Africans will live on a maximum of 1.90 US dollars per day. As part of her doctoral research, the researcher undertook to understand whether the public college system was responding with empirical evidence of improved social gains, and socio-economic gains to the requirements of the developmental state, and whether the increased funding played a role in the social gains achieved. Aim and objectives This paper draws on the researcher’s thesis titled “A Social-Return-on-Investment in Higher Education in South Africa” which was the central phenomenon that was explored. The phenomenological inquiry, as part of uncovering what the expected social-return-on-investment would be from the college sector was studied in the context of South Africa as a developmental state. In the original research, the critical epistemology was one of subjectivism which is based on real world phenomena and linked with societal ideology (Scotland, 2012). The objectives therefore were to: Determine the rationale of the South African developmental state devoting a considerable increase in the public college sector budget allocation. Examine the policy, norms and standards processes established to analyse the demonstration of return-on-investment on government expenditure Investigate the use of social ROI information to the benefit of the TVET sector as it relates to setting financial policy guidelines. Analyse the development of measures of ROI across different countries. Develop a social ROI framework that can measure social ROI in the public college sector in South Africa. Primary research question What is the nature and scope of the public funding of the public college sector and how does it affect the SROI in Higher Education in South Africa. Theoretical framework The researcher sought to look at the relationship among the key variables to explain a current state and also to look at predicting future concurrences. Conceptual framework The research problem formed part of the researcher’s conceptual framework, which framed the study and identified what was going on in the world with regards to budget increments to the public college sector, as well as the social gains derived from such an investment. Research methodology The research focussed on identifying the problem on whether the expected social-returns-on-investment had been achieved through the financial investment by the South African government to the public college sector. The qualitative approach focused mainly on the deliberate government strategy to address the legacy of the past inequalities in education in South Africa. The research utilised critical theory to explain what social value was demonstrated through increased budgetary allocation. The method of enquiry included the researcher’s social constructivist ontological perspective which formed part of her interpretivist epistemological perspective, and qualitative approach included referencing documentary work undertaken by several authors. The first phase dealt with the conceptualisation of the research problem and question within the contextual and literature review. The second phase, consisted of the research approach and the empirical design, methods and processes of in-depth data collection and analysis. Therefore, the purpose of the second phase, the empirical section, was to provide a functional plan, i.e. the philosophical positioning as the research approach or paradigm to the qualitative methodological decisions of data collection and the qualitative data methodological decisions made that concerned the grounded theory data analysis procedures (Roller, 2017). The case of a social priority towards a social-rate-of-return in education Why should return-on-investment be measured? SROI is a method that measures and accounts for a wider concept of value for the attainment of multi-bottom lines in the not-for-profit sector. The returns to investing in equality accrue over time and ultimately lead to communities with more trust and less social ills, i.e. more social capital. Deliberate TVET financing increase by the government plays a major role in ensuring the public college’s implement and have as an outcome the country-specific objectives guided by the Constitutional (1996) objectives and the requisite legislative framework. Korea provided an interesting illustration from the East Asia region of how a country’s TVET financing mechanisms has changed as TVET objectives changed (Lee, 2016). TVET financing approaches do not operate in isolation of other TVET reforms and therefore governments need to create a conducive policy, regulatory and administrative climate for a financing mechanism to function. Due to SROI being the instrument used to measure value and governments’ in the instance the South African, to be held accountable with regard to their financial obligations to society, governments need to have a tool to evaluate the value of their fiscal obligations. The same consideration should be considered by a government to examine the investment in a college education or whether such an investment should not be made elsewhere. Public confidence in public colleges as well as universities is considered through the lens of its understanding of the ROI the institution can generate for society especially and including individual students. The investment in public college education should measure the sum of all economic and non-economic net benefits that accrue to society at large and the students, measured against an investment by a student, government and in the instance of private colleges, by other contributors too. Economic impact is more easily measured but it is the social impact that completes the whole SROI as studies indicate that social implications in training are most important to understand as they provide a true value of training that is often neglected in TVET research due to difficulty in measuring it (Schueler et al., 2017). A holistic approach to return-on-investment is that financial return is one way to evaluate ROI, but return-on-investment can be measured not only by increased student enrolment but also by values, especially for communities that are not traditionally reflected in financial statements. Education and the rate-on-return, evaluation of the TVET One of the fundamental factors of development in a country is education. Education improves the quality of lives and provides social benefits to individuals as well as society. The reasons given for the popularity of estimating returns-to-education derives from the resulting efficiency, equity and the financing decisions. This can assist policy makers to make informed investment decisions. These are to be found, for example in the educational impacts on the economy, on labour productivity, health, technology, and income distribution. Several studies of the Southeast Asian countries bear testimony to achieving high income per capita growth when there have been high rates of investment (ibid). These studies concluded that heavy initial investment in human capital by households and governments as well as investments in physical capital are responsible for the high income per capita growth in East Asia (ibid). The literature refers to two methods being used to calculate the returns in education, namely, the discounting method and the Mincerian function (Psacharopoulos, 1995; Mattson, 1998). In South Africa STATSSA (2016) revealed that the census 2016 survey showed that 13,4million black Africans aged 25-64 had not reached secondary education level, 3 million black Africans in the same age group dropped out of school with some primary education. Disparities in post-secondary education still exist as Whites and Indians have the highest proportions of such graduates. A fair education system could provide for upward mobility for poor families as the past structural inequality is still at play in educational mobility. Social value measurement is an evidence-based approach. Even though market proxies may lack the precision of market exchange, effort is made to assess items that are of importance and measurable, and to use measures that are transparent and that can be independently verified. Often social value measurement attempts to focus on change in an organisation. One of the challenges in doing so is that organisational change can be attributed to many internal and external factors and separating change that is attributable to the organisation from change that occurs because of other factors is very challenging (Mayne 1999; Mook et al., 2007). The benefit of providing information on SROI is that governments and funders are provided with analytical information on the performance of the system (Psacharopoulos, 2014), and provides a justification for the expenditure on TVET. The approaches that demonstrated the value of TVET to the economy through increases in employability and increasing productivity are referred to as: Determining the SROI for spending that has occurred. Investigating the potential return should funding/spending alter. Griffin (2016) and Schueler (2016) inform the researcher that measuring SROI in TVET is very complex as there are different dimensions of outcomes to consider. These include economic growth, equity and sustainability (Marope et al., 2015). Return-on-investment in the public sector, a myth debunked In the public sector the view has been expressed that government is not able to demonstrate a return on investment, due to some myths that are prevalent. These common myths are (Blagg & Blom, 2018): That government services are essential and therefore may not need the level of evaluation. The absence of revenues and profits make the concept of ROI inappropriate. Governments generally lack real or hard data. Investment decisions in the public sector take place in a context of political and policy influences. The global environment is changing government organisations’ practices and acceptance of new concepts are only limited to the private sector organisations. Policy makers have to consider opportunity costs; for example, when government builds a bridge and invests in education, government should expect a rate of return at least equal to the yield from alternative uses of the money (Zerbe, 2014). Governments have to deliver services that must benefit the citizens as well as enhance the value of government as a public asset. The three dimensions of ROI in the public interest are: The Financial ROI which is direct, measurable benefits and costs. Social ROI which is indirect and difficult to measure, the “public good” benefits and costs. Political ROI which is motivational feasibility of the project or the benefits and costs for interested parties, for example opponents and decision makers. The restraints to ROI include: Bureaucratic and approval cycles The scale and complexities Shrinking annual budgets Lack of alignment with government policies A silo-culture and multiple stakeholders The motivating attributes include: Government policies become effective. There is an improvement in efficiencies. The economic policy objectives can be met. Qualitative improvements in service delivery can be realised as well as gaining trust from the citizens (Al-Khouri, 2009). Al-Khouri (2009) demonstrated what the reality is in the following manner in response to the myths that the public sector should not undertake an exercise of ROI. It is argued that these exist in many agencies through legislation: The argument that ROI is a corporate concept is wrong as the cost-benefit analysis has its origins in the public sector. ROI studies pay off in cost savings through improvements in productivity as well as direct costs reduction. Data exists in the public sector as output is required of all programmes and this can be converted to monetary value. The ROI methodology represents both qualitative and quantitative data. Both the private and public sectors have multiple constituencies and the development of training programmes for various leaders in the institutions can be considered. There is a vested interest in the outcome of education of the different stakeholders such as students and the institutions. The likelihood of the results being misused for political purposes might be addressed by presenting several types of data with several recommended solutions. Whilst government budgets are declining, some organisations report that they have doubled their evaluation budgets by undertaking the ROI evaluation exercise. The decisions policymakers face is not only to look at which types of colleges and programmes to devote funds to, but how to allocate them across the different functions (Blagg &d Blom, 2018). For some institutions expenditure on students’ services lead to better outcomes than instructional spending on the margin (Webber et al., 2010). Other arguments suggest that increasing spending can be more effective than decreasing tuition (Deming et al., 2017). Thus calculating an accurate ROI will depend on understanding the productive value of each investment (Kristin et al., 2018). Policy makers have access to data on higher education institutions such as the college scorecard, student throughput, college performance, and this lays a basis to consider the return on investment from higher education institutions (ibid). With access to data, especially as it relates to the performance of institutions in higher education, the need to review policies and to change legislation seems possible. Review of the ROI in developing countries Most research that has been done to estimate the returns-on-investment to education has been conducted in high-income countries (Card, 2001). A few studies have been done to identify the returns to education in developing countries (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1994a, 1994b; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). While both Card (2001) and Duflo (2001) argue that returns on education in developing countries are likely higher than in industrialised countries, supporting empirical evidence is scarce. A study done between 1985 and 2012, revealed that overall returns are remarkably heterogeneous across regions, countries and residential locations and that in Africa returns are over two times the average in Asia (Peet, 2015). Peru experienced rates of returns close to zero in 1994 but returns greater than 13 percent in 1985. Other features of the research found that returns-on-education for females and in urban areas are higher as opposed to returns-on-education in rural Asia that are higher than returns-on-education in urban areas. Private returns on educational investment appear to be consistently above five (5) percent (ibid). Models of ROI Different models apply to different situations and thus if economic and social returns are included, this will influence the selection of the ROI model along with the choice of the forecasting perspective. Different returns on investment models include: Cost-Benefit Analysis which assigns monetary value to costs of the training programme to determine the cost benefit ratio. Internal Rate of Return – Rate of interest that equals the returns from an investment to the cost of the investment. Kirkpatrick/Phillips Evaluation Model (globally recognised method of evaluating the results of training and learning programs) - 4 Levels of Evaluation – Reaction, Learning, Behaviour, Results plus Level 5 ROI that converts 4th level to monetary value. Net Present Value- Compares the value of money now with the value in future. Return on Expectation- Estimates returns to training relative to stakeholder expectations. Social-Return-on-Investment- Stakeholder driven evaluation with cost-benefit analysis and strong focus on social impact (Schueler, 2017). Major Findings The literature reviewed by the researcher showed that the use of SROI was a phenomenon that was not widely used by governments. The findings within the qualitative phenomenological methodology motivated by Saevi (2017) describe this approach as an educational research and therefore the researcher added meaning to educational thinking and practice. The findings, motivated by the grounded theory methodology, selected information-rich literature. This method provided an in-depth understanding about the research question as it related to the SROI experiences and outcomes, the roles and responsibilities of policy makers and implementers, international experiences on TVET funding evaluation, amongst others. The literature review identified the different aspects that emerged from the research as it related to the increase in public funding and colleges. It offered some insights about what had gone into the aspect of social-return-on investments and offered comparisons on the different expenditure patterns in South Africa from 1994 and beyond, as well as provided international comparisons. Different responses have been given on the need to do research into the SROI from finance allocation of government on public college education and whether there is sufficient reason to propose that it is a good investment and whether government should not invest in other socio-economic needs. From the literature review it emerged that returns on education use two main methods which are the full-discounting method and the Mincerian earnings function. Researchers have tended to prefer the Mincerian method as it is apparently convenient (Mincer, 1974). The Mincerian earnings function has also attracted criticism in the literature (Psacharopoulos et al., 2018; Layard, 1979; Heckman, Lochner & Todd, 2006). The critique of estimating returns to education is missing variables such as ability bias. Others such as Griliches (1977) argue that bias is small or negative. The Mincerian method relates to private returns as opposed to the full discounting method that provides us with private and social returns. To understand a SROI analysis, is to understand what benefits such measurements could mean for the TVET sector as well as government. Within the documentary analysis of Karl Marx, he stated that “Education of the Future” is part of the struggle for a new society (Rikowski, 2004). He further expanded that polytechnic education must combine physical, mental and practical training as a combined education. Understanding Marx’s future society is an understanding that the TVET sector must be located within a concept of preparing work-ready graduates, enhancing their employability and skills improvement. These are part of the social-returns-on-investment of the government’s financial investment into the public college sector. The reviewed literature informed the researcher’s study that a ROI analysis could be used as a tool to address efficiencies, provide advice on funding agreements as well as investment decisions. A social-return-on-investment is about value rather than money only. A framework for measuring and accounting should therefore be based on the concept of value and improvements. The TVET education is undervalued and therefore the TVET sector can benefit from an analysis of its value, to inform policy makers to understand the economic and social value of TVET investments. A review of the literature on ROI consistently indicates that ROI is context specific to the stakeholder and relative to the environment (OECD, 2008). The measurement of ROI is diverse and thus key indicators must be identified to formulate a conceptual framework which requires an overarching structure that supports a practical approach and broad application (Schueler et al., 2017). Most of the research acknowledges the importance that the TVET sector can contribute towards the economy, but calls for better financial frameworks and ensuring that the finances that are set aside must achieve the objectives that are set. Because a specific return-on-investment is required to measure the benefits government derives from the increasing investment into public college education, the impact data might have to be converted into monetary benefits. While the literature raised the difficulties in doing a ROI on the college sector, it however pointed out that the myth that exists in the government sector can be remedied to undertake an ROI exercise in the public sector. Some research had been undertaken in South Africa on rates of return amongst the levels of education (levels refers to the South African Qualifications Framework which is separated into predetermined levels, which are guidelines that dictate the qualification you have). The studies however were conducted by Joubert (1978), Trotter (1984), Archer and Moll (1992) and Hosking (1990, 1992a, 1992b, 2003) and it should be noted that they conducted the research before 1994 (South Africa ushered in a democratic dispensation in 1994 and therefore studies post 1994 becomes more relevant to the research undertaken). According to the literature, it is pointed out that the main aim of the research was to encourage funding by government. A further consideration in the literature relates to the calculations of the role ROI plays in the evaluation of public policies related to TVET. Multiple forms of returns that interest policy makers are in the realm of social effectiveness, credibility and strategic effectiveness. This leads to impact assessment using a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Stufflebeam et al., 2000). An example is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which established an indicator around the following key policy objectives of TVET: The social outcomes are influenced by the institutional settings, as the nature of the social benefits will change depending on the type of system and country in which TVET is situated. The dimensions of ROI must be represented in the right context and by a framework that considers the scope and key stakeholders. The context and scope will be the main elements towards measuring SROI. The findings reveal that dimensions must include the context of employability, consider the Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) and idle factor of young people, output must be aligned to identifiable sectors such as towards a reduction in crime and gender-based violence. For the TVET sector this will include all the various stakeholders such as government, public colleges, and student and industry participants. Within the documentary findings ascribed to Smith and Todaro (2009), developing economies are cautioned not to waste limited financial and human resources on unproductive ventures and investment projects must be chosen on the basis of taking overall development and long-term objectives into account. The nature of development planning as in the case of economic planning requires government to choose social objectives. Based on development planning, government would set targets and finally organise a framework for implementation, co-ordination and monitoring and development. In Australia, the National Centre for Vocational Education Research (NCVER) however, embarked on an international guideline to measure ROI in TVET. They wanted to understand where to invest and which qualifications could generate the best economic returns over a lifetime. The ROI exercise made a case for additional funding for TVET in Australia in “thin markets” (which are places of inadequate service delivery resulting in participants needs not being met, especially in rural areas) using social indicators. Discussion Looking at the strength and benefits of SROI, reveals that it makes a concerted effort to include all impacts which are important to stakeholders in the evaluation process. A paradigm shift by government and society is required in the success of social programs. SROI frames social policy as an investment as opposed to an expense. This results in a more balanced focus between productive and technical efficiency, between measurable and non-monetisable costs and benefits. Furthermore, SROI can lead to more effective decision-making at the program planning level (SROI Canada Network, 2010). SROI allows organizations to become more familiar with the complexity of solving socioeconomic problems among individuals and institutions (Arvidson et al. 2010; Rotheroe and Richards 2007) SROI completed in the planning stages will be a forecast of potential social value creation. Not only will the SROI indicate the expected social return for comparison sake, it can also highlight activities that may be improved to create additional social value if adjusted or direct policy-makers towards activities with higher potential social value. The measurement of SROI includes different dimensions that must be considered. As with the economic and social aspects, undertaking a SROI completes the whole ROI (Schueler, Stanwick & Loveder, 2017). To understand a SROI for the TVET sector is to understand the true value of TVET programmes and what they produce. The documentary analysis provides government with an understanding that a social-return-on-investment can be an enabler towards performance evaluation possibilities. In turn it can provide for a justification for expenditure on the TVET sector and the much-needed calculation of the value of the TVET sector to the economy. Inherent in the findings are the complexities of TVETs with different existent dimensions as stated. Myths exist that SROI is inappropriate to the government sector as education is an excludable good and not for profit. These views negate the constitutional obligations, laws and policies that advocate a TVET to be responsive to the needs of society and the economy and that government expenditure requires an adherence to meet the needs of its people. A new education financing system, framed within the parameters of a SROI, will seek to reflect from theory to practice towards a desired outcome of what is expected from the TVET sector. Furthermore, this will include having an outcome which promotes responsible and accountable control over the quality and delivery of services, ensuring the integrity of the public finances and maintaining effective and efficient administration. In addition to satisfying key general principles such as these, education financing arrangements must accommodate the diverse needs, abilities, aspirations, interests and choices of learners of all ages and make a full contribution to educational redress, reconstruction and development. A social-return-on investment has to be underpinned by the values of those that matter most. Value refers to the relative importance of different outcomes informed by the beneficiaries such as students, broader society, the public colleges and government. A social-return-on-investment methodology according to the literature, accounts for the value for money realised by the public colleges in the country. SROI frames social policy as an investment as opposed to an expense. Conclusion The literature review identified the different aspects that emerge from the research as it relates to the increase in public funding and colleges. It offered some thoughts about what has gone into the aspect of social-return-on investments and offered comparisons on the different expenditure patterns in South Africa from 1994 and beyond, as well as provided international comparisons. When a measurement by government is strictly through a financial lens, all other value is placed as secondary. A distortion of views on value creation occurs as well as acknowledging the important goals the TVET sector are to contribute towards improving the quality of life and to contribute to the reduction of inequality of society tends to be overlooked. Different responses have been given on the need to do research into the SROI from finance allocation of government on public college education and whether there is sufficient reason to propose that it is a good investment and whether government should not invest in other socio-economic needs. The measurement of a SROI has not been done in the TVET sector in South Africa according to the literature and documentary analysis. A plethora of research has been done on the financing of education as the highest expenditure in a country’s budget, and on strengthening the TVET and college sector, the need for the private sector to improve their contributions towards ending the skills deficits in the countries, especially developing and lower income countries. The dominant theories of human capital presented by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018) have been provided in most literature and researchers who wrote about the concept of rates of return-on-investment being similar to other investment, cost and benefits as well as the human capital theory put forward the concept that investments in education increase productivity. Comparisons between different public colleges in South Africa offer opportunities of what are working well, planning, and the introduction of innovative ideas and possible areas of improvements. A new education financing system, framed within the parameters of a social-return-on- investment, will seek to reflect from theory to practice towards a desired outcome of what is expected from the TVET sector. This will include having an outcome which promotes responsible and accountable control over the quality and delivery of services, ensuring the integrity of the public finances and maintaining effective and efficient administration. In addition to satisfying key general principles such as these, education financing arrangements must accommodate the diverse needs, abilities, aspirations, interests and choices of learners of all ages and make a full contribution to educational redress, reconstruction and development. A social return of investment has to be underpinned by the values of those that matter most. Value refers to the relative importance of different outcomes informed by the beneficiaries such as students, broader society, the public colleges and government. A social-return-on-investment methodology according to the literature, accounts for the value for money realised by the public colleges in the country. To achieve a social value, agile methods can enhance a qualitative benefit which can improve attitudes towards the TVET sector. To understand a SROI for the TVET sector is to understand the true value of TVET programmes and what they produce as they are most important. The documentary analysis provides government with an understanding that a social-return-on-investment can be an enabler towards performance evaluation possibilities. In turn it can provide for a justified expenditure on the TVET sector and highlight the much-needed value of the TVET sector to the economy. Investing in social programs is a worthwhile undertaking in its own right. Reference Al-Khouri, A. M. (2009). Public value and ROI measurement in government sector. Available on academia.edu. (Accessed 12 March 2020). Arvidson, M., F. Lyon, S. McKay, and D. Moro. 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Policymakers need to be mindful of opportunity costs. Winter 2013-2013 Regulations. Public Finance. Available on cato.org. (Accessed 16 May 2020). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2023 Ethical reflections on population challenges by Dr Motsamai Molefe MA (Developmental Studies), Phd (Philosophy) Abstract The paper is a contribution to debates on population growth. It contributes to debates on population growth from an ethical standpoint. It draws two resources from moral philosophy to reflect on population growth issues. The first revolves ethical frameworks in environmental ethics and/or justice. Specifically, it considers the debate whether a robust approach to morality must be one that is human-centred (anthropocentric) or one that is non-anthropocentric. The insight from this approach is that it will challenge moral agents, at individual and institutional levels, to adopt ethical and policy frameworks that is more sensitive to the general well-being of the environment beyond the human good. The second ethical framework relates to the abortion debate in moral philosophy, where we consider the permissibility of abortion. We consider this debate as it might have ethical implications for managing population growth via the permissibility of the use of contraceptives. In the final analysis, the paper indicates that there are resources in moral philosophy to contribute to debates on population growth. Key words: Abortion, Contraceptives, Environmental ethics, Human dignity, Population, Well-being Introduction In 2011, the human population on planet Earth was just over 7 billion. A United Nations report indicates that this number could jump to over 15 billion by 2100, if the current growth trajectory continues unabated (UN, 2011; UNFPA, 2011). This would mean that by 2100 the population would have increased by over 50%. There is no doubt that population changes have serious social, economic and environmental consequences that require our earnest and urgent attention. Some of these issues are ethical in nature, as they relate directly to questions of human dignity, well-being, or even justice itself (Cripps, 2021). In relation to dignity, the question revolves around whether, as the population changes, individuals, cultures and institutions will provide conditions suitable for decent human habitation, where we can survive or even thrive. Or whether human beings will find themselves living under deplorable and dehumanising conditions. In relation to human well-being, the concern is whether human beings will have access to the basic needs and conditions required for their lives to go well. In terms of justice, the focus is on how we protect the interests and welfare of future generations. As the population grows, it throws out all manner of problems for policymakers and, in the instance of this paper, for ethicists too. The central concern then revolves around developing ethically robust “policies for reducing fertility rates and … stabilising human numbers” (Coole, 2021). The motivation for seeking to stabilise human numbers, or population, is informed by the observation that there is a direct relationship between population changes and consumption (The Royal Society, 2012). The idea of “population changes” is very broad. It encompasses more than just population growth; it also includes a variety of complex dynamics related to the population such as migration, urbanization, age structure, education structure, and so on. Human beings require access to resources – which they access from the natural environment – so that they can produce goods for consumption. The natural environment provides natural capital. And it is this natural capital, by use of technology, that is processed and converted into goods which human beings can consume to satisfy their basic and aspirational needs (Budolfson & Spears, 2021). As the human population grows, we need to extract and use more natural resources to respond to human needs. Bear in mind that it is not only the human population that relies on the natural capital of the planet for their survival, but also many other species. The complex ecosystem functions precisely to respond to the needs of other components of the natural environment, all things being equal. It is, however, human activity that has the most extensive impact and places extraordinary demands on Earth’s natural resources. The technical term “Anthropocene” is used to capture the extensive, fast-paced and pervasive human activity on the social, cultural and environmental components of the planet, and its demands and impact on planet Earth (Meybeck, 2013; Trevennon-Jones, 2022). One crucial consideration related to human activities and requirements associated with human existence, in relation to consumption, is the fact that the planet is finite (Meadows et al., 1972). In other words, as the population grows and changes, the demand for natural resources grows as a result of the increase in human needs, but the planet itself is not growing – the planet does not have a limitless supply of natural resources. To exemplify the point of the finite nature of Earth and the serious problems it presents for current and future generations in light of a growing population, consider the example of a soccer stadium. A stadium might have the capacity to carry 80,000 people. The human need to consume soccer, in this instance, can only accommodate 80,000 people. Should the population of soccer-lovers who want to go to the stadium exceed this number, the stadium would be put in a precarious situation, where it might collapse as a result of being forced to carry a number of people beyond its natural capacity. The ethical questions focussed on this paper pivot on the finite status of the natural resources provided by planet Earth. If it is a fact, as I suppose it is, that the planet has a set capacity and, therefore, its resources are limited, how should we ethically respond to this situation? In other words, what moral responsibilities are engendered by the limited nature of the natural resources of the planet? This paper provides some ethical suggestions on how we might respond to the challenges posed by population changes. Specifically, given that the problems of increased consumption have to do directly with extracting more resources from the planet, the solution will encompass suggesting means – ethical ones – to manage or reduce population growth. In pursuing the task of proposing ethical means to positively intervene in our relationship with the natural environment, its natural capital, this paper is divided into two major sections. The first section appeals to the environmental ethics framework, to inform our approach to the environment and our duties towards it, or, at least, some components of it. At the heart of the environmental ethics framework is the question of the boundary of morality. Specifically, the debate centres on whether we require an ethical framework that limits our duties to human beings or one that locates it beyond human beings. The consideration which emerges in this section is that robust ethical frameworks that could point us towards an ethics that requires us to be respectful towards the environment, are possible, which will have serious implications for our approach to the environment, how we relate to it, and what within it counts as a resource for human consumption. The second section focusses on the ethics of birth. It does so via the debate in moral philosophy regarding abortion and its direct relation to the question of contraceptives. It suggests practical ways, drawing from ethical perspectives, to reduce fertility. Section One: Environmental Ethics What is the relationship between human beings and the natural environment? One obvious answer is that human beings are located and navigate their entire lives, be it as individuals or through family, cultural groups and institutions, in the natural environment. It is our home, our only home, and we cannot begin to imagine or conceptualise human lived experience outside of it. It provides the very context for what is humanly possible. All that I have stated above is not controversial. We could ask – a somewhat controversial question – do we have ethical duties towards the natural environment, or at least some of the non-human components in it, like animals? In other words, should we think of ourselves as having duties towards mountains, rivers, forests, animals, oceans and so on? The answer we provide to this question is important for its own sake, as it will challenge both our influential ethical theories and our attitudes about how we ought to relate to the natural environment. But this question is also crucial because it has direct implications regarding how we ought to relate to nature at an “engineering” level. By engineering level, I mean we have to decide what technological means to use to produce goods in the world. This question is not a purely empirical or scientific question, it is also one that is deeply ethical. It involves what scholars in Development Ethics describe as “the ethics of means”. The underlying idea here is that “the technological, cultural and economical policies and actions” we exercise in the context of development must be ethically sound (Goulet, 1996; Crocker, 1991). The ethics of means accentuates a view which rejects the claim that the ends justify the means. Economic growth, and the means we employ to achieve it, must be subjected to ethical considerations, where ethics is primary and the pursuit of economic growth secondary (Sen, 1987). The means themselves, the “how part”, which involves the choice of technology we use to achieve our production-method-and-goals, must be ethically justified. The engineering aspect, do not forget, is crucial in the process of converting natural resources to goods which human beings can consume. So here, we are confronted by ethical reflection on two levels. On the one hand, we are asking questions about whether the whole or parts of the natural environment are objects of moral concern towards which we have duties of respect – it is this question that lies at the heart of environmental ethics. On the other hand, we have the question about how we ought to go about choosing and using technology to produce goods for human consumption – the ethics of means. Both levels of ethical reflection are crucial for how we relate to the environment. Do we relate to the environment merely as a resource? Or do we have to nurture respectful attitudes and duties towards it? In the rest of this section, I focus on the first of these two questions – the question of (1) “who else” in the natural environment is the object of direct duty other than merely human beings? and (2) what means are ethically justified to produce goods for human consumption? I hope it is clear how both questions are central in ethically relating to a finitely resourced planet. These questions have direct implications for human consumption. The first question involves concerns about what we may consume in the natural environment. The second question involves concerns about how we go about producing the things we may consume. Underlying these questions about how to relate to a finite planet and its resources are the values of dignity (respect), human well-being and intergenerational justice. These values are directly connected to human survival or even flourishing, for the current and future generations. For the sake of focus, in relation to the environmental ethics, I limit myself to the case of animals. The inquiry is centred on whether we are ethically justified to continue regarding them as a mere resource for human consumption. I select this question because it has direct implications for the environment and climate change insofar as the choice of what we consume and the methods of production we use have environmental costs. Some options have high and some low environmental costs. The question of environmental costs is crucial because it requires us to choose options that are sustainable. Moreover, my focus on animals might offer us a useful way to think about our duties to other finite resources in the environment as we proceed to search for a robust ethical framework in relation to managing finite natural resources. Our Relationship with Non-Human Components in Nature (Animals) The central question for our consideration here is whether we should see ourselves, being moral agents, as having duties towards non-human components in the environment, or even the environment itself. This question arises because of the negative consequences our attitudes and conduct has had on the natural environment. The large-scale degradation of the natural environment could be traced, in part, to our moral theories and the attitudes they foster in us towards it. The concern raised in the literature on environmental ethics is that many of our ethical theories circumscribe the enterprise of morality strictly to human-to-human relations. That is, ethical concerns are strictly limited to issues revolving around human well-being and/or dignity. The implication of such an approach to ethics is that it tends to exclude all other elements of the natural environment from the moral purview, and without a place in the moral community, they remain exposed and vulnerable to all kinds of use or, even, abuse. What is worse, such (ab)use of other non-human elements cannot be condemned, as it is not immoral, since the environment is not a proper object of moral obligations. There are at least two prominent ethical theories that have come to shape our relationship with the environment and its contents. One is religious: a Christian ethical perspective that accounts for the highest value in the world in terms of human beings as bearers of the divine image (Schroeder & Bani-Sadr, 2017). With this view, only human beings bear the divine resemblance which creates responsibilities of respect towards them. Since almost all of nature is devoid of the image of God, it is not an object of moral concern. Another theory is secular, and it explains the highest good in terms of rationality, where only entities with the capacity for rationality belong to the community of respect (Rosen, 2012). The upshot of such religious and secular ethical views is that we can “fill the earth” without any concern, and we can go on to “subdue it”, that is, extract as much as is possible from it – for our consumption – without any concern (Jamieson, 1996). These influential moral theories have tended to be human centred in ways that foster attitudes of total disregard towards the environment. Environmental ethics emerges as a concern and response to these human-centred theories and the negative attitudes they foster in society towards the environment (Brennan & Lo, 2002). The moral intuition behind many scholars’ criticism of and scepticism towards human-centred ethical approaches is that on the one hand, it does not tell us the whole story about the nature and scope of our duties towards the planet. The intuition is that surely our moral debts ought to go beyond human beings. On the other hand, human-centred moral theories reflect a false story about the environment and other non-human inhabitants in it. Theories and policies that limit the scope of morality to human beings and their well-being are described as “anthropocentric” (Grey, 1993; Almiron & Tafalla, 2019). The idea of “anthropocentrism” literally means the policy or ethical theory under consideration is human centred, which implies that only human interests, well-being and goals should matter in our moral calculus (Behrens, 2011). All other elements of the environment can be rightly regarded as a mere resource for human consumption, or tools to make such consumption possible. If all value is intrinsically connected only with the human good and the environment in its totality is reduced to a mere resource, then there is no ethical limit to the extent of the damage that can be done to it. Environmental ethics emerges precisely as an objection to this kind of theorisation about the environment and its non-human components. It is an attempt to elevate the imagination of our moral systems to carefully think about the place of the environment in our moral schemes. One way to appreciate the possibility that environmental ethics could challenge us to rethink the place and status of the environment in our ethical frameworks, policies, attitudes and conduct, is by focusing on animals for heuristic purposes. I focus on animals, and I include fish in the community of animals, for the sake of making a point about how environmental ethics could challenge us to rethink what falls within the scope of human consumption and our general attitudes towards the environment. The issue of animals (and fish) is crucial because they are an important aspect of our culture in terms of consumption, but we have tended to ignore ethical concerns around our duties towards animals. Notice that the Royal Society report on population and its impact on the planet make this point about animals and fish as a requirement for human consumption: A greater number of consumers exist than ever before because of population growth. Economic development has meant that the material needs of societies have become more complex, reflecting aspirations as well as basic needs. Over the last sixty years total fish production has increased nearly fivefold … and total world meat production fivefold ... (2012: 11). A serious ethical and policy implication related to such increases in the production of fish and animals is its environmental costs. Note, for example, that a recent study on the environmental costs of meat-and-fish production indicates that “the highest impact production methods were beef production and catfish aquaculture” (Hilborn, 2018). They used four metrics – energy use, greenhouse-gas emissions, release of nutrients, and acidifying compounds – to measure the environmental cost of meat-and-fish production, among others. At an environmental policy level, it occurs that we need to be intentional in terms of supporting the production of certain foods and we equally need to distance ourselves from others precisely because of their associated high environmental costs. Meat production, as indicated in this study, has a high environmental cost in as far as it has adverse consequences for the environment. In this light, environmental ethics could come in handy in relation to challenging our cultural, institutional and individual attitudes and conduct in relation to animals (and possibly fish) production and consumption. Environmental ethics operates with the moral intuition that our exclusion of animals, for example, from the community of respect, is premised on arbitrary and unjustified human prejudice and greed. Some scholars of ethics argue that animals do reach the minimum threshold for moral consideration warranting moral attention and respect (Regan, 1987; Singer, 2009; Behrens, 2011; Horsthemke, 2015; Metz, 2017). There are several ways to capture the minimum threshold for inclusion in the moral community, where “one” (whatever object or entity that might be referring to) may be worthy of moral recognition and respect. One influential model proposes “rationality” as a minimum standard for inclusion for moral candidacy. The problem with appealing to rationality is that it does not only exclude animals from the moral community. It excludes more than our moral intuitions and standards would permit, since it also disturbingly excludes infants and people living with serious mental disabilities (Kittay, 2013). Very few of us believe that people living with serious cognitive disabilities are not objects of ethical respect in their own right. However, taking rationality as a standard of being a member of the moral community has the unpalatable implication of excluding beings we would naturally include as objects of ethical concern, such as infants. Another influential moral theory proposes “sentience” as a minimum threshold for inclusion in the moral community (Singer, 2009). Sentience refers to the ability to experience suffering and/or joy. With this view, the worst evil in the world is pain and suffering, and the good involves joy or happiness (George & Lee, 2009). The implication of this view, which is more inclusive than typical anthropocentric theories, is that animals do have a moral standing, and, as such, deserve moral recognition, protection and respect. It is in this light that Tom Regan commented: I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights — as a part of the animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive it, is committed to a number of goals, including: the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping (1987: 179). I may not entirely agree with Regan regarding the first point on the use of animals in science. I do, however, believe many of us can agree with him on the points involving commercial animal agriculture, more so that we know its environmental costs, and the use of animals for hunting and entertainment. The underlying concern and objection informing animal ethics and animal rights movements is that animals, as components of nature, “are not merely a resource for human consumption”, but they warrant respect in their own right so they can pursue a good life according to the possibilities inherent for their species (Nussbaum, 2017). An animal free from unnecessary human interference can go and live its life to the fullest. To think of animals as objects of ethical concern, and not as mere resources for human consumption, has serious implications for human consumption and the environment. For example, Peter Singer, in his elaboration of animal liberation observes that the acceptance of the moral idea that animals are not a mere resource for human consumption – they can suffer or enjoy their own lives in their own-species-related way – has revolutionary implications for human beings and consumption tendencies. He observes that it will cause a massive change in our fridges, eating tables, restaurants, forms of entertainment, as animals and meat will no longer be a part of our diet. The entire meat industry would have to close down or drastically be reduced in respect of the rights of or duties we owe to animals. This ethical revolution in relation to our attitudes about animals would radically challenge us to rethink animals and fish as a resource for human consumption. The implication is that to mitigate the increasing consumption of meat and fish, which has a high cost on the environment in terms of energy use, greenhouse gas emissions, release of nutrients, and acidifying compounds, we may seriously have to consider promoting and educating about less costly food types and production methods. In this light, policymakers may have to promote more plant-based food choices, as they tend to be less demanding and costly on the environment, and they promise to have positive consequences for human well-being now and in the future. The one interesting conclusion we might draw from this rough discussion of environmental ethics, is that it offers us a positive way to approach the planet and the resources it offers. Environmental ethics requires us to abandon anthropocentric moral theories and policy options in relation to the planet. One consequence might be the promotion of plant-based foods and their accompanying low production costs in relation to the environment, which might have positive consequences for the environment and future generations. This means, our policy options in relation to consumption and production of food could be interpreted within a non-anthropocentric framework, which requires us to take a generally humble and respectful attitude towards the environment. The pressing implication gleaned from environmental ethics concerns what in the natural environment counts as a resource for mere human consumption. Here, we suggested that some interpretations insist on the general removal of animals as a resource for human consumption. One wonders what else an extensive analysis of environmental ethics might reveal in relation to what counts as a resource and the kind of attitude we ought to have towards the environment. There are two other useful moral-theoretical frameworks associated with environmental ethics, which might be helpful in terms of rethinking our attitudes towards the environment. Here, we might distinguish between weak anthropocentrism as opposed to the strong versions of it – the latter are represented by the religious and secular theories mentioned above. Bryan Norton (1984: 131) recommends weaker forms of anthropocentrism in as far as they “provide a basis for criticising individual, consumptive needs … providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics”. The insight here is that it is not only human interests that matter, we also need an approach to the environment that will be robust enough to identify and criticise greedy, excessive and often unnecessary human consumption, and that will foster respectful attitudes towards the environment (Passmore, 1974; Bookchin, 1990). This form of anthropocentrism is weak in that it recognises that some elements of nature, like animals, might have value in their own right, but it still assigns greater value to human beings. In other words, in a trade-off situation where one has to choose between saving a human being or an animal, all things being equal, one ought to save a human being because they have greater value. Very close to weak anthropocentrism is the “enlightened anthropocentrism”, which, like stronger versions of anthropocentrism, only locates value in human beings (Brennan & Lo, 2002). Unlike strong anthropocentrism, it recognises our general strong indirect duties towards the environment. This view requires us to be kind and respectful towards the environment because how we relate with it has direct consequences for human well-being. From this view, we might have to minimise our consumption of beef in order to manage its environmental costs and consequences. From this perspective, it is not wrong to eat meat per se, it is, however, imprudent to do so in large scale, which might end up harming the well-being of present and future generations. Weak anthropocentrism also has direct implications for the second question involving the means, or the how part, of producing consumptive goods. The general crucial point facing governments and policymakers is the awareness that we have an ethical duty to be critical and ethical when we exercise options for pursuing our goals of development or economic growth (Crocker, 1991). The Industrial Revolution was extremely costly, ethically speaking, for many aspects of the natural world. The most important goal of industrialisation was economic growth, but the growth came at a high cost to the environment and human beings. We saw in it the worst forms of environmental degradation and human exploitation. Efficient production plants were established everywhere in Europe and the Americas without any sensitivity to the environment and the damage done to it. The mantra was development or economic growth. Weak anthropocentrism promotes policies that require us to take approaches to economic growth that are sensitive to people’s cultures, by way of encouraging their participation in decision-making, respecting other non-human communities on the planet – animals, rivers, mountains – so that Earth remains habitable and beautiful. Section Two: Ethics of Birth This section focuses on another aspect that directly affects population growth: fertility rates. If we are serious about managing population growth and changes, it is absolutely essential for us to have clear ethical and policy thinking around matters relating to fertility. To properly situate the discussion of ethically reflecting on birth and fertility, I look to the debates in moral philosophy on abortion. I do not enter this debate for its own sake, I engage in it because it is directly related to the question of pregnancy, birth and contraception, which speaks to the theme of population growth. The discussion on abortion is important in contexts where you have unwanted pregnancies due to poverty, lack of economic opportunities, no access to contraceptives, and general lack of decent sexual education (Royal Society, 2012; Bongaarts et al, 2012). Reflecting on debates pertaining to abortion and contraceptives is vital if we are to make progress in addressing population growth, considering researchers predict that the human population might increase to up to 15 billion by 2100. It is also worth noting that as much as over 50% of this increase might come from Sub-Saharan Africa (Royal Society, 2012). We need to have policies grounded in clear ethical perspectives regarding how to reduce fertility rates. The first pressing ethical question focuses on whether abortion is ethically permissible or impermissible. The aim here is not to come up with a definitive or final statement on this debate, but to show how it might contribute on deliberations and policies aiming to manage population growth in ways that are ethically robust. The question pertaining to the permissibility/impermissibility of abortion (and contraceptives) is important for its own sake, as it will normatively guide us regarding our duties, or lack thereof, towards foetuses. This question is also significant as it relates directly to questions of population growth, where it might play a crucial role in informing robust family planning strategies and programmes that will speak directly to reducing fertility rates. To get a concrete sense of how abortion debates affect population policies, consider the implications of this debate. If abortion is morally justified, that is, if it is permissible to terminate a foetus, then a robust family planning policy might include the roll out of accessible and affordable, if not free, abortion clinics to manage population by responding to unwanted pregnancies. It might also require expanding access to reliable and healthy contraceptives. If, however, abortion is impermissible, then it also has direct implications for our strategies and programmes to manage fertility rates in the world. Thus, ethical considerations relating to abortion are crucial because we are informed that: Voluntary family planning is a key part of continuing the downward trajectory in fertility rates, which brings benefits to the individual well-being of men and women around the world (Royal Society, 2012). To get a sense of how ethics might help to reflect on issues of the ethics of birth and to reduce fertility rates, we have to explore ethical theories, albeit our exploration aims merely to be cursory. To begin, we can distinguish between religious and secular theories of abortion. It is worth noting that it is largely religious theories of value that usually forbid abortion. For example, Christian ethics tends to consider abortion to be immoral, and therefore impermissible. Catholic ethics considers abortion to be an instance of murder, which violates the divine commandment that forbids killing (Tooley, 1972). Many of these theories depart from the assumption that from conception, at the embryonic stage, we are dealing with a being that bears divine worth (Morgan, 2013). On the other hand, secular views generally consider abortion to be permissible, particularly before the first or second trimester, since the foetus has not developed crucial value-endowing properties like sentience (Metz, 2012). There are scholars, however, who consider abortion to be permissible throughout the entire pregnancy, thus granting women power to be the final arbiter over whether to abort or not (Warren, 1997). It is also interesting to notice that there is a continuity between a moral theory in relation to its recommendation, whether it permits or forbids abortion and its stance on the permissibility of contraceptives. If, for example, as most religious views tend to do, it does forbid abortion, it will also quite naturally forbid the use of contraceptives. If, on the other hand, as do many secular theories, it does permit abortion, then it will tend to allow individuals to use contraceptives. So, the debate on abortion should generally be understood to have serious consequences for our moral use – permissibility or impermissibility – of contraceptives, which has direct implications for implementing robust family planning education and programmes. With more societies, however, including those in developing countries, coming to embrace secular cultures, they are more open to abortion as a way to manage the problem of unwanted children. Moreover, it is very important to appreciate that questions of abortion and contraceptives can be mediated at a cultural level. Many African cultural beliefs, for example, tend to look unfavourably on abortion. Often, upon careful analysis, it will emerge that these cultural groups forbid abortion not so much on ethical grounds, but on the basis of controversial metaphysical commitments. I consider the metaphysics involved controversial not in a pejorative or patronising sense, but in light of our intuitions informed by science and the plurality of competing and contradicting views on such topics. To get a sense of controversial metaphysics, consider the case of an African practice which requires that those who are serving a king should be killed on the day of his burial and be buried with or around him, so as to accompany and continue serving him in the afterlife (Wiredu, 1996). What is controversial in this practice is the belief, a metaphysical one, that there is an afterlife. Note, my claim is not that the belief is false, I am simply claiming that it is controversial. It is upon this controversial belief of the afterlife – and that the king would still need his vassals around him to serve and attend to him in light of his status as a king – that the practice of killing people and sending them off as servants to attend to the dead king in the afterlife was justified and generally accepted. Analogously, some beliefs about the permissibility of abortion in some regions might rest on such cultural or metaphysical beliefs. Note, for example, that African scholars tend to construe an African community as constituted by three distinct members: the unborn, the living and the living dead (Magesa, 1997; Bujo, 1998; 2001; Ramose, 1999). The category of the unborn is taken to be an actual community of those that have not yet made it into the real world but will be joining it in the near future. We also have the community of the living, you and me. The third community consists of those who continue to live after their physical death as spiritual members of the community. From this African view, abortion is impermissible because it harms the unborn, who are living in a state of readiness to join the living (Molefe, 2020). It is upon this controversial view about the existence of the community of the unborn that many individuals and groups in Africa believe in the impermissibility of abortion and contraceptives (Tangwa, 1996; Bujo, 2001). Here, I wish to propose an approach which might assist us to resolve the challenge posed by cultural beliefs that may forbid abortion. This intervention does not suggest that we should not have robust discussions about abortions, its implications for family planning, and our strategies to manage population growth. These debates are important, but it is crucial to underscore the relation between religious and secular ethical theories and the inclination to forbid or permit abortion and contraceptives. My intention is to suggest ways in which conceptual clarity might be useful to distinguish proper moral and metaphysical issues. It is easy to conflate cultural or metaphysical for proper ethical issues. The examples of the practices of servants of the king being killed to accompany their king challenge us to separate pure ethical from metaphysical issues. I take it many of us might contest this practice, even among Africans, at several points. For starters, one might question the metaphysical presupposition that informs this practice – the belief in the afterlife. One must rightly ask critical questions, without being condescending toward those who embrace the belief, concerning why we should accept that there is an afterlife in the first place. Asking this question is important for its own sake because it might teach us a lot about what we believe about the world and our destiny as human beings. It might lead us to think critically about the implications of our deeply held beliefs. One might also question the ethical implications of such a belief in terms of whether they coincide or diverge from our deeply held moral intuitions. In other words, we might ask whether it is morally correct to kill another person so that they can accompany another one. Here our concern is to evaluate the ethical appropriateness of the practice of killing innocent persons and cutting their lives short for the sake of another. The point I am trying to make, in a roundabout way, is the importance of not only education in general, but also proper ethical education. Education about the debates inherent in our varied cultures and beliefs on issues that might affect policy and our goals for managing population growth. The theoretical challenge I am bringing to attention is the ability for us, as we evaluate cultures on controversial issues like those of abortion and contraceptives, to distinguish mere metaphysical from proper ethical issues. But although in most instances we should take upon ourselves a duty to be sensitive and respectful towards the diversity of human cultures and their metaphysical beliefs, we should never elevate cultures to be an ethical standard. We should also note that some cultural beliefs are objectionable on ethical grounds – killing servants to accompany the king, for example. Even in the debates on abortion, as societies adopt secular approaches like those anticipated in human rights policies, we will be able to set up proper family planning services that are compatible with rolling out abortion clinics and making contraceptives easily accessible. Moreover, in the evaluation of our cultural beliefs, in relation to abortion and contraceptives, we should be careful of the undue and continued influence of cultural norms riveted on the undemocratic values of patriarchy and unscientific basis (Gillighan and Snider, 2018). Often, human cultures frown on abortion and contraception because there is a tendency, sponsored by patriarchy, to reduce women to mere makers of children. It is for this reason that we need to imagine robust education contexts and programmes for both women and men, which are emancipatory in their orientation and empower women to take charge of their own lives, which surely ought to involve voluntary family planning options. The research clearly indicates that there is a relationship between access to education and women’s attitudes towards family planning, abortion and contraception, which will definitely have implications for population growth (Potts et al., 2009). The expansion of meaningful access to education for women, in particular those living in areas with high fertility rates, who have the potential to contribute greater proportions towards population growth, will have a telling consequence. As education and economic opportunities open and expand for women, we might expect positive developments in relation to our efforts to manage population growth. Martha Nussbaum (2004: 327 - 328) in an interesting paper, Women’s Education: A Global Problem, makes the following remarks: Women’s education is both crucial and contested. A key to the amelioration of many distinct problems in women’s lives, it is spreading, but it is also under threat, both from custom and traditional hierarchies of power and from the sheer inability of states and nations to take effective action. In this article, I shall try to show, first, exactly why education should be thought to be a key for women in making progress on many other problems in their lives. I think Nussbaum is correct to identify the education of women, or the lack thereof, as a global problem. Many societies and countries still fail to equalise women by empowering them through access to robust and meaningful education, and to create conditions through which they can liberate themselves from the shackles of traditional hierarchies of power. It is through access to education and economic opportunities that women can make progress in resolving many challenges facing them such as poverty and gender-based violence. The suggestion being made here is a macro-ethical-and-political one, where global and local policymakers need to prioritise the education of women, as a group, particularly those from poorer regions of the world. The prioritisation of women in education is decisive in as far as it has direct implications for solving many problems in the world. Two of those problems stand out in the context of our discussion on population growth: one is that between one to two billion people living in extreme poverty and the other is high fertility rates. With regards to the first, there is an urgent need to pull the over one billion people out of the absolute poverty they currently live in. This we need to do in ways that raises consumption without further depleting limited natural capacities. The second problem resonates with the observation that as we meet the sustainable development goals, and, as women gain access to education, fertility rates tend to drop (Royal Society, 2012). Hence, the macro-ethical intervention to prioritise their education will go a long way in our quest to addressing population growth, by addressing their access to education and economic opportunities. Conclusion This paper offered cursory ethical reflections on issues of population growth. Its discussion was situated within the context of seeking to achieve the goals of reducing population growth and understanding how to respond to the increasing depletion of our finite resources. To do so, it suggested that environmental ethics and the ethics of birth might offer useful ways to respond to challenges posed by population growth. In relation to environmental ethics, I suggested how it could point us to earth-friendly policies, which might challenge us to rethink some of our habits and cultures that rely on the production of meat and fish, which has relatively high costs for the environment. The weak and enlightened versions of anthropocentrism might also challenge us to take a humble and sensible approach to the environment for the sake of ensuring the well-being of the current and future generations. Such approaches could involve making more judicious choices in relation to how we relate to the finite resources of the planet, and how we might maximise them for the benefit of all, including future generations and non-human elements in nature. In relation to the ethics of birth, I pointed to the relationship between abortion and contraceptives. If a moral theory forbids abortion, it is also more likely to forbid the use of contraceptives. While if it does permit abortion, it is also more likely to permit contraceptives. In addition, I indicated that religious ethical theories and traditional societies tend to forbid abortion, whereas secular and more modern societies tend to permit it. This general awareness of the debates about abortion is important because it will inform how policymakers frame their efforts to promote a robust culture of family planning, which has direct implications for increasing or decreasing fertility rates. I concluded the last section by accentuating the importance of education, particularly for women, in addressing poverty and fertility rates. The more women have access to meaningful education and economic opportunities, the more they may adopt different family-life options, and this may drastically reduce fertility rates. Reference Almiron, N. and Tafalla, M. (2019). Rethinking the Ethical Challenge in the Climate Deadlock: Anthropocentrism, Ideological Denial and Animal Liberation. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32: 255-67. Behrens, K. 2011. African Philosophy, Thought and Practice and Their Contribution to Environmental Ethics. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Bookchin, M. (1990). The Philosophy of Social Ecology, Montreal: Black Rose Books. Brennan A. & Lo, Y. (2016). Environmental ethics. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. [Online] Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-environmental/. 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Niger: too little too late. International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 37: 95-101. Regan, T. (1987). The Case for Animal Rights. In Advances in Animal Welfare Science 1986/87. vol. 3., edited by M. W. Fox and L. D. Mickley, 179-189. Dordrecht: Springer. Royal Society (2012). People and the Planet. Royal Society: London. Schroeder, D. & Bani-Sadr, A. (2017). Dignity in the 21st century Middle East and West. SpringerOpen, New York. Singer, P. 2009. Speciesism and Moral Status. Metaphilosophy 40: 567-581. Tangwa, G. (1996). Bioethics: an African perspective. Bioethics 10: 183-200. Tooley, M. (1972). Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2: 37-65. Trevennon-Jones, A. (2022). The Next Frontier: South Africa and Participatory Local Government in the Anthropocene. Journal of Inclusive Public Policy 2: 44-55. UN (2011). World population prospects: the 2010 revision. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations: New York. UNFPA (2011). The state of world population 2011: People and possibilities in a world of 7 billion. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): New York, NY. Warren, A. 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: Clarendon Press.D. J. & Walters, C. R. (2017). The impacts of price and spending subsidies on US Post-Secondary Attainment Working Paper. Cambridge, MA Harvard Kennedy School. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2023 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2023 Role of industrial policy and the fourth industrial evolution within fibre processing and manufacturing (FP&M) sector by Victor Kgalema Mphil: International Finance (University of Glasgow) Abstract This paper investigates industrial policy, strategy, and trends in the FP&M sector. It does so by looking at the global and local macro-economic overviews of the subsectors, the impact of industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) on growth and development, and the implications for skills development. The paper finds that while the role and efficacy of industrial policy continues to be a bone of contention in debates, it is clear that industrial policy remains a key tool employed by countries to help guide industry to achieve sustainable growth in all economic segments within the FP&M sector. There is also no doubt that a significant number of industries – with well organised stakeholders – do benefit from financial and non-financial support emanating from these policies. However, the success of any policy intervention is dependent on skills development strategies that respond to and support such growth strategies. The emergence of the 4IR has radically shifted the workplace paradigm: traditional technical skills remain in demand, but the composition and content of these skills has altered, causing skills gaps. What is becoming even more critical is the emphasis on formal education by industry stakeholders, requiring a workforce with the ability to learn and re-learn. Keywords: Industrial policy, fourth industrial revolution, 4IR, FP&M sector, macro-economic, growth and development, sustainable growth, skills development, skills gaps 1. Introduction 1.1. Background to the study This study explores global and local industrial policy, strategy and trends in the FP&M sector, within an environment where there are radical structural and technological changes driven by the advent of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) globally. It also explores the extent to which current industrial policy and strategy approaches are able to support companies in the FP&M sector to respond to these changes. 1.2. Industrial policy Industrial policy as an economic subject has attracted different viewpoints and debates from major economic stakeholders, making it a contentious topic. At the centre of these debates and this contention is the role and efficacy of industrial policy in a free-market capitalist economy. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, many leading economies had dismissed the efficacy, if any, that industrial policy has in facilitating economic growth, however, after the crisis, more economies were willing to recognise the value of industrial policy and often put measures in place to strengthen it – the United States of America (USA) and Germany being the most prominent examples of these economies (Chang & Andreoni, 2020). Industrial policy usually refers to a set of policies designed to promote promising industries or segments thereof, while propping up or easing the falling or declining segments. Defined that way, industrial policy is often described as the government picking winners and losers (Neely, 1993).This paper adopts the following definition of industrial policy: “as selective targeting of pre-identified industrial sectors or subsectors, particularly within manufacturing to enhance efficiencies and promote productivity, growth and long-term sustainability”. 1.3. Fourth industrial revolution While the paper explores the role of a coherent industrial policy in the promotion and enhancement of growth and sustainability of the sector, particular attention is paid to how the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) also impacts on the economic fortunes of this sector. The term 4IR has been used in the main to frame and analyse the impact of emerging technologies on nearly the entire gamut of human development in the early 21st century, from evolving social norms and national political attitudes to economic development and international relations (Schwab, 2016). The paper adopts the definition that: 4IR or Industry 4.0 is a holistic automation, business information, and manufacturing execution architecture to improve industry with the integration of all aspects of production and commerce across company boundaries for greater efficiency. 2. Methodology 2.1. Research questions The study was guided by the following research questions: How does the sector compare to other sectors within manufacturing, in relation to its contribution to GDP, employment and other economic indicators? Are there discernible structural, growth, technology, skills and employment changes in this industry over the last five years or so? What are the key drivers underlying such changes? Are there government industrial policy measures in place to support growth and long-term sustainability of the sector or part of its subsectors, e.g., financial incentives, tariffs or state procurement preference, etc.? What are the global drivers and trends in the FP&M sector, with regards to market structure, growth, technology, skills requirements and employment? With regards to those trends, how are they relevant to the South African FP&M sector, and how is the country responding compared to its international counterparts? That is: What can we learn from various international case studies about what kinds of strategies could be adopted or strengthened locally for supporting the domestic FP&M sector? 3. Structure of the report 3.1. Global macro-economic overview of manufacturing, with a focus on the FP&M sector Broader global and domestic manufacturing industry context is provided so as to analyse and appreciate similarities and dissimilarities between the domestic and global economic dynamics within the sector. The manufacturing industry is considered a key catalyst and multiplier for job creation and broader economic growth. The sector accounted for approximately 16% of global GDP and 14% of global total employment in 2018, and continues to grow its contribution globally (Businesswire, 2020). Despite its growth, though a bit muted, the 2008 financial crisis highlighted the need for new sources of jobs and growth. Policymakers are already re-examining industry-related policy interventions, as they reflect on the changing nature of the sector globally. These changes include: the declining share of manufacturing activity in OECD countries; growing competition from emerging economies; the growing demands for resource-efficient manufacturing; the increasing complexity and importance of global manufacturing value chains; and finally, the accelerating pace of technological change across all segments of the industry (O’Sullivan et al., 2013). With all these structural changes, the industry remains critical to both the developing and developed world. In developing economies, the sector continues to provide a pathway away from subsistence agriculture to rising incomes and living standards. Whilst in developed economies, the sector remains a vital source of innovation and competitiveness, and continues making outsized contributions to research and development, exports, and productivity growth. Sustained changes within the sector over time have brought both opportunities and challenges and neither business leaders nor policymakers can rely on old responses in the new manufacturing environment (Manyika et al., 2012). 3.1.1. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution As mentioned above, the 2008 global financial and economic crisis has forced researchers and policymakers to confront the reality that market forces alone generally do not lead to pareto-efficient outcomes (Stiglitz et al., 2013). Most countries continue to review and re-adjust industrial policy measures and instruments to respond to continuous industrial changes, both disruptive and non-disruptive. Recent industry research studies show that a significant number of economies, both within the developed and developing world, are still lagging behind in fashioning coherent responses to current industry disruptions (Guliwe, 2019). Some of the response delays, or lack thereof, are attributed in part to a global manufacturing landscape that has become increasingly fragmented and complex. Goods are increasingly created in stages – including raw material extraction, component production, assembly, and customisation – that may occur in different locations and countries (Shi & Gregory, 1998; Cattaneo et al., 2010). Each of these stages may involve multi-level interactions between firms from different manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, thus making it difficult for effective design and implementation of policy instruments (Park, 1989; Pilat et al., 2006). Despite the industrial policy design challenges mentioned above, there are a significant number of countries that are already engaged in the policy design and implementation or are at an advanced stage in designing such policies, to ensure that their economies are able to effectively and in a targeted manner respond to current structural and technological changes. For example, countries like the United Kingdom (UK), China and Vietnam are at different stages of policy formulation and implementation when it comes to responses to the fourth industrial revolution – the UK already has a white paper (government policy) in place that seeks to guide government and industry in responding to the fourth industrial revolution (UK Government, 2019). Even companies that are attempting to implement a response are confronted by a number of hurdles. Figure: 2 Source: WEF, 2018 Figure 2 above lists the top nine factors that make it difficult for companies to accelerate changes needed to take advantage of potential benefits availed by the fourth industrial revolution. 3.1.2. Emerging trends and implications for skills development Industrial policy has re-emerged as a critical and potent tool employed by governments and industrial stakeholders in guiding growth and sustainability of targeted economic sectors. A number of governments and industry have come to embrace potential disruptive changes that the fourth industrial revolution is likely to bring to this industry. Developed and developing economies alike, are busy setting up policy and regulatory frameworks in an attempt to effectively respond to the fourth industrial revolution. Research undertaken in this industry, including the research done by the European Union (EU), India and Vietnam, shows that while traditional technical skills remain crucial and are in most cases still not optimally supplied, skills which were mostly in the background are becoming even more critical as the industry rapidly transform. In addition, emerging research information shows that changes within the sector are rapid and ongoing and therefore make it difficult for skills development experts and practitioners to work out the nature and form of skills that would be needed by industry in the near future. 3.2. South African macro-economic overview of the FP&M sector The South African manufacturing sector contributes 14% to the country’s GDP and 11% to total employment in the economy (Stats SA, 2018). Within the FP&M sector, wood products, paper and printing form the fourth major contributor to manufacturing value add, at 11%, whilst textiles and clothing, and furniture contribute 3%, respectively. The country has managed to establish a resilient manufacturing base and to induce substantial competence in the automotive, metal, chemical, food and beverages, and the textiles and clothing sectors (Stats SA, 2018). Production in manufacturing has experienced downswings over the last two decades, from 19% in 1997 to 14% in 2018. The sector has seen a loss of 105,000 jobs in just one quarter of 2017, and it has managed to register a lackluster growth in 2018 of 1.2%, coming off a 0.5% contraction in 2017 and a growth rate of 0.7% in 2016. This is despite successive policy interventions by government in a number of segments within the sector, like automotive, textiles and clothing, and agro-processing (South African Market Insights, 2019). Figure: 3 below provides a macro-economic overview of the manufacturing subsector’s contribution to the country’s manufacturing sector’s value add. Source: Stats SA, 2018 Figure 3 above shows the contributions of different subsectors to manufacturing value add. As the fourth-largest industry in the country, manufacturing contributes 14% to GDP, whilst the various subsectors contribute the following: food and beverages is the biggest contributor at 26% to total manufacturing activity; within the FP&M sector, wood products, paper and printing is the third-largest contributor within the sector, contributing 11% to manufacturing value add (Stats SA, 2018). 3.2.1. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution South Africa developed elaborate industrial policy measures and strategies over the years, designed for targeted support to identified economic segments, particularly within manufacturing. These policy instruments were and are still designed to enable such targeted economic segments to improve their growth and sustainability prospects. Some of these policies are: the National Development Plan (NDP), which sought to map-out a planned long-term economic development trajectory of the country; Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), which seeks to transform the economy in ways that improve participation of black people at all levels of the economy; and the Industry Policy Action Plan (IPAP), which provides targeted sectoral support programmes (the dtic, 2017). These policies, for varied reasons, of which some are discussed in this paper, have mixed results in their attempt to transform and grow the economy, particularly manufacturing. For example, a sector like clothing and textiles was brought from the verge of collapse and stabilised through targeted policy interventions during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Allais et al., 2021), whilst on the other hand, parts of the steel economic segment have either disappeared or are struggling to survive despite sustained government support. Due to limited information and the fact that South Africa is in the early stages of developing comprehensive policy responses when it comes to the 4IR, only limited evidence is emerging from a few studies that show most stakeholders in this industry are aware of this revolution and are beginning to explore ways to respond to the 4IR (Allais et al., 2021). There are, however, also a number of sectoral initiatives led by government in partnership with industry, who’s objectives are to develop sectoral masterplans for national priority sectors – these plans are to guide planning and strategy implementation aimed at enabling industry to effectively respond to current changes (Barnes et al., 2016). 3.2.2. Emerging trends and implications for skills and skills development Industrial policy is one of the key instruments used by the South African government in its quest to build and grow a sustainable manufacturing base. There is general recognition and acceptance by major industry stakeholders that the industry is being confronted by rapid and disruptive changes brought about by the fourth industrial revolution. Emerging occupations are likely to be disproportionately concentrated in the non-routine and cognitive category and require skills that cannot be easily automated. There are strong emerging arguments, that meeting the skills demands of the fourth industrial revolution requires strengthening learnability, the willingness and ability to learn, unlearn and relearn, amongst the current and future workforce. Skills remains a major challenge within the sector, as industry is struggling with supply of appropriate skills. Changes in the structure and business models within the sector, are also having an impact on the profile and/or content of current technical skills. 4. Clothing, footwear, leather and textiles 4.1. Global macro-economic overview of the sector The clothing and textiles sector is varied, which means that many countries choose their own path and direction to follow, whether it is medical textiles or high fashion. However, there are a few discernible trends that seem to be the new direction for most of the textiles market. The sector remains a significant contributor to economic growth in countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh and India – these are countries that dominate significant parts of the global clothing and textiles value chain and markets, after China (Knack, 2017). The sector also remains a major employer, particularly of women, in a number of economies globally. It is estimated that the total number of textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) workers employed in the sector is 75 million worldwide, with textiles and apparel exports totalling more than $750 billion in 2017, however, a significant number of these workers are without contracts and labour law protection (Solidarity Center, 2019). The geographical distribution of production in the TCF industries has experienced a dramatic change in the past 30+ years, resulting in sizeable employment losses in the developed economies of Europe and North America, while Asia and other parts of the developing world, on the other hand, gained from these changes. This trend, according to the International Labour Organization, has been generally accompanied by a parallel shift of production from the formal to the informal sector in many countries and that, in some cases, has had negative consequences on wages (ILO, 1996). 4.1.1. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) Developing countries remain highly competitive in a number of segments within the clothing and textiles sector, despite market restrictions and high tariff walls imposed by developed economies. Comparative advantages of the developing economies over the developed ones, are in the main driven by lower labour costs in emerging economies. However, developed economies are continually reviewing these market restrictions, some of which can be traced back to 1935 when Japan was forced to announce a voluntary restraint (VER) on textiles exports to the US. Recent market restrictions by the developed economies are better illustrated by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA). Introduced in 1974, the MFA was an international trade agreement regulating clothing and textiles that was in place from 1974 till 2004. The arrangement imposed quotas on the amount of clothing and textiles exports from developing countries to developed countries. Despite these restrictions, the export market share in the sector by developing countries was more than 50% in 1987, and growing (World Bank, 1990). The effectiveness or success of industrial policy measures within the clothing and textiles sector currently depends to a large extent on the manner in which they are designed, to enable industries to respond to the new wave of changes brought about by the 4IR. The clothing and textiles sector, having been at the cutting edge of changes during the first industrial revolution, finds itself again at the cusp of this new revolution. New business models are being developed within TCF and production processes are being re-imagined or re-designed. The fourth industrial revolution, it is said, presents unimaginable opportunities within clothing and textiles, while at the same time, it also brings with it challenges. For example, whilst digitisation enables companies to improve production efficiencies and competitiveness, and also bring new fabrics and new manufacturing techniques powered by a wave of new innovations across the physical, biological and digital worlds, such as 3D printing, artificial intelligence and biomaterials, it however also poses a threat to developing economies, as it may put emerging economies at risk of losing their cost advantage (Andreoni et al., 2021). Figure 4 below shows a list of the top ten barriers to digitalisation, with the most inhibiting factor shown at the bottom of the figure. Figure: 4 Source: McKinsey & Company, 2017 Figure 4 above shows the top ten key barriers to companies fully embracing digitalisation. At the top of the list, companies identify upfront investment in systems integration as highly prohibitive. 4.1.2. Implications for skills and skills development Changes in the factory business model and production line, has significantly impacted on skills required within manufacturing and the economy, broadly. A recent study by the European Skills Council on textiles, clothing and leather identified expectations for future skill needs based on a series of scenarios on how the sector in Europe might progress towards 2020 that: What were once secondary competencies are coming to the foreground – such as the increasing importance of logistics and commercial skills, reflecting that, for many companies, ‘trade has taken the place of production’. Technical production competences remain central to recruitment and training plans, although with increased focus on the demand for motivated and versatile staff, who, given the overall decline in staffing levels, can operate across different workstations to meet shortages. The priority focus should be on basic skills linked to recruitment difficulties, the characteristics of the workforce, and changes in work organisation (including an increased focus on ICT). There should be a general focus on technology, innovation and sustainability (Horgan, 2014). The Indian National Skills Development Corporation (NSDC) also identifies significant skills gaps in the current workforce required by industry in order to adjust to current industry challenges. Two functions are highlighted below where such skills gaps are said to exist (NSDC, 2022). Table: 2 Skills gaps within India’s garment economic segment Source: NSDC, 2022 The table above shows that Purchasing Managers and Senior Merchandisers in India are some of the skills gaps experienced by industry (NSDC, 2022). 4.2. South African overview of the sector The South African textiles, clothing and footwear sector has a long history of being considered critical within the country, in that it is seen as a source of employment in the economy, particularly for women and peri-rural communities. The employment creation potential of the sector has benefited from government support over the years, through financial incentives and high tariff bearers and preferential procurement (the dtic, 2017). The sector contributed R10 billion to manufacturing value add in 2017 and employed approximately 59,000 workers in 2016. Policy instruments like the Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Programme (CTCP), the Competitiveness Improvement Programme (CIP) and the Production Incentive Programme (PIP), have played quite a key role in recent years to help stymie job losses and reposition the clothing and textiles sector for sustainable growth (the dtic, 2017). From the earliest beginnings, the South African clothing and textiles sector was built to focus on supplying the domestic market, with no clear strategy to grow it beyond this market. This domestic focus was further strengthened by economic sanctions against the country in the 1980s. By the early 1990s the sector sourced the majority of its fabric from local textile mills, supplied 93% of local clothing demand, and exported only a small proportion of total output (Hirschsohn, Godfrey & Maree, 2000). 4.2.1. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution The clothing and textiles sector was built on the back of high tariff walls, which sought to protect it from internal competition. The sector was in the main created by government, through financial incentives and industrial policy measures designed to establish it and set it on a sustainable growth path. An industry study by the Board for Trade and Industry, commissioned by government in 1950, for example, provides quite a comprehensive background on how the industry was conceptualised and developed. The objective of the study was to determine the prospects of, and the conditions for, the development of the local textiles industry to a stage where it could obtain a substantial domestic market (John Maree, 1995). While government succeeded in the establishment of the industry through the above-mentioned measures, a number of them were revised in 1993 as the country sought to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and had to comply with the organisation’s rules (Vlok, 2006). The revision took place on the eve of democracy; all tariffs were radically slashed. Even though the trade unions, with the support of Nelson Mandela the incoming president, tried to reverse what was seen as destructive policy, they were only partially successful in changing the country’s offer in the final talks (The Journalist, 2016). The reduction of tariffs resulted in significant job losses in the sector, leading to the establishment of the Swart Commission to investigate policy options required to halt the demise of the sector. In its recommendations the Commission noted that the sector needed technology upgrading, infusion of new skills, improved process management systems, specialisation and dynamic marketing efforts. The industry’s lack of capital, technology and innovation, led to high labour and management costs in relation to output, and its domestic market focus meant it was never able to achieve economies of scale (Barnes, 2005: 7). In the evaluation of the impact of 4IR within the sector, emerging research shows that the majority of companies are aware of these radical structural changes driven by 4IR, however, a significant number of these companies say they are not yet in the position to attend to these challenges, as they are still focusing on measures designed to deal with immediate concerns about the survival of their businesses and/or maintaining their current markets (Allais et al., 2021). A number of other research studies conducted in the sector make similar findings. They show that as industry and government continue with efforts to restructure the sector, in order to set it on a sustainable growth trajectory, a significant number of companies are at the same time grappling with the design and formulation of new strategies to respond to new disruptions (TIPS, 2018). 4.2.2. Emerging trends and implications for skills Industrial policy remains a key growth driver within the clothing and textiles sector. South Africa is lagging far behind in developing a policy framework to guide industry responses to the fourth industrial revolution, compared to a significant number of comparable countries. There is also emerging evidence that points to re-ordering of key skills within manufacturing broadly, that is, skills which are currently predominantly utilised in the service sector are said to be becoming key drivers of the new business model or smart factory within manufacturing. Domestic clothing and textiles industry stakeholders, despite being concerned about market retention and business survival, are however also actively influencing industry and national skills development policies and strategies in an effort to ensure that skills requirements and emerging skills gaps are addressed as the technical content of traditional skills evolves and/or changes. 5. Forestry, pulp and paper, wood products, and furniture 5.1. Global sectoral overview The pulp and paper sector is considered a strategic sector globally, not only because of its significant contribution to the fiscus and employment, but also because of its extensive contribution to technological development and acquisition, including skills development within the global economy. The sector is valued at US$63.3 billion in 2018 and is expected to reach US$76.8 billion by the end of 2025, growing at a Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 3.56% during 2019-2024 Research studies show that some of the segments in this sector, like paper and forest products, are experiencing growth, albeit at a slower pace than before, as other products are filling the gap left by the shrinking graphic-paper market. Although a relatively small market, pulp for textile applications is also registering noticeable growth. In addition, a broad search for new applications and uses for wood and its components is taking place in numerous labs and development centres within a number of developed and developing countries (Berg & Lingqvist, 2019). The paper and forest-products industry is not disappearing as initially anticipated by industry pundits, far from it, but it is changing, morphing and developing, though the sector as a whole is going through the most substantial and/or radical transformation it has seen in many decades (Berg & Lingqvist, 2019). The pulp and paper sector is dominated globally by the Asian region, both as producers and consumers of pulp and paper products. For example, China's accelerated economic growth over the past decade has driven a sharp increase in the nation's demand for paper and paperboard products. In 1997, China's apparent consumption of paper and paperboard was 32.7 million tonnes; and by 2007, this figure is estimated to have reached 71.9 million tonnes (China Paper Association, 2007). Total pulp imports increased more than tenfold between 1995 and 2005, from 750 000 tonnes to 7.2 million tonnes (UN Comtrade, 2007). The structural changes that have been taking place in the sector for the past two decades, led to consolidation into growth segments of the sector, and in some instances resulted in big companies becoming even bigger in their chosen areas of focus. At the aggregate level, the world’s largest paper and forest-products companies have not grown much, if at all. As mentioned above, several of them have, in fact, reduced in size and what they have done is to focus their efforts on fewer segments. As a result, concentration levels in specific segments have generally, if not universally, increased. Figure: 5 Source: Berg & Lingqvist, 2019 Figure 5 above shows the segments of the pulp and paper sector identified as having growth potential and those that do not show potential at all. The world production of paper and paperboard is around 390 million tonnes and is expected to reach 490 million tonnes by 2020. Total revenue of the industry for 2018 stands at US$422 billion and it has 7,278 companies and employs 1,1 million people (Bajpai, 2014). The top 10 countries by forest sector employment are: China, USA, Brazil, Russia, India, Japan, Germany, Indonesia, Italy and Malaysia. Some studies estimate that the number of jobs attributable to forestry could be much higher and that these figures are likely to be a vast underestimate of the true levels of employment in forestry, despite the generally small contribution of the sector as a formal employer, as it is characterised by a high degree of informality. Particularly in developing countries, it remains a significant employer, particularly within rural communities. It is estimated that it employs 54 million workers globally, 13 million within the formal sector and the remainder in the informal sector (FAO, 2019). A tendency that reinforces the weight of informal work in the subsector is the expansion of illegal logging. Although women are important in the wood industry and forestry operations around the world, their work is often overlooked. Furthermore, the rapidly evolving tourism industry in the Middle East and Africa is anticipated to boost the growth of the market for furniture in the coming years. The forestry subsector, on the other hand, employs globally an estimated 13.7 million formal workers, which is equivalent to 0.4% of the total global labour force. The industry is dominated by ten countries, which concentrate more than 60% of the total employment. Out of these, China employs 3.5 million in the formal sector, which accounts for 26% of the world’s employment (ILO, 2018). 5.1.1. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution A number of segments within the sector enjoy considerable government support through a range of policy instruments globally. Some of the segments within the sector are highly regulated by the majority of countries because of their negative impact on the environment. Whilst this paper focuses on incentives – that is, financial and non-financial – derived from government, environmental regulations employed are the key policy instruments, used to guide production behaviour of companies in support of greener or cleaner processes. For example, because of the sector’s existing environmental problems, which include global warming, human toxicity, ecotoxicity, photochemical oxidation, and the generation of solid wastes, countries have introduced stringent regulatory majors (Söderholm et al., 2019). Countries like China and Canada have always provided a number of financial incentives to establish, grow and modernise the sector. For example, China aggressively promoted the development of a domestic wood pulp industry, integrated with a plantation-based fibre supply and downstream paper production in 2004 – one of the highlights of the extent to which industrial policy measures are utilised, in this case to establish and grow an industrial sector. The government did so by providing discounted loans from state banks, fiscal incentives, and capital subsidies for the establishment of at least 5.8 million hectares of fast-growing pulpwood plantations (Barr & Cossalter, 2004). These policies obviously are also being implemented within an environment where the industry is undergoing immense market and structural changes. For example, the industry has experienced mixed results in recent years due to increasing digitisation of the global economy and rising internet usage across the globe, which has cut into demand for various traditional industry products, such as newsprint and other forms of paper. However, the sector has benefited from other trends. Rising consumer spending and increased use of online retail have resulted in booming demand for paper packaging products, and many operators have pivoted (Price, 2022). There is lack of information as studies are still being undertaken to review if some or most of the industrial policies being developed are factoring in the fourth industrial revolution. Furthermore, whilst there is increasing acknowledgement and preparedness to embrace the 4IR, research studies show that a number of countries have made significant strides in setting up policy frameworks, and that there is an equal number of countries that are still lagging behind in formulating responses to these industry changes (Guliwe, 2019). 5.1.2. Implications for skills and skills development The Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) has found that there is a clear demand, not just to strengthen core technical competence, but also “softer” skills. Closer to the core technical competences, such as health and safety and maintenance, there is a growing need for a broader set of skills with regards to mastering entire production processes. Behavioural skills, such as communication, team building, the ability to learn and be results-driven, are becoming more important. They are needed to help workers to adapt to a continuously changing and more complex work environment. In short, workers will need a broader set of skills and the basic and higher education system will have to help provide these skills (CEPI, 2016). Figure: 6 Source: European Commission, 2018 Figure 6 above shows that there is an increasing need for team building and ability to learn skills, which are seen to be critical in driving the new production process. 5.2. South African overview The sector straddles the primary, secondary and tertiary industries with one of its large segments in forestry, which is part of agriculture (primary industry). The reality is that South Africa’s forestry value chain reflects a legacy of historically import-substituting industrialisation policies. This segment is a resource-based set of activities, the majority of which are local value addition and are globally competitive, however, there are major changes occurring in the value chain. Dominant amongst these changes is the transformation of the forestry resource base, as the government privatises its plantation forestry holdings and simultaneously shifts afforestation to small growers (Kraak, 2009). It is a multibillion-rand industry, responsible for 9.8% of the country’s agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 4.9% of South Africa’s manufacturing GDP, with an export value of over R38.4 billion (Forestry South Africa, 2019). On the other hand, pulp and paper is estimated to be R29 billion and has a direct contribution to the balance of trade of R7 billion in 2016. Table 3 below shows the forest-paper subsector contribution to the country’s GDP, to manufacturing industry’s GDP and to agriculture from 2015 to 2017. The subsector is shown to be a major contributor to the agricultural GDP (PAMSA, 2016). Table: 3 Source: PAMSA, 2016 Table 3 above shows that forestry-paper contribution to the South African agricultural GDP remains substantial at 21% in 2017, having moved from 23% in 2015. The two subsectors are quite significant contributors to manufacturing GDP, at 3.6%. Forestry, pulp, paper and furniture is one of the sectors identified as part of lead sectors in the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF), because of its potential for growth and employment-creation, particularly in rural areas, and also for its potential to enable economic and industrial decentralisation (the dtic, 2018). The sector, especially sawmilling and activities further down the value chain, is one of the most labour-intensive in the country’s economy. However, despite its potential, the sector faces major structural challenges around access to raw materials, especially for small-scale saw millers. 5.2.1. Furniture The South African furniture industry is viewed as one of the strategic and important sectors in the country’s economy, considering its labour-intensity and its real potential for developing small, micro and medium-sized businesses, and also for exports. The industry is sustained by timber supplies from a vibrant South African forestry sector. It contributes about 1% to manufacturing GDP and 1.6% to manufacturing employment. South Africa’s exports of furniture were worth US$4.29 billion in 2016. Seven out of the top ten South African export destination markets for furniture are other African countries, namely: Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (the dtic, 2019). The furniture industry currently comprises more than 2,200 registered firms involved in manufacturing of furniture, bedding and upholstery and employs approximately 29,000 people. The economic segment has seen its employment number shrink over the years, from a labour force of 44,536 in 1995, the work force shrank to 23,300 in 2010, before a modest recovery to 28,411 in 2018. These jobs are now in danger unless protection against external competition is increased and there is a clampdown on illegal imports, which do not meet the required standards. General lack of competitiveness in the South African manufacturing sector results in the country being a net importer of furniture, with 2014 imports amounting to R8.3 billion compared to exports valued at R5.7 billion. Most furniture imports originate from China, however, even with the current weakness of the rand – which should be an advantage for the local manufacturing sector – imports from China and other Asian countries are still cheaper. Local manufacturers attribute this to support in the form of subsidies from the Chinese government and much lower input costs (Harrison, 2015). 5.2.2. Industrial policy intervention and the fourth industrial revolution Financial incentives provided by the Canadian government for modernisation of the Québec paper mills, discussed above, are not an exception within this industry globally. Most countries like the USA, China and India, use a number of incentives, both financial and non-financial, to help, protect, develop and modernise this industry (Québec Ministry of Finance, n.d.). The forestry, pulp and paper, wood products, and furniture sector forms part of a number of sectors identified by the South African government as being a strategic industry (the dtic, 2017). The sector is seen as showing potential for significant growth, which would lead to an increased contribution to the country’s fiscus and employment, amongst others. For example, the IPAP outlines a number of industrial policy interventions developed by government to help grow the sector – two such interventions are the Forestry Beneficiation Framework and the Furniture Competitiveness Programme (the dtic, 2017). Whilst current industrial policy interventions by government within the furniture segment are not necessarily designed to respond to the 4IR challenges, processes are in place to develop a framework or legislation so as to enable government, through policies, to guide industry in the design and deployment of appropriate strategy responses to challenges posed by the 4IR. However, in the meantime, companies have been rapidly increasing the speed of automation, to maintain or improve their market share. A number of companies in the industry are saying, to fully embrace the 4IR, companies will need huge upfront capital investment and this is the most inhibiting factor in this regard (Allais et al., 2021). The other main challenge facing the sector in South Africa is that there are significant segments of the sector that operate in the informal sector and current policies are not calibrated to take this into consideration (Kraak, 2009). 5.2.3. Emerging trends and implications for skills There is a global push to move the sector or a significant number of its segments to develop and adopt cleaner production technologies, and this would demand injection of new skills and capabilities. There is general acknowledgement and acceptance by most industry stakeholders of the need for urgent policy and strategy, which should guide the sector through the disruptive changes of the 4IR. The sector is accelerating automation, as part of a costs management strategy, and the process entails multi-skilling of workers and moving them up the skill ladder. A number of segments within the sector are unable to attract young workers, while faced with an ageing workforce. This poses a serious risk to skills in the medium- to long-term, unless the industry finds ways to attract this cohort of future workers. 6. Publishing, print media, printing, and packaging 6.1. Global macro-overview The global printing industry is forecast to reach US$821 billion by 2022, driven by growth in packaging and labels, rather than graphic applications, and digital rather than analogue printing, according to a new market report (Smithers, 2019). The report further indicated that global printing markets are changing many publishing products, electronic versions replacing previously printed volumes. E-books, online newspapers and magazines are taking significant market share (Long, 2018). Many commentators and analysts have recently confidently declared that the age of the printed newspaper is over. Industry-wide developments, including falling advertising revenues and fragmented audiences that are increasingly shifting to online content are said to signal the end of the newspaper industry as we have come know it. However, research information shows that the industry is far from disappearing, actually, the publishing, print media, printing and packaging subsector (sometimes referred to simply as ‘printing and publishing’), worldwide, remains in a stage of transition but not disappearing. On the other hand, market research shows that packaging demand across the world is increasing at a faster pace, reaching US$917.1 billion in 2019 and is expected to grow in the coming four years, according to the latest data from industry analysts. Consumption at current prices has increased from US$861 billion in 2014 to US$891 billion in 2018, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 0.9%. In a comprehensive study, “The future of global packaging to 2024”, industry research analysts forecast market expansion across 2019-2024 at a 2.8% CAGR to reach US$1.05 trillion in 2024 (Smithers, 2019). 6.2. Industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution Interventions by government in some segments of the sector have been for some time considered necessary for a number of reasons, for example, media and publishing form part of segments considered cultural and therefore demands government support. For example, the European Competitiveness Report stresses that the economic rationale for government intervention in favour of cultural industries is based on the notion that this sector constitutes a significant locus of economic dynamism in the post-industrial world (European Commission, 2009). Besides, the media have an acknowledged role in the functioning of democracies, triggering consequent rights and responsibilities with respect to human rights, democracy, and freedom of information and cultural diversity (De Prato, Simon & Sanz, 2014). This role of media is then made to justify public intervention beyond the mere correction of imperfect markets and/or market failures. Despite guaranteed government intervention in the sector, technological and business models brought about by what is now considered to be the fourth industrial revolution, have transformed the sector beyond recognition in the past two decades. Segments like print media and publishing were even expected to disappear in most economies, whilst recovery in some segments demands even more focused and targeted government support. The impact of the fourth industrial revolution on the printing segment of this sector comes at a time when this segment has gone through continued changes since it started developing digital more than two decades ago. The printing process has become more sophisticated and quality has improved over time, whilst the printing infrastructure has also become more advanced, with complex operational capabilities and a level of flexibility that could not have been imagined at the beginning of these changes. These rapid technological advances are seen to be leading to an increase in skills gaps as candidates with knowledge needed to operate sophisticated machines become fewer, and the 4IR will make this situation even more pronounced than it is now. 6.3. Emerging trends and implications for skills Industrial policy is one of the key drivers of growth and sustainability of the sector. Changes in technology and organisation are transforming jobs and the skills needed in the sector. Emerging key drivers of skills in the sector and to an extent, all other economic sectors are: the overall performance of the global economy: that is, the overall level of economic growth continues to put pressure on skills requirements. changing patterns of demand: customers are changing the ways that they want products and services delivered, thus demand changes on current business models. changing patterns of doing business: technological change is perhaps the most important driver of skills demands, as it is altering the ways in which companies produce their products. 7. Conclusion It is clear that industrial policy remains a key component of measures employed by countries to help guide industry to achieve sustainable growth in all economic segments within the FP&M sector. Whilst the role and effectiveness of these policies in the long run remains a major point of discussions, there is no doubt that a significant number of industries do benefit from financial and non-financial support emanating from these policies. Having said that, we need to acknowledge that while this is true, as illustrated throughout this paper, a number of economic papers have also argued that these policies encourage inefficient and uncompetitive ways of production, in that they also support companies and/or economic sectors which do not possess a comparative advantage in the products they produce. What is however clear from the review of the role of industrial policy, is that industries with well organised stakeholders are able to leverage government support for their benefit. The success of any policy intervention, in many ways, is dependent on skills and skills development strategies that respond and support such growth strategies. On skills, research evidence shows that whilst what is usually referred to loosely as traditional technical skills remain in demand, the changing nature of work has altered the composition and content of these skills, thus causing what is termed skills gaps. There is an emerging increased demand of skills that were traditionally in the background of the production process, particularly skills that are employed in the services sector. What is becoming even more critical is the emphasis made on formal education by industry stakeholders, as there is more and more a realisation that the changing nature of the structures and business models within the industry is continuously altering not only the profile of skills required by industry, but also the content and nature of these skills, and thus, requiring a workforce with the ability to learn and re-learn. 8. References Allais, S., Kgalema, V. & Marock, C. 2017. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/media-entertainment-digital-organization-companies-go-digital-who-is-charge [accessed: 31 July 2023]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2023 Cooperatives are a vital form of economic development and job creation in the world, particularly in the developing countries like South Africa by Xitlhangoma Mabasa Abstract The world is in dire need of a solution to the ever-increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and the economic challenges currently facing most countries globally. Some developed countries, and a few developing countries, have cottoned on to the fact that cooperatives, with their dual nature of addressing both social and economic troubles, could be a potential panacea for these challenges – although not if they act alone. They need support from governments and to work side by side with companies, sole traders and close corporations if they are to succeed. While corporates importantly provide capital and jobs, their focus is on maximising profits, largely achieved at the cost of workers. Cooperatives, on the other hand, while also businesses driven by making a surplus, do this with great concern for the community. And unlike companies, which compete against each other, often destroying one another in price wars, cooperatives emphasise complementing one another. This paper argues that cooperatives are better poised than other forms of economy generating methods to enrich the poor and working class, as cooperatives encourage a more participative and empowering approach. South Africa, despite efforts to incorporate cooperatives into its socio-economic model, is lagging on the use of this crucial tool to tackle the triple challenge of inequality, poverty and unemployment. South Africa would do well to take heed of how both developed and developing countries globally are benefitting by using cooperatives as key instruments to generate economic growth, job creation and redistribution of wealth – while also enhancing the social fabric of their societies. Introduction There are numerous forms of economy generating methods in the world, from companies and sole traders to close corporations and cooperatives. Some developed countries – for example, Spain, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and Italy – use cooperatives as an alternative and/or supplementary form of ownership, economic growth, job creation and social development. Among developing countries, some embrace cooperatives in addition to the other forms of economic enterprises. Examples of such countries are Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Cuba, Chile, China and India. South Africa is also making efforts to support and promote cooperatives, although they, thus far, continue to occupy minimal space within the economic and social spheres. This is disappointing as South Africa, together with many developing countries, and more than most developed nations, needs cooperatives to address the inequality, poverty and unemployment quagmire it is trying to get itself out of. It is widely known that South Africa is the most unequal country in the world. Cooperatives, as an economic and social tool, would help to seriously address these inequalities, which in the main are the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. A common challenge faced by developing countries that have emerged from colonialism and foreign occupations is that, although such countries have attained political freedom, for most of them economic emancipation remains elusive and a dream. However, among a number of other economic and social tools, cooperatives can assist in getting to grips with inequality and its destructive side effects, especially if supported by governments. The world needs to embrace cooperatives as they contribute towards helping the world to share its resources equitably. The world faces a myriad of dilemmas, some of which are human made, while others are beyond human control. Earthquakes, for instance, are not something we have the ability to control. Whereas climate change, which is threatening to have devastating consequences on the lives of people, and which most are well aware of, is continuing to worsen – largely because of greed and selfishness – despite our ability to have some effect on its outcome. The same can be said of the ‘triple challenge’ of inequality, poverty and unemployment, which has remained – largely unabated – at the top of the agenda facing humankind. The gap between the haves and the have-nots on a global scale is massive, and growing. And these challenges only worsen when zooming in on the developing nations, who have the added burden of the legacy of colonialism and occupations by foreign powers to contend with. Then, looking at South Africa, its history of apartheid adds to these woes. Pile on top of that gender and disability discrimination and it becomes a perfect storm. This paper focuses on cooperatives as tools potentially available to the world to help create jobs, shrink poverty and promote equality, especially in developing countries like South Africa. Surprisingly, even developed countries are using cooperatives to deal with these problems. Redistribution of wealth and resources and job creation are in the interests of all people the world over if we ever hope to raze poverty to the ground. Corporate involvement is critical to generating jobs, and governments must contribute by making the environment conducive for industry to thrive and grow, so that it can employ more people. The corporates should also help to bring down poverty. Unfortunately, even if industry does thrive and there is huge economic growth, it is not a given that such wealth will equitably and reasonably be shared with workers and the working class. We could easily have jobless growth, with the corporates sticking to maximising profits and not impacting on the lives of the poor. But one of the economic tools that can help to level the playing fields by kindling both wealth and jobs, is cooperatives, which, ideally, should exist alongside companies, sole traders and close corporations. Defining cooperatives vs corporations “A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise” (International Cooperative Alliance, 1995). There are two characteristics that distinguish cooperatives from other enterprises: Firstly, they are associations of people which agree to be the owners, the makers of democratic decisions and the users of their joint enterprise. And secondly, their main purpose, as an economic unit, is to promote their members’ interests by rendering services, rather than focusing only on maximising profits. Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-reliance, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, cooperative members believe in ethical values of trust, honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others. The core principles of cooperation are voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for community (International Cooperative Alliance, 1995). Now, briefly defining a company (there are many types of enterprises, but this paper will be limited to mainly defining cooperatives and companies): “A company is a form of enterprise which is a legal entity in its own right in terms of the Companies Act. The functions of a company are divided rationally between the board of directors, which sees to the management of the enterprise, and the shareholder owners who provide the share capital. A company exists independently of its members. Its assets and profits are its own and the members have no right of ownership over the assets. Its liabilities and obligations are its own and may not be recovered from its shareholders. Their liability is therefore limited” (Le Roux, 1999). The case for cooperatives Most big foreign corporates drive the economy without any intention of redistributing the economic benefits to the native inhabitants. That said, job creation by corporates remains a welcome contribution to countries that have just obtained freedom, and foreign direct investments also become a critical necessity as such countries attempt to rebuild their economies. The problem is that wealth redistribution to the poor and the working class typically does not occur voluntarily. The situation is even worse if there are no strong trade unions to fight for better benefits for workers. After all, what is freedom if it fails to transform the economy to the benefit of the previously exploited citizens? This paper does not discuss the world’s myriad of problems and possible solutions. And this approach is not intended to undermine other solutions that are available to address problems and challenges facing the world’s populations. Rather, it consciously focuses on the social economy as one contribution to alleviate the plight of the poor and the working class. In addition, this paper’s argument does not ignore other impediments such as the flight of capital from developing countries to the developed world. Neither is it ignorant of some new leaders of liberated countries who steal from the government purse funds that are supposed to further liberate their people socially and economically. And that these challenges get more pronounced where the legislature arm of government is weak, and even more so where the judiciary is also weak or compromised. The argument advanced here in favour of the social economy and cooperatives is that even in some developed countries, cooperatives are seen as a necessary complementary form of economic activity alongside companies, close corporations and sole traders. Cooperatives build and own buildings which they rent out, for example, in the UK and other developed countries. In Germany and Spain cooperatives have developed to the degree that they occupy space in the manufacturing areas, for instance, manufacturing machinery components like motor vehicle gearboxes and engine parts. In developing countries like Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania, cooperatives are key instruments of growing the economy. In Kenya, this is demonstrated in the milk industry. Cooperatives at family and community level take the milk to a secondary cooperative, where the milk is assessed in quality and quantity to be combined with other cooperatives’ contributions. Those huge volumes of milk are then taken to a tertiary cooperative, where it is processed into various milk products like cheese and yoghurt. Some milk is put into cartons in readiness for both local selling and exporting. And these Kenyan cooperatives operate alongside the economic activities of companies, sole traders and close corporations. Clearly, cooperatives benefit both developed and developing countries. A prominent common challenge facing the world is a persistently growing gap between the rich and the poor, which is even more pronounced in developing countries. It is not uncommon to hear of jobless growth, where governments are celebrating huge profits, while employment lies in the gutter. In contrast, cooperatives are by nature inclined to produce and create jobs and also contribute to social development (as they contribute to economic growth). Ownership is typically more dispersed under cooperatives than under companies. In developing countries, colonialism has perpetuated ownership patterns in favour of the rich. Usually, the rich are the colonialists who own a major part of the economy, and few natives may, after liberation, join the rich in sharing the spoils. Ownership patterns are characteristically against the majority, who are usually the natives of the ‘liberated’ countries. Multinational companies are, on the whole, not shy of owning a huge percentage of the assets and wealth of formerly colonised countries, where the poor and the working class remain in perpetual poverty and unemployment. It is ordinarily not the intention of big corporates to redistribute wealth to the poor and the working class. There is an argument that market forces, if left undisturbed by governments, will create and redistribute wealth. But that has proved to be a fallacy, as typically it has never materialised; the market has generally failed to redistribute wealth. Hence, we speak of market failures and the need for government intervention. Cooperatives offer a solution to market failures. Guided by the seven principles mentioned earlier, cooperatives and their leaders have noted that the disparities between the richest and the poorest must be addressed, and so, there is a deliberate plan being executed by cooperatives to narrow that gap. Some countries embrace cooperatives to a degree where they even help in the establishment of universities and technikons that specialise in training people on cooperatives. For example, in Spain (a developed country) and countries like Kenya (a developing country). The values upon which cooperatives are founded help build better communities. Complementing one another is emphasised over competing against each other. Price wars – where one company does everything to kill a competing company under a free market and untempered capitalism – are hardly heard of between cooperatives. Cooperatives as a tool for change Cooperatives serve a number of objectives: generating economic growth, job creation and redistribution of wealth. They also contribute to enhancing the social fabric of societies. Social and economic challenges continue to ravage the world in general and developing countries in particular. The 2008 economic meltdown is a vivid example. Economic tools used to address these challenges should serve humankind in a complementary way, backing what good governments are supposed to do. Using a variety of different economic tools provides diverse types and levels of services, which is needed in a world dominated by such contrasting interests and circumstances: war-thirst vs peace-loving, wealth vs poverty, greed vs generosity, totalitarianism vs democracy, corruption vs lawfulness, oppressive vs progressive, self-serving vs community serving. Although this paper focuses largely on poverty, unemployment and inequality as the main threats facing the majority of the world’s population, especially the poor and working class, there remains an awareness of other challenges across different parts of the globe. Dire problems such as climate change, racism, religious-extremism, imperialism and colonialism are all affected by and affect the ‘triple challenge’. Added to these serious worries is the horror of gender-based, xenophobic, child and transgender killings. World wars are also a threat to humankind, as we cannot discount the possibility of a third world war. As if that terrifying list is not enough, the globe is also facing the disastrous outcome of the Covid-19 pandemic. The inequalities facing the world were acutely exposed by the greed of developed countries as they hoarded vaccines in the thick of it, depriving poor developing countries of the life-saving medicine. The global leaders should strive to contribute to world peace. And whatever tools are devised, we should continually ask ourselves whether they contribute towards making the world a better place or worsening its condition. We must accept that different people will have different opinions about which tools to use, however, it is clear that if the world embraced cooperatives more, and used them alongside other progressive methods or policies, the world would not only be better positioned to address challenges such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality, but also environmental and climate change issues. Which is not to say that approaches like the creation of companies as a means of generating economic growth and wealth generation are entirely bad. Actually, the creation of companies is good for both developing and developed countries. But the corporates do not go far enough to address the plight of the poor and the working class. Unfortunately, the world embraces these other forms of economic activity, like companies, more than cooperatives. To quote Louis Favreau: “The cooperative movement is becoming aware of the severity of the crisis and its international scope: stock market capitalism, environmental disasters and rising inequalities. At the same time, cooperatives are rediscovering that they are faring better, thanks to their cautious economic approach. Leaders are now more inclined to assert that cooperatives are part of the economic alternative to this crisis. Although cooperatives tend to be politically reserved, powerful initiatives have been springing up around the world alongside with what the ICA is now trying to do as an international organisation for political representation” (Favreau, 2012). Favreau further argues for: “1) greater distancing from capitalism, which has been ongoing for some time; 2) increased international activity; 3) greening activities within several of its organisations. All this transformation seems to indicate that its legendary political neutrality may be a thing of the past. Could this be a major turning point?” (Favreau, 2012). Most corporates exacerbate the crises – poverty and inequalities – of developing countries, and they are not ashamed of publicly admitting that their main objective is profit-maximisation. For most of these companies profit maximisation is achieved at the cost of permanent workers, who are converted into casual labour, and also by denying workers essential benefits like medical aid and unemployment insurance. In the name of implementing labour flexibility, especially in developing countries where unemployment is usually too high, most workers easily get retrenched and their wages get reduced, with the utilisation of casual labour becoming the norm. It is far too difficult and risky for casual labour to form or join trade unions. Consequently, low paid workers translate into poor households with low per capita income for families and communities. Cooperatives need support to succeed For cooperatives to succeed, governments need to support them. This could take the form of governments exempting emerging and small cooperatives from paying tax for a certain period as they get their footing. It could also imply providing land, seeds and implements to agricultural cooperatives. In South Africa, a country that leads the world in terms of the gap between the few rich and the majority of poor people, cooperatives are making efforts to emerge as a role player, but that noble objective is proving to be a steep mountain to climb (DSBD, 2023). Small business is attempting to assist cooperatives to emerge as a strong role player, through various supporting agencies: Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), National Empowerment Fund (NEF), Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO), South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), among others. These agencies provide essential supportive services, for example, SEDA empowers new cooperatives with appropriate skills that the cooperative will need in its area of operation. For instance, it would train emerging cooperative farmers, teaching them farming skills before they endeavour to start their businesses. This enhances the chances of cooperatives succeeding, reducing the chances of failure – it is a worldwide observation that most businesses fail during the early stages. SEFA then typically helps emerging cooperatives with funds after such cooperatives have been empowered by SEDA. In the 1960s the cooperative sector in Chile experienced major expansions, “with more than 3 400 active cooperatives coming into existence as a result of broad government support and promotion ... Various challenges followed which led to the University of Santiago de Chile, through its International Centre for Social and Cooperative Economy (CIESCOOP), pursuing work in various cooperative subsectors (schools, workplace, drinking water supply, etc.) with a view to strengthening and publicising the specific contributions – not to mention their very existence – of cooperatives” (Dávila et al, 2012). In Canada, it has been demonstrated that government support assisted the development and growth of cooperatives. “All cooperatives in the North had certain features in common. First, they were dependent upon government support in the form of financing for initial capital outlay (which in no way set them apart from resource industry development in the North). They received technical supporting areas of accounting, pricing, and correspondence with outside dealers, and some supervision or management of the business in order to manipulate outside markets successfully. They also relied upon access to air transportation and shipping for distribution to widespread communities, perhaps the most costly factors” (Stopp, 2012). To further illustrate how essential government support is for the success of cooperatives, Caroline Gijselinckx (2012) argues that “Governments are partners: Cooperatives in the areas of (health) care and social services cannot function without government support. Governments create the legal framework in which they can operate, but also purchase services and determine and control the criteria to which products offered and their supplies must conform, provide price or wages subsidies, grant access to investment funds that only ask a modest return on investment, assign favourable fiscal or social measures, support pilot projects, and so on”. Gijselinckx’s arguments are informed by research from, among others, Italy, UK and Sweden. “In Sweden and the United Kingdom, there are cooperative development agencies, often with co-financing by the government, supporting new cooperative developments” (Gijselinckx, 2012). In 2008, during the economic meltdown, cooperatives are among the economic entities that suffered less and mainly survived the economic onslaught. In Italy and Spain, and other countries, cooperatives survived relatively better during this time compared to companies and sole traders. Cooperatives are better at knitting communities together than other economic enterprises Economic development (even with economic growth) if unaccompanied by social development and emancipation, is inadequate in meeting the challenges facing humankind, particularly the poor and the working class. In developing countries like South Africa, cooperatives are not new. Historically, most rural places practiced an economic activity called ‘letsema’, whereby a community would collectively plough one of its members’ fields and thereafter move to plough the next community member’s field until the collective finish ploughing all the participants’ fields. That way the collective energy ploughed more fields than if each field owner had singularly worked on their field alone. This notion can be transferred to cooperatives. We simply call it the strength of teamwork. In addition to companies, close corporations, sole traders and others, cooperatives have emerged as a tool that occupies a particular niche that is often ignored by governments. “Cooperatives have been driven by principles that make them different from other organisations since their origin. The statute from the first experience on cooperatives in 1844, in Rochdale, contained principles upon which a cooperative organisation should be created. According to Schreiner, some founders of the Rochdale cooperative had already participated in pre-cooperative experiences and were familiar with the ideas of Robert Owen, a socialist utopian and founder of the cooperative movement” (Cardoso Cançado et al, 2012). To give testimony to this, are the seven principles of cooperatives listed earlier. “The founders of the cooperatives did not only want food at fair prices; they also aimed for education of family members and access to housing and employment – through the purchase of land and factories – for the unemployed and the underpaid” (Cardoso Cançado et al, 2012). Inspired by the success of cooperatives in Rochdale, “in 1895, the International Cooperative Alliance (an authority on cooperative principles) was created in London, with the initiative of English, French and German leaders” (Cardoso Cançado et al, 2012). Members of a cooperative seem to identify with their cooperative to a degree that they may even choose to agree to lowering wages if they understand that such a sacrifice will grow the cooperative. As a company exists independently of its members, employees would normally not agree to a salary cut as they are not involved in the running of a company and, in relative terms, identify less with the company. Cooperatives cooperate among themselves to a degree where they can accumulate their moneys for purchasing stock, and using the principle of economies of scale, they can negotiate better prices as they purchase in bulk. In contrast, companies guided by the principle of competition may find it easy to destroy the competitor by using a price war as a strategy. During the recent pandemic, most pharmacies increased prices of medicine for Covid-19 – for example, vitamin tablets and ginger – in their pursuit of profit maximisation. In South Africa, the Competition Commission had to intervene by investigating the claim of excess pricing, and having found a leading pharmacy, Dischem, guilty, it was penalised with a fine. In comparison, most cooperatives, while striving to make a surplus, would have been guided by the noble principle of acting in the interest of the community in which they operate. One of the seven principles, ‘concern for the community’, renders this guidance. Guided by those principles, most cooperatives would not unduly increase prices as they lean more towards caring for the community. There are two related concepts that are important to look at here: concern for community (relates to cooperatives) and social responsibility (relates to corporates). The concept of concern for the community is closely related to other concepts, like the principle of democratic member control. “The principle of concern for community is founded on two pillars: (i) the sustainable development of communities where cooperatives are located and (ii) the accomplishment of this development through policies approved by their members” (Cardoso Cançado et al, 2012). The concept of social responsibility, on the other hand, is problematic. Most companies if accused of not doing enough for the communities and countries in which they are located, deny this in response. They argue that they do carry out social responsibility in the area where they are located or operate by creating employment for community members and paying taxes, which benefit the said community. Fighting for dominance here is private interest versus collective welfare – that is, pursuing the interests of shareholders (profit maximisation) as opposed to satisfying community needs (improving quality of life). But there is a slight overlap. One argument is that most corporates are doing the social responsibility function as a public relations (PR) exercise. Another argument is that they are doing it as a marketing exercise. Reputational capital is another aim of corporates; it enhances the company brand if well executed. This partially explains why companies will go to great lengths to sponsor a soccer team that is winning. Usually, weak or new teams struggle to secure sponsorship. Therefore, social responsibility (for corporates) is not the same as the concern for community (of cooperatives). If a bigger proportion of the world could embrace cooperatives, it would indeed be a better place, both socially and economically. There is enough space for cooperatives to exist alongside companies, close corporations, sole traders and other economic methods. Cooperatives will only enrich and complement the other methods, without threatening their existence. However, although there is a strong argument to be made that humankind will be better served with a wider variety of economic and social methods, this does not mean that cooperatives are a panacea for all economic and social challenges in the world, particularly for the developing nations. For the world to become one socially and economically, more needs to be done beyond what cooperatives and corporates can offer. Other advantages of cooperatives There are many other ways that cooperatives are adding value to people’s lives. Cooperative capital is less expensive than external capital, provided that the investors – who (often) also have a user-relationship with the cooperative – are not investing in the cooperative for speculative reasons. A lower (or even zero) return on investment is accepted for cooperatives where members have great user value, for cooperatives that have a high value for the community, or that are embedded in a well-organised community of interests or ideological community, for initiatives that would otherwise have to primarily rely on the work of volunteers and charity. A higher return on investment in accordance with the market is expected from more commercially-orientated investments. Training is another virtue of cooperatives. Most cooperatives train their members not only to benefit the cooperative, but also to benefit the broader society, as those skills can be used elsewhere in society, for example, in the broader labour market. According to Caroline Gijselinckx, offering high quality services at the lowest possible price is one of the virtues of cooperatives (Gijselinckx, 2012). In addition, cooperatives offer an enriched vehicle for providing social welfare. The increasing tension between tightening state budget constraints on the one hand and growing social needs on the other has led welfare states all over the world to try to find ways to scale back public expenditures and responsibilities, by persuading citizens and private organisations to engage in the alternative financing of social services. The 2008 worldwide financial crisis has made most countries appreciate the value of cooperatives as an economic and social instrument. Yasmin Lemzeri et al succinctly summarise this: “The financial crisis that hit the banking sector in 2008 was so serious that the States had to intervene to prevent a systemic crisis. It seemed that no bank – either cooperative or commercial – was spared. However, depending on their membership structure, their level of capitalisation and geographical situation, cooperative banks appeared and seemed to weather the storm better – so much better, in fact, that their indicators had deteriorated to a much lesser extent and even improved. Cooperative banks have proven to be important contributors to financial stability. However, commercial banks have shown themselves to be more resilient in the post-crisis period. Although they suffered strong downgrades of their indicators scores, they succeeded in making up for time lost between 2006 and 2008” (Lemzeri et al, 2012). Another authority on cooperative banks in India, Sudha Kornginnaya, says, “In the past, cooperation was conceived ‘essentially as corrective to the excesses and deficiencies of capitalism’, and it is now all the more relevant in the present time. Though the financial crisis has devastated the market-driven corporate economy, cooperatives have shown their economic resilience by fulfilling common goals of the association. ‘A cooperative is a symbiosis: a union of an association of people and a business, both of which have to keep healthy for the orgasm to thrive’. Hence social achievements are vital for business success, while economic strength is imperative to yield social aims. However, the financial cooperatives that have replicated corporate banking behaviour have now embraced a renewed socialist imperative alongside their economic performance goals. There is a growing realisation among financial cooperatives that their effectiveness is based on the reconciliation between economic efficiency and adherence to social values” (Kornginnaya, 2012). Some problems facing cooperatives As favourable as the arguments for cooperatives are, this does not preclude that they face challenges. In Argentina, during its 2001 financial crisis most companies collapsed. Cooperatives took over the running of companies and converted them to cooperatives. The one challenge they faced was that they mimicked a company’s hierarchy in running their cooperatives, which believe more in a relatively flat structure. In China, in the words of Wu Xiliang: “Even although China’s rural financial markets have undergone great reform in recent years and banks financial institutions cover every township, today China’s rural mutual credit cooperatives (RMCC) remain underdeveloped in contrast with other financial institutions” (Xiliang, 2012). This constitutes a critical problem for the RMCCs. Another problem arises out of inadequate knowledge of rural areas by commercial banks. “In China, the current, longstanding government measures used to manage the banking market in the rural areas are the same as the measures used in urban areas. However, commercial banks cannot know the rural areas completely, and it is difficult for farmers to get loans from commercial banks” (Xiliang, 2012). Another reason why there is, relatively, poor knowledge of rural areas and rural cooperatives by commercial banks is that most commercial banks are situated in urban areas, as they pursue a high geographic concentration of clients (in urban areas) compared to sparsely distributed cooperatives (in rural areas), which have less appeal. To lay out infrastructure in rural areas is more expensive than in urban areas. Fortunately, there are other types of banking institutions that are suitable for the rural areas: Rural Credit Cooperative, Agriculture Bank of China and China Post Bank, rural and township banks, lending companies and rural mutual credit cooperatives. The irony is, although the China Post Bank receives more deposits from farmers, it gives fewer loans to farmers. It is a challenge. As a result of strict access rules, many civil rural financial cooperatives cannot obtain registration from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and this encourages the existence of village and township banks that operate unregistered. But even though they are unregistered, they occupy a critical niche as they are able to serve scattered farmers who would otherwise be too expensive to service. In South Africa, remote places are hungry for banking institutions that should be located in rural areas. India and China are doing better than South Africa, as they have more cooperative banks, which are better suited to serve the sparsely populated areas. The weakness of rural places that are without cooperative and suchlike banks is that loan sharks and other opportunistic pseudo loan and borrowing institutions can spring up and occupy the space that should be occupied by properly registered banks. In Argentina, in some cases worker cooperatives (WCs) own and manage firms. These are Argentina’s recovered firms (RFs), which “represent a movement of WCs that emerged from Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis. In that crisis the economy of Argentina got completely devastated. According to the World Bank, unemployment topped 25 percent in 2002. Argentina could no longer afford to export goods or service its debts. The resulting run on Argentina’s banks marked the definitive start of the crisis in December 19, 2021” (Reese, 2012). Characteristically, most RFs are committed to community development as they run firms guided by cooperative principles. During the crisis in Argentina, cooperatives succeeded in saving some firms from complete collapse, with a number of jobs saved. Research and development are critical for the development of cooperatives and for cooperatives to keep up to date with the dynamic world development and challenges. Cooperatives are empowering: “They are developed as instruments for stakeholders who want to develop answers to their needs and expectations, and to gain mastery over their lives. Participation, active involvement, control and critical awareness are key to this mastery and this is exactly what drives cooperative development” (Gijselinckx, 2012). The dual nature of cooperatives: marrying the social and financial economies As can be seen, there are advantages and disadvantages to both companies and cooperatives, and so, it makes sense for cooperatives, companies, close corporations and sole traders to exist together in the world. In certain areas their advantages will overlap to the benefit of all people globally. It would be highly regressive for countries to shun cooperatives, which would rob communities of the benefits. Sonja Novkovic makes an important point: “Cooperative firms are known to possess a dual character; on the one hand they are business driven by economic incentives, while on the other, they are associations with a social purpose and character. Cooperatives have often been portrayed by their members as businesses that combine a social mission with their economic goals. This dual aspect has not been easy to quantify, and literature has been divided along those dual lines – social aspects have historically been addressed more or less separately from economic concerns, while economics literature has steered clear from addressing the social nature of cooperative organisations” (Novkovic, 2012). What the world needs is for all forms of economic and social development activities to act together without aiming to displace each other, because together they all add value to humankind. There is adequate space for this approach to work. Government should support all progressive forms of economic and social activities, especially cooperatives, as they are more likely to help empower the poor and the working class by addressing the inequalities between the rich and the poor in the world, where the economic and social disparities are astronomical. A fitting example of a conglomeration of corporate business and cooperatives is Mondragon in Spain, where Mondragon represents many cooperatives internally in Spain as well as all over the world. Cooperatives under Mondragon expand their interests by relating to corporate businesses in Spain and globally, with the understanding that that co-existence is in the interest of both major players. “In October 2009, Ebrahim Patel, South Africa’s newly appointed Minister of Economic Development, caused a stir by publicly expressing his support for the social economy. Opening an International Labour Organisation (ILO) regional conference on the role of the social economy in Africa’s response to the global economic crisis, he declared: ‘As we chart a new growth path on the continent, we need not see cooperatives and social economy entities as simply residual absorbers of labour. Instead of limiting their role, enterprises in the social economy can be a leading force for modernising economies and expanding economic development.’ He went on to say that the social economy was ‘absolutely vital to the recovery of African economies”. On 12 April 2011, Patel told the South African parliament: “The key to empowering women, black South African, workers, the rural population and young people is to provide them with real economic opportunities – in jobs, access to resources and entrepreneurial opportunities, meaningful self-employment, and through the social economies. This is not an act of charity, but fundamental to sustained growth, to using our wide talent pool fully and to the social solidarity any society requires to prosper” Conclusion Cooperatives are not a hostile competitor to other forms of business enterprises. Rather, they should be seen as complementary to them. All the different types of enterprises should exist side by side, as each occupies a particular niche. This complementary value is best illustrated by the German companies of BMW, Mercedes Benz and Golf, where some of their components are manufactured by cooperatives, which purchase those same vehicles to fulfill transportation needs. While one of the objectives of cooperatives is to make a surplus, it does so with utmost concern for the community in which it operates, for example, by avoiding the disposal of litter in rivers in the area. Concern for the community is one of the seven principles of the International Cooperative Alliance, to which all cooperatives subscribe. Cooperatives are better poised to enrich the poor and working class, as they encourage a more participative and empowering approach. Generally, cooperatives cooperate among themselves as a matter of principle. Sometimes, cooperators even identify with their cooperative to the point where they are willing to take a pay cut if they believe it will help their cooperative survive a financial crisis, such as the one in 2008. Cooperatives, by design, are better positioned to reduce inequalities in the workplace, as the salary gaps between the top executives and the ordinary workers is usually very low when compared to that in companies, sole traders and close corporations. International bodies should learn what some of the virtues and strengths of cooperatives are and explore integrating them into their practices, as it seems cooperatives internationally are more united than organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, United Nations, among others. Components of these bodies tend to be negative towards one another and, thereby, lose the benefits of collectivism. Governments throughout the world need to support cooperatives to benefit from their many advantages. In turn, cooperatives will fare better through this support, which could take the form of training on cooperatives in colleges and universities, or funding. Learning about cooperatives could also be added to the syllabus at high school level alongside subjects like business economics. It is clear from this paper that the pros far outweigh the cons when it comes to incorporating cooperatives into the economy. Cooperatives have the potential to address the economic and social concerns that continue to plague the globe, especially poor developing countries. They have the potential to fight the triple threat of inequality, poverty and unemployment – and to win. Countries that do not support cooperatives for whatever reason, should not be surprised to find the gap between the rich and the poor widening further. References Cardoso Cançado, A., Scalfoni Rigo, A., Torres Silva, J. & Arruda Souza, M. 2012. Beyond mimicry: a critique of "Social Responsibility" in cooperatives, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Dávila, A.N., Radrigán Rubio, M. & Penaglia, F. 2012. Fortalezas y debilidades del sector cooperativo chileno: análisis de caso en tres sectores económico-sociales, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Department of Small Business Development (DSBD). 2023. SMMES AND CO-OPERATIVES FUNDING POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA. [Online] Available at: http://www.dsbd.gov.za/sites/default/files/Final%20Gazetted%20SMMEs%20and%20Co-operatives%20Funding%20Policy.pdf [accessed: 28 June 2023] Favreau, L. 2012. Les multinationales devront composer avec un nouvel acteur politique : le mouvement coopératif, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Gijselinckx, C. 2012. Cooperative Answers to Societal Challenges: 9 Insights from 2 x 9 Cases, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] International Cooperative Alliance. 1995. Cooperative identity, values & principles. [Online] Available at: https://www.ica.coop/en/cooperatives/cooperative-identity [accessed: 28 June 2023] Kornginnaya, S. 2012. Achieving Business Success through Association Strategies in Cooperative Banks in India, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Lemzeri, Y., Jaeger, M. & Ory, J-N. 2012. Les banques à statut coopératif ont-elles plus de capacité à résister à la crise financière et à la surmonter?, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Le Roux, E.E. 1999. Business Management: A practical and interactive approach, Second Edition. Sandton: Heinemann Higher and Further Education Novkovic, S. 2012. The balancing act: Reconciling the economic and social goals of co-operatives, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Reese, A. 2012. Identity, participation and firm longevity: An Analysis of Worker Cooperatives through the Lens of Argentina’s Recovered Firm Movement, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Stopp, M.P. 2012. The Inuit Co-operative Movement in Northern Canada, 1959-1968, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] Xiliang, W. 2012. Problems and Countermeasures of Rural Mutual Credit Cooperatives in China, The amazing power of cooperatives. Texts selected from the international call for paper proposals. Cooperatives Summit Quebec 2012. [Online] Available at: https://www.socioeco.org/bdf_fiche-document-959_en.html [accessed: 28 June 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Philosophy’s response to the problem of recession in Nigeria Dr Valentine Ehichioya Obinyan and Dr Faith Gloria Eheimua Accounting for social value in funding public colleges in Higher Education in South Africa Dr Cornelia C September (co-contributors: Dr S Lloyd & Prof P Singh) Ethical reflections on population challenges Dr Motsamai Molefe Role of industrial policy and the fourth industrial revolution within fibre processing and manufacturing (FP&M) sector Victor Kgalema Coalitions in South African Local Municipalities: Is the Constitution enabling democracy or not? Nondumiso Sithole Cooperatives are a vital form of economic development and job creation in the world, particularly in the developing countries like South Africa Xitlhangoma Mabasa

- an Inclusive Society Institute and Daily Maverick collaborative project "As we approach the 2024 national elections in South Africa, participatory democracy becomes even more crucial in our endeavour to establish a fair and all-encompassing society. These elections serve as a significant opportunity for us, as conscientious citizens and leaders, to actively engage in shaping the future of our nation. Participatory democracy plays a vital role as a fundamental pillar in our pursuit of creating a just and inclusive society. It goes beyond the traditional concept of representative democracy, where elected officials make decisions on behalf of the people. Instead, participatory democracy emphasises the active involvement and direct engagement of citizens in the decision-making processes that shape their lives." (Daily Maverick)

Occasional Paper 7/2023

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, attended the inaugural lecture of the Maxeke – Robinson Irish Studies Chair, which is located at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). The lecture was delivered by the Tánaiste, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Micheál Martin, at an event hosted at the UWC’s Greatmore Humanities Hub in Woodstock, Cape Town, on Monday, 17 July 2023. In his lecture, the Minister recalled the collaboration during the days of Apartheid between the people of Ireland and those that worked for liberation in South Africa. He spoke of the similarities in their shared struggles and the current-day challenges to keep the peace. Reconciliation in Ireland, as in South Africa, has not yet been fully achieved, requiring renewed efforts, to ensure its ultimate fulfilment. He said that reconciliation is not an event, but a process that needed ongoing attention over a period of time. The lecture was followed by a reception to open the Good Friday Agreement Exhibition at UWC’s Greatmore Humanities Hub.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is part of the Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform Network, which gathers international affairs, sustainability and communication experts from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East. The network is a collaborative initiative by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), based in Brussels, Belgium, and the research group Humanitarian Journalism and Media Interventions (HumanizaCom) of the Methodist University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. The CEO of the ISI is a member of the core group, who again met on 30 June 2023. The Network is currently undertaking research into perspectives on the main non-military threats and other risks such as such as economic, social, environmental, technological, and health crises. They are also working on reform proposals for the United Nations (UN) and the future of multilateralism.

Over the weekend of 30 June – 2 July 2023, the Inclusive Society Institute co-hosted the inaugural Youth Leadership Camp. The camp was co-hosted by the Athlone Development Action Collective and sought to bring together a broad collective of participating high-school learners from across the municipality. With more than twenty schools present through their learners and educators, the camp was able to introduce a diverse group and facilitate conversations that developed into friendships. The diversity of the group lent to a stimulating atmosphere and spirit of collective civic action. While the camp was a resounding success, it remains a pity that none of the former model-C schools or so-called white schools accepted the invitation to partake in a camp that had nation building as a premise. The campers arrived on a rainy Friday to a warm reception, ice breakers and team building exercises. It took only minutes for the youngsters to settle in; it was immediately impressive to witness their willingness to learn and develop new skills. After a discussion on the values and functioning of democracy, the conversation turned to building community across the racial and cultural divides. The educators, one for every two schools present, closed the first evening when given the opportunity to reflect on how things have changed into the democratic era. It was impressive to witness the youngsters’ admiration and respect for those who came before them. The youth offer great promise in this troubled country of ours. The Saturday was packed with learning, activity and fun. After a workshop on leadership and another on active citizenship, the group moved outside for team and confidence building activities. After dinner it was movie time, with film maker Nadine Cloete screening her celebrated documentary, Action Kommandant. The inspirational story of political activist Ashley Kriel who was gunned down by Apartheid police. Sunday would be the last day. It started off with the group taking a stroll along the beautiful mountain slopes above Llandudno. Overjoyed, the youngsters did not need reminders to take photos. After breakfast, it was time the Constitutional training programme, developed and presented by the Institute. Together with the previous two days’ discussions, the programme was well received and engaged with. Altogether, the camp was a significant step in fostering an inclusive society marked by active citizenship. The Institute looks forward to initiating future, collaborative events that help build the nation.

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. June 2023 Author: Ilze-Marie le Roux Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Content Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Literature Review Introduction Electricity Usage Global EV Market vs South African Market Government Support SA’s Barriers to EV Uptake Climate Mitigation Foregoing the Valuable Fuel Levy SA’s Automotive Sector Conclusion Chapter 3: Methodology Introduction Source of Data Analysis Limitations Similar Forecasts Calculations and Results Eskom’s Conundrum Conclusion Chapter 4: Conclusion References List of tables Table 1: Charging Times of Different EVs Table 2: Region/Country EV target Table 3: Manufacturer EV target Table 4: EV Prices in South Africa Table 5: Eskom data List of figures Figure 1: Global sales and sales market share of electric cars, 2010-2021 Figure 2: EV Sales: SA vs China vs World Figure 3: EV Sales: SA vs Chile Figure 4: Sales of Battery Electric Vehicles Figure 8: Technology Cost Trends for Lithium-ion batteries Figure 9: Change in average price of new US electric vehicles and lithium-ion batteries since 2012 Figure 10: Effect of EV Charging on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Figure 11: Effect of all EV Charging during afternoon peak hour on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Figure 12: Effect of all EV Charging during off-peak hours on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Chapter 1: Introduction Since the arrival of the first combustion engine in South Africa in 1897, it has dictated the development of the country’s landscape: city planning, infrastructure locations and employment creation. Today, nearly 13 million vehicles are registered to operate on South Africa’s roads (Natis, 2022). This roughly equates to one vehicle for every five citizens. Moreover, the local automotive industry provides direct employment to 110 000 workers and supports an estimated 1,5 million indirect jobs, while contributing 6,4% to the country’s GDP (Del, 2019). Industry exports, mainly to Europe, totaled R175 billion in 2020. Now, the latest vehicle revolution is taking shape: electric vehicles (AIEC, 2021). There has been a global trend for greener sources, which has led to the rapid expansion in global usage of electric vehicles. The global electric passenger car stock boomed between 2015 and 2021 (IEA, 2021). In a move that could further bump electric vehicle (EV) sales, the European Union has tabled a proposal to ban the sale of new combustion engines by 2035 (Abnett, 2022). This holds significance for South Africa, as the European bloc receives most of the country’s vehicle exports. The National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (Naamsa) has already expressed their concerns that other countries, like Egypt and Morocco, are gearing up to grab the country’s export market while government is dragging their feet in developing supportive EV policies (Barron, 2022). Worldwide governments are incentivizing consumers to purchase electric vehicles as they sprint to adhere to climate commitments. This, undoubtedly, will drive further expansion of the market in future, with some expecting that electric vehicles will account for 70% of all vehicle sales by 2040. South Africa lags far behind the global market trend. The slow growth has been attributed to, among others, high import duties – and therefore prices – lack of trust in electricity supply and inadequate infrastructure (GC, 2022). However, the market is set for an upswing. More and more vehicle manufacturers are announcing an end to combustion engine vehicles in their ranges, which will eventually leave consumers with little choice but to acquire an electric vehicle. Given the prominence of vehicles and the accompanying sector for South Africa, it is imperative for authorities, industry bodies and policymakers to ensure the country is fully prepared for the impending change. This includes ensuring sufficient electricity generation to support an electric vehicle market in South Africa. Chapter 2: Literature Review Introduction Countries worldwide are racing to combat climate change or at least slow down its effects. Strategies to limit carbon emissions are being implemented to limit the temperature increase to below two degrees Celsius, with 1,5 degrees Celsius as the ideal target (UN, 2015). Road transport contributes around 23% of all carbon emissions. An uptick in electric mobility, which includes electric vehicles, is therefore among the strategies being implemented. According to the International Energy Agency’s report, released in 2015, at least 20% of global road transportation must be electrically driven by 2030 to reach the world’s climate targets. This translates to 35% of all new vehicle sales in 2030 to be EV (UN, 2015). In 2020, a report by Climate Action Tracker, however, projects that to reach the 1,5 degrees target, fully electric vehicles will need to account for 75-95% of global annual passenger vehicle sales by 2030 and 100% by 2035 (CAT, 2020). Both reports set ambitious targets for the rapidly expanding EV market. Some experts have warned that EV adoption is currently not happening at a fast enough rate to meet these targets (Skibell, 2021; Econ, 2022). At the current adoption rate, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects EV to represent only 30% of all new vehicles sold, which is well below the required target (IEA, 2022a). Electricity Usage Determining whether South Africa’s state-owned energy supplier, Eskom, is up to the task to support the impending market, we have to note the amount of charging EVs require. An electric source is needed to charge an EV battery. Standard home plugs are one option. This, however, provides Alternating Current (AC), while a battery requires Direct Current (DC) to charge (EVch, 2022). EVs are fitted with an internal switch that converts the current from AC to DC. A charging station can also be installed where the converter is located inside the charger, so the current is switched to DC before it enters the EV. These are also known as ‘superchargers’, as it cuts down significantly on charging time. There are currently three levels of chargers (EVch, 2022): Level 1 The charger can be plugged into a standard domestic socket and supply up to 3,7 kW of AC power. Although simple to use, it’s the slowest method of charging an EV. Level 2 A charger specially installed into an electric circuit by an electrician which can supply between an estimated 7 kW and 22 kW of AC power. This is the fastest source of at-home AC charging. Level 3 These superchargers can supply as much as 150 kW of DC power. They are mainly installed at charging facilities at public spaces, like malls. The time it takes to charge an EV from empty to full is dependent on the following aspects (Kia, 2022): Size of the battery: Charging takes longer for larger batteries Charging rate of the EV: There’s a cap on the amount of kW-rate an EV can accept. Charging Rate of Charger: The speed at which an EV can charge is also dependent on what type of charger is being used (Level 1, 2 or 3). Weather: Lower temperatures lead to longer charging times. PodPoint, an EV charging service, has compiled the charging times of different EVs from an empty to a full battery using one of the three levels of chargers. Charging Times of Different EVs *Not available in SA **Charging is measured up to 80%, as the charging time slows after reaching this point to protect the battery. Source: PodPoint, 2022 Global EV Market vs South African Market Since the launch of the first passenger electric vehicle in 2008, more than 10 million have since been sold (WRI, 2021). There has been an accelerated uptake of EVs from 2010, with a 43% growth in sales year-on-year between 2019 and 2020 alone (IEA, 2021). EVs now constitute 4,6% of all new global vehicle sales. Global sales and sales market share of electric cars, 2010-2021 Source: IEA, 2022 The EV market’s exponential growth is expected to continue as countries attempt to reach their individual targets. Europe, China and the USA have among the most aggressive EV targets, as they already enjoy the largest market share (IEA, 2021). Region/Country EV target Sources: Abnett, 2022; GSEP, 2021; UK, 2022; Wayland, 2021a In their attempt to align themselves with the abovementioned policy goals, vehicle manufacturers themselves have set some bold EV targets. Manufacturer EV target Sources: Wayland, 2021b; Fingas, 2021; Vol, 2021; BBC, 2021; Eisenstein, 2021 EV sales are expected to grow by between 24% and 29% over the next 10 years (Del, 2020; FBI, 2020). According to the 2020 Deloitte report, EV sales will reach 31,3 million by 2030 and constitute 32% of the total market share for new car sales. The EV market in South Africa is lagging far behind global trends. In 2021, two hundred and seventy-one EVs were sold in the country, of which 220 were PEV and 51 were HEV (IEA, 2022b). This is compared to 6,6 million EVs sold worldwide in the same year, with 3,3 million being sold in China alone (the biggest EV market worldwide) (IEA, 2022b). Source: IEA, 2022b Data represents combined sales of PEV and HEV. Even for a developing country and economy, South Africa is behind the EV curve. The developing Chile in South America has seen a steady increase in EV sales since 2013 (apart from a slowdown in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic). In South Africa, EV sales went up by 697% between 2013 and 2021 (34 in 2013 to 217 in 2021). Compared to an 11 300% increase in Chile over the same period (5 in 2013 to 570 in 2021) (IEA, 2022b). Although sales in both countries pale in comparison to the markets in more developed countries, it is still indicative of the rapid rate at which EVs are expanding. Source: IEA, 2022b Data represents combined sales of PEV and HEV. Government Support The main reason for the rapid uptake in developed countries boils down to government support measures. Various governments have implemented one or a mix of interventions to boost support for EV growth as part of their strategies to meet their respective climate goals. Examples of these measures include: Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Mandates Legislative requirements placed on vehicle manufacturers to reach a mandatory number of ZEV credits. These targets are met upon the delivery of a ZEV for sale. The number of ZEV credits varies between manufacturers based mainly on their respective total vehicles produced (ICC, 2019). The State of California, in the USA, has successfully implemented ZEV mandates since 1990. Although the program has been adapted many times over the years, with additional changes earmarked for the future, it seems to have at the very least contributed to California’s uptick in EV sales. In 2011, EV sales constituted 0,15% of all vehicle sales across the USA, reaching 2,1% in 2018. Over the same period, EV sales grew from 0,6% to 7,9% of all vehicle sales in the state. EVs therefore represent a much larger share of vehicles sold in California compared to the rest of the country (ICC, 2019). Sales of Battery Electric Vehicles Source: ICC, 2019 Other US states have adopted similar programs, as well as China and Canada. Purchase Incentives To promote the sale of EVs, some authorities have provided purchase incentives to EV customers, ranging from subsidies and tax savings to bureaucratic advantages. In Norway, EVs are exempt of import duties and value added tax. This in turn makes EVs more affordable, with prices on par with their combustion engine counterparts (Volk, 2022a). Norway is a leading EV market, with nearly every second vehicle registered in 2019 being electric. French authorities have placed a hefty surcharge on vehicles with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, with the aim to incentivize consumers to rather opt for an EV (Volk, 2022a). An ecobonus of up to €6 000 can also be claimed for purchasing an EV. In Germany, EVs are exempt from vehicle tax for up to 10 years while in the Netherlands, EV owners don’t have to pay registration taxes on pure electric cars (Volk, 2022a). In the US, a Federal Tax credit of US$7 500 is granted upon the purchase of an EV. Various studies have proven the direct positive result between fiscal incentives and the adoption of EVs (Alali et al, 2022). One European analysis states incentives may lead to a 5-7% relative sales share increase (Gnann et al, 2019). An American-focused study suggests an individual monetary incentive can lead to an average 2,6% increase in EV registrations per US$1 000 offered (Gopal, 2018). In 2020, governments spent US$14 billion on direct purchase incentives and tax deductions for electric cars – 25% more than the previous year (IEA, 2021). Other EV supportive initiatives Some cities have created zero-emission zones (ZEZ) allowing only EV (given they do not produce tailpipe pollutant emissions) to drive in the area and/or granting access to other vehicles at a prescribed fee. London, Rotterdam, Shenzhen and Oslo are among the metros with ZEZ (ICC, 2021). Other cities, like Dubai and London, opted for free parking spaces dedicated to EV drivers only (GoD, 2022). To appease consumers with charging-related concerns, policy-focus has been placed on developing charging infrastructure, which in some cases may even be provided free of charge. The EU has proposed legislation which, if adopted, would obligate new buildings and those undergoing renovations, to either install charging stations or provide the required infrastructure in parking spaces (Virta, 2022). Germany is on an ambitious drive to install one million charging stations across the country by 2030 (Volk, 2022b). Some countries have developed other measures, like charging station subsidies for companies and tax reductions on the electricity used to power commercial electric vehicle charging infrastructure (EVB, 2020). In the leading EV regions, mainly China, EU and the USA, a mixture of these measures in some format has contributed to the advancing market share of electric cars. SA’s Barriers to EV Uptake There may be various reasons for the slow pace of EV adoption in South Africa. In March 2022, then Transport Minister Fikile Mbalula pointed out that range anxiety (the fear that an EV won’t have sufficient electricity to complete the trip), a constrained power grid and EV’s high prices are the main reasons for the low EV numbers (BT, 2022a). Some of his assertions are corroborated by AutoTrader’s 2021 Electric Vehicle Buyers Survey report (AT, 2021). Respondents perceived the following to be the biggest drawbacks when owning an EV: Lack of National Charging Infrastructure (59%) Charging Time (57,8%) Initial Cost of Purchase (54,6%) Impact of Loadshedding (37,9%) Inconvenient Charging Options (34%) Range Anxiety (25,7%) Battery Life Deterioration (21,3%) Lack of Knowledge with Roadside Assistance Crews (9,6%) A Gauteng-focused study found the high price of an EV and battery to be the biggest constraints to EV market expansion in South Africa (Moeletsi, 2021a). Majority of the respondents in this study were not too phased by the range limits (although the author points out that this may be due to most travelling less than 100 km per day) or by a perceived lack of charging facilities. A study conducted in 2019 similarly found the high cost of an EV along with a concern about the inaccessibility of charging infrastructure among the top reasons why more electric cars aren’t being sold in South Africa (Manu, 2019). It further found a lack of public education on EVs as well as low levels of government support policies to also have had a significant role in the low uptake. The three common reasons cited in the literature for the low number of EVs on South African roads are the following: High Price tag of an EV relative to a combustion engine vehicle Real or Perceived lack of charging infrastructure Concerns about insufficient electricity supply 1. The High Price tag of an EV New Electric vehicles in South Africa continue to be on the high end of the price scale. EV Prices in South Africa *Not available in SA **Does not include import duties or any other South African taxes Sources: Tesla, 2022; Mini, 2022; Cars, 2022; BMW, 2022; Jag, 2022 Taking into consideration that the monthly earnings of a South African employee working in the formal non-agricultural sector amounts to R23 502 per month, it’s clear that at these prices the cars remain out of reach for most (Stats, 2022). Even the few available on the secondhand market retail at a relatively high price. A secondhand 2021 Mini Cooper SE sells for R688 000 and a used 2022 BMW iX3 Sport sells for R1 359 000 (AT, 2022). On average, the market price of an EV is more expensive than a comparable internal combustion engine vehicle (Moeletsi, 2021a). One report found a typical price differential between EVs and their respective ICE equivalent models to be 36% in high-income markets (Tips, 2022). The price difference is largely due to the high manufacturing cost of an EV battery pack. The technology costs for a lithium-ion battery (the battery technology used in most EVs), however, have declined significantly between 2015 and 2021 (IEA, 2022c). Technology Cost Trends for Lithium-ion batteries Source: IEA, 2022c Despite this decline, a report by the World Economic Forum found EV prices did not decline at the same rate (WEF, 2022). According to their data, the average cost of an EV battery declined by 80% between 2012 and 2021. Meanwhile, the average market price of an EV increased by more than 80%. The reason cited for this is the fact that EV manufacturers are developing luxury models before expanding into cheaper versions intended for the mass market. Change in average price of new US electric vehicles and lithium-ion batteries since 2012 Source: WEF, 2022 Global market forecasts before 2022 envisioned that the price of EVs would decline to such an extent that electric cars will be able to compete with the prices of their ICE counterparts in the near future (Del, 2020). While some expect the EV manufacturing costs to be cheaper than ICE vehicles before 2030, others found that EVs will only reach parity after 2030 (Partridge, 2021; Miller, 2020). In 2022, however, challenges linked to battery production may put a damper on these future EV predictions. Most EVs use Lithium-ion batteries, with Lithium as the main mineral component. The price of Lithium has reached record levels over the past year, with a 330% increase in August 2022 year-on-year (TE, 2022). The spike is largely due to a higher EV demand, mainly from China (Kurmelovs, 2022). Other factors include supply chain constraints due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The IEA estimates that the demand for Lithium will increase 900% by 2030 and 4 000% by 2040, as the various countries try and reach their climate policy goals (Blackmon, 2022). Locally, South Africa further pumps up the EV price by adding on a 25% Customs Excise Import duty as well as an Ad Valorem tax (calculated based on the EV price), which can range up to a maximum of 30% (GC, 2022). That’s compared to the 18% import duties paid on ICE vehicles coming into the country. A report commissioned by the Western Cape Government found the average Ad Valorem tax on the current EV products to work out at around 17%. Altogether, this then translates to an added average 42% in total taxes paid on an EV (GC, 2022). In its draft Green Paper 2021 on the advancement of new energy vehicles in South Africa, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (dtic) has suggested reducing or scrapping the Ad Valorem tax on EV to stimulate demand for EVs in the country (dtic, 2021). The Department proposed a standard rate per kWh using US$137/kWh as one example. The document further suggests lower- or zero-rated import duties on some specified EV components. Should these measures be implemented, it will only be valid for a specified number of years. The Green Paper is yet to be finalized. A study conducted by the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies recommends a ‘temporary cash grant or innovative financial arrangement’ to stimulate demand. The data found R80 000 for PEVs and R20 000 for HEVs to be the most optimal amounts through which to reach this goal (Tips, 2022). The research further suggests complementary or extremely low interest loans to support EV uptake. Another proposed support measure is to introduce policies to assist in the development of locally produced EVs destined for both the local and export markets. A form of localization allowance credits, for example, can be used to support local manufacturers, which in turn can drive down EV prices on the South African market. The South African government has little fiscal room, as finances are constrained. Careful consideration will have to be given to where the funds will come from to support such an EV strategy. 2. Real or Perceived lack of charging infrastructure South African cities seem to be well serviced by charging infrastructure. According to the search tool, PlugShare, which assists users in locating public EV charging stations, there are currently 273 stations mapped across South Africa (PS, 2022). In its research, the IEA ranked the country as fourth globally when it comes to the ratio of public EV chargers to electric vehicles, at 6 EVs per public charging station (IEA, 2021). Most of the charging stations are located in major cities, with strategically placed stations along the N1 and N3 highways to connect Johannesburg with Cape Town and Durban. Other charging stations are provided by shopping malls, specific car dealerships or local municipalities. Charging stations outside city boundaries, however, are limited and motorists will struggle to keep their vehicles charged through publicly available infrastructure. The dtic’s draft Green Paper, recognizes a lack of charging infrastructure as a hurdle to the adoption of EVs in the country (dtic, 2021). It has called on the private sector to play a key role in such a development. If international trends are considered, which shows that the vast majority (80%) of EV owners charge their vehicles at home, then perhaps public charging spaces should not be the main focus of such an infrastructure rollout (Badik et al, 2017). 3. Concerns about insufficient electricity supply South Africans cannot be blamed for doubting Eskom’s ability to constantly provide sufficient electricity to meet EV charging requirements. Mismanagement and corruption have led to bouts of rolling blackouts sometimes leaving consumers without power for hours on end. The state-owned utility has struggled for more than a decade to keep its ageing coal fleet from total collapse, while the new built projects are delayed due to corrupt activities and shoddy construction. Meanwhile, South Africa’s renowned renewable energy program was also delayed, adding further pressure to the already constrained power grid. The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) released the latest Integrated Resources Plan in 2019 (DMRE, 2019). The document sets out the course for the country’s energy plans up until 2030, with cautionary scenarios provided for 2040 and 2050. According to these projections, Eskom should have installed a capacity of 44 GW in 2022 and projected capacity of 78 GW by 2030 and 120 GW by 2040. Although this may be South Africa’s best estimated roadmap, the document contains flaws and therefore these projections may vary from reality on the ground. The Medupi power plant is one such example. It is the fourth-largest coal-fired plant in the world and has an installed capacity of 4,8 GW (Eskom, 2022). It was scheduled to be fully operational by 2019. Various delays as well as an explosion at Unit 4 has left the plant unable to provide the total amount of electricity as anticipated in the IRP 2019 (Labuschagne, 2022). To address the crisis at hand, more renewable energy is being procured from private entities than initially planned (Omarjee, 2022). It is therefore expected that South Africa’s energy landscape may look vastly different than what is forecast in the IRP 2019. Climate Mitigation The drive for an increased EV-use compared to ICE vehicles stems from countries racing to meet their respective climate commitments to slow climate change. While the carbon emissions during manufacturing were addressed earlier in this paper, another related problem is the source of energy used to charge an EV. More than 90% of South Africa’s electricity is produced from coal (DoE, 2015). Should EV owners then largely rely on Eskom-supplied electricity to charge their vehicles, it would negate the reasons related to carbon emissions of owning an EV in the first place. A 2021 study found that charging from South Africa’s current electricity grid is more carbon intensive than driving a new ICE vehicle (Moeletsi et al, 2021b). Moeletsi et al further found that the carbon emissions mitigation impact of EV will increase from 2040 as the power grid becomes less reliant on fossil fuels and more decarbonized. EVs are projected to reduce baseline emissions of cars by 19% in 2050. Using embedded energy from solar plants to charge an EV could be an alternative to Eskom’s coal power. Charging stations powered by solar is already in use, like the one provided by the City of Cape Town (BT, 2020). Car dealer, Audi, is also now selling a solar home charging kit, along with full installation, to its e-tron electric vehicles customers (Du Toit, 2022). The installation of solar panels at home and small to medium businesses is also gaining in popularity as a way to mitigate against Eskom’s rolling power cuts. The regulations have been amended to ease this process further. Consumers now only require a license from the National Energy Regulator if they intend on generating more than 100 MW from their installed solar panels (Stoddard, 2022). This then also creates an alternative for home charging an EV, which, as opposed to using power from the grid, will assist in climate change mitigation. Foregoing the Valuable Fuel Levy South Africans pay both a general fuel levy (GFL) as well as a Road Accident Fund (RAF) levy per liter of fuel purchased. These serve as valuable income streams for the National Government. In December 2021, the GFL stood at R3,93 and the RAF levy at R2,18 per liter of petrol respectively (Stats, 2021). The GFL generated R80 billion in revenue in 2019/2020, accounting for about 6% of total tax revenue. The RAF levy generated R41,2 billion over the same period. This represents 99,8% of their total income and 93% of these funds were used to pay claims submitted to the Road Accident Fund. Thus, a decline in ICE vehicle sales due to an increased uptake of EVs will lead to a decline in tax income and RAF revenues. Other funding models will need to be developed to replenish the lost income. Some of the lost income may be offset by a balance of trade saving from reduced oil imports as the total ICE vehicles decline. A Green Cape report found that the introduction of one million EVs that drive 20 000km per year in South Africa, would collectively reduce oil importations by 58PJ/a (Petajoules per annum) (GC, 2022). This represents a potential R8,1 billion balance of trade saving for the economy. The savings from reduced oil imports is thus far less than the income generated by the fuel levy. It’s not a uniquely South African problem. Other countries face similar losses through their various tax structures. As motorists in the UK shift towards EV purchases, the government will lose out on the fuel duty and vehicle excise duty, which in 2019/2020 amounted to £37 billion and is equivalent to 1,7% of the UK’s GDP (UK, 2021). In the US, $36 billion was collected in federal fuel taxation in 2018 (Morris, 2020). This income will continue to decline as the EV market expands at the cost of ICE vehicles in that country. In his article, Morris argues that a global shift in car taxation is inevitable as the landscape continues to change at a rapid pace. In 2021, the South Australian government adopted legislation to tax EV owners 2,5 Australian cents per kilometer travelled, from July 2027. The law was passed while the Liberal Party was in power. The Labour Party has since taken over and the new government is attempting to repeal the measure (Sky, 2022). A report commissioned by the California legislature and released by the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California made a similar finding. It found a distance-based road user charge to be the most efficient way to recoup the funds lost on vehicle-related taxes that are not applicable to EV owners (Jenn, 2018). The South African government may consider a similar structure to supplement its income in the short to medium term as the country transitions and to ultimately replace the fuel levy in the long run. SA’s Automotive Sector South Africa’s vehicle and automotive component manufacturing is the largest manufacturing sector in the country (dtic, 2020). It accounted for 18,7% of manufacturing output in 2020. The sector contributes around 5% to the South African economy. Of all the vehicles locally manufactured, just over 60% is destined for the export market, with the European Union receiving the largest shipment. The EU alone receives three out of every four vehicles exported from South Africa. Any changes to the automotive legislation or policy by EU authorities therefore has a significant impact on South African operations. This was already evident in 2020. Due to stricter emissions legislation in the EU at the start of 2020, South Africa recorded record exports of automotive components due to the spike in demand for catalytic converters. (Catalytic converters fit into the exhaust system of a vehicle to reduce emission of gaseous pollutants (Milton, 1998).) Naamsa expects 40% of all European vehicle sales to be EVs by 2030 (BT, 2022b). If South Africa cannot meet their export vehicle requirements, the country could forego R201 billion in export earnings per year. Based on its draft Green Paper, government is aware of the implications of the changing automotive market, both locally and internationally. The document underscores the importance of a ‘just transition’ from manufacturing ICE vehicles to EVs. Among the proposals are the following: Transition the current ICE vehicle manufacturing infrastructure to incorporate EV production. Support local EV adoption, perhaps providing incentives for a specified period, expanding charging infrastructure and scrapping or reducing Ad Valorem on imported EVs. Increase international EV investment in South Africa to fund a transition to EVs. Stimulate local EV manufacturing from the required raw materials to possible battery production through EV supportive policies. Ensure the required skills development is being undertaken to support the transition. It is unclear what the status of the draft Green Paper is after it was released for public comment in 2021. The automotive industry is busy shaping up for the incoming EV future. Toyota invested R2,6 billion to develop the Corolla Cross – South Africa’s first locally produced HEV (Malinga, 2021). The vehicle has been available since 2021. According to an industry body’s sales report, the Corolla Cross has been doing well among South Africans, even outselling the local favorites, Polo Vivo and VW Polo (TA, 2022). The 2022 Green Cape report on EVs has found there is a lack of skills to drive EV development in South Africa (GC, 2022). It states the following insufficiencies relating to the EV value chain: Electrical engineering and mechatronics skills Regulatory compliance knowledge Advanced materials engineering Advanced ICT skills Research and development capabilities Robotics Vehicle maintenance and repair skills A few training programs have been launched to add the required EV skills. The Porsche Aftersales Vocational Education Training Centre, Retail Motor Industry Organisation, Automotive Remanufacturers’ Association and the Vehicle Testing Association are among those who have launched EV training programs (Malinga, 2022). Audi became the first Original Equipment Manufacturer in South Africa to train first responders on how to handle EV incidents (Audi, 2022). Utilizing a R30 million pledge by the UK government, the South African government launched the Yakh’iFuture. The program is aimed at upskilling engineering students to assist in the transition to new electric vehicle manufacturing in the country (BT, 2022b). Jobs at refineries and service stations will also be impacted by the shift to EVs (Tips, 2019). If service stations don’t pivot to support electric cars, thousands of jobs in the industry may be lost. These include petrol attendants, service kiosk workers and marketers. It again highlights the widespread impact that EVs will have throughout the value chain. Conclusion The changes brought about by EV expansion have many avenues. Manufacturing will have to adapt, future energy plans will be influenced by EV developments, the planning of cities and buildings will have to incorporate the technology at a rapid rate and eventually, EV charging may even influence how people structure their day. It is a technology tsunami that will wipe the automotive landscape as we know it, but with it comes a myriad of opportunities to boost jobs and the South African economy. Understanding the rapid EV development, how it operates, and the extensive influence thereof is also important for creating the context for the situation in which Eskom finds itself. Policies, together with technology and skills development, will impact both the local and international demand for EVs, which in turn holds significance for the country’s energy supply and demand. As South Africa’s main supplier of electricity, this will invariably affect Eskom’s future operations. Chapter 3: Methodology Introduction To establish whether South Africa’s current energy supplier will be able to generate sufficient electricity to support an EV market reliably, secondary quantitative data was used. The information was obtained from Eskom and includes both demand and supply scenarios for the three-year points: 2022, 2030 and 2040. Data on the EV’s future market penetration at three different levels (low, medium and high) was also supplied by Eskom (Eskom, 2019). The information was reworked by an electric vehicle and solar energy advisor to establish whether or not there will be enough electricity available to charge all the electric cars on South Africa’s roads in future. Source of Data The data was sourced from a 2019 Eskom presentation as well as the latest forecasts obtained from the utility in 2023 (the data provided is not publicly available yet) on the future of electric transportation in South Africa. The state-owned entity continues to generate the majority of the country’s electricity requirements. Eskom is therefore the best current source of information about future energy demand projections. It also has an in-house e-mobility research program and has been focusing on the development of the local EV market since the early 1990s. The electric vehicle and solar energy advisor used for this study was the Transport Energy Consultant at Eskom between 1992 and 2002, after which he continued exploring the e-mobility sector in South Africa through research and consulting work. Analysis The advisor provided data on the average amount of electricity required to sufficiently sustain an EV for one year of road travel. The data was then merged with Eskom’s projections on different EV market penetration levels at three-year points, to calculate the total energy demand stemming from EVs alone per year. These figures were then compared to Eskom’s future energy projections over the same period to establish whether sufficient supply will be available. Limitations Although Eskom may be best placed to provide details on South Africa’s energy needs and demands, there are limitations to their information. Seeing as the projections are for a long period into the future, slight changes in either the energy supply or demand side may have significant impacts on the results. These changes may include a different reality to the previous assumptions made by Eskom when calculating energy supply. This flaw is evident in the country’s Integrated Resources Plan 2019, where the forecasted electricity supply by the state-owned entity is yet to be realized as projected. This is largely due to faulty power generators and a delay in its renewable energy program. The economic growth assumptions the forecast is based on also never realized due to the Covid-19 pandemic and other factors. It also doesn’t consider how many EV owners may end up charging their EV using private renewable energy sources, whether at home, office, or a shopping mall (for example). The uptake of EVs may also evolve differently due to external factors. Some examples may include a rapidly increasing fuel price (as seen in 2022), which could prompt more motorists to buy EVs, expanding the market at a quicker rate than would have been otherwise anticipated. The implementation of government support policies to promote EV adoption could also spur market growth quicker than originally envisaged. On the opposite end, a continued economic slump may limit EV market growth. Despite these concerns, Eskom has been in existence for nearly 100 years. It is therefore the best possible source of information when it comes to South Africa’s electricity analysis. Similar Forecasts A study conducted by the American Government, examined similar forecasts to Eskom. Based on EV sales, future energy demand was modelled based on low, medium or high EV market penetration between 2020 and 2050 (USD, 2019). This was done to establish whether there will be sufficient electricity generation to support the increased demand brought by EV expansion. The document cites technological developments as one of the future uncertainties that could impact the end result of the study. Improved energy efficiency is one example. It further highlights the importance of off-peak charging as to not overpower the grid. The study therefore went further than Eskom’s data by providing different charging strategies. Another study about the impact of various projected levels of EV market penetrations on the electrical grid was conducted by the European Commission (EC, 2018). It considered the uptick in electricity demand by EV charging and whether sufficient electricity is expected to be generated to support the market. Like the US study, it too went further, taking the impact of the anticipated increase in demand per various charging strategies into account. The study recognizes that EV won’t just change the overall electricity demand, it may also change the shape of the hourly load curve of the power system. Calculations and Results The data provided by Eskom and the energy analyst have been assembled and calculated in the following Excel spreadsheet: Calculations Energy Potential Hours = Electricity (hrs/yr) x Projected Installed Capacity (GW) Total Energy Demand Hours = Electricity (hrs/yr) x Energy Demand (GW) Electricity need (GWh) = {[ average energy (kWh) required to travel 100km x average distance (km) travelled in one calendar year ] /100 } x (total registered EV/1000000) Percentage of Potential available electricity = Electricity need (GWh) / Energy Potential Hours Percentage of Demand = Electricity need (GWh) / Energy Demand Hours Findings Scenario 1 A Low EV market penetration in 2022 sees an energy demand of 0,44GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,0001% of the total energy potential and 0,0001% of total energy demand in 2022. The Projected Energy Demand for 2022 is 30GW, while the Projected Capacity is 44GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a low market penetration scenario. Scenario 2 A Medium EV market penetration in 2022 sees an energy demand of 1,324GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,0003% of the total energy potential and 0,0005% of total energy demand in 2022. The Projected Energy Demand for 2022 is 30GW, while the Projected Capacity is 44GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a medium market penetration scenario. Scenario 3 A High EV market penetration in 2022 sees an energy demand of 4,9GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,3% of the total energy potential and 0,002% of total energy demand in 2022. The Projected Energy Demand for 2022 is 30GW, while the Projected Capacity is 44GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a high market penetration scenario. Scenario 4 A Low EV market penetration in 2030 sees an energy demand of 325,94GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,048% of the total energy potential and 0,078% of total energy demand in 2030. The Projected Energy Demand for 2030 is 48GW, while the Projected Capacity is 78GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a low market penetration scenario. Scenario 5 A Medium EV market penetration in 2030 sees an energy demand of 371,3GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,054% of the total energy potential and 0,088% of total energy demand in 2030. The Projected Energy Demand for 2030 is 48GW, while the Projected Capacity is 78GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a medium market penetration scenario. Scenario 6 A High EV market penetration in 2030 sees an energy demand of 416,656GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,061% of the total energy potential and 0,099% of total energy demand in 2030. The Projected Energy Demand for 2030 is 48GW while the Projected Capacity is 78GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a high market penetration scenario. Scenario 7 A Low EV market penetration in 2040 sees an energy demand of 668,904GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,064% of the total energy potential and 0,141% of total energy demand in 2040. The Projected Energy Demand for 2040 is 54GW, while the Projected Capacity is 120GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a low market penetration scenario. Scenario 8 A Medium EV market penetration in 2040 sees an energy demand of 1971,624GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,188% of the total energy potential and 0,417% of total energy demand in 2040. The Projected Energy Demand for 2040 is 54GW, while the Projected Capacity is 120GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a medium market penetration scenario. Scenario 9 A High EV market penetration in 2040 sees an energy demand of 3274,344GW per year. This is equivalent to 0,311% of the total energy potential and 0,692% of total energy demand in 2040. The Projected Energy Demand for 2040 is 54GW, while the Projected Capacity is 120GW. Therefore, sufficient energy on average will be available to support the added EV demand in a high market penetration scenario. Eskom’s Conundrum The calculations are based on an increase in energy demand due to EV adoption spread evenly across the energy supply spectrum. Energy demand, however, is not a constant throughout a 24-hr period. Peak hours see a noticeable spike in demand. In its own research, Eskom raises its concerns about the impact of simultaneous EV charging during peak hours, as this may pose supply challenges. Concerns also exist about whether local infrastructure will be able to accommodate the influx of energy demand, especially during peak hours. The following Eskom graphs represent the electricity demand (MW) spread across a 24-hour period as indicated by the blue area. It assumes 3,2% of all registered passenger vehicles are EV (at 2019 passenger car figures) and the added demand, stemming from charging at different times throughout the day, is then added in red. In the first instance, the demand from EV charging is represented as being spread evenly throughout the day. Effect of EV Charging on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Source: Eskom, 2019 This, however, does not represent a realistic scenario. The second graph takes a look at the demand spike when all EV owners charge their vehicles during peak hour. This is considered a dangerous scenario, as it could easily overpower the infrastructure and out-demand supply at that current point in time. Effect of all EV Charging during afternoon peak hour on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Source: Eskom, 2019 To avoid this, EV drivers will have to be incentivized to charge at non-peak hours. As seen in both the European and US studies, an optimized charging strategy will have to be implemented to avoid demand outstripping supply during peak hours. The last graph is an indication of how little impact there would be on the grid should EV owners only charge during off-peak hours. Effect of all EV Charging during off-peak hours on the National Grid in a 24-hour period Source: Eskom, 2019 Conclusion In the scenarios explored, energy demand, including the added EV requirements, is spread evenly over the time period of a year. Based on the assumptions made by Eskom, the state-owned entity is expected to have sufficient energy-generating capacity to support a projected EV market over the next 20 years. There are, however, potential realistic factors that may derail Eskom’s support of South Africa’s EV market. The early establishment of an optimized charging strategy will be a key factor in avoiding a negative impact on the country’s electrical grid. A special thank you to EV and renewable energy expert, Carel Snyman, for his invaluable input and assistance in compiling the methodology. Chapter 4: Conclusion The global EV market is gaining traction at an accelerated pace. Unfortunately, South Africa is lagging the required development in the EV space (apart from some limited pockets of progress). The country currently does not have the skills or policy to ensure we limit fiscal and job losses that will accompany the incoming transformation from ICE to EV. At least, if current projections materialize, the state utility, Eskom will be able to provide sufficient electricity to support the added demand stemming from the uptake of EV by local consumers. Without meaningful change to the grid, however, increasing EV in South Africa will do little to mitigate against climate change in the short to medium term. The expansion of the Electric Vehicle market in South Africa will happen. It’s just unclear how long exactly it’s going to take to reach a significant level. What is certain is that the switch from ICE vehicles to EVs is happening at a much faster rate in developed countries, many of them being South Africa’s trading partners. This alone should incentivize government to actively drive EV expansion to avoid job, income and economic losses. It will further ensure the country can capitalize on EV opportunities, like battery development, while mitigating the possible damage brought about by the transition. Authorities will also have to work together with stakeholders in establishing a tax system that doesn’t kill EV adoption, while supporting the industry through a subsidy measure. Eskom is also changing, and chances are that South Africa’s energy landscape will look vastly different in 20 years’ time to what may be envisioned today. It’s understood that part of this change will be the incorporation of more green energy sources. More people are further expected to be capable of generating some solar power at home in future, which could decrease pressure on Eskom while providing cleaner charging. Electric Vehicles in South Africa is not a question of if, but when. It’s vital for the South African government, together with the private sector, to ensure every link in the EV chain is prepped for this tech take-over. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung hosted a Living Room Conversation on the 28th of June 2023, at their conference centre in Dunkeld, Johannesburg. The event was co-hosted in association with the Institute for Global Dialogue and UNISA. The theme of the conversation was “How solid id our common ground?” and focussed on the building of progressive internationalism and its fractured realities. Progressives in South Africa and Germany appear to be drifting apart. Whether it's the recent pandemic, the war in Ukraine, or the climate and energy crisis - ideas and expectations about mutual responsibilities and responses appear to differ. Multiple crises are deepening global inequalities and threatening peace and our very existence. They are exacerbated by the rise of authoritarianism, imperialism, geopolitical shifts, and a looming block confrontation. Progressives on both sides largely agree that the multiple crises are too important to be left to the government alone and that the political moment calls for multilateral responses and progressive internationalism. Is there enough common ground for that? Do we truly understand each other's interests and perspectives? What are the pillars of a shared progressive agenda? The speakers were: Martin Schulz - President FES, former President of the EU Parliament, former president of the Social Democratic Party of Germany; Alvin Botes - Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation; Lebogang Mulaisi – Presidential Climate Commission; former Head of Policy, COSATU; and Sithembile Mbete – Lecturer, International Relations and Political Science, University of Pretoria The conversation was moderated by Yolokazi Mfuto - Civil Society Liaison Officer at the Pan-African Parliament; FHAS alumni.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the roundtable discussion on Building the Centre, which was organised by the In Transformation Initiative. The dialogue was held at the Winston Hotel in Rosebank, Johannesburg on the 27th of June 2023. The discussions, including key inputs by an array of high-level speakers, were led by Mr Roelf Meyer and Prof Nick Binedell, focussed on the: Current political, economic, and social environment in South Africa; and Critical challenges: education, mining and crime & justice. In Transformation spelt out the purpose of the discussion as the following: South Africa is experiencing various challenges at all three levels of government due to the incapacity to deliver services as required by a functional state. This situation is demonstrated by line departments being unable to execute government policy (to the extent that more and more functions are located in the Presidency); failed state-owned enterprises across board; unserviceable local authorities; extraordinary high levels of crime. Locally, these issues result in poor economic growth, unemployment and neglect of the poor and insufficient socio-economic transformation. At international level, South Africa lags behind peers on the continent and further afield. It seems impossible for a single political party to correct the situation, although the intent might be there. Also, a single platform or vision between civil society, private sector and government does not exist. In order to give rise to our Constitutional aspirations and imperatives it is suggested that dialogue be stimulated to advance ideas on how the situation can be turned around for the benefit of all South Africans; by means of leadership and execution. Urgent measures need to be taken to increase the capacity of the state, to expedite economic growth through investment and to achieve real economic transformation.

The Istanbul Security Forum’s panel titled “Türkiye as a Stabilising Power in an Age of Turmoil” focused on Türkiye’s efforts aim at contributing to the regional and global stability. Experts evaluated Türkiye's role in the reforming of the international system in an era of uncertainties. Moderator: Prof. Birol Akgün, Chairman, Turkish Maarif Foundation Panelists: Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute (40:07) İpek Tekdemir, Political Advisor, European Parliament Dr. Valeria Giannotta, Coordinator, CeSPI Türkiye Observation Centre Assoc. Prof. Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Navigating China-Africa cooperation under the global development and security initiatives within a globally constrained geopolitical environment Occasional Paper 6/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MAY 2023 by Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Until recently the world was getting used to the idea of the world being an interconnected village. The Cold War was becoming a distant memory. The East-West divide, not so much an ideological constraint, but more of a geographical consideration. It was fast becoming a global village. Then came Covid (2019). Then came the Russia-Ukraine war (2022). In the blink of an eye, the old divisions were being re-established. This essay explores how China-Africa development and security cooperation needs to adapt in this new emerging multipolar world. Make no mistake, great strides have been made towards interconnecting the global architecture so as to focus on the greater coordination of development and security to the benefit of all mankind, as opposed to the benefit of individual nations, often skewed in favour of the developed world. The role of multilateralism in achieving such coordination should not be underestimated. Neither should initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. The Global Development Initiative The Global Development Initiative (GDI) was put forward to the United Nations by China’s President, Xi Jinping, in September 2021. In addressing the General Assembly, he raised the initiative in his speech titled “Bolstering Confidence and Jointly Overcoming Difficulties to Build a Better World”. It is intended to support the seventeen 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations, which goals envisage a “global development partnership” to promote a “stronger, greener and healthier” world (UN, N.d.). Since then, 32 practical measures for cooperation have been identified and more than one hundred countries and international organisations have indicated their support therefore, 68 of which have joined the Group of Friends of the GDI at the UN (UN, N.d.). The GDI upholds the following core principles: Remaining committed to: development as a priority; a people-centred approach; benefits for all to leave no country and no one behind; innovation-driven development; harmony between humans and nature; and results-orientated actions. (UN, N.d.) Furthermore, the GDI aims to promote international cooperation in eight priority areas: poverty alleviation; food security; pandemic response and vaccines; financing for development; climate change and green development; industrialisation; digital economy; and connectivity in the digital era. (UN, N.d.) Going forward the GDI will function under the principles of: Remaining committed to development as a priority, and focusing on the implementation of the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda; Remaining committed to results-orientated actions and a project-led approach in promoting policy dialogue, experience sharing, capacity building, and practical cooperation; Encouraging extensive participation, with the UN as an important partner for cooperation and the Group of Friends of the GDI as the main driver; Increasing efforts to pool resources, encourage donor participation in cooperative projects and to better leverage the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund; Strengthening comprehensive GDI cooperation across all 17 SDGs in order to ensure the timely achievement of the 2030 Agenda; and Focussing on addressing the pressing key issues of poverty alleviation, food and energy security, as well as overcoming the disruption to industrial and supply chains. (UN, N.d.) In a nutshell, the GDI provides renewed impetus to the implementation of the UN’s “2030 Agenda by revitalising the global development partnership, mobilising international development resources, deepening development cooperation, bridging the North-South gap, and aiming for stronger, greener and healthier global development” (UN, N.d.). The Global Security Initiative The Global Security Initiative (GSI) was also proposed by China’s President, Xi Jinping. It calls on countries to adjust to the changing international environment “in the spirit of solidarity”. It proposes that the complex and intertwined security challenges ought to be addressed with a “win-win mindset” (MOFA, 2023). The GSI aims to: eliminate the root causes of international conflicts; improve global security governance; encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era; and promote durable peace and development in the world. (MOFA, 2023) The six core principles, interlinked and mutually reinforcing, under which the GSI is to operate include: Remaining committed to the ideal of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; Remaining committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; Remaining committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; Remaining committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; Remaining committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and Remaining committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. (MOFA, 2023) The GSI priorities of cooperation include: Actively participating in the formulation of a New Agenda for Peace, as well as the other initiatives put forward on the UN’s “Our Common Agenda”; Helping to coordinate the healthier interaction among major countries in order to build peaceful coexistence, overall stability, and balanced development; Upholding the consensus that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”; Seeing to the full implementation of the resolution “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security”, which was adopted by the 76th session of the UN General Assembly; Encouraging the political settlement of international and regional disputes; Supporting and improving the ASEAN-centred regional security cooperation mechanism and architecture; Supporting the implementation of the five-point proposal on realising peace and stability in the Middle East; Supporting African efforts aimed at resolving regional conflicts, to fight terrorism, to safeguard maritime security, and to encourage the international community to provide financial and technical support to these African-led operations; Supporting Latin American and Caribbean countries in actively fulfilling the commitments in the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace”, and supporting the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in upholding regional peace and security; Attending to the special situation and legitimate concerns of Pacific Island countries in regard to climate change, natural disasters, and public health, and supporting their efforts aimed at implementing the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent; Strengthening the maritime dialogue and practical cooperation to combat maritime differences, and work together to tackle transnational crimes at sea; Strengthening the UN’s role as the central coordinator in the global fight against terrorism; Deepening international cooperation in the field of information security; Strengthening biosecurity risk management; Strengthening international security governance on artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies; Strengthening international cooperation with regard to outer space and safeguarding the international order in outer space regulated by international law; Supporting the World Health Organization in its efforts aimed at global public health, and coordinate and mobilise global resources to jointly respond to global infectious diseases; Safeguard global food and energy security; Seeing to the effective implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; and Supporting the cooperation among countries in addressing climate change. (MOFA, 2023) The GSI proposes a number of platforms and mechanisms to carry out the hefty objectives. These include engaging in wide-ranging discussions within all organs of the UN, leveraging the roles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other relevant mechanisms, and holding of high-level conferences on global security (MOFA, 2023). It also undertakes to support international peace and security fora, such as the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, and the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang). And, with a view to “improving the governance capacity in the domain of non-traditional security”, it suggests the building of more international platforms and mechanisms for exchange and cooperation on addressing security challenges in such areas as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity and emerging technologies (MOFA, 2023). What has changed? Covid-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war has happened, and the world has changed in two major respects. Firstly, global supply chains have been disrupted, and secondly, a multipolar world has started to re-emerge. The Covid-19 pandemic, for one, brought about considerable supply chain challenges across the globe. This was due to the stopping of raw materials and finished goods flow, which in turn disrupted manufacturing (Harapko, 2021). The seamless flow of goods and services was interrupted because of the lockdown measures adopted by countries as a health strategy to mitigate the impact of the pandemic’s spread amongst their citizens. This resulted in production stoppages and restrictions to the movement of people and goods. Moreover, border closures, logistical constraints, as well as the slowdown of trade and business activities constrained the smooth functioning of the global supply chains (PWC, N.d.). Manufacturers found it difficult to distribute their products, and there were serious inventory build-ups resulting in an increased cost of storage. And producers of especially perishable finished goods experienced wastages. Due to the restrictions, the cost of distribution was also increased, affecting the profitability of manufacturers, and increasing the cost of living (PWC, N.d.). A further contributor to the increased cost of living has been the soaring sea freight rates, which, for example, in 2021 registered increases in excess of 300 per cent. This was caused by a series of complex factors, such as shifting air freight to shipping containers, which created container shortages, congestions in ports, holding back of ships because they could not be received in ports due to lockdowns, and rerouting, all of which impacted operational costs (UNICEF Supply Division, 2021). As a result of the pandemic’s disruption, enterprises plan to be more resilient in future with customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders, and they are reviewing their strategies with regard to their supply chain architecture. In order to prepare for future disruptions, renewed consideration is being given to what should be “done locally, regionally and globally, including warehouses and manufacturing sites” (Harapko, 2021). Similarly, the Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted global supply chains and increased the cost of living. To cite just one example: Europe has been heavily reliant on gas imports from Russia. Due to the disruption of gas flows caused both operationally and as a result of economic sanctions, energy inflation soared. And since energy inflation is a significant contributor to food inflation, food prices in 2023, for instance, rose by 14,1 per cent (Arce, Koester & Nickle, 2023). The graphs below show the dramatic impact of the war on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and HICP food inflation with sub-components: Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations. Latest observation: January 2023. Another example is the disruption in wheat exports caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. This, for instance, has a devasting effect on food prices in Africa. Because Africa imports a large portion of its food from Russia and Ukraine, it has resulted in the prices of wheat going up by as much as 60 per cent. The president of the African Development Bank suggested that the continent could lose up to 11 billion USD worth of food due to the conflict (Tasamba, 2022). Consequently, China and Africa have not escaped these developments. The Covid-19 pandemic has materially impacted the Chinese economy. Following the outbreak in 2019, China’s GDP fell sharply. In the first quarter of 2020, for example, it fell by 6,8 per cent. Demand fell by between 2 and 4 per cent, its GDP fell by 0,2 per cent and imports fell by an alarming 6 per cent. The outbreak of the pandemic disrupted production, business, and households’ standards of living. It harmed the industry, led to many business closures, and made it difficult for them to manage credit, staff, and expenses (Habibi, Habibi & Mohammadi, 2022). And then the extended lockdown further hampered China’s economic goals. 2022 predictions were obliterated. Retail sales of consumer goods dropped by 11,1 per cent from the previous year. Year-on-year production fell by 2,9 per cent, manufacturing decreased by 4,6 per cent and the sale of motor vehicles dropped by a whopping 31,6 per cent (Chin, 2022). And, of course, China is also feeling the global cost of living crisis resulting from the war, the imposed sanctions on Russia, and the more inward-looking United States. They have not escaped the rising oil prices, and the disruption to international financial transactions, and they are a target in the United States’ localisation drive. Apropos Africa, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General, Ahunna Eziakonwa, has pointed out that Russia’s war in Ukraine “has disrupted Africa’s promising recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic”. It has raided food and fuel prices, disrupted trade of goods and services, tightened the fiscal space, constrained green transitions, and reduced the flow of development finance within the continent (Sen, 2022). The exporting of products such as grain, fertilizer and crude oil has been disrupted. 2019 wheat imports have increased by 68 per cent to 47 million tons since 2007. Kenya, in 2021 for example, imported 30% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. This has resulted in unprecedented levels of inflation and food scarcity. And the cost of food is around 42 per cent higher than it was from 2014 to 2016 (The Borgen Project, 2023). And, of course, Africa has not yet fully recovered from the damage caused to its economies by the Covid-19 pandemic. The continent has not only been set back by the loss of economic activity during the period of Covid-19, but exponentially so through the loss of GDP growth that would have been had, had Covid-19 not emerged. A double whammy, so to speak. This is especially harmful in a high population growth environment, which Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, is. China-Africa cooperation within the changed environment China-Africa cooperation has contributed immensely to the economic and human upliftment of Africa. China is Africa’s largest trade partner and source of foreign direct investment (FDI). The investment has had a significant impact on the continent’s infrastructure development and economic growth. It has offered development loans to nations, such as resource-rich Angola; invests in agriculture; and it has assisted in the development of special trade and a number of economic zones in several states, for example in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zambia, amongst others (Albert, 2017). And China’s need for oil and other mineral resources, and the market it presents for selling its products, has driven its investment in Africa (Albert, 2017). In 2016 already, Angola emerged as China’s third-largest supplier of oil. Other countries supplying oil to China include the Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. China rose to become Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009 (Albert, 2017). Its share in Sub-Saharan Africa trade increased from 4 per cent in 2001 to 25,6 per cent in 2020 (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2021). China’s “going out” policy has resulted in it diversifying its business interests in Africa. It is invested across a wide spectrum ranging from mining to energy, to telecommunications and agriculture – tobacco, rubber, sugar, and sisal plantations, amongst others. And it has through a mixture of public and private funds financed the construction of roads, railways, ports, airports, hospitals, schools, and stadiums (Albert, 2017). The graphs below indicate the extent of China’s FDI in and loans to African countries. Source: Jones, Ndofor & Li, 2022 The bulk of Chinese humanitarian aid in Africa in 2020 and 2021 was overwhelmingly in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The aid comprised the provision of medical supplies, vaccines, and medical teams. Prior to this, the majority of Chinese humanitarian aid was also health-related (making up 74 per cent of activities and 76 per cent of funding) and included the deployment of medical personnel, construction of infrastructure such as hospitals, and contribution of medical supplies, equipment, and drugs. The remaining aid was more or less evenly split between emergency food aid and disaster relief. China’s African humanitarian spend has been concentrated in Angola, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda. These countries accounted for 51 per cent of humanitarian spending from 2000-2017. The vast majority of Chinese humanitarian aid – 89 per cent – tends to be of a bilateral nature, but in recent years it has been increasingly contributing to African multilateral organisations. Some examples are cited in the table below: Source: Lucas, 2022 China is also increasingly helping Africa to establish a more secure, conflict-free continent. At the opening ceremony of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) last November 2021, President Xi said that peace and security play an important role and that China would undertake ten peace and security projects for Africa. He said that China would continue to deliver military assistance to the African Union, and that it would support African countries to independently maintain regional security and fight terrorism. It was also announced that it would conduct joint exercises and on-site training between themselves and African peacekeeping troops and cooperation on small arms and light weapons control (Zhou, 2022). China’s contribution to peace and security in Africa is characterised by: Using diplomatic means to push for the resolution of some conflicts such as that in Darfur, but in a manner that does not compromise the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; It is becoming a major supplier of conventional arms to African countries; It is increasing the number of troops toward UN peacekeeping missions, which has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000, with the majority based in Africa; and It intends to involve itself in post-conflict reconstruction through its economic engagement. (Saferworld, N.d.) Practical examples include the provision of strong support for the strengthening of Africa's own peacekeeping capacity by providing aid and support to Africa to enhance its independent peacekeeping capability. Since 2018 it has delivered at least “100 million USD to the African Union (AU) in military assistance grants to support building up the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)”. Furthermore, it has established a Peace and Security Cooperation Fund. It has undertaken 50 security aid projects, and it has provided equipment, supplies, training, and other forms of support for Africa’s efforts at maintaining peace and stability. It also regularly has close high-level exchanges with its African counterparts, carries out military technology exchange and cooperation, and assists in the building of academies, hospitals, and other facilities in Africa. It also assigns military experts to advise on the strengthening of national defence, military development, and the reinforcement of Africa’s own peacekeeping capacity (Lin & Zhou, 2022). China played a mediation role in Darfur, Sudan in 2007, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda in 2008, South Sudan since 2013, and Djibouti in 2017. Military and police cooperation, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement are also listed as strategic priorities in the Dakar China/Africa Action Plan 2022-2024. Between 2003 and 2017, China was engaged in mediating 15 conflict situations globally, including seven in Africa. It is currently actively involved in crisis management in Sudan and South Sudan (Ryder, 2022). The destruction of the mutually beneficial cooperative nature of the China-Africa development model must not become a casualty of the emerging multipolar global order. Both China and Africa must guard against this. African countries, the author predicts, will come under increasing pressure to choose sides. They must not. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is already viewed with a measure of scepticism by some of those outside of the arrangement. Amongst others, China is often criticised as having a habit of offering huge amounts of low-interest loans to countries that they know will most probably not have the means to pay them back. They accuse China of “debt trap diplomacy” (Shattuck, 2018). FOCAC should not be swayed. Rather, instead of retreating, FOCAC should strengthen its resolve for multilateralism. In this regard two proposals are ventured: • FOCAC should establish a strategic think-tank within its structures to contemplate the changing diplomatic environment, and to mitigate the new economic challenges that are bound to arise from the actions of more inward-looking superpowers. And the work of FOCAC needs to be aligned with the Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. The think-tank needs to be properly resourced and organised to enable it to adequately prepare research and analyses to underpin the policymakers within FOCAC. To this end, a proper inclusive coordination mechanism – balanced with China and African input – needs to be designed that will ensure adequate research outcomes across all the strategic focus areas of the initiatives on an ongoing and sustainable basis. This will require workstreams aligned with the GDI and GSI objectives. And since the priority areas of the GDI (and GSI) are closely aligned with many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including in the areas of poverty eradication, food security, health, climate action, the planet, industrialisation, innovation and means of implementation, the workstreams’ programmes ought to be synchronised with the SDGs (Chatterjee, 2023). The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) could seamlessly be morphed into such a structure, tasked to undertake such work. • Africa should advance an argument in favour of triangular engagement between itself, China, and the West. Competition between the United States and China is not going to go away, and Africa is increasingly going to be confronted with demand choices. But for Africa, it should not be about what the decision holds for the United States, or for China, but what is in the best interest of Africa. A sound relationship with China, and a sound relationship with the West, is what is in the best interest of Africa. Therefore, creating a mechanism for the three parties to engage in developmental and security issues in Africa could be a useful tool to guide and assist continental leaders in harnessing the most out of their diplomatic and inter-governmental efforts. This will be no easy feat given the heightened tension of late between the United States and China. Political observers told CNBC that the relations are on a dangerous path, with no trust on either side. They said that Beijing regarded the United States as its primary adversary and believes that the United States “is intent on closing off the path of China” (Bala, 2023). That said, the more rational thinkers do see the need for improved relationships between the two superpowers. For instance, US Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, recently said that the US and China “can and need to find a way to live together” despite the strained relations (Hussein, 2023). Finding that way will require mechanisms of dialogue between the two sides, and as Africans ponder their relations between the two, the need for three-way engagement seems evident. It may be, given the current tensions, that direct triangulation may not immediately be possible, and that parallel dialogue might be more feasible. Whatever the mechanism, the need is urgent. The initiation of the triangular discussion could take the form of a high-level roundtable between academics, geopolitical analysts and experts tasked with exploring options for convergence, cooperation, and co-existence. The neutrality of the convening authority will be key. New global trade and investment thinking Both the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war have been a wake-up call with regard to global supply chain thinking and have highlighted a need for new international trade and investment architecture. Firstly, it shone a light on Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing and, secondly, it brought into question the efficacy of global value chains (GVCs) and the outsourcing of manufacturing to external jurisdictions. Modern manufacturing across the globe widely uses Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing processes, which is the “production model in which items are created to meet demand, not created in surplus or in advance of need. Organisations adopt the JIT approach to increase efficiency, reduce costs and speed up product delivery. To achieve these goals, however, they must eliminate the types of waste typically associated with manufacturing, such as overproduction, unnecessary wait times and excessive inventory – only then can they implement an effective JIT strategy” (Sheldon, 2022). The vulnerabilities and deficiencies of the lean, just-in-time global supply chain model have been exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. The geopolitics, labour shortages, and pandemic-related shutdowns, led to supply chain bottlenecks, increased costs and disruptions. The imbalances with supply versus demand made the JIT strategies somewhat obsolete and resulted in increased costs, and rising inflation (Kimberling, 2022). The tumultuous events associated with Covid-19 challenged the merits of paring JIT, as industries were left vulnerable when the pandemic hampered factory operations and sowed chaos in global shipping. Economies around the world were bedevilled by shortages of a vast range of products (Goodman & Chokshi, 2021). The Russia-Ukraine war had a similar impact on JIT manufacturing. Fourty-two per cent of Ukraine’s exports were, for example, semi-finished manufactured products, which when stopped or delayed as a result of the war, had a negative knock-on effect on production processes down the line in other jurisdictions (Goodman & Chokshi, 2021). In response, organisations are now trying different strategies like onshoring or reshoring vendors and vertically integrated supply chains. Several leading organisations are planning to build operations closer to the markets they serve, arguing that locating suppliers closer to assembly and manufacturing locations could assuage product shortages (Hamilton, 2023). Similarly, Global Value Chains (GVCs) were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and are still being disrupted by the Russia-Ukraine war. A GVC is where the different stages of the production of a product are located across a number of jurisdictions. Enterprises structure their processes through outsourcing and offshoring the production stages across different jurisdictions in order to optimise productivity and production costs (OECD, N.d. (a)). It is about maximising benefit derived from, for example, different government incentives, tariffs and subsidies, availability of skills and labour costs, and manufacturing cost structures, which differ from country to country. To cite the OECD example: “A smartphone assembled in China might include graphic design elements from the United States, computer code from France, silicone chips from Singapore, and precious metals from Bolivia. Throughout this process, all countries involved retain some value and benefit from the export of the final product” (OECD, N.d.(b)). It goes without saying though that in order for the GVCs to function effectively, all jurisdictions across the chain need to be stable, predictable and open for business. Covid-19 disrupted this. “The persistent uncertainty related to the shift of the epicentre of the pandemic from region to region, and the parallel instability affecting production costs”, made it impossible for enterprises to restart their business on a global scale. This led to many having to decrease or stall their production activities. Yet, simultaneously, there was an increase in demand for a range of critical products that could not be met (Fortunato, 2020). The Russia-Ukraine war is having a similar negative impact on GVCs. According to Dun and Bradstreet data, at least 374,000 businesses worldwide rely on Russian suppliers, and at least 241,000 businesses across the world rely on Ukrainian suppliers (FF, N.d.). The war has interrupted the logistics supply chain and by extension made any GVC dependent on these two countries unworkable. The trade sanctions imposed on Russia and those that circumvent the sanctions, the disruption of shipping and air routes, are impeding the flow of goods and creating product shortages. Catastrophic food shortages around the world as a result of the war – Ukraine is a global supplier of wheat – raise the real possibility of famine in vulnerable societies across the globe (Stackpole, 2022). At the same time, the movement of electronics, raw materials, and parts supplies out of China and other countries has seriously hampered GVCs (Stackpole, 2022). They now need to find innovative ways to recalibrate alternative ways to ensure a complete GVC. What does this mean for global trade and investment? Apropos trade, it means that individual countries (and/or regions) will have to re-evaluate their dependence on imports. They will have to plan their economies in such a way that they can be more self-reliant, lest they are held hostage by future pandemics and natural catastrophes. This does not necessarily dictate that countries need again to become inward-looking, albeit that in many instances local manufacturing will be more beneficial, for example, where it could aid job creation in high-unemployment economies. But then it needs to be balanced with competitiveness. What it may entail is that supply chains need to be adapted to ensure sufficient stock reserves in individual markets and not only in the country of production. It may also entail new thinking in terms of the domain of manufacturing. Where markets – individual countries or regions – warrant it, the sight of manufacturing should shift to those individual countries and/or regions. African trade ministers have been calling for such for a long time. And with the launch and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – the world’s largest free trade area which brings together 55 African countries, organised in eight regional economic communities – this has become an imperative for African economic planners. It creates a single market comprised of 1,3 billion people with a combined GDP of around 3,4 trillion USD (AfCFTA, N.d.). The objective of the AfCFTA is to, amongst others, remove trade barriers and advance Intra-Africa trade. It aims to promote “trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy” and to foster industrialisation, job creation, investment, and competitiveness (AfCFTA, N.d.) In terms of Chinese investment into Africa, the changing focus from export trade to manufacturing investment needs to be accelerated, which, in any event, fits well with the objectives of the Global Development Initiative. Conclusion As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, the world has changed. A new multipolar world is emerging, which is counter-productive to what is envisaged within the Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. This negative trajectory must be countered in the interest of economic and human development. The cooperation between Africa and China, through fora such as FOCAC, have had immense positive spin-offs for development and stability on the African continent. Africa and China must guard against their cooperation becoming a casualty of the emerging new order. To this end, it needs to adapt and deepen its reach through new strategic thinking and triangular engagement between themselves and the West. If the ideals of the Global Development and Security Development Initiatives are to be advanced, it will require a departure from posturing diplomacy to engaged diplomacy. No easy achievement within the constrained global geopolitical setting. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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The Embassy of Denmark in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and the Southern Africa Trust had a seminar on Inequality in Southern Africa. This seminar also served as the Launch of the ISI’s Youth and Gender Inequality Report. The seminar was held at the Royal Danish Residence in Pretoria on Wednesday, 31 May 2023. It was well attended by the Ambassador of Denmark and other high-ranking officials from the Embassy as well as invitees from the World Bank, UNICEF, and other CSOs. Mr Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the ISI, introduced the ISI at the seminar. The presentation for the ISI on the Youth and Gender Inequality Report was done by Dr Nicole Daniels and Dr Beth Vale, who were part of the ISI’s research team, was well received. Presentations: Southern Africa Trust - Reflections on poverty & inequality post Covid Multi-dimensional inequality in South Africa Report links: Understanding youth inequality Understanding gender inequality

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was invited to participate in the 12th meeting of the China Africa Think Tanks Forum )CATTF), which was held from 30 to 31 May 2023 in the Chinese City of Jinhua. The CATTF is an important sub-forums of the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Founded in 2011, The CATTF was founded in 2011 and has become a major platform for academics and experts to promote multilateral cooperation, as well as to produce ideas for developing countries around the globe. The forum was attended by more than 200 scholars and experts from China and Africa, including, amongst many others, Mr Lui Yuxi, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs; Pierre Gomez, Minister of Higher Education, Research and Technology, Republic of the Gambia; and Kgalema Motlanthe, former President of the Republic of South Africa. The 12th meeting of the forum focussed on four thematic areas: Centennial journey of China-Africa striving in unity for rejuvenation: retrospect and prospect The principles of sincerity, real results, amity and good faith and pursuing the greater good and shared interests usher in a new era of China-Africa cooperation China-Africa relations under the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) Toward common prosperity: Africa’s 2063 vision and Chinese modernization The ISI’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, moderated the GDI/GSI/GCI session, where he also spoke on the highlights of a paper developed by the ISI on “Navigating China-Africa Cooperation under the Global Development and Security Initiatives within a globally constrained geopolitical environment” Click here for access to the occasional paper

On the 23rd and 24th of May, Dr Klaus Kotzé represented the Inclusive Society Institute at the Masterclass on Coalition Governance. The event was hosted by the Hugenote School of Social Innovation in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The event was well attended by a variety of South Africa’s political parties who actively and discursively contributed to making the event a success. In the whole, the attendees agreed on the need for clarity and workable structures for coalition governance. Professor Erwin Schwella, Dean of the School of Social Innovation, facilitated the programme and explained that the attendant sessions would serve as a test case for the future Masterclasses that would be rolled out to party and governance officials. In an open and participative space, Professor Schwella sought the inputs from the various party officials and leaders present. It clearly emerged that political parties agreed that coalitions have been fraught with structural contention and contests for positions, as opposed to negotiations towards policy balance and societal advance. In the last session of the programme, the Inclusive Society Institute presented its Coalition Training Assignment which will be included in future Masterclasses. The aim of the assignment is to challenge the participant to grapple with the likely 2024 election result whereby the ANC will maintain either an outright majority or would only require the support of one or two minor parties. It is the Institute’s goal to ready South Africans at large and the various parties for a future where multi-party coalition prevails. The Institute believes that, above all, trust, respect and generosity should steer the relations between political parties in serving the people of South Africa.

Occasional Paper 5/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MAY 2023 by Gustavo de Carvalho & Daryl Swanepoel Introduction - heightened geopolitical risk Geopolitical risk is characterised by its omnipresence, but there have been few, if any occasions than the events of 2022, when such a variety of overlapping shocks have transpired to create a bewildering sense of near-universal anxiety. Abstract This paper critically examines Türkiye's growing engagement with Africa over the past two decades, focusing on its potential to contribute to the region's peace, security, and economic development. It seeks to determine whether Türkiye's approach offers a genuine alternative to traditional global powers with historical colonial ties. It also assesses the connection between its peace and security initiatives and sustainable economic growth. The analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of Türkiye's involvement, spanning diplomacy, development cooperation, military engagement, and trade and investment. Through qualitative analysis of case studies, including its summit and educational diplomacy, and the flagship project in Somalia, the paper sheds light on the opportunities and challenges posed by Türkiye's unique approach in Africa. It concludes with recommendations for Ankara's future engagement, emphasising the need to carefully consider the continent's fragility context and potential implications on regional stability. Introduction Over the past two decades, Türkiye's engagement with African countries has grown considerably, indicating its intent to bolster its regional presence and contribute to peace, security, and economic development. As a rising global power, Türkiye claims to offer an alternative perspective on cooperation, differentiating itself from traditional global powers with historical colonial ties. This burgeoning relationship could reshape the continent's geopolitical landscape, fostering a more balanced and inclusive approach to regional development. However, it is essential to critically assess the extent to which Ankara's engagement represents a genuine alternative. The deepening connection between Türkiye and Africa is exemplified by the increase in embassies, from 12 in 2002 to 44 by 2022 (Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), and President Erdoğan’s 27 visits to African countries since 2003 – more than any other non-African leader (Mitchell, 2021). Rapid growth in trade between Türkiye and Africa, from a volume of 5.5 billion USD in 2003 to around 25 billion USD, underscores the country’s diverse relationships with Africa’s fastest-growing economies, with investments spanning infrastructure development, mining, and energy sectors (Orakçı, 2022). Turkish cooperation assistance and conflict engagement, particularly in Somalia, demonstrate the inextricable link between its peace and security initiatives and economic interests. This multifaceted approach reflects a broader strategy to strengthen Türkiye's presence in the continent while promoting regional stability and development. Türkiye's engagement in Africa brings opportunities and risks for addressing fragility and promoting regional development. To achieve this, it must consider the continent's fragility context, including weak state capacity, poor governance, political instability, and insecurity (Hoeffler, 2019). This paper aims to critically evaluate Türkiye's role in Africa's peace and security landscape and assess the prospects for future engagement. It explores whether Türkiye's approach offers an alternative to "old colonial" strategies and its potential moderating role in Africa compared to other global powers. Additionally, it will examine the connection between the country's peace and security initiatives and sustainable economic growth, along with the tools employed to achieve these goals. This paper uses qualitative analysis to offer a comprehension of Türkiye's involvement in Africa and its possible influence on the region's stability and development. Overcoming Fragility and Enhancing Agency: the Role of Emerging Powers in Africa Africa, home to some of the world's fastest-growing economies, has the potential to become a significant global force economically and politically. However, African nations face challenges such as a youth bulge, rapid urbanisation, natural resource management, poverty, exclusion, and socio-economic divisions (African Development Bank, 2019). African countries experiencing fragility must reconsider their governance, institutional capabilities and develop strategies to boost their resilience. The African Development Bank identifies six factors to tackle fragility: robust leadership and governance, social inclusion and equity, economic opportunities and job creation, access to essential services, environmental sustainability, and regional cooperation (African Development Bank, 2019). These elements can foster inclusive economic growth, alleviate poverty and inequality, enhance human development, and prevent conflict. Global powers, including China, the United States, and others, are increasingly interested in Africa, intending to expand their influence. Addressing fragility challenges requires collaboration, as these issues are too complex for any single actor to handle alone (African Development Bank, 2019). Partnerships between African nations and external powers can catalyse development and resilience building. Traditional global powers like Europe and the United States have engaged with Africa for decades through development assistance and economic partnerships. However, maintaining these narratives presents challenges. The US has shifted its strategy to counter the rising influence of China and Russia, prioritising strategic alliances and investments over development aid. China focuses on infrastructure, resource extraction, and trade in Africa, while Russia's involvement centres on arms sales, military cooperation, and energy agreements. African nations have increasingly acknowledged the necessity of a strategic and cohesive approach towards external actors as the global scenario increasingly becomes multipolar, especially through the African Union (AU). Emerging powers in Africa offer opportunities for resilience and stability but require a nuanced, long-term strategy. High-level visits from Germany, Russia, France, and the US to 13 African states since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 illustrate the competition for Africa's hearts and minds (de Carvalho and Rubidge, 2022). The increased attention from global powers could benefit Africa, but it also presents challenges regarding the continent's ability to negotiate its position in the international landscape and maintain its agency. One such challenge is the risk of Africa being perceived merely as a theatre for global power competition, where it is utilised as a proxy in geopolitical rivalries. The escalating global competition in Africa presents challenges and opportunities for Türkiye as it expands its engagement on the continent. In the following sections, the analysis will consider Ankara’s potential to emerge as a moderating power, bridging the gap between the Global South and Global North. Türkiye's distinct approach could contribute to a more balanced and collaborative environment, fostering partnerships that respect African agency and address the complexities of Africa's relationship with the wider international community. Case Study 1: Summit Diplomacy and Impact on Turkish African Policies Africa's economic potential, natural resources, and a young population have attracted the attention of emerging countries seeking access to untapped markets (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). As a result, international summits have been relevant for establishing institutional structures for Africa's relations with other countries and discovering areas of mutual interest (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The Türkiye-Africa summits have played a crucial role in fostering Türkiye's engagement with African nations by creating institutional frameworks, exploring opportunities, and enhancing mutual understanding (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Three summits have been held thus far: Istanbul (2008), Malabo (2014), and Istanbul again (in 2021, despite COVID-19 restrictions). They have facilitated increased economic cooperation and investment between Türkiye and African countries, with trade volume growing significantly since the first Summit. The Türkiye-Africa Partnership mechanism was established as a direct outcome of these summits. These gatherings have provided a platform for African countries to showcase their potential and attract investment from Turkish firms. It creates a framework for cooperation in several areas. It serves as a critical entry point for signing agreements and memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and various African countries, further formalising relations and opening the space for Turkish engagement in the continent (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Trade Value in USD Billions. Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/| Map developed by the author on Tableau The map above shows that Türkiye’s presence in Africa has become increasingly significant in recent years, largely a result of the summits and mechanisms developed thereafter. Now, as one of the top trading partners on the continent, Turkey is competing with countries like Brazil, Russia, Thailand, Japan, and Korea for access to Africa's markets and resources. The last Summit in 2021, was co-organised with the AU, showcasing the increasing importance of continental and regional organisations in shaping Africa's engagement with global powers. Collaborations between the AU, RECs, and emerging powers like Türkiye has the potential to create a more inclusive platform for African nations, allowing them to address global challenges more effectively. During the Summit, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that the Summit aimed to "win with Africa and to walk together to the future” (“Africa – Turkey,” 2022). Such statements showcase Türkiye’s intentions not only to expand its presence in the continent but also to promote its image as a responsible global actor committed to South-South cooperation (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The Summits have also been a space for further collaboration in areas of common interest in global governance. President Erdoğan's call for UN reform, emphasising his belief that "the world is bigger than five," highlights the need for a more inclusive and representative global governance system (Erdoğan, 2017). The alignment of views between Türkiye and African nations on issues such as UN Security Council reform highlights their shared understanding of the evolving role of global powers in Africa. This strategic convergence has opened opportunities for cooperation between emerging powers and African countries, challenging existing norms and influencing global decision-making. The discussions in these summits have played a significant role in expanding Türkiye and Africa's claims for a more equitable international order. While the summits have positively impacted Türkiye-Africa relations, the ambitious goals outlined in the Istanbul and Malabo Declarations have not consistently been fully implemented (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). This highlights the need for ongoing dialogue and concerted efforts to ensure that commitments are upheld, and that the partnership continues to evolve in a mutually beneficial manner. Indeed, the summits' success should be assessed concerning economic indicators and the context of political, social, and cultural exchanges between Türkiye and African nations. Establishing sustainable partnerships requires addressing various sectors' infrastructure development, regional security, and capacity-building challenges (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Türkiye’s historical engagements in Africa Analysing Türkiye’s historical engagements in Africa is essential for understanding the cultural and historical ties that form the foundation of its current involvement in the continent. These ties offer context for the present-day dynamics and motivations behind Türkiye’s approach to African nations. Türkiye’s historical engagement with Africa can be divided into three periods, as described by Özkan (2008). The first period of relations between Turks and Africa spanned several centuries until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. During this time, the Ottoman State maintained substantial connections with the continent. Some African countries were entirely or partially under Ottoman rule, such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Niger and Chad (Özkan, 2010). In the northern Sub-Sahara region, the Ottomans were part of the balance of powers system, forging friendships and alliances with the Kanem Bornu Empire, which still exists in today’s Northern Nigeria, Niger, and Chad (Özkan, 2010). These cultural and historical ties continue to influence Türkiye’s engagements in the continent, providing a foundation for its contemporary approach. From 1923 to 1998, the second period saw Türkiye-Africa relations at their lowest point, almost non-existent due to Türkiye’s focus on domestic issues and its orientation towards the West during the Cold War (Donelli, 2021). During this time, Türkiye’s relations with Africa were limited to a few countries, such as Egypt and Sudan (Özkan, 2010). The third period, which began in 1998 with the launch of Türkiye’s first “Africa Opening Action Plan”, marked a revival of Ankara’s interest in Africa. This period represents a significant shift in Türkiye’s engagement with Africa. It will be the focus of the following section, as it is most relevant to the objectives of this article. Ankara’s Foreign Policy Diversification and Africa Despite the deep historical, cultural, and religious ties between Türkiye and the African continent during the Ottoman Empire, it was only in the late 1990s that Türkiye’s connection to Africa began to develop (Turhan, 2021). The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly impacted Türkiye’s foreign policy, prompting diversification and creating a more independent approach, no longer constrained by the bipolar world order. This systemic change coincided with diversifying societal and political sources influencing Turkish foreign policymaking. New uncertainties and threats emerged, leading to a renewed debate on Türkiye’s international role due to ethnic conflicts and instability in neighbouring regions. These changing geopolitical conditions resulted in differing perspectives on Türkiye’s international role (Özkan and Akgün, 2010). Some advocated focusing on traditional Western allies and closer ties with Europe. In contrast, others called for diversifying foreign relations and developing stronger connections with countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, the Balkans, and Africa. Domestic factors within Türkiye, such as the rise of religious and nationalistic groups, also contributed to the diversification process and encouraged the development of ties outside Europe (Özkan and Akgün, 2010). These groups urged governments to adopt a more independent stance from Western institutions, emphasising the importance of domestic factors in shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy during that period. This change in policy orientation can be viewed as a reassembly of its previous legacy under a different name, with Türkiye utilising its historical, cultural, and religious connections with Africa to shape its foreign policy towards the continent (Turhan, 2021). This shift is a broader trend towards a more proactive and assertive Turkish foreign approach. It aims to increase Türkiye’s influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood, including new regions like Africa. Turhan (2021) highlighted the considerable impact of Turkish leaders, including Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, on shaping Türkiye's foreign policy towards Africa by prioritising cultural and historical connections with former Ottoman territories. Turkish Development Cooperation Tools in Africa Türkiye has been trying to develop its own approach to South-South cooperation based on its experiences from working with Balkans and Central Asia countries. Until recently, Türkiye's donor contributions were not significant in the past due to poor coordination and modest funding, but it is becoming more apparent now. Türkiye's approach to South-South cooperation aims to increase its visibility and engagement in African development projects, which has successfully achieved economic, political, and social gains in the region (Özkan, 2018). The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), an essential instrument for executing Türkiye’s strategy, has notably extended its reach into the country’s areas of interest in Africa. Türkiye’s engagements predominantly focus on its immediate vicinity. As a result, it is no surprise that the country’s most substantial contributions in Africa are allocated to Somalia and Sudan, both of which rank among the top 10 recipients of ODA from Türkiye (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). African nations constitute most of Türkiye’s contributions to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with countries like Somalia, Sudan, Niger, Djibouti, Chad, and Guinea ranking among the top beneficiaries (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). Türkiye’s development assistance prioritises education and education policy, exceeding other sectors such as administrative and civil infrastructure, health, water, and sanitation (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). As an OECD member, Türkiye’s engagements align with those of other donor countries, setting it apart from emerging powers like Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. TIKA serves a critical function by facilitating Turkish government projects and directly engaging with Turkish NGOs. In 2019, Türkiye allocated 8.6 billion USD to official development assistance (ODA), with 90% of its support targeting humanitarian and food aid (OECD, 2021). It is worth noting that only a small portion of Türkiye’s aid constitutes programmable aid, subject to multi-year planning at country and regional levels. Most of Türkiye’s assistance is developed case-by-case, frequently through project-specific initiatives and humanitarian responses. Among OECD members, Türkiye has one of the lowest rates of programmable aid per ODA, with approximately 7.3% of its support allocated to country programmes, compared to the OECD average of 47.7% (OECD, 2021). Case Study 2: Türkiye's Educational Diplomacy in Africa Beyond its humanitarian support, education is critical to Türkiye's foreign policy in Africa. It is pivotal in fostering long-term cultural exchange and strengthening social, political, and economic ties with African states. In 2020, the education sector received the highest multi-sector funding from the Turkish ODA, with 220.5 million USD provided (OECD, 2021). Source: Graph downloaded from OECD Development Co-operation Profile (2021) Türkiye's educational diplomacy in Africa involves scholarships, exchange programs, and establishing Turkish schools and universities. These efforts enhance Türkiye's soft power and address challenges such as language barriers, cultural differences, and resource limitations (Enwere, 2014). Turkish universities have become more popular among African students due to scholarships managed by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) (Gunn, 2020). These scholarships have facilitated academic and cultural exchange between the regions. A prime example of the significance of education in Türkiye's foreign policy was the Gülen movement. As an Islamic transnational religious and social organisation, it shaped Türkiye's engagement with Africa between 2003 and 2014. The Movement played a crucial role in formulating and implementing Türkiye's public diplomacy, primarily through establishing numerous schools throughout the continent and reinforcing cooperation in the education sector. The Gülen movement was once an ally of Erdoğan and his AKP party; however, their relationship deteriorated post-2013. Subsequently, Türkiye accused the Movement of masterminding the unsuccessful coup attempt in July 2016 (Bishku, 2019). Since, Turkish authorities implemented measures to shut down schools and businesses associated with the Movement and sought the extradition of its members from other countries to Türkiye. After the attempted military coup of 2016, Türkiye established the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) to reclaim its own domain in international education, which was controlled mainly by the Gülen movement (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). The TMF now operates nearly 150 schools and 20 dormitories across 25 African countries (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The TMF has become a significant element of Turkish soft power in foreign policy, promoting Turkish education abroad through its initiatives (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). Military Engagement in Africa: Asymmetric Wars and the Rise of Drone Diplomacy Understanding Türkiye's role as an alternative partner in Africa requires a closer look at its military engagements. Türkiye interacts with African nations using diverse tactics, encompassing high-level diplomatic visits, military training schemes for African troops in Türkiye or Africa led by Turkish personnel, collaborative military exercises, and involvement in peacekeeping operations under international organisations like the United Nations (Yaşar, 2022). Many African states are keen to take advantage of Türkiye’s experience in counterinsurgency, the modernisation of its security sectors, and the developments in its defence industry (Yaşar, 2022). This experience allows Türkiye to draw on its background while achieving objectives through proxy warfare, supporting local actors, and minimising risks and costs associated with direct military intervention. In response to Marshall Haftar's 2019 offensive threatening Tripoli, Türkiye increased its support for Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) (Yüksel, 2020). This support included providing GNA-aligned forces with conventional combat enablers, irregular components and deploying Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance their defensive capabilities. Türkiye also facilitated the participation of thousands of Syrian opposition fighters in the Libyan Civil War. Türkiye's proxy warfare strategy in Libya is characterised by high centralisation and control (Yüksel, 2020). This tailored approach to commanding proxies in conjunction with Türkiye's military operations allows the country to achieve its objectives while reducing risks and expanding its influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Türkiye's most prominent effort is its increased arms exports to African nations, providing competitively priced military equipment with minimal restrictions. The growing emphasis on military arrangements in Africa, particularly involving drones, armoured vehicles, naval apparatus, and infantry equipment, has directly influenced Turkish defence and aerospace exports. As per a report presented to DW, a German media outlet, Turkish exports to Africa recorded a significant surge, increasing more than five times from 2020 to 2021 and reaching 460 million USD (Hairsine, 2022). The report suggests that due to their comparatively affordable nature, Turkish arms have become an attainable resource for numerous nations grappling with conflict on the continent. Drones have transformed modern warfare by enabling states to project their power while minimising the potential danger to friendly personnel (Lin-Greenberg, 2022). Türkiye's military-industrial complex has experienced significant growth in recent years, especially in developing UAVs. Since the late 2010s, Türkiye has emerged as a leading source of drone technology, with the Bayraktar TB2 becoming a key player in the global market. In Africa, Türkiye's drones first saw action in Libya, providing tactical and operational advantages in asymmetric warfare. As such conflicts become increasingly common on the continent, Turkish drones have become an attractive choice for African nations. However, it is crucial to recognise that drones should not be considered a standalone solution but rather a component of a comprehensive strategic framework that includes defence systems, political initiatives, and diplomatic efforts (Kasapoğlu, 2022). Countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Nigeria have reportedly purchased drones from Türkiye, demonstrating the growing relevance of Turkish UAVs in the African security landscape and highlighting Türkiye's role as an alternative partner in the region. Türkiye's military and defence engagement in Africa, though modest compared to global powers such as Russia, the United States, China, and France, is steadily growing. This heightened involvement may carry significant implications for future interactions between Türkiye and African nations. As Türkiye furthers its presence in Africa, it could foster a diversification of influence within the region, potentially shifting the existing balance of power. Furthermore, the affordability and accessibility of Turkish military equipment might empower African countries to enhance their defence capabilities, ultimately affecting regional security dynamics. However, Türkiye's no-strings-attached approach to governance and human rights in its military engagements raises concerns about potential arms proliferation, which could aggravate existing conflicts or provoke new ones, leading to negative implications for the continent. Case Study 3: Türkiye's Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia Türkiye's engagement in Africa, with a particular emphasis on Somalia, showcases a blend of humanitarian concerns and long-term strategic interests, reflecting the nation's aspiration to establish a prominent role in regional and global politics. Somalia is a flagship project for Türkiye, transforming the country's approach to African engagement and elevating its status as a complex and multifaceted political actor, thereby influencing its broader African agenda (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Initially commencing as a humanitarian response to the severe drought that struck Somalia in 2011, Türkiye's involvement has since evolved into a comprehensive policy encompassing political and social dimensions (Sıradağ, 2018). Ankara's engagement is characterised by several critical factors, including timely intervention, risk inclination, the availability of Turkish products and expertise, soft power projection, the lack of historical imperial baggage, and a highly coordinated unilateral approach (Cannon, 2017). Türkiye has played an active role in supporting Somalia's humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Its approach has focused on concrete actions that can have an immediate impact, such as investments in infrastructure projects like roads, hospitals, and schools (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). These projects aimed to improve access to essential services and create job opportunities for local workers. In line with its focus on education as a tool for increasing its soft power, Türkiye has supported education in Somalia through the establishment of partnerships between Turkish and Somali universities, the provision of scholarships for Somali students to study in Türkiye, and investment in human capital within the country (Sıradağ, 2018). Türkiye has contributed to peacebuilding efforts in Somalia by hosting conferences to bring together various factions to resolve the conflict. Türkiye's peacebuilding in Somalia prioritises establishing a functioning state as crucial for achieving sustainable peace. In 2017, Türkiye opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia, aiming at providing capacity building for Somali soldiers and support for peace support operations in the country (Sıradağ, 2018). Despite these efforts, Türkiye's humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia is not without limitations. Türkiye's approach balances conscience and interest by utilising official, civic, and business channels (Akpınar, 2013). However, the implementation of humanitarian diplomacy encounters challenges due to on-the-ground realities, the interests of other intervening nations, public support, capacity constraints, and the necessity for regional recognition and international collaboration. Expanding Türkiye's Trade and Investment Horizons in Africa Türkiye's diversification strategy has led to a growing reliance on Africa to expand its export markets and sustain economic growth, focusing on sectors such as agriculture, construction, and textiles. Key African trading partners include Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa, chosen for their geographic proximity, cultural similarities, and economic growth rates (Aman et al., 2017; Mohamud and Köksal, 2021). By 2022, Africa became Türkiye's third most significant trade source, surpassed only by Europe and Asia (“Turkey trade balance, exports, imports by region 2020 | WITS Data,” n.d.). Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/, https://www.trademap.org/ | Map developed by the author in R Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/| Graph developed by the author on Tableau This increasing engagement has been supported by Türkiye's improvements in the corruption perception index, rising ODA donations, and the opening of commercial consulates in various African countries (Aman et al., 2017). Türkiye has also signed Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements with 38 African nations to establish a solid contractual foundation for mutual economic relations (“Turkey | African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow,” n.d.). Türkiye's African investments, which have increased tenfold since 2004 to an estimated $5-$8 billion (Ofodile, 2019), are part of a broader strategy to extend its economic influence and promote sustainable development and South-South cooperation. Turkish contractors have executed over 1,150 projects involving airport and highway construction, renewable energy initiatives, and joint ventures with African enterprises (Ofodile, 2019). Ethiopia remains the top destination for Turkish FDI, receiving over $2.5 billion of the $6 billion allocated to Africa (Ofodile, 2019). In Addition, Egypt is Türkiye's largest bilateral trading partner in Africa. Türkiye’s Unique Approach in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges Türkiye's focus on diversification in its engagement with Africa demonstrates a mutual need for both parties to explore new opportunities and expand their respective economic and political horizons. This shared interest in diversification is driven by a desire to reduce over-reliance on traditional markets and partners, fostering more sustainable and resilient economies. For Türkiye, diversification is essential to maintain its economic growth and extend its influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood. By engaging with Africa, Türkiye can access new markets, resources, and investment opportunities while establishing itself as a significant regional actor. This diversification strategy is crucial for Türkiye, given its current geopolitical challenges and need to reduce its dependence on traditional markets in Europe and the Middle East. For African countries, diversification is equally critical for sustainable economic development. Engaging with partners like Türkiye, which offers different perspectives and approaches compared to traditional powers, allows African nations to broaden their economic base, access new technologies and investments, and foster more balanced relationships. This diversification can contribute to greater resilience in the face of global economic fluctuations and promote a more inclusive development trajectory. As a potential moderating power in Africa, Türkiye can navigate the complexities of regional conflicts and power dynamics while fostering dialogue and cooperation. Its unique position, devoid of historical colonial baggage, may allow it to mediate disputes and promote stability more effectively than traditional powers. Ankara's coordinated effort, exemplified by the Türkiye-Africa summits, state visits, and institutional frameworks, has significantly contributed to the country's growing influence in Africa. These top-down initiatives have facilitated increased economic cooperation, investment, and mutual understanding between Türkiye and African nations. While ambitious goals outlined in summit declarations require ongoing dialogue and commitment, the success of these efforts extends beyond economic indicators to encompass political, social, and cultural exchanges. However, Türkiye faces challenges in balancing its interests, navigating geopolitical rivalries, and adapting its foreign policy apparatus to the growing demands of African engagement. By addressing these challenges, Türkiye can strengthen its position as a key player in Africa's peace, security, and development landscape. Türkiye's involvement in Somalia has emphasised the significance of a coherent multi-sectoral approach to African participation. The Somalia project showcases Türkiye's ability to combine humanitarian concerns with strategic interests, demonstrating the need for a comprehensive policy to address state fragility. This approach encompasses timely intervention, soft power projection, and coordinated efforts, reflecting broader aspirations for promoting stability and development across the continent. Türkiye's development cooperation in Africa reflects its commitment to long-term partnerships and capacity-building, crucial to its broader strategy for the continent. As an OECD member, Türkiye aligns with traditional donors while demonstrating adaptability through case-by-case initiatives. Through prioritising sectors like education and leveraging TIKA's expanded reach, Türkiye establishes itself as a multifaceted and influential actor in Africa, promoting mutual growth and development. Türkiye's military engagements in Africa, while modest compared to traditional powers, contribute to its goal of offering an alternative partnership to the continent. By providing competitively priced military equipment, including drone technology, with minimal restrictions, Türkiye enables African nations to enhance their defence capabilities. This diversification of influence has the potential to shift the balance of power. Still, concerns about arms proliferation and implications for regional security dynamics must be considered as Türkiye expands its presence in Africa. Conclusion and recommendations While the debate continues over whether Türkiye truly offers a genuine alternative to traditional powers in Africa, its emphasis on diversification, cultural connections, and long-term cooperation is undeniably reshaping the dynamics of engagement on the continent. Despite having a smaller reach than other global powers, Türkiye's consistently increasing role in the continent indicates that the country is indeed moving towards becoming an alternative. The future success of this diversification strategy will depend on the ability of both Türkiye and African nations to navigate challenges, seize opportunities, and continue fostering mutually beneficial relationships that contribute to regional stability and development. Ankara's efforts in diplomacy, development cooperation, and military engagements contribute to its growing influence on the continent. Türkiye's experience in Somalia exemplifies its comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach to addressing state fragility, reflecting broader aspirations for promoting stability and development across Africa. However, challenges remain in balancing interests, addressing geopolitical rivalries, and preventing arms proliferation. Türkiye must navigate these complexities while fostering dialogue and cooperation, leveraging its unique position devoid of historical colonial baggage to mediate disputes and promote stability more effectively than traditional powers. The future success of Türkiye's engagement will hinge on its ability to address these challenges and adapt its foreign policy apparatus to the growing demands of engagement in Africa. Türkiye and Africa are expected to deepen their cooperation and further diversify their relationships across multiple sectors. This includes expanding trade, investments, and development assistance, collaborating on shared security interests, and addressing global challenges like climate change and pandemics. To solidify its position as a key player in Africa's peace, security, and development landscape, Türkiye should maintain mutually beneficial relationships promoting regional stability and development. As Türkiye and Africa strengthen their ties, ensuring that the diversification strategy promotes mutual benefits, sustainable development, and long-term partnerships is crucial. This article presents five recommendations for positively enhancing the Turkish presence in Africa. Enhance transparency in military agreements: Türkiye and African countries should collaborate to improve transparency and accountability, ensuring compliance with international norms and human rights standards. In this process, involving AU organs, particularly the Peace and Security Council, can bolster these efforts. By incorporating third-party monitoring mechanisms and engaging regional organisations, the potential negative implications of arms proliferation and increased militarisation can be mitigated, further strengthening the cooperative relationship between Türkiye and African nations. Increase long-term programmatic funding: Türkiye should consider expanding its long-term programmatic financing for African nations, transitioning from a predominantly project-based approach to a more structured, strategic investment in development programmes. This will give African countries greater predictability and resources to address complex, systemic educational, healthcare, and infrastructure challenges. Bolster commitment to development and social responsibility within trade and investment: Türkiye and African nations should emphasise sustainable development, human rights, and social accountability as central pillars of their trade and investment activities. By jointly focusing on environmental conservation, social inclusion, gender equality, and ethical business practices, both parties can create a solid foundation for expanding and deepening their trade and investment relationships. Foster regional integration and cooperation: Türkiye should consider supporting regional integration efforts in Africa, working closely with organisations such as the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) to promote economic growth, intra-regional trade, and political stability. The country should consider the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a key avenue for trade and investment in Africa. This could include technical assistance, capacity-building programs, and investment in regional infrastructure projects. Bolster political dialogue and cooperation: African nations should actively work to establish clearer objectives for their engagement with Türkiye. Alongside Türkiye, they ought to continue investing in high-level diplomatic interactions, including Türkiye-Africa summits, state visits, and institutional structures, to nurture mutual understanding and tackle common challenges. Such collaboration can involve addressing global issues like climate change, pandemics, and peace and security and promoting democratic governance, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. About the authors Gustavo de Carvalho is a public policy analyst and consultant. He is also a Senior Researcher at the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). With more than 15 years of experience in Africa, he previously worked with several international organisations and think tanks, including the University of Johannesburg, the United Nations in Guinea-Bissau, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Gustavo holds an MSc in African Studies from the University of Oxford and a bachelor’s in international relations from the University of Brasilia. Daryl Swanepoel is the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, an independent South African Non-Profit public policy research institute. The institute also promotes democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and international cooperation. He is a qualified financial accountant, a former Member of Parliament, and has filled a number of senior party political and private sector posts. He holds a National Diploma in Company Administration from the University of Johannesburg, a Bachelor of Public Administration (Honours) degree honours degree (cum laude) and a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Stellenbosch. In the honours degree, he distinguished himself as the best overall achiever in the degree, as well as the best subject achiever in economic governance, political governance, and research. For the master’s degree, he received an academic achievement bursary. Daryl’s current research focus areas are economics, social cohesion and geopolitics. Concurrently, he is the Vice President of the Institute for Accounting and Commerce, a statutory recognised professional body tasked with licensing financial accountants and tax practitioners in South Africa. He is also an advisor to Tianyuan University, Tianjin, China, and recently joined the Advisory Board of the Istanbul Security Forum. References Africa – Turkey: Istanbul Summit, 2022. . Africa Res Bull: Pol Soc Cul 58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2022.10337.x African Development Bank, 2019. High-Level Panel on Fragile States [WWW Document]. African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow. URL https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/high-level-panel-on-fragile-states (accessed 4.16.23). Akgün, B., Özkan, M., 2020. Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation. 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URL https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publication/list/turkish_development_assistance_reports-24 (accessed 4.9.23). Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. Türkiye-Africa Relations [WWW Document]. URL https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-africa-relations.en.mfa (accessed 4.8.23). Yaşar, N.T., 2022. Unpacking Turkey’s Security Footprint in Africa. Trends and Implications for the EU. SWP Comment 42. Yüksel, E., 2020. Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa. Security and Defence Quarterly. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Percept Actuaries and Consultants Editor: Daryl Swanepoel MARCH 2023 This research has been enabled through the generous support of the Embassy of Denmark in Pretoria, South Africa Content Executive summary Introduction Focusing on families and the caregiving role Gender-equity policy context Global gender-equality policies South African gender-equality policy South African families Family composition The role of labour migration in family composition Culture, tradition and changes in marriage trends and women-headed households Social grants as a major source of household income Women as caregivers and care receivers Unpaid care work and its relationship to gainful employment The type of paid work performed by women The mental, physical, and emotional toll of unpaid care work amid paid work Men as caregivers and care receivers Men’s employment in the care sector Loss of ‘breadwinner’ status Male-headed households, social grants and extended family forms Perceptions of gender and gender-based violence The road to a more gender-equal South Africa List of Tables Table 1: Household types with children List of Figures Figure 1: Framing care and caring Figure 2: Structure of report Figure 3: World Economic Forum gender gap indicators Figure 4: Number of civil marriages by year 2011-2020 Figure 5: Household head by household size Figure 6: Women’s employment in post-apartheid South Africa (total and as a share of total) Figure 7: Employment absorption by gender Figure 8: Labour force participation rate by sex and presence of children 2022 Figure 9: Employment absorption by gender and education status Figure 10: Unemployment rate by gender and education status Figure 11: Gender representations by industry Figure 12: Female domestic workers in South Africa Figure 13: Infographic of the ‘glass elevator’ in men’s occupation of female caring jobs Figure 14: Unemployment rate by sex Figure 15: SASOF 2021 survey participants’ perceptions of fatherhood and employment Figure 16: Household heads by income proxy Figure 17: Attrition of rape cases in South Africa Figure 18: Recommendations arising from this research report List of Boxes Box 1: Sustainable Development Goal 5: Goals Definition of Terms Family Following Hall and Richter[6] we argue that “families are not just about biological relationships, and parenting is not simply about reproduction: the family serves a social function as ‘one of the great, enduring institutions of organised human life’”. Hence we refer to families as a network of kin relationships that might reside within a single or multiple households. A family might be tied together through blood, marriage or co-residence, and the organisation of families and households might change according to social, economic and political factors. Gender Gender is the socially determined rather than biologically determined notion of ‘femininity’ (what it means to be a woman) and ‘masculinity’ (what it means to be a man). Gender is an identity that is leant through socialisation and changes across time and place and in different cultures. Although it is a social construct, it has real-life consequences as it is lived as real. Gender is relational, and in a patriarchal society this relationship is unequal. Gender is based on a complementary and hierarchical relationship of patriarchal domination and subordination; thus it delineates power and influence. “In personal or individual terms, gender refers to the specific roles, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours and dress that individuals use to express their personal gender identity, and this is influenced both by social ideas of gender, and personal feelings about oneself and how one wants to be and be seen in the world. For this reason, even though society tells us that there are only two genders, there are in fact many different ways to express one’s gender that fall between or outside of man/boy and woman/girl”.[7] Cisgender This term refers to people whose gender expressions and gender identities fits the sex they were assigned at birth. Transgender “This term can refer to trans men and trans women specifically. It can also be an umbrella term for all people whose gender identity or gender expression differs from the social expectations for the sex they were born with”.[8] Non-binary People whose gender identity is neither male nor female and do not confirm to the ascribed gender binary. Also known as gender queer folks who use they/them as pronouns. Executive Summary South Africa is the most unequal country on Earth.[1] Its inequality is profoundly gendered. Women represent slightly more than half (51%) of the South African population,[2] and more than 40% of the country’s homes are headed by women.[3] Still, their share in household income and expenditure is significantly lower than that of men. Although women’s participation in labour has expanded since 1994, they continue to fair poorer than men in employment, earnings, and job security. In 2022, women were 18% less likely to participate in the labour market, and 9% more likely to be unemployed (see Figure 7). This is exacerbated by the concentration of women in informal, precarious labour, that presents limited opportunity for social and economic mobility. Women represent most of the workforce in only two industries: private households and community and social services (see Figure 11). The undervaluing of care work – often understood as ‘women’s work’ – pervades both private domestic spaces and the public care economy. South African women spend eight times the amount of time on unpaid domestic and care work than men.[4] Because of women’s disproportionate caregiving role in families, and their impact in safeguarding household wellbeing, women’s poorer labour market outcomes have extraordinary ripple effects. Affecting the nation, the future chances of children, and intergenerational cycles of poverty. Underlying gender inequality are complex dynamics around family formation, childcare and financial responsibility, as well as questions surrounding women’s wider participation in education and labour markets. This transdisciplinary report explores the roots and effects of South Africa’s gender inequality, with a particular focus on care and families. The report discusses changes in South African household structure over time, including declining marriage rates, and rising numbers of women-headed households. These changes have increased the number of impoverished homes in South Africa and forced women to juggle their unpaid care work with paid work to make ends meet – reducing their ability to give freely and fully to both. The role of caregiving and care receiving for men and women is different, yet it is precisely that difference, which indicates gendered inequalities in paid care work and the undervaluing and lack of recognition of unpaid care work. For example, as industries which traditionally employ men have downsized resulting in greater rates of male unemployment and a narrowing gender gap in unemployment, there has been an increase of jobs in feminised care roles. Where men take up these new work opportunities, they experience a ‘glass escalator’ in their advancement to senior and more managerial roles. Thus, unequal outcomes result from men and women’s participation in care work, with patriarchy, the underlying system that privileges men, remaining in place. During the HIV/Aids epidemic and Covid-19 pandemic, men’s relationship to caregiving and care receiving changed. This suggests that gender arrangements during times of crisis might encourage more fluid, flexible gendered care regimes. The recommendations stemming from this report (see Figure 15) are neither new nor novel, but they accurately display where South Africa sits in its trajectory toward a gender-equal society. The foundational recommendations relate to the value and visibility of care work specifically and the care economy more generally It also suggests increased accountability for South Africa’s poor policing of gender-based violence, and an introduction of a rebate or financial incentive for businesses and industries that employ more women, while providing appropriate childcare and parental leave policies. Despite the well-researched and thought-through National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence & Femicide: 2020-2030,[5] much more needs to be done. This report recognises the structural inequities, discrimination, and targeted violence borne by trans, non-binary and gender non-conforming South Africans, but limitations of scope and data have meant that this report focuses largely on the experiences of cisgender women and men. Introduction Prior reports published by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) have revealed the profoundly gendered nature of South Africa’s inequality. To further explore this, we have drawn on a framework of care used to discuss ‘The State of South African Fathers’,[9] ‘Children, Families and the State’,[10] and gendered perspectives of ‘Care in Context’.[11] In this way we situate our discussion of gender inequality in relation to families. We link the unpaid care work that ensures the wellbeing of families, to continuing forms of gender discrimination inside and outside the home, with the undervaluing of both care and those most closely associated with it. In this report, we use Tronto’s “interconnected caring phases” to discuss different aspects of the work involved in caring processes (Figure 1).[12] While seemingly interchangeable, the terms and definitions described help to separate out the different phases and forms of caring and we use this language throughout for clarity. Figure 1: Framing care and caring[13] The gendered nature of care and caring work makes women disproportionately responsible for care, an association that diminishes their social power given the undervaluing of care work generally. For example, by June 2020, two months into the Covid-19 lockdown, women were more than twice as likely as men to be taking care of children, preventing them from going to, or looking for, work.[14] Gendered and unequal patterns of giving, receiving, and seeking household care are significant features of South Africa’s inequality, both reflecting and reproducing larger structural inequities. Understanding care as a lever that drives and entrenches gender inequality helps illuminate women, girls, and other marginalised identities’ systematic disadvantage, from a transdisciplinary perspective. Focusing on families and the caregiving role One of the core intuitions of feminist theory has been to argue that what happens in the private sphere of the home has public and political implications, and vice versa. In this report, which aims to unpack the gender dimensions of inequality in South Africa, we have chosen to focus specifically on the roles that women and men play in families – whether their own or others. Because families remain the primary providers of care in society, caring patterns within the home have profound effects on the education, health, and economic participation of their members. In other words, structural gender inequality lands heavily on families, and can also be reproduced there. At the same time, more just, equitable caring relations are central to redressing inequality and furthering human flourishing. Care is central to maintaining, repairing, and ensuring the wellbeing of all who live in our country. Care is also central to social and economic development and yet the cost of caregiving is largely invisible to policymakers and planners, and unaccounted for in measures of GDP.[15] Because women are more likely to invest higher shares of their income in the wellbeing of their families, and because of their caregiving roles, investing in women’s empowerment and increasing their labour force participation is also an investment in the next generation and in today’s economy. It is for this reason that care ethics is increasingly being used to speak about and action our moral and political obligation to reduce gender inequality in our homes, communities and socio-political contexts. “Care is a way of framing political issues that makes their impact and concern with human lives direct and immediate. Within the care framework political issues can make sense and connect to each other. Under these conditions political involvement increases dramatically”. Tronto (1993: 177) By placing care within the family at the centre of experiences of gender injustice and inequality, we also shine a light on intimate, interpersonal relations. While South African households are by no means homogenous, in many we find men and women along with children and older people. High levels of violence, crime and victimisation within families require further examination of where the care and caregiving systems in families have become dysfunctional. Caring processes also show up the uneven way financial and decision-making powers are spread across families and between men and women. Power at the level of the family influences: Who or what is cared about, and how caring needs are met Where the resources for care are procured and how they are shared What support for care exists and who is responsible for care This report begins with the foundational policy context. It is meant to provide orientation to where gender inequality sits within the policy environment but we focus much more on the lived experience and reality of gender inequality in this report (rather than stated policy intentions). We then describe how South African families are composed, and how historical and current changes in the political environment have changed family power dynamics. Next, we explore care and caring in South Africa, followed by two sections that focus on women’s and men’s caregiving roles and responsibilities in their families, respectively. The following section pulls together how this nexus of gender and family contribute to South Africa’s high gender-based violence and violence against women and children (VAWC), proposing that care, or the lack thereof, has a material influence on gender-based violence and experiences of masculinity and femininity. We conclude with a section that focuses on pragmatic and achievable recommendations for South Africa as it tries to shift itself to a more gender equal world. Figure 2 shows the structure of this report. Figure 2: Structure of report Gender-equity policy context Given the global impetus to improve gender equity, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of gender-related policies in place from a global, country, funder and local perspective. This section provides a brief overview of the material - global and South Africanspecific policy environment - which we use to guide our analysis of how South Africa is performing against its own, and the global, gender-equity targets. Global gender-equality policies The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates that there can be no discrimination on the basis of gender, including that there should be equality in how men and women are paid for the same job.[16] Although a milestone for the human race, in 1948 there were still many countries (across the high- and low-income spectrum) which did not afford women the right to vote - a most basic of human rights. South Africa was one of the last to introduce full voting rights for all women, which only happened at the dawn of its democracy in 1994. In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were introduced, which provided eight goals for which the 189 United Nations (UN) member states would work towards achieving by 2015.[17] Goal 3 was to ‘empower women and promote gender equality’. At the end of the MDG period, research found that many low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) had achieved the goals focused on improving access to education for girls.[18] Women’s participation in the labour force (excluding the agricultural economy) also showed growth from 35% in 1990 to 41% in 2015. Furthermore, the proportion of women who were working in vulnerable employment decreased by 13% between 1990 and 2015. Politically, women also saw progress in their representation in parliament/government- but despite a doubling, women still only made up one in five members of government.[19] Despite this progress, there was still more to be done and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the MDGs from 2016.[20] The SDGs timeframe for achievement was 2016-2030, and there are 17 goals - more than double those in the MDGs. Goal 5 is the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of all girls and women. There are nine goals under Goal 5, shown in Box 1. We have emboldened the goals to which this report speaks directly. Lastly, since 2006, the World Economic Forum (WEF) put indicators in place to measure progress towards closing the gender gap (Figure 3).[21] This index tracks global progress towards gender equity and is the longest- standing of its kind. The indicators are tracked annually, and the latest report (July 2022) states that at the current pace of change, it will take another 132 years to reach gender parity.[22] The top 10 countries with the best performance feature two sub-Saharan African countries – Rwanda, an LIC at sixth place, and Namibia, an upper middle-income country (UMIC), in eighth place. This provides evidence that a country’s economic status should not be an inhibiter for progress on gender. Figure 3: World Economic Forum gender gap indicators Source: World Economic Forum[23] South African gender-equality policy South Africa subscribes to the above WEF global policies, and as such has created local policies to support implementation and achievement of the policy goals. South Africa’s own constitution upholds the right to equality for all persons, irrespective of gender, race, religion or sexual orientation. This has created a human-rights-based legal system that is able to redress and act on gender inequality in the country. In 2020, the National Strategic Plan (NSP) on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide was launched. In the foreword by President Cyril Ramaphosa, it states that South Africa is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be as a woman.[24] This was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, with both services for those affected by GBV curtailed by the lockdown restrictions and an increase in GBV incidents as a result of the ‘stay-in-place’ orders that kept women in unsafe homes.[25] The NSP mentions a long list of national policies that are all related to gender equality in some way[26]: National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030; National Gender Policy Framework; National Sexual Assault Policy (Department of Health); National Contraception Policy; Guidelines Within a Reproductive Health Framework Strategy (2001); White Paper on Population Policy 1998; A Comprehensive Primary Health Care Package for South Africa (2001); National Youth Policy; National Strategic Plan for HIV, STIs and TB for South Africa (2012-2016); White Paper on Social Welfare Services; Strategy for the Engagement of Men and Boys in Prevention of Gender-Based Violence (2009); Department of Social Development, Policy on Funding Non-Governmental Organisations for the Provision of Welfare and Community Development Services (2013); White Paper on Families in South Africa (2012); Social Development Guidelines on Services for Victims of Domestic Violence (2010); Guidelines on Services for Victims of Sexual Offences (2010); Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy (ISCPS): White Paper on Safety and Security (WPSS, 2016). Without going into each one, it is clear that gender has been top of South Africa’s agenda, and at the same time, progress has been undeniably slow. The sheer number of policies, now culminating in the 2020 NSP showcase South Africa’s ability to write excellent policy, while simultaneously being unable to implement or execute these policies effectively. Therefore, as we delve into the literature, we are mindful of the strong legal and policy environment in South Africa and how that might be leveraged to effect change – it is the ‘wicked problem’ South Africa has been struggling with for decades. South African Families In this section, we outline some of the major trends in the composition and functioning of South African families. The intention of this section is to orient the reader to how the nature of families has changed, providing some background to how gender norms are seeded within the family. At their best and with sufficient support, families can be adaptive, responding to changing needs and finding creative ways to best care for their members. Under enduring and prolonged conditions of hardship, and without sufficient support, the positive caregiving functions of families can be eroded, showing up care deficits in the form of malnourishment, violence, and entrenched inequalities. Families are also ideological spaces in which there is contestation and negotiation around gender and age hierarchies, roles and responsibilities, social and cultural norms and practices that inform ideas about marriage and procreation. Families are a primary means of socialising youth into what is ‘right’ and ‘acceptable’ - and for the purposes of this report, are a key site where gender-related norms are learned. Therefore, where families are the main providers of care, they should be the key target of gender-related interventions. Family composition In South Africa, families do not always live in the same household. The definition of families offered in the revised White Paper on Families is inclusive of multiple family forms and defines a family as: “a societal group that is related by blood (kinship); adoption; foster care; or the ties of marriage (civil, customary or religious), civil union or cohabitation; and goes beyond a particular physical residence”.[27] Families are not homogenous, nor are they necessarily ‘nuclear’. This is particularly true in South Africa, with its history of forced migration, which meant that families were spread across diverse geographical areas. The disruption of family life has been identified as the most enduring consequence of colonial and apartheid policies and strategies.[28] As such, movement to and from urban areas has continued post-apartheid, both for labour migration and job-seeking, with grandparents (mostly grandmothers) remaining important sources of childcare support for working-age adults. A third of South African households are extended beyond biological parents and their children (the so-called nuclear family) and might include aunts, uncles, cousins, in-laws and grandparents.[29] Table 1 shows the variety of household types in which children reside. Distinct racial patterns make clear the legacy of apartheid on family and household dynamics. Nuclear families are most common among White and Indian/Asian families. African and Coloured children are more likely to reside in extended households. Table 1: Household types with children[30] Source: Hall and Posel (2019) The role of labour migration in family composition Under apartheid legislation, access to White urban areas was restricted for Black South Africans who were instead removed to ‘reserves’ or apartheid ‘homelands’, which functioned as labour reservoirs for the White-ruled state. Apartheid laws limiting Black mobility and related flows of migrant workers and job-seekers, have contributed to a long history of separation between parents and their children, producing many severed and stretched households across South Africa.[31] Black men travelled from the country’s ‘homelands’ to work in urban areas and were mandated to leave their families behind.[32] These migrant men were not only wage labourers for a racist capitalist system; they were also often patriarchs and proprietors of rural homesteads, and involved, through remittances and trips home, in maintaining rural homes in partnership with wives and relatives.[33] Political turbulence and high rates of mobility affected women as well, with many moving between rural areas where pre-existing gender norms meant women were solely responsible for childrearing,[34] to urban areas in search of remittances, where laws prevented them from settling.[35] In the post-apartheid period, women-centred homes have been further entrenched.[36] This has put survival of households with children under threat, given that women-headed homes tend to be more impoverished (see Figure 5). Poverty and hardships are disproportionately spread across geographical areas: there are more female headed-households, who are most vulnerable to poverty, located in rural areas. Large-scale migration to urban areas in search of work has forced mothers to separate from their children. Grandmothers have become the primary caregivers for children remaining in rural areas.[37] These mothers were often employed (formally or informally) in domestic service, looking after other people’s homes and children.[38] This further cemented the perception of women as carers. Culture, tradition and changes in marriage trends and women-headed households In many south African cultures and customs, cultural norms and practices require the payment of ‘lobola’ (or a ‘bride price’) to get married.[39] The practice entails the giving of gifts (usually money or livestock) by the groom’s family to the parents of a bride-to-be.[40] Lobola has been thought of as a way to ensure patrilineal (fatherly) ties and allow formal recognition and provision of intergenerational care and support. It is worthwhile to mention that the concept of lobola has come under criticism.[41] Many scholars have questioned its relationship to gender-based violence because of its (incorrect) perception as an exchange of ‘ownership’ of a woman, from her family to her husband.[42] This misinterpretation of having ‘paid for’ ownership has led to men believing they may do as they please to that which they own.[43] Even more worrying is the normalisation of abuse during marriage by women themselves who believe it acceptable for a man to beat his wife if he has paid lobola.[44] The reality of South Africa’s unemployment rate, coupled with the financial implications of lobola (where it is more recently being commercialised resulting in higher associated costs)[45] has contributed to the sharp decline in marriage (Figure 4).[46] However, this trend is not entirely new, and as early as the late 1930s, marriage rates in urban Black communities had started to decline in South Africa.[47] Without the formal process of marriage and/or lobola, the responsibility for caregiving and providing for children often fall to women (who become de facto single parents). This has contributed to the high number of women-headed households (WHH) in South Africa.[48] Figure 4: Number of civil marriages by year 2011-2020[49] Source: Marriages and divorces (2020). Statistics South Africa The rate of WHH has been increasing since 1995.[50] WHH in South Africa have been shown to be more impoverished than maleheaded households (MHH),[51] with some statistics showing that WHH are up to 40% more impoverished than their male-headed counterparts.[52] This is related to two main factors: firstly WHH often have more dependents, requiring whatever income there is to go further (Figure 6).[53] MHH are in the majority for household sizes of one to six people, but if the household size is greater than six, it is more likely to be women-headed.[54] Secondly, in WHH, women tend to be the only source of income – creating an imbalance between income and expenditure. Figure 5: Household head by household size Source: Own analysis of StatsSA General Household Survey 2021 data As women have become more responsible for financial provision due to this decline in marriage and increased dependents, their entry into the labour force has begun to climb. Figure 7 shows how the decline in marriage rate from 2011 dovetails with the increasing share of women as a proportion of the labour force in South Africa and how, between 1995-2015, the number of employed women continued to rise.[55] Figure 6: Women’s employment in post-apartheid South Africa (total and as a share of total)[56] Source: Msomi (2019). “Distributional changes in the gender wage gap in the post-apartheid South African labour market” However, unemployment across genders remains unacceptably high in South Africa. Despite this, the unemployed have – until very recently – received almost no support, from the Government nor private schemes. Social grants as a major source of household income The final trend related to the composition and dynamics within families relates to the introduction and expansion of South Africa’s social grant system. Half of South African households depend primarily on their social grant-recipients.[57] Whether it be the older person’s grant (because women live longer) or child support grant (because of women’s caregiving responsibilities), women tend to be the primary grant beneficiaries.[58] The post-apartheid shift in household income, away from migrant remittances towards social grants, has translated into a shift in many South African homes, in which women – as recipients of child support grants and pensions[59] – are increasingly central to domestic economies.[60] In some households, grandmothers have replaced wage-earning men as economic lynchpins. These ‘granny-focal’ domestic arrangements are further necessitated by a frequently missing middle generation, some of whom have been lost to AIDS and others to the perpetual search for work in cities and neighbouring countries.[61] In South Africa, nearly 5% of homes are skipgeneration homes, where grandparents (and mostly grandmothers) care for grandchildren. The South African social grants system has supported women in their care for families but has further entrenched gendered norms that associate women with care.[62] While elderly women receiving the older person’s grant have some ‘bargaining power’,[63] there are also strong intergenerational tensions in families with young under or unemployed persons which keep these women, whether as mothers or grandmothers, in a subservient role.[64] In Bangladesh, an LMIC, studies conducted on farmworkers have shown that women with a higher education status or who brought in higher income had more decision-making power.[65] However, in South Africa, where the increased income is coming from grants rather than educational attainment or gainful employment, these same changes in decision-making power are not evident. In South Africa, women’s primary grant status coupled with advances in women’s socio-economic, political representation and educational status have not impacted entrenched gender norms or high rates of gender-based violence in ways one might have expected.[66] Part of this story, relates to the caregiver roles women have been thrust into, and that men in particular, have sought to maintain. This combination of declining marriage rates, rising unemployment and mass distribution of social grants, have meant that men are increasingly peripheral to the South African family.[67] Women as caregivers and care receivers In this section, we unpack women’s caregiving roles in families. The systemic undervaluing of caregiving (whether paid or unpaid) is a global phenomenon, and the impact is seen in employment opportunities and associated pay. The position of women as caregivers who do the physical labour of caring – including washing, dressing, lifting, carrying, feeding – and the emotional labour of caring about and taking care of others, has commanded the most attention.[68] The road to becoming a caregiver within the family often starts in girlhood, where girls are more likely to be asked to assist their mothers or female relatives with household tasks, even if that requires missing or dropping out of school.[69] Unpaid care work and its relationship to gainful employment Unpaid care work refers to all unpaid services provided within a household for its members, including care of persons, housework, and voluntary community work.[70] These activities are considered work, because theoretically one could pay a third person to perform them. Care work (whether paid or unpaid) has been shown to improve wellbeing and contribute to economic growth in a country.[71] The answer is not to rid the world of unpaid care work but rather to democratise responsibility for it; unpaid work plays an instrumental role in family wellbeing and social and economic development.[72] It is sometimes termed ‘social reproduction’ because this care has such a profound impact on emotional, psychosocial and cognitive development of the population.[73] Globally, research has shown that women are responsible for 2-10 times more unpaid care work than men.[74] This has been given as a primary driver for women’s suboptimal access to, and participation in, the labour force.[75] It is most often referred to as the ‘care economy’, but some also refer to it as the ‘core economy’ or the ‘reproductive economy’. Whichever name, the purpose is to illustrate that whether this work is unpaid or not, it is still work.[76] Despite this unpaid care work burden, there have been significant gains in growing women’s education and labour participation since the early 1990s. But, women continue to fare worse than men in the South African labour market. Figure 7 shows the employment absorption rate by gender, which represents the number of people employed divided by the total population. It is a good measure because it shows movement in the labour market adjusted for population growth. Female employment absorption is consistently 10% lower than male employment absorption. Not only this, but in periods of negative economic shocks, females are more likely to lose jobs than males. Female employment decreased 14.7% in Wave 1 (April-June 2020) of Covid-19 compared to a 12.7% decrease for males.[77] Figure 7: Employment absorption by gender Source: Own analysis of StatsSA QLFS data 2017 Q1-2022 Q2 This can be partially explained by maternity, domestic, and childcare responsibilities (i.e. unpaid care work) forcing women to opt out of the workforce. For example, several American studies showed that there was an inverse relationship between the care economy and labour workforce participation for women (i.e. if women were performing unpaid care work, they were less likely to be in the paid economy), but this did not hold true for men. Looking at the South African case, we see in Figure 8 that labour force participation decreases as the number of children in the household increases. It also shows the disproportionate burden of childcare carried by women compared to men. Figure 8: Labour force participation rate by sex and presence of children 2022[78] Source: Statistics South Africa (2022) This effect is despite women being more educationally qualified than men. In the second quarter of 2022, 13.2% of women had tertiary qualifications compared to 11.2% of men, and 46.7% had completed secondary education compared to 43.5%.[79] Yet despite being more qualified, women fare worse than men in the labour market as shown by the persistent gaps in absorption rate between genders even when accounting for education status (Figure 9). Figure 9: Employment absorption by gender and education status Source: Own analysis of StatsSA QLFS data 2017 Q1-2022 Q2 While these effects are certainly present, even for women who opt into the workforce and are actively seeking work, women experience worse employment outcomes than men with the same qualification.[80] This is evidenced in Figure 10 where the rate of unemployment by gender and education status on a quarterly basis is more pronounced in women, showing the precarity of the work women are more likely to be employed in. Figure 10: Unemployment rate by gender and education status Source: Own analysis of StatsSA QLFS data 2017 Q1-2022 Q2 The type of paid work performed by women Women are not only less likely to be employed than men, they are also concentrated in low-skilled and less secure positions.[81] Drawing on 2012-2019 data, South African research suggests that women earn between 18% and 23% less than men, controlling for key explanatory factors such as age, experience, province, occupation, education level, degree of employment formality, type of contract and employer type, and accounting for maternity leave.[82] The gender pay gap is estimated to have widened from 29% before March 2020 to 43% in June 2020.[83] This gap is largely constant across incomes but widened substantially for quintiles one and two during the early months of the pandemic. This could potentially be explained by the higher burden of childcare for women, resulting in fewer working hours than for men. Gender norms link ideas of womanhood to caregiving and hence, women are disproportionately represented in caring professions in the labour market, which continue to be poorly paid. This is exacerbated by the concentration of women in informal, precarious labour, that often demands limited formal qualifications and, as such, presents limited opportunity for social and economic mobility. Women are only overrepresented in two industries: private households, and community social and personal services (Figure 11).[84] On the other hand, men are overrepresented in occupations such as mining, transport, and construction that often require extensive periods of absence from family life. Figure 11: Gender representations by industry Source: Own analysis of StatsSA General Household Survey 2021 data One of the more researched areas is on domestic workers, who often perform more than just cleaning roles. They are surrogate parents and carers to unwell children or adults in the home. The fairly recent shift has been to talk about decent work and a living wage, recognising that this work done by domestic workers supports the broader economy in a range of direct and indirect ways.[85] By remunerating this work better, it also supports the acknowledgement of the unpaid care economy as valuable and economically important. As seen in Figure 12, female domestic workers account for almost one million jobs and approximately one in seven employed women is a domestic worker.[86] Figure 12: Female domestic workers in South Africa Source: Own analysis of StatsSA QLFS data 2017 Q1-2022 Q2 The mental, physical, and emotional toll of unpaid care work amid paid work In discussions of the unequal, gendered distribution of caregiving, the additional burdens and occupational stresses endured by women is often emphasised.[87] The disproportionate expectation placed on women to conduct unpaid care work has been shown to have a negative impact on mental health and quality of life, evidenced through measuring cortisol (the primary stress hormone) levels.[88] The socioeconomic position of carers has warranted particular attention, with numerous authors citing the compounding pressures falling on poor women, who are often not only caregivers in their own homes, but in the homes of others too.[89] Research has shown that women suffer emotional, physical and financial burdens as a consequence of caregiving. Carers endure stress and stigma, poor health, a crippling lack of support, and desperate poverty. Gender norms are inherent to the reason women are unable to access the labour market; it is women’s caring labour that goes unpaid and unrecognised that hinders women’s economic participation.[90] Termed ‘the second shift’ (and more recently ‘the third shift’) women’s unpaid care labour is performed in addition to their paid labour, often taking place outside employment hours on week days and weekends.[91] The care work itself, and the expectation that this will be fulfilled by women, prevents them from working as long hours, or taking full-time roles, often in such a way that supports men to do exactly that which illustrates that unpaid care work is critical to family flourishing.[92] Because the caregiving burden is large, to achieve gender justice it must be shared. However, the paid labour market often rewards those who negate their caregiving responsibilities, hindering equal distribution.[93] The Covid-19 pandemic has offered an opportunity to again bring to the light the disparities in expectations. Research shows that it was women who bore the brunt of childcare and job losses, during the lockdowns.[94] Despite faring worse in the labour market, women were less likely than men to benefit from the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant or the Temporary Employee Relief Scheme (TERS), designed as a safety net for unemployed and furloughed workers.[95] Far more women than men in the NIDSCRAM surveys cited childcare responsibilities as a barrier to participating in the labour market.[96] There is urgent pressure from global bodies such as the United Nations for immediate action to prevent the fall-out from unequal caregiving responsibilities from becoming embedded, ‘post-pandemic’.[97] A common solution presented to the issue of invisible care work is for this work to be made visible in a way that shows the direct link between unpaid care work and a growing economy.[98] However, there are no countries in the world where this has been implemented, highlighting both the difficulties of measuring and quantifying this labour, but also the degree to which care and the labour it entails is part and parcel of human flourishing. Men as caregivers and care receivers In this section, we unpack disputes around men’s caregiving roles in families and employment. Can men care? We also discuss the way an undermining of care affects men’s work opportunities, gender stereotypes and family-life. Gender is relational, and care is relational, meaning that women’s strong association with caring is inversely related to men’s association with care. In times of crisis, for example during the HIV/Aids epidemic and Covid-19 pandemic, men’s relationship to caregiving and care receiving changed. Men’s willingness to engage in care work could be parcelled with broader movements to increase the value and visibility of care that could in turn, potentially improve the status of women and feminised care work. However, there must be a simultaneous willingness to address the link between gender and care so that binary positions are not merely repackaged, as the ‘glass escalator’ for men and ‘glass ceiling’ for women examples illustrate poignantly below and in Figure 13. Men’s employment in the care sector The gendering of care work means that where men do participate in paid care work, they are more likely to do higher-order care; the work of ‘caring about’ and ‘taking care of’, as opposed to caregiving and care receiving (see Figure 1).[99] This more abstract talking about and planning for care is associated with men as a socially determined rather than biologically determined construction of masculinity that aligns to gendered notions of power, strength, and male breadwinning status.[100] Few men work in the care professions as nurses, counsellors and therapists, nannies, or social workers, where women are overrepresented (Figure 11). However, the international literature shows that in cases where they do, they earn more than women, and are often promoted at a faster pace and placed more frequently in senior and managerial roles - a phenomenon known as the ‘glass escalator’.[101] Figure 13 presents this phenomenon graphically showing the upward job mobility of men in industries and roles traditionally dominated by women. In theory, increasing the number of men in industries and professions traditionally dominated by women should be a tool to reduce inequality. However, when men enter these fields, they are often promoted significantly faster than women. Rather than reducing gender inequality, it increases it.[102] This is because the structural inequalities that favour men are merely reproduced and not transformed through men’s role in caring professions. Thus, while women are understood to reach a ‘glass ceiling’ that prevents their upward job mobility, where the opposite phenomenon is associated with men’s employment in fields traditionally dominated by women, it is the unequal basis of the gender order that promotes men at a faster rate than women. Masculine identities or the norms associated with what it means to be a man are at stake when men participate in feminised work, so despite their structural advantage, few men enter these professions.[103] Figure 13: Infographic of the ‘glass escalator’ in men’s occupation of female caring jobs Information Source: Hultin, Mia. “Some take the glass escalator, some hit the glass ceiling? Career consequences of occupational sex segregation.” Work and occupations 30.1 (2003): 30-61 Source: Own representation based on Hultin (2003) Loss of ‘breadwinner’ status Earlier, we described a new domestic terrain in South Africa: the role of adult men in domestic life has declined and marriage has rapidly disintegrated. Under apartheid migrant labour, absent men were still able to appropriate women-headed households under their name through the circulation of bride wealth.[104] The more recent decline of wage labour has meant that many men can no longer afford bride price, nor can they contribute wages to build the family homestead. As a result, many men no longer have access to the means they had historically, to be incorporated into such kinship arrangements. Figure 14: Unemployment rate by sex[105] Source: Statistics South Africa (2012) As shown in Figure 14, in the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2012, female unemployment rates were, on average, 24% higher than male unemployment rates. However, in the period starting 2017 Q1 and ending 2022 Q2, female unemployment rates were 13.5% higher than male on average (own analysis, based on StatsSA QLFS 2017 Q1-2022 Q2). Over the same comparison period, male unemployment rates increased from, on average, 22% to 28%. Overall, this means that the shape of unemployment has changed and the gender gap in unemployment is narrowing, with more men unemployed now than in the past. Where men’s contribution to care is through the provision of wage labour, then we can deduce a renegotiation of breadwinner status. The erosion of this status has important socio-economic and political consequences, and could potentially allow for renegotiation of male gender norms. Figure 15: SASOF 2021 survey participants’ perceptions of fatherhood and employment[106] Source: State of South African Fathers Report (2021: 113) Figure 15 shows ambivalence amongst the 1377 survey respondents regarding the idea that you need to be employed to be a good father. 55% neither agreed nor disagreed or somewhat agreed and somewhat disagreed, suggesting that gendered norms might be changing given the reality of low employment chances. Persistent and deepening unemployment since democracy, combined with an absence of social security for the jobless, has further eroded possibilities for the archetypal male breadwinner. While democracy has legally and politically incorporated Black South Africans into the economy, jobs have become scarcer. Plummeting employment opportunities, particularly in the industrial economy, have made it increasingly difficult for men to fulfil their gender-normative role of ‘breadwinner’, one such manifestation being the ability to pay lobola.[107] Male-headed households, social grants and extended family forms Constructions of masculinity mean that men are seldom associated with the hands-on caring work of caregivers, and because of the associations of powerlessness with care receivers, they are also seldom the receivers of care, either in the form of social grants or as healthcare recipients. [108] Male-headed households make up 54% of the total households as compared to 46% in WHH. If you control for income, using the proxy of whether someone in those households is receiving any kind of social grant from the Government, the picture shifts (Figure 16). Households where no social grants are received were predominantly MHH (74%), whereas 56% of the households where at least one social grant is received, are WHH.[109] Figure 16: Household heads by income proxy Source: Own analysis of StatsSA General Household Survey 2021 data The trend of women being primary recipients of social grants shifted during the Covid-19 pandemic. Income support in the form of both the Social Relief of Distress Grant (SRDG) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund - Temporary Employer/Employee Relief Scheme (UIF-TERS) went primarily to men.[110] The SRD Grant was implemented in response to the loss of jobs and income for millions of South Africans during lockdown. To be eligible, one needed to be unemployed and not in receipt of other social grants. This meant that women (who are the principal receivers of the child support grant (CSG) on behalf of their children) were denied this type of state support.[111] Entrenched gender norms further penalise women for their role in direct care through government provision of the CSG as a grant for children that is only meant to be administered by the grant recipient. Thus, it makes invisible caregivers’ needs, and the work it takes to do care for young children by making zero provisions for the caregiver themselves. Hence during Covid-19 women were triply denied available forms of support because women’s receipt of this grant on behalf of their children made them ineligible to receive the covid relief grants. On top of which, because women sustained the greatest job losses during covid, this unequal pattern reinforced the gender-differentiated effects of the pandemic and increased overall gender inequality in South Africa.[112] A rapid assessment of the Covid-19 SRD Grant found that almost all male survey respondents used the grant to purchase food, which was unsurprising given that many households ran out of food. 53% stated that whatever was bought went toward household consumption.[113] This alerts us to the fact that men can and do perform caregiving roles in households. However, given that 39% of men were not living with children during Covid-19, the potential reach of this grant was limited by men’s primary receipt of it.[114] Studies of caregiving and care receiving in the context of HIV/Aids in South Africa have critiqued the sexgender binary by foregrounding the “relationality of care and the inevitability and value of human interdependencies”.[115] These studies have shown that in the face of immense needs for care within communities, family boundaries and parenting practices were redrawn, as seen in the phenomenon of child-headed households, and grandmother-headed households.[116] Furthermore, studies found that voluntary caregiving was performed by men, who understood and explained their caregiving practices as mothering.[117] This idea was upheld by caregivers without biological ties to the care receivers.[118] This is significant given the importance of and reliance on informal means of community-based caregiving in meeting the caring burden generated by HIV/Aids.[119] Gender fluidity encourages the adoption of more permissible and flexible caring arrangements. Overall, complex arrangements of gender and care require that we pay careful attention to the gendered norms and behaviours that are determining who cares for whom, in what ways, and the resultant economies of care. As important are those social determinants of care, which challenge and destabilise gender associations, especially in the case of gender nonbinary, trans and queer folks. Additionally, as shown in the section above, healthcare crises may force a reappraising of gendered norms and caring roles, but whether long-term positive shifts in men’s relationships elevate the status of care, is yet to be shown. Perceptions of gender and gender-based violence Gender-based violence (GBV) is rooted in patriarchal power imbalances and carried out with the intention to humiliate and make a person or group of people feel inferior and/or subordinate because of their gender.[120] Normative role expectations associated with each gender, as well as the unequal power relationships between genders, mean that gender inequalities underlie GBV.[121] Also, because GBV intersects with norms governing sexuality, other marginalised populations such as sex workers, gender minorities and queer communities are also targets of GBV. “GBV cannot be attributed to a single factor, but an interplay of … gender inequalities between men and women, social constructions of hegemonic masculinities, social perceptions of what it means to be a man, normalisation of violence, and cultural practices”. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation CSVR (2016: 2) This type of violence, which is influenced by social structures, cultural practices and the norms and values that govern society, mean that local inflections of this global phenomena give rise to situated forms of GBV.[122] In South Africa, for example, ongoing legacies of racism, dispossession, and enduring structural and interpersonal violence, have resulted in rates of femicide (which is the intentional murder of women because they are women) being five times higher than the global average.[123] The various forms of GBV most often noted in South Africa include: femicide, domestic violence, sexual violence, physical violence, emotional violence, and economic violence.[124] Examples of this violence include human trafficking, mutilation, rape, forced or child marriages, and even accepted customary practices like the bride abduction practice of ukuthwala,[125] and medicalised forms of obstetric violence during labour and delivery.[126] Violence against women occurs in critical sexual and reproductive healthcare services, and includes psychological dimensions of violence, for example the threat of violence, reproductive coercion and the denial of freedom and autonomy.[127] This means that GBV is not only rooted in gender inequality, but is also a driver of gender inequality as it targets women (and minorities) because they are women (and minorities). Not only does GBV have negative health effects, but even the institutions women approach for sexual and reproductive healthcare are implicated in its continuation. More than a third of women and girls experience intimate-partner physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.[128] It is often in their homes, and within their families. This is in stark contrast to the situation for men, who in general, are more likely to be attacked by a stranger or acquaintance.[129] GBV poses an enormous obstacle to the eradication of all forms of discrimination against women and girls and gender non-conforming persons. GBV undermines the health, dignity, security, and wellbeing of its victims, and is perpetuated within a culture of silence and denial. Less than 10% of rape cases opened in South Africa land in a guilty verdict (Figure 14). This is not due to untruthful accusations, but rather as a result of the severely underperforming police sector and how gender norms imbued the policing sector.[130] Figure 17: Attrition of rape cases in South Africa[131] Source: RAPSSA study, National Strategic Plan on gender-based violence & femicide (2020) The road to a more gender-equal South Africa Families are recognised by human rights agencies and watchdogs as key partners in realising the sustainable development goals.[132] The family is the primary level of socialisation where children learn the norms and standards of society. As such they are key to ensuring and promoting human rights, equality and dignity. “… the stability and cohesiveness of communities and societies largely rest on the strength of the family … the very achievement of development goals depends on how well families are empowered to contribute to the achievement of those goals. Thus, policies focusing on improving the wellbeing of families are certain to benefit development.” Richardson (2018: 5) In a recent publication, Cecile Jackson (2014) explores the feminisation of kinship under modernity.[133] She emphasises that one should not assume that gender equality is a linear binary and that each move shifts a country or policy to either a more or less gender-equal pole. Instead, she implores people to understand that gender roles and norms are constantly reformed and reconfigured, over generations, and are influenced by who holds power in these generational moments.[134] So it is important to consider power in its societal and individual manifestation when reviewing progress towards gender equality. In Figure 18 below, we list some key pragmatic recommendations that the findings in this report support. Please note the following: Recommendations in red focus on the sections on men and women as caregivers and care receivers. Recommendations in dark red focus on the interrelatedness of care and gender where care is an axis of gender inequality. Recommendations in grey focus on government and community interventions to decrease gender inequality and violence against women and children. Recommendations in light grey focus on overarching, systemic approaches to dismantling gender inequality. There are many other recommendations cited in South Africa’s National Strategic Plan (NSP) on Gender-Based Violence & Femicide. Figure 18: Recommendations arising from this research report We recognise that recommendations are often insufficient unless they are paired with real-life examples of how to implement these on the ground. As such, we offer suggestions for how to fulfil these recommendations according to the colour coded key provided above. 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It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za