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The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Daryl Swanepoel, met with a delegation from the US State Department in Cape Town on Friday, 18 November 2022. The team visited South Africa in an effort to solidify and strengthen the Biden administration’s strategic outlook to help set a stronger foundation for the bilateral partnership between South Africa and the United States. The US team comprised the Principal Deputy Director of the Bureau of Strategic Planning, Matan Chorev, and the Senior Advisor for Africa, Cecily Brewer. The aim was help shape and sharpen the US’s approach to key broader multilateral foreign policy priorities. A wide range of issues were raised during the meeting, key amongst which included the role of multilateral fora and their role and operation in Africa. Swanepoel also raised the need for triangular engagement between Africa, the West and the East as they converge on the African continent. He also urged the US to continue to strengthen economic cooperation. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was a key instrument, which, he urged the US to, amidst rumors that is was to be renewed excluding South Africa, to renew with South Africa being retained as a beneficiary. Both sides agreed that the engagement was very useful, and that dialogue channels be maintained and expanded.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) presented its findings related to the Institute’s research on the feasibility of a Basic Income Grant (BIG)( to the Deputy Minister of Finance, on Wednesday, 17 November 2022. The presentation was made by Dr Roelof Botha, the Institute’s lead researcher on the project. The findings of the Institute confirm that the introduction of a targeted Basic Income Grant is indeed feasible and in fact, will marginally grow Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proposed grant will be made to all unemployed South African citizens. The research modelling includes both the BIG costing and the potential financing mechanism. The ISI will release its report in January 2023, whereafter it will embark on a promotion campaign aimed at securing the introduction of this overdue social intervention, which is aimed at securing a greater degree of social justice and cohesion.

A group of civil society organisations that are lobbying for electoral reform met the media on Wednesday, 9 November 2022, to voice their concerns with regard to the current parliamentary processes related to amending the Electoral Act. The Constitutional Court declared the existing act unconstitutional in that it did not provide for independent candidates to participate in national and provincial elections. Civil society is of the view that the amendment bill being processed by parliament is in itself unconstitutional, in that the constitutional principle of equality is not being adhered to. There are two separate sets of rules for independents and parties. The Inclusive Society Institute’s CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, spelt the Institute’s three main concerns out to the media: § Whilst political parties could aggregate their votes from across all nine provinces, independent candidates cannot; § Whilst political parties only require 1000 supporting signatures to gain access to the ballot, independents required 15,000 and more; and § Votes for parties and votes for independents do not carry equal weight.

Daryl Swanepoel, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), attended a reception hosted by the Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ms Tanja Werheit, in honour of a visiting delegation from the Bavarian State Parliament. The reception was held on the evening of 3 November 2022 at the official residence of the Consul General in Cape Town. The Bavarian delegation was led by the President of the Bavarian State Parliament, Hon. Ilse Aigner. The ISI has as one of its objectives the promotion and development of rules-based international cooperation. In this regard it is working with a number of institutions and academics in Germany to advance and strengthen the bi-lateral relationship between South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as to foster a better understanding between the two sides as to the need for reform of the global multilateral organisations.

Statistic South Africa hosted a stakeholder information sharing workshop on Monday, 31 October 2022, on the upcoming Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) 2022/23 which will be in the field from November 2022 to November 2023. The IES is a household-base sample survey that collects information on all acquisitions, consumption, spending, and income earned of households living in South Africa. The Inclusive Society Institute, who participated in the workshop, supports the survey, especially since the last such survey was conducted in 2015. The institute is of the opinion that it is long overdue in that the economic landscape has changed considerably since then and, given the constrained economic environment the country finds itself in, it is now urgent to get a more comprehensive view on issues such as inequality, levels of debt, growth potential, etcetera, all of which could be empirically examined through such updated information.

On 29 October 2022, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended a reception hosted by the Consul General of Türkiye, HE Mr Sĩnan Yeşĩldağ, which was held to commemorate the 99th foundation anniversary of the Republic of Türkiye. The reception was held at the residence of the Consul General in Constantia, Cape Town. The Inclusive Society Institute wishes the people of Türkiye all the best for a prosperous future. Türkiye has done well in its development trajectory and has a built a solid foundation on which to excel even further. South Africa enjoys a friendly and constructive relationship with Türkiye, with growing economic and people to people ties. The Institute is committed to further strengthening those ties, and to work together with its Turkish associates in strengthening global democracy, human rights and peace and security.

The Istanbul Security Forum (ISF) will be held for the first time in January 2023. It aims address the concept of “security” in regional, global and thematic context, by employing the combined wisdom of experts from Türkiye and across the globe. The Advisory Board of the ISF met on Monday, 24 October 2024, to help chart its path and to plan for the upcoming January 2023 event. The ISI was represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel.

On Tuesday 18 October, the Inclusive Society Institute continued to roll out its new civil education programme at Westerford High School in Newlands, Cape Town. The workshop, titled “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know your Rights and Responsibilities”, is aimed at young adults at the end of their schooling. It seeks to stimulate awareness of Constitutional principles and values. Beyond bringing awareness among the scholars of their rights, the workshop aims to evoke perception about where they can become involved in the civic and public affairs. How they can apply the Constitution in their day-to-day lives and why it is important that they take civic responsibility for their environment, community and the state at large. The session at Westerford High, which was also attended by partners from the OR Tambo School of Leadership, was very well received and plans are already in the pipeline for another session in the new year.

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in the UN Protection Working Group Meeting which was held on 20 October 2022. The meeting was called to discuss the outcomes on the PWG survey and proposals for reforming the PWG, as well as to determine the capacity needs of government, civil society and other stakeholders. The Protection Working Group (PWG) is a UNHCR platform aimed at forging partnerships with civil society organisations across the country and directly supports implementing partners (IPs) to conduct xenophobia related programmes and activities in many areas through a range of approaches. It is the primary platform for civil society engagement on matters related to refugees, an initiative that has engendered concrete partnerships and collaborations between UNHCR and other organisations. With the statistics on immigration grossly overstated in the public domain, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is concerned with the sporadic outbreaks of xenophobic attacks based on the emotional outburst premised on wrong statistical data. Whilst popular speak refers to some 13 million illegal immigrants in the country, recent data from Statistics South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council suggests only around 2 million illegal immigrants in South Africa. The ISI is working on programmes aimed at better controlling immigration in South Africa, but also to moderate the immigration environment based on South Africa’s obligations under international law and the constitutional embodiment of a culture for human rights.

Occasional Paper 8/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2022 by Prof William Gumede Associate Professor, and former Convener, Political Economy, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand; former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Introduction Russia’s war with Ukraine – and global responses to it – is not only remaking the post-Cold War world but has also shown that many global institutions established to keep the peace between countries have become redundant. In 1945, following the end of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was established by 51 countries to maintain international peace and security. However, the UN, together with Belarus, of Ukraine, has been spectacularly absent during the invasion by Russia. In fact, the UN has been strikingly uninvolved in most of the recent violent conflicts between countries. This underscores the fact that the global organisation established after the Second World War to prevent conflict between countries appears to have lost its credibility, relevance, and authority. It has been left to individual country leaders – the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), and the G20 – to desperately try to end the hostilities. The UN was also absent during Afghanistan’s descent into chaos last year, when the Taliban took over and the government and citizens fled the country en masse. In addition, the UN has been largely silent in the face of the ongoing dispute between China and Taiwan, which the Chinese dragon views as part of it (which authority Taiwan rejects) and not a sovereign country. Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. The decline of the UN has raised the spectre of more copy-cat incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable ones, making the world even more unstable, violent, and chaotic. Without a credible UN, the world will increasingly be divided between countries that have nuclear military power versus those who do not. Many countries, having seen how Russia used its military power to dominate the US, EU, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), will desperately try to acquire or shore up nuclear military abilities. Clearly, the UN in its current form is not fit for purpose to address current and future global challenges. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Mehta, 2020). Even France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), has conceded that the UNSC has reached its sell-by date. French President Emmanuel Macron said recently that the UN Security Council “no longer produces useful solutions today” (French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2021). The UN’s, and other global institutions’, laws and rules will have to be collectively democratised or abolished and new more relevant, consensual ones created, or the world will plunge into more Russia–Ukraine-like conflicts and eventually a global nuclear Third World War. New multipolar world Many of the global multilateral organisations that anchored the post-Cold War consensus – the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and World Trade Organization (WTO) – have lost their credibility. The post-Cold War Western-led global order is facing a profound reputation crisis. The US-led global hegemony wilted in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis; unilateral military interventions in developing countries, without seeking global consensus; and the often manipulation of multilateral organisations for self-interest, rather than for the greater good of the world. Furthermore, during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis some of the neoliberal economic thinking that underpinned the US post-Cold War ideology hegemony lost its lustre when, in order to save economies, companies and livelihoods, Western countries used decidedly un-neoliberal tools, such as state investment in private businesses. Since the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the communist alliance led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), the US–European Union-led Western alliance has dominated global political, economic power, institutions, and ideology. This has now come to an end. The world has now changed into a multipolar one – moving away from the domination of the US-led global order, which has held sway in the post-Cold War era, and towards an order where power will become more evenly spread across regions and countries across the globe. The world has seen the economic, political, and ideas rise of emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey, amongst others, resulting in a multipolar global order that has challenged the US–EU-led Western-dominated global order. It is very likely that instead of one or two powers dominating the world – as was the case with the US in the post-Cold War period and the competition between the US and USSR during the Cold War – we will see multiple power poles emerging. The US’ shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, when the Taliban took over and the government and citizens fled the country, most probably symbolised the loss of its global hegemony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during the decline of the US–EU post-Cold War hegemony and prior to the launch of his invasion of Ukraine, tried to refashion the old USSR alliance against the US–European-dominated world, but this time between Russia, old allies of the USSR, and new emerging powers. In 2015, as part of his strategy, Putin reintegrated some of the former economies of the Soviet Union into a regional trade bloc between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, called the Eurasian Economic Union. Developing countries are increasingly clubbing together in international fora. African countries are collaborating with each other or with others as a group more. Africa now accounts for more than a quarter of the total membership of the UN. There have been several initiatives by developing countries to build alternative global institutions. In 2003, India, Brazil and South Africa established an alliance, IBSA, which promised to align the globe’s largest developing country democracies across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas, and institutions, and share development experiences. IBSA was established after India, Brazil, and South Africa had been invited, at the time as observers, to the 2003 G8 summit of industrial countries in France. They left feeling that their own fates, and those of the developing world, were being decided by a small group of unrepresentative developed countries. Following the 2003 G8 summit, India, Brazil, and South Africa felt strongly about formally clubbing together to push for a bigger say in global governance for developing countries, to diversify their trade away from industrial countries, and to share their unique lessons of the twin pursuit of development and democracy amidst multicultural societies with extreme poverty and inequalities. BRICS was established in 2009 by China, Russia, India and Brazil, with South Africa joining in 2010. For its members, the BRICS partnership offers geopolitical allies for these countries to press for the restructuring of the global trade, economic, and political architecture, to give Africa and developing countries a fairer say – and therefore a better chance to compete – in relation to their Western counterparts. The potential protective barrier of BRICS membership may provide individual members the policy space to make independent development, trade, and political policy decisions – which may not otherwise be the case, yet is so crucial for the sustainable economic development of individual countries. The BRICS partnership also offers participating countries the space to resolve disputes, whether trade, political, or diplomatic, constructively. The new multipolar world demands a new kind of UN, or a different organisation entirely. Post-Cold War multilateral global institutions seen as marginalising developing countries The post-Cold War multilateral global institutions have in the past been dominated by the US–EU, often for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good – which has undermined their authority, effectiveness, and credibility amongst the majority of countries around the world. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, market, and trade rules for self-interest – while developing countries cannot. Developing countries have less say within global institutions that set the rules of the global market, whether that is the UN, World Bank, IMF, IFC, or the WTO. Some scholars have referred to the phenomenon as global apartheid: industrial powers have more power than developing countries, particularly African countries (Bond, 2004). For example, since the Second World War, the US has always chosen the president of the World Bank, “using the appointment as a vehicle to advance American economic interests, power, and development priorities around the globe” (Zumbrun, 2019). Similarly, Europeans have traditionally selected the head of the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank is owned by 189 member countries. The members elect a board of executive directors. However, industrial countries have in the main larger voting shares than developing countries and have more power in decision-making. The US has the largest voting share, at around 16%. This is above the 15% share threshold that gives a country veto power on key decisions – the US is the only country with veto power at the World Bank. Many developing countries were critical of the US favourite, Jim Yong Kim, for World Bank president in 2012 (Zumbrun, 2019). Following Kim’s early retirement in 2019, three years before his term ended, divisions sharpened between industrial and developing countries over who should replace him. Industrial countries often punish other countries or multilateral organisations if these adopt policies that go against the domestic policies of industrial countries. Developing countries do not have the global power to react similarly. In 2017, the administration of then US President Donald Trump withdrew the US membership of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Beauchamp, 2017; John, 2017). UNESCO, in 2011, had admitted the Palestinian territories to the organisation as an independent member state called Palestine. In the UNESCO decision to admit Palestine, 104 countries voted in favour of allowing Palestine, while 14 opposed it, with 52 states abstaining. A US law stipulated that US funding will be cut from an organisation recognising an independent Palestine. Global development institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies, and ideas of these institutions. In the current global economic system, developing economies do not have the policy independence to use monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate their own economies – lest they face a market, investor, and Western media backlash. Many unilateral monetary policies adopted by industrial countries to deal with their domestic crises often destabilise African and developing countries. Global capital markets are also against many African and developing countries. So unfavourable is the current global political, financial architecture and cultural systems, that policies, decisions and events which are triggered in industrial countries, over which developing countries have little say, often undermine well-being of developing countries. When in financial crisis, Western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies that are destabilising for African and developing countries. For example, these governments often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness. Again, African and developing countries do not have the same power to come up with unilateral monetary policies to protect their economies, strengthen their currencies, and boost employment, so they will face backlash from Western governments, global financial institutions, and markets (Panitchpakdi, 2011). In fact, when in financial crisis, African and developing countries are often force-fed economic, political, and trade policies – from global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank – that are often astonishingly inappropriate, in return for funding by these multilateral organisations. If African and developing countries do not follow the prescripts, they are often punished by the markets, withdrawal of investment by the private sector, diplomatic isolation, and negative global media reporting. Following the past global financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Japanese Central Bank introduced quantitative easing in 2015. However, these quantitative easing policies eroded the competitiveness of emerging market economies (Rajan, 2014; Sablik, 2019; Powell, 2018). The former Reserve Bank of India, Governor Raghuram Rajan (2014) has rightly warned that the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was causing spillovers in emerging markets, with seesawing capital flows, volatility, and the destabilising of financial markets. Global trade rules and laws are stacked against African and developing countries. High tariff and non-tariff barriers in industrial countries block African countries from exporting value-added products, which create more jobs and more wealth to more people, to industrial countries (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). African free trade agreements with Western countries, such as the Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act with the US, are mostly disadvantaging African and developing countries. If African and developing countries object to global rules stacked against them, they are often threatened with retaliation, from blocking their products, withdrawal of trade, and development aid sanctions, to the political isolation of specific countries (Gumede, 2012). African and developing countries have few recourses for trade, economic, and political disputes with developed countries – they are marginalised in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). How the world should respond to global crises, reform of international organisations, laws and rules, and appointments of heads of UN agencies and multilateral institutions now increasingly divides the world into Western countries versus developing countries. Increasingly, developing countries have tried to circumvent global multilateral organisations or establish alternative global institutions to the existing ones, where they can. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping have established a series of alternative global institutions, such as the BRICS Development Bank, rivalling existing ones (Gumede, 2012). Appointments of UN general secretaries and heads of agencies The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries increasingly are often not getting wider legitimacy amongst countries. The five permanent members (P5) have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries. As the world gets more uncertain, dangerous, and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s P5, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible, who lack global country support. In the past, UN general secretaries were larger-than-life figures – with global personal or country authority, credibility, and reputations – many of whom could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders. The P5 also dominate the appointments of heads of UN agencies, such as UNESCO, UNDP, and the World Health Organisation. And at times when non-permanent members prevail in the appointments of heads of UN agencies, these appointees are often undermined by permanent members. A case in point was the appointment of the head of the World Health Organisation, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, in 2017, and his reappointment in 2022 (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). Developing countries successfully pushed for the appointment of Tedros, who was endorsed by the African Union, as the World Health Organisation Director General, in 2017. His criticisms of Western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic caused outrage amongst these countries. Tedros waged a fierce campaign to get poorer countries a fair share of Covid-19 vaccines. Support for or against Tedros became a proxy battle between Western and developing countries. Developing countries came to his support and he was re-elected unopposed in 2022. At his re-election as head of the WHO in August 2022, Tedros (2022) said: “The global community cannot properly address the mountain of health emergencies and challenges we face, including the Covid-19 crisis and emerging pandemic threats, ‘in a divided world’”. Inequality between countries in global affairs and law Developing countries are also unequal in international law. For instance, the US, China, and key industrial countries have not signed up to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and their leaders and citizens are not subject to its jurisdictions. Industrial countries’ security, intelligence, and police forces often operate across the borders in African and developing countries, something which developing and African countries cannot do. US-led coalitions, for example, have frequently used their power in the UN to push through invasions in developing countries’ regimes perceived to be anti-Western – in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere – under the guise of defending human rights. Ironically, these countries support equally evil regimes in other developing countries as long as they are pro-Western. Such decisions, many developing countries say, are often based purely on protecting industrial countries’ commercial interests. Developed countries have increasingly manipulated global political, economic institutions and laws for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant developed countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, and trade rules for self-interest, at the expense of developing countries. Developing countries appear to have less power in global relations than industrial countries, especially former colonial powers. The voices of developing countries often appear to have less weight than those of industrial countries, although new emerging powers – such as China, India, and Brazil – with large economies are increasingly pushing back. Former South African President Nelson Mandela was also critical of Western nations abusing their domination of global and multilateral organisations for their own selfish ends, rather than for the global good. In his farewell speech to South Africa’s parliament, Mandela said: “We see how the powerful countries, all of them so-called democracies, manipulate multilateral bodies to the great disadvantage and suffering of the poorer developing nations.” The French economist Jean Dresch in 1948 described the economic, political and trade relations between African colonies and colonial powers at independence as: “In essence, it consists of taking money out of a country its export products and selling imported products to the native population which has received money for the exports. It is a very elementary circle in which the market, in so far as is possible, is in the hands of the mother country, and the colony is condemned to produce only raw goods without manufacturing them at home” (Dresch, 1948). Very little appears to have changed, since Dresch’s description of the power relations between former colonies – whether in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, and former colonial powers, the industrial countries. Global racism Racism against black or darker-skinned people in industrial countries, global multilateral institutions, and multinational companies is systemic. It undermines the much-vaunted idea of globalisation; the tighter integration of countries, resulting from increased global financial, trade, and services flows; widespread penetration of new technologies; and advances in transport. Global racism against black and darker-skinned people prevents them from freedom of movement across borders, specially from African and developing countries to industrial countries, whether for work, trade or living. They are more likely to be stopped at customs entry to industrial countries. The Council of Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, in its 2022 annual report, said: “Racism in policing (in the European Union countries) continued to be an issue in a number of countries, including in the context of enforcing pandemic-related restrictions. The ECRI report refers in particular to racial profiling in stop-and-search activities, the use of racist language and excessive use of force against individuals, which not only targeted individual victims, but stigmatised communities as a whole. Victims of such practices have often felt insufficiently supported by the authorities”. The idea of globalisation makes no sense when dark-skinned people cannot move freely from developing to industrial countries; and products, especially value-added ones that foster wealth, jobs and economic growth, from predominantly dark-skinned developing countries, face higher tariff barriers in industrial countries. “Critics of the way globalisation is organised refer to people as the ignored side of globalisation … (T)he freedom of movement of people has not enjoyed any easing of conditions” (COE, 2012: 18). During the Covid-19 pandemic, many industrial countries were accused of placing stricter entry conditions on citizens from black and darker-skinned countries. During the Covid-19 Omicron variant restrictions in late 2021, the Canadian government was accused of racism after only restricting entry from African countries, while many European countries had higher Omicron loads, but their citizens did not face the same travel restrictions into Canada. The UN, World Bank, IMF, IFC, and WTO set the rules for the global politics, economy, and trade. All of these global institutions are dominated by Western countries and have been criticised for being biased against African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies, and ideas of these institutions. Western countries and global agencies often appear to act with more urgency in disasters, human rights violations, and environmental neglect when the victims are white. Global interventions often appear to take place only when Western business interests and citizens’ lives are threatened in African and developing countries. The organisational cultures of multilateral organisations, such as the Western-dominated IMF, World Bank, IFC, WTO, and the UN, have often also exhibited unconscious bias towards developing countries in their decision-making, lending practices, and appointments. The World Bank’s shareholding is dominated by the US (23.66%), Japan (5.87%), Germany (5.36%), France (5.04%), and the United Kingdom (5.04%). A 2009 report by the US Government Accountability Project (GAP) reported that “only four black Americans held professional positions out of more than 1,000 US nationals. This figure represents a significant proportional decline even from the abysmal levels reported thirty years ago” (GAP, 2009; Chiles, 2012). The World Bank’s own internal survey during that time showed that Sub-Saharan African, Caribbean, and black American staff do not appear to have the same opportunities to advance as others (GAP, 2009; Chiles, 2012). Africa accounted for over 50% of the World Bank’s development assistance, but only 2.5% of the professional staff in the development economics section responsible for ideas on poverty alleviation were African (Chiles 2012). The decline of the UN The UN in its current form has lost its credibility, relevance, and authority. The UN has in many cases failed to maintain global peace, security, and intervene timeously in humanitarian crises. In more recent times it “failed to effectively respond to international crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, the second Iraq War, the Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and mass atrocities in the Sudanese region of Darfur and Myanmar’s Rakhine State” (Friedman, 2022). In 2020, the then President of the UN General Assembly, Volkan Bozkir, said “competing interests among its members and frequent use of the veto have limited the Council’s effectiveness”, and that even in the most urgent humanitarian crises, the organisation has “failed to provide a timely and adequate response” (UN, 2020). The mistrust in the UN has caused many countries not to cooperate with UN-led attempts to mobilise international cooperation in global crises, such as wars, the health pandemics, and disasters. During the Covid-19 pandemic the UN Security Council was spectacularly absent in providing leadership. The Covid-19 pandemic has “laid bare the United Nations Security Council’s incapability to produce quick solutions to contain the spread of the virus. The UNSC held very few meetings even as the pandemic was spreading death and destruction” (Mehta, 2020). A dispute between the US and China that lasted for three months after the global outbreak of Covid-19, delayed a resolution proposed by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres calling for greater international collaboration to combat the disease, support for poorer countries, and requesting countries in wars to call ceasefires to prioritise combating the disease (Mehta, 2020). The UN released a report in September 2021, “Our Common Agenda”, on the future of multilateralism. The report highlighted the failure of countries to cooperate under the UN banner to tackle global crises and to coordinate efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. Following the UN “Our Common Agenda” report, the UN Secretariat was tasked with developing policy responses to these criticisms of the organisation’s failures. A global gathering, called a Summit for the Future, is planned for September 2023, when the recommendations from the UN report will be discussed and a “New Agenda for Peace” for global peace and security agreed upon (Gowan, 2022). Alongside the planned Summit for the Future, the UN has also appointed a “High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism” convened by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, the former Liberian President, and Stefan Löfven, the former Swedish Prime Minister, to come up with proposals for a change in global governance structures (Gowan, 2022). The perception that the UN is biased against developing countries has led many developing countries to unite behind calls to reform the organisation. For another, many developing countries, on principle, vote against or abstain on issues in the UN pushed by industrial countries. In the last couple of years, developing countries have increasingly formed blocs opposing industrial countries – turning the UN into an “us (developing countries) versus them (industrial countries)”. This has further undermined the authority, focus, and workings of the UN. Nevertheless, the rising calls from developing countries for reform of the UN has up to now been ignored by industrial countries. For another, the collapse in credibility of the UN has given countries such as Russia and China the opportunity to act unilaterally. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat Russian-like incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable ones, making the world even more unstable. Unless something is done about reforming the UN, the rule of law at global level will collapse. Furthermore, unless the UN and other multilateral organisations are made more representative, inclusive, and equal, countries who feel excluded may form alternative global organisations. Many developing countries are increasingly turning their back on the UN – because they have no voice. During the first few weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia as a permanent member of the Council blocked UN action, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2022) called for new, more democratic global institutions. Zelensky proposed a new “union of responsible countries” to replace the UN. Zelensky explained that such a new UN would intervene within twenty-four hours of a country experiencing an attack by another country, a natural disaster, or a health crisis, saying that it would be “a union of responsible countries that have the strength and consciousness to stop conflicts immediately”. And many other countries are reluctant to contribute to UN activities, such as peacekeeping. On the ground, because of the perceived bias of the UN, many UN peacekeeping forces have often been wrongly attacked in Africa by locals. UN Security Council – central shortcomings The central weakness of the UN is the Security Council, which is limited to five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – with outsized powers. The five have veto power on key UN decisions. The UN Security Council as it is, is simply not relevant to the changing world anymore. The only substantial reform of the UN Security Council introduced since the establishment of the UN in 1945 was in 1965, when the number of elected, non-permanent seats, but without the veto, was increased from six to ten. The UN Charter was amended to make this possible. There have been two broad reform focuses, one to expand the UN Security Council beyond the P5 and the other to reform the Council’s processes, meeting procedures, and administration – the working methods (Kugel, 2009; Swart, 2013; Lehman, 2013). In 1992, an Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council was established to spearhead reforms. The group’s workings were on the basis of consensus. However, the reform group collapsed because of disagreements (Lehman, 2013; Swart, 2013). By 2005, a number of different developing country groups had emerged split along the lines of the type of reforms they wanted. The Africa Group and the Group of Four (G4), consisting of Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India, called for the expansion of permanent seats. Another country grouping, the Uniting for Consensus group, formed by countries including Italy, South Korea, and Argentina, limited their proposals to only an extension of non-permanent seats. Because of the impasse, the UN members in 2008 proposed to conduct what is called intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly of the UN. In such negotiations decisions can be resolved by a two-third majority of the General Assembly. However, by 2013, after eight rounds of negotiations, the process collapsed. It has not moved since. Jerry Matjila (2020), South Africa’s UN representative, blamed the UN’s failure to maintain global peace and security as “largely due to its current outdated configuration”, which makes it impossible for the organisation to make decisions. Instead, decisions are made on the self-interests of permanent members and lead to non-permanent members rejecting what appear to be biased decisions by the P5. These members have often abused their power for their own national interests, rather than in the common interests of humankind. This has destroyed the UN’s credibility, forcing other countries to turn their back on the organisation as a place where they have a voice. These abuses, including the invasion of Iraq, for questionable reasons, with many countries outside the P5 opposing it, and the invasion of Libya, which was also opposed by many countries, have undermined the UN. The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries often do not get wider legitimacy amongst countries. Appointments of heads of UN organisations such as UNESCO, UNDP, and UNCTAD are often also heavily influenced by the P5. The veto power of the five permanent members is particularly anachronistic. The legitimacy of five countries having a veto over decisions at the UN Security Council has been bitterly questioned (UN, 2020). Critics of the veto have rightly said that it has often been arbitrarily used, or used to protect the five countries’ self-interests, rather than the interests of humankind broadly, and that it has undermined the functioning, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the UN. Challenges of reforming the UN administration Some countries have also rightly called for an overhaul in the way that the UN conducts its business, its processes, and meeting formats, called its working methods (Nadin, 2014). Article 30 of the UN Charter (1945) says that the Security Council must adopt rules of procedure, or operating procedures, for its administration. The Security Council adopted its Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96) in 1946, which have remained provisional ever since. Security Council permanent members have been unenthusiastic about making the changes, beyond the most superficial. The rules of procedure remain untransparent, and lacking in participation and accountability. How decisions on sanctions are made, where peacekeeping forces should be deployed, and how to hold decision-makers accountable are veiled in secrecy. In 2005, the UN World Summit Outcome document proposed that the Council’s way of operating should become more accountable. It recommended the Council improve its working methods, by becoming more transparent and inclusive in its decision-making processes. However, the permanent five members of the Security Council have consistently blocked proposals to make the working methods, procedures, and decisions of the Council accountable. Some non-permanent members have been wanting reform of the Council to simultaneously address the composition of the Council and the working methods of the organ. Others have tried to separate the working methods reforms from those of calls to change the composition of the Council. In 2005, five countries – Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland – formed a group, the S-5, to mobilise for reform of the working methods of the Council. The S-5 group stayed clear of proposing Council composition reforms, and instead, remained within the confines of proposing reforms that will be passed by a simple majority in the UN General Assembly (Lehmann, 2013). In 2012, the S-5 proposed a draft resolution (A/66/L.42/Rev.2) calling for administrative transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability in the workings of the Security Council. It called for greater inclusion of non-permanent members in decision-making on peace-building initiatives, in preparing, monitoring, and ending mission mandates. The S-5 group called for the Security Council to provide information about its activities, decisions, and planned actions, including holding monthly briefings to UN members about these. The S-5 resolution called for the permanent members not only to be transparent in the use of the veto, but to limit the use of the veto. They proposed the permanent members must explain why a veto is used. The group suggested the veto not be used to block UN action against mass atrocities. The S-5 proposals also called for greater participation, inclusion, and transparency in the appointment of the General Secretary of the UN. The appointment of the UN General Secretary has been dominated by the P5. In addition, the S-5 group called for greater participation in the workings on and for the end of domination by permanent members of subsidiary bodies of the UN. The S-5 group proposed a change in the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, away from the current one, where the permanent members can override General Assembly resolutions or ignore them. They argued for greater accountability of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The permanent members rejected the reform proposals from the S-5 group, insisting only they, the P5, can decide on the appropriate reforms of the working methods of the Council. The permanent members put sufficient pressure on the UN administration to make it obligatory for the S-5 group proposals to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly – something not easy to achieve. The P5, despite their political differences, were united in their opposition to the proposed transparency, accountability, and inclusivity reforms. At the time, Russia and China were pitted against the US, France, and the UK over the Security Council’s handling of the Syrian civil war. The opposition by the five permanent members was particularly riling for many non-permanent members, as they put pressure, inducements, and even coerced poor developing countries to support them (Lehmann, 2013). China was accused of pressuring African countries in which it had large investments, loans, and projects, to not support the reforms of the working methods of the Council proposed by the S-5 group (Lehmann, 2013). Furthermore, the Uniting for Consensus group, after initially supporting the S-5 proposals, withdrew their support at the last minute before the vote was to take place. This lobby – the Uniting for Consensus group, nicknamed the “Coffee Club” – which was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt, and Pakistan in 1995, has since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain, and Canada. They did so because the G4 group of countries – Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India – which compete over UN reform direction with the Uniting for Consensus group, had supported the S-5 proposals. Following the opposition by the five permanent members and the Uniting for Consensus group, the S-5 withdrew their UN working methods reform resolution. They also withdrew it for tactical reasons, to prevent a precedent being set that at the insistence of the permanent members, critical reforms, such as the working methods reform, would need a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly (Lehmann, 2013). By 2012 the S-5 group’s attempts to reform the working methods of the UN had collapsed. “The failure of the S-5 was first and foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 determined to maintain their control over the representation of member states’ interests and the reform agenda at the UN” (Lehmann, 2013: 3). In 2013, following the failure of the S-5 reform proposals, 27 small and mid-sized members of the UN launched a fresh effort to reform the UN Security Council’s internal workings and its relationship with the broader UN membership, calling themselves Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT). The group included Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland, and Chile. The ACT group stated their objectives as: “[T]he UN Security Council (UNSC), in its present composition, shall work in a more transparent, efficient, inclusive, coherent, legitimate and accountable way, both within its own structure, but also in relationship with the wider membership” (FDFA, 2014). It argued that a Security Council that is accountable was “more legitimate, coherent and efficient” (FDFA, 2014). The ACT group stayed clear of proposing reforms on democratising the Security Council. The group included some of the reform proposals of the S-5 group – four of the S-5 members were ACT members. The ACT group repeated the S-5 group proposal that the Security Council should not use their veto when a decision involves mass human rights abuses. In 2015, the ACT group proposed a Code of Conduct to guide Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, “which calls upon all members of the Council (permanent and elected) to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities” (FDFA, 2014). The group asked for more due process when the Council decides on sanctions against errant countries. The group called for fairer allocation of penholdership – the role of initiating and negotiating Council draft resolutions, which has in the past been heavily skewed towards allies of the permanent members. Furthermore, it called for more inclusive and transparent processes for the distribution of the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. They also want troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations to participate in Council decisions on when and where to send peacekeepers. The ACT group also wants more transparency in the relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ACT group proposed more open meetings of the Council, regular briefings, and wider consultation before resolutions are prepared by the Council to the Assembly. The ACT group wants more meetings between the UN Security Council and civil society organisations. The UN reform debate so far In 2009, the UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) framework to look at Security Council reforms. The discussions within the forum are considered “informal”, and therefore the UN General Assembly rules of procedure do not apply. Many countries have called for the “urgent need for transparency and application of General Assembly’s rules of procedure to the intergovernmental negotiations” (Naidu, 2020). Some countries have accused the permanent members of deliberately stalling, turning the consolidated text of the “informal” Intergovernmental Negotiations framework into formal negotiations, which will apply the General Assembly’s rules of procedure (Naidu, 2020). At a UN Assembly debate in 2020 on Security Council reforms, Assembly President Volkan Bozkir, from Turkey, said reform is “an unavoidable imperative, both challenging and essential” (UN, 2020). Bozkir warned: “This process can and should be an opportunity to correct the problems of structure and functioning of the Council. It should not create new privileges” (UN, 2020). UN Security Council reform to bring into it more equitable representation, has been on the UN General Assembly programme since 1979, with very little progress. Ronaldo Costa Filho, Brazil’s representative at the UN Assembly, said inclusive representation at the Council is a precondition for restoring the legitimacy of the organisation (UN, 2020). Recent reform proposals argue for the expansion of the 15-member Council beyond the five permanent seats held by the US, UK, Russia, China, and France and the remaining non-permanent membership. The proposals all push for greater regional representation and greater participation in the Council’s affairs, to increase its legitimacy. Changing the Council’s composition and substantial decisions need a two-thirds majority of member states in the UN’s General Assembly. Most of the UN reform debate has focused on reforming the Security Council, specifically to reduce the dominance of the five permanent members. There are essentially three broad overarching reform proposals or lobbies. Some countries, such as Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India – the G4 – have proposed enlarging the Council (Nadin, 2014) by adding at least six new permanent members, which would include Brazil, Japan, Germany, India, two African countries, and introducing an additional three elected seats on the Council. Another proposal is to create “new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which member states should sit in those seats, and for how long” (Nadin, 2014). This lobby, the Uniting for Consensus group, proposed a 26-member Council, with nine permanent seats amongst regions, and the remainder of the seats would be held for two-year terms, with the option to get re-elected for another term (UN, 2020). The Uniting for Consensus group rejects an increase in the number of permanent seats in the UN Security Council but argue for the increase in non-permanent seats. They believe that increasing permanent seats will increase the power inequality, whereas increasing non-permanent seats would mean more countries will have access to Council power. The group’s membership now includes 50 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. African countries as a group, have proposed two permanent seats and two additional elected seats for Africa on the Council (Nadin, 2014; UN, 2020). All the different proposals for reform include Africa in one form or the other on a transformed Council. African countries cobbled together their common position under the ambit of the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. At the 2020 UN Assembly debate, the Chinese representative said: “Reform must focus on equality between big and small States, strong and weak, rich and poor” (UN, 2020). South Africa has advocated for a 26-seat Council with an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats and for giving representation to all five regions of Africa in some form on the Council (Matjila, 2020). The US supports “modest” expansion of the Council “as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power” (UN, 2020). There have been compromise reform proposals suggested by individuals outside the formal UN reform negotiations process. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022), the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Jordan Ambassador to the UN, has proposed that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should override any veto of a permanent member. Such a super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eighths of the membership vote. Former Colombian Finance Minister, José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister, Kemal Derviş have similarly proposed a majority veto be introduced. They called it a “large double majority – representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population – to override a veto”. Clearly, given that permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquishing their veto, such majority vote proposals to override the veto of permanent members should be considered. UN reform opposition, and lack of consensus Currently, any change to the UN Charter – which involves reform of the composition of the UN Security Council – needs a two-thirds majority and must be supported by all permanent members of the UN Security Council. A veto from any of the five permanent members of the Council stops any decision to be taken by the Council. In the past, China has used its veto power to stop efforts to discuss criticisms of its role in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Mehta, 2020). For example, China used its veto power to block sanctions against Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed Masood Azhar, which has been accused of terrorism for over a decade, until it budged in 2019 (Mehta 2020). Some developing country analysts have accused China of “using a variety of excuses to delay the intergovernmental negotiations process, which has been going on for over 10 years” (Mehta, 2020). The intergovernmental negotiations process refers to country discussions at the UN on reforming the Security Council. India has accused China of dragging its feet on reform, because it did not want India to become a permanent member of the Council (Mehta, 2020; Gupta, 2020). China “supports reasonable and necessary reform” of the Council. The Chinese dragon does not want to abolish the Council or the idea of permanent membership, neither the veto. However, China wants to increase the representation of developing countries on the Security Council (CGTN, 2022). “At present, the makeup of the Security Council is out of balance between the North and the South, and reform should correct the over-representation of developed countries, earnestly improve the representation of developing countries, correct the historical injustice suffered by Africa, and give more opportunities to small and medium-sized countries that come from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Arab countries and small island countries to serve in the Council and play their important role” (Zhang, 2021). Russia has also used its veto power to block UN action against it (UN, 2022). In February 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have demanded the country stop its invasion of Ukraine and withdraw its troops (UN, 2022). Some countries, such as Pakistan and Colombia, oppose Security Council expansion. In the UN Assembly 2020 debate, the Pakistan representative said since the five current permanent members cannot agree on policies, adding additional ones will increase decision paralysis. Columbia’s representative said that expanding the Council will not automatically increase transparency of the structure. There have been a number of proposals not to eliminate, but to limit the veto. Mexico, for example, has argued for limiting, rather than eliminating the veto that permanent members have (UN, 2020). Mexico and France have proposed to retain, but to restrict the instances in which the veto could be used. They propose that the veto be restricted in cases where the UN must urgently intervene when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent paralysing inaction. The UK does not support the elimination of the veto but advocates its responsible use. UK representatives emphasise that the “UK has not used its veto since 1989 and will never use it on any credible draft resolution to prevent or end a mass atrocity” (Allen, 2020). The US and the UK are not enthusiastic about large-scale reforms of the UN Security Council. The UK supports “modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories”, which includes the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, to bring “the Security Council’s total membership to somewhere in the mid-twenties” (Roscoe, 2021). The US is “open to a modest expansion of the Council in permanent and non-permanent categories as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power”. The US is opposed to taking away the veto power of permanent members. The US insists that any alteration in the Council structure must be “made by consensus” (UN, 2020). Historic feuds between individual countries are often also played out in the debate over UN Security Council reform and undermines building developing country consensus on reforms. China got Taiwan expelled from the UN and Security Council membership in 1971. China then took Taiwan’s place on the Security Council, after it became vacant (UN, 1971). South Korea, for example, opposes Japan securing a permanent Security Council seat because of Japan’s former colonisation of South Korea. China has consistently opposed Japan’s admission to the UN Security Council (AFP, 2005). China has insisted that Japan should not be granted permanent status on the Security Council until it atones for its wartime history (AFP, 2005). In 2009, Japan’s public bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat unleashed two days of violent protests in China (Fincher, 2009). Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at the time said: “I think the core issue in the China-Japan relationship is that Japan needs to face up squarely to history” before China will support its Security Council seat bid (Fincher, 2009). India claims China is blocking its ambition to secure a permanent Council seat because of frosty relations between the two countries (Mehta, 2020). In 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed China has stood in India’s way to becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and into associated UN international fora such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Modi claimed China deliberately tagged India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group to Pakistan’s acceptance, although India, according to Modi, had an “impeccable non-proliferation record”, which he said was not the case with Pakistan (Gupta, 2020). Conclusion: A new UN democratisation agenda New global institutions are needed, or current ones need to be remade to be more relevant to the new, more complex, uncertain, and unpredictable post-Cold War world, where the ideologies of the past, old institutions, and old ways of looking at the world are increasingly becoming largely irrelevant. If the UN is to be retained, it must not only be reformed, but it must also be democratised to ensure equitable representation, participation, and decision-making to ensure the credibility, legitimacy, and embrace of the organisation. The UN’s administration must be democratised to “increase transparency and enable greater engagement of the Council members, especially with small and medium-sized countries in the Council’s work” (PRC, 2022). In fact, the working methods of the UN must be democratised in such a way to allow all members to have equal participation. The idea of a UN Security Council with permanent members is clearly outdated. Yet, permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto. So far, proposals for reform have been mostly about increasing the number of countries on the UN Security Council. Proposals that call for majority votes in the General Assembly – if permanent members refuse to let go of their veto power – to override the veto of permanent members, should be considered. Ultimately, the idea of a limited number of countries having veto power should also be abolished entirely. The veto is not only unfair, makes countries unequal, and is open to abuse, but it has also paralysed the function of the Council. The UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocs – do not dominate the organisation’s decision-making or are not enabled to manipulate or block action. Importantly, democratisation of UN decision-making must be based on every country having equal power. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-pered-kong-73609 [accessed: 14 October 2022]. Zumbrun, J. 2019. The U.S. Has Always Chosen World Bank Presidents—Will It This Time? [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-has-always-chosen-world-bank-presidentswill-it-this-time-11546989351 [accessed: 14 October 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the workshop on reframing migration narratives through hope and value-based narratives in the context of migration. The workshop was conducted, in the context the OHCHR’s broader work on social cohesion in South Africa through the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund Joint Programme on Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders’ Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities and Countering Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa. The programme is being implemented in collaboration with the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and UN Women. The workshop took place at the Cape Town Lodge Hotel on Friday, 14 October 2022.

Occasional Paper 7/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2022 by Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPA Hons, ND: Co. Admin Abstract It is universally recognised that reform is necessary and urgent for the United Nations (UN) to reclaim its initial lustre, and that this cannot be complete without a comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Failure to do so would feed into the current narrative of an increasingly irrelevant organisation clinging on to old-world structures and processes, which still reflect the post-1945 unipolar geopolitical and economic landscape. The UNSC is assailed by a number of disquiets about its representativity, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. But this paper argues that it is the use – or rather, misuse – of the veto power of the five permanent member countries that is at the core of credible reform. It finds that, despite all its faults, the UN will remain a relevant force in the fight for global peace, security, and sustainable development, as long as it adapts to the new multipolar world order. Rather than a wholesale overhaul, a more sensible – and probably more realistic – way to tackle reform would be to follow a piecemeal approach, with a focus on inclusive multilateralism and natural justice. Setting the scene The Turkish Consulate held a panel discussion in Cape Town at the Westin Hotel on 30 August 2022 regarding the Türkiye government’s UN reform initiative, which it hosted in South Africa, as it has done and is doing in other countries around the world. This specific campaign is summed up by the catchphrase of President Erdoğan that the “world is bigger than five”. It captures the important notion that global peace, justice, and development should be in the hands of all countries at the UN, not only a few. In fact, the use – or rather misuse – of the power held by each of the five permanent UN Security Council members lies at the heart of the Turkish position on UN reform. Türkiye believes that the aim of the reforms should not be to devise a new global structure but rather to reform the existing UN system, and that this cannot be complete without a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. The Council’s membership needs to be restructured to reflect the modern multicultural global political balance, by adopting a more equitable and just representation of member states. The emergence of new centres of power – mainly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – heralds the end of the hegemony of the West, and the need for a new international system to rise (Acer, 2022). The Turkish president has proposed a rotating membership system wherein all countries would get a chance to be a member at some point, rather than increasing the number of permanent members. The criteria for membership should be reasonable and achievable, to avoid selectivity, which would wall off the majority of member states from the prospect of a seat on the Security Council (Republic of Türkiye, 2005). Another priority identified by Türkiye, is creating greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability – the Council’s credibility is hanging in the balance. In its current state, the UN’s decision-making and interaction processes around major global disputes happen largely behind closed doors and lead only to stalemates, instead of to unlocking the solutions needed. And when those in the UN who make the rules do not themselves follow them, it brings into question the legitimacy of the organisation as a whole. Striking examples are the dozens of resolutions on Palestine the UN Security Council has made that have come to nought and the UN General Assembly resolutions on Israel, which are mostly not applied (Acer, 2022). In addition, Türkiye points out that the relationship between the Council and other states and with the main UN bodies needs to be improved, with better cooperation and coordination. The General Assembly and ECOSOC need to be remedied and revitalised in the face of new challenges for the true success of the UN’s reform. The UN also needs an efficient Secretariat and Human Rights Council (Republic of Türkiye, 2005). The Turkish government remains committed to the UN as the centre of global governance and remains open to discussing any proposal based on these principles. Türkiye is willing to take any action necessary to reach a solution that is inclusive of the interests of the majority of state members. Türkiye’s adoption of the Action Plan for Opening up to Africa in the late 1990s has also been lauded. This Action Plan assigns greater priority to Africa and boosts economic cooperation. This was followed by Türkiye’s announcement in 2005, that it would be "The Year of Africa". Africa is also mindful, and thankful, that the reign of the Ottoman Empire left Africa unscathed in terms of colonial outreach and subjugation. The relationship is therefore based on a different premise to the relationship between Africa and the former colonial regimes, which still impacts Africa’s legacy and, it could be argued, persists, even within organs such as the UN. Maybe food for thought as the path to a reformed UN is navigated. Introduction Undoubtedly, the world is safer today than at the UN’s founding in 1945, notwithstanding the belligerence in Ukraine, Yemen, Sahel, Ethiopia, and the other hotspots around the globe. The UN that emerged from post-WWII had an aspiration of a world free from conflict, hunger, inequality, etc, where nations can solve problems collectively and for the global common good. And it has achieved some major feats since then. Probably its most notable contribution to world peace was the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a response to the atrocities that occurred during World War II. The UN also deployed the first fully-fledged peacekeeping unit, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to oversee the end of hostilities in the Suez Crisis, leading to the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces (Pruitt, 2018). An achievement which is particularly relevant today, is the UN’s landmark Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although this pact has not stopped nuclear proliferation, it has set a major precedent for international cooperation on the arms control issue. Another pressing current issue the UN should be commended for is its lead in taking on the climate crisis. In the global health arena, the WHO led the fight to eradicate smallpox, and won. UNAIDS still leads in the fight against HIV/AIDS, with the lowest levels of new HIV infections and deaths reported this century. In addition, the UN has been at the centre of combatting a number of emergency health situations – including the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, and the recent unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic (Pruitt, 2018). The General Assembly’s Declaration of the Rights of the Child was the first global consensus on the matter of children’s rights. Women’s rights are also built into the United Nations Charter. UN Women continues to champion women’s rights, engendered by the 2014 ground-breaking HeForShe campaign (Pruitt, 2018). And the UN’s agencies take care of approximately 60 million refugees and other vulnerable people across the world (Santamaria, 2020). The UN has also won the Nobel Peace Prize numerous times, with the latest recipient being the World Food Programme (WFP), which has been responding to the urgent need for food supplies during global crises for over 60 years. The WFP assisted over 128 million people in 2021 and provides school meals to more than 15 million children. Each day the WFP has up to 5,600 trucks, 100 planes, and 30 ships on the move, delivering food and other assistance (WFP, 2022). The UN and its other multilateral entities, at its founding, reflected the geopolitical and economic power and influence dynamics of the time. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States found itself transformed from a midlevel global power to the leader of the “free world”, alongside the Soviet Union, which had experienced a similarly unexpected rise to power, while there was a sharp decline in the power and economic influence of the European colonial empires (The National WWII Museum, 2020). The Global South was essentially absent from the UN’s establishment process, as they were undergoing processes of independence. Africa, for example, was almost totally absent, with only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa present. Today, the UN’s functioning and governance mechanisms still reflect the post-1945 geopolitical and economic landscape. This despite the world undergoing tremendous changes and developments since then. The new reality needs to be reflected in the UN architecture. It is not. Need to transform This august body cannot remain untransformed and largely unaffected by these momentous geopolitical and economic shifts that have occurred over the last 77 years, if it wants to remain relevant, credible, and responsive. If it truly wants to be inclusive, not only in terms of geographic inclusion, which it does by way of membership, but also in terms of geopolitical orientation, influence, and the realpolitik, it will need to adapt and become fit for purpose for the new world order that has emerged since 1945. The spectacular rise of China over the past two decades and the relative decline of the US marks the end of the dominance of the West. A massive 35% of world growth pre-pandemic came from China, with 18% from the US, 9% from India, and 8% from Europe. By 2050, the top five largest global economies are most likely to be China, India, US, Brazil, and Indonesia. To survive this global geopolitical transition, the first step is to accept the new multipolar world order, with the US and China at its centre (WEF, 2018). Democratic South Africa has been a proud member of the UN family for a mere 28 years. While it recognises the importance of being part of the global community, it is not blind to the inherent deficiencies, even a measure of unfairness, that is built into the current architecture, which has been of concern over the years, but which has become more pronounced as time goes by. It is universally recognised that reform is necessary and urgent for the UN to reclaim its initial lustre. The UN is assailed by a number of disquiets about its efficacy, effectiveness, representivity, governance mechanisms, mode of operation and functioning across a number of fronts. Despite its many successes, the UN has also had several failures, largely due to ineffective leadership and a limited range of actions at hand. In some instances, it has been the all-encompassing power imbued upon the permanent members of the Security Council that has stalled operations and nullified resolutions. Simply put, while the UN has the power to pass resolutions, it often lacks the punch to enforce them. As a result, the UN presents with unfair decision-making processes, lack of inclusion of new and emerging global powers, and few accountability mechanisms in place (Gardiner, 2007). Critics of the UN also point to the overly bureaucratic and slow way in which it deals with development issues. Former UN officials have criticised its lack of coherent strategic planning, outdated structure and business practices, and staggering personnel costs. In fact, as the UN has expanded more and more over the years, many of its bodies now have overlapping mandates, and it has become a rather unwieldy organisation (The Guardian, 2015). Analysts have over the years identified a number of problems and obstacles causing the need to improve the UN. This includes, amongst others: In the broader context, it needs to move from a state-centric model of international governance towards a citizen-orientated model. The domination of the Security Council, its exclusive power, self-interest of Council members, and lack of checks and balances The veto power Non-participation of UN members in Security Council decisions Lack of transparency of Security Council meetings Procedures to amend the Charter Financial and political realities. But principally, it is the veto power of the P5 countries that has remained intact, despite numerous attempts at reform over the years, that has seized the minds of those arguing for reform. The Security Council’s veto power is granted solely to its five permanent members – the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia – and allows them to block any substantive resolution, rendering it invalid. The UN is shackled, watching on as these powerhouses decide on matters to suit their own interests, rather than the interests of the international community or those of justified sides. Ostensibly, the P5 hold the whip hand through vetoes and the 10 temporary members of the Security Council are simply window dressing (The Guardian, 2015). Attempts at reform have been further impacted by labyrinthine bureaucratic processes and budget constraints. This is especially evident to us in Africa with reference to peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, etcetera, given our challenging economic levels. The UN’s failure to prevent the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, and its slow response to the Sudan genocide are shameful episodes that will haunt the UN for generations (Gardiner, 2007). The UN, despite its best efforts to live up to its Charter and noble aims, suffers from a lack of legitimacy and a crisis of confidence in its abilities to effect the requisite changes. The Charter is asymmetrical in its outlook and functioning. There are also many flashpoints in the world and the UN is often criticised for not doing enough to quell or address such conflicts. In a number of instances, it has not intervened in these conflicts, because it was paralysed by competing self-interest, principally of the P5 nations. Since 1982, the US has used its veto power to block 35 resolutions critical of Israel. Other permanent members have put a stop to 27 resolutions over the same time period. And recently, UN intervention in Syria has been blocked by Russia and China (The Guardian, 2015). Africa’s UN position and ambition Since 1963, members of the African group have been represented in the UN as a region, with the creation of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), now the African Union. It is Africa’s firm contention that the UN must work more closely with the AU to address and resolve Africa’s myriad challenges. In 2018, for example, over 50% of UNSC meetings, 60% of its outcome documents, and 70% of its resolutions with Chapter VII mandates – that is, action in respect of threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression – concerned African peace and security issues; the majority by far. Currently, there are 12 peacekeeping operations being led by the UN Department of Peace, with six of those in Africa alone – in Western Sahara, Central African Republic, Mali, Congo, Abyei, and South Sudan (UN Peacekeeping, 2022). Yet, no African country is yet a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The 2005 Ezulwini Consensus represents the AU’s unified position regarding UN reform. The main elements relate to UNSC reform; the question of equal representation, in numerical and geographical aspects; the question of effectiveness of UNSC actions, linked to equality and transparency; and the question related to improving working methods through the implementation of new procedures for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and UNSC. The Sirte declaration at the 5th African Union (AU) Assembly re-affirmed the strong commitment to the Ezulwini declaration. It is acknowledged that there was no agreement on categories of membership, eligibility, number of seats, system of rotation and the so-called veto power (deadlock result) and that further work needs to be done, but there seems to be agreement as to the areas that need to be reformed. There are of course some contentious internal issues, but it is believed that these can be overcome (ISI, 2020). South Africa is committed to the Ezulwini Consensus. What is the essence of the Ezulwini Consensus? In the consensus document, the AU expressed the need for the UN General Assembly to be strengthened. While it should retain its intergovernmental character and remain essentially as a forum for intergovernmental dialogue, measures should be taken to improve its effectiveness, including its ability to ensure that its decisions are implemented (ISI, 2020). Furthermore, the relationship between the General Assembly and UNSC needs to reflect a more balanced distribution of competence (AU, 2005). Once again, keep in mind that in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa lacked representation. And in 1963, when the first UNSC reform took place, the continent was still not properly represented. Now that Africa is fully represented in the UN, it is, however, better placed to influence reforms. The AU’s goal, therefore, is for Africa to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the UNSC, which is considered the principal decision-making organ in matters relating to peace and security (AU, 2005). In the AU’s opinion, Africa should be allocated at least two permanent seats on the UNSC. These appointments should be accompanied with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent members, including the right of veto, should the principle of veto rights be maintained. Although opposed to the principle of a veto, the continent’s leadership argues that, as long as it exists, it should be made available to all permanent members of the UNSC as a matter of common justice. Furthermore, Africa should be allocated a further five non-permanent seats on an expanded UNSC (AU, 2005). The selection of Africa’s representatives on the UNSC should be the AU’s responsibility. Criteria should include continent-wide representation, and the chosen member states’ capacity to represent the continent and to effectively execute its responsibilities within the UNSC (AU, 2005). Although the Ezulwini Consensus stipulates that the AU reserves the right to elect the two permanent members to the UNSC, a number of African states have already pronounced themselves ready to assume such a seat (Anon., 2020). A range of reform initiatives The Ezulwini position is one of a number of other initiatives, whilst different in detail, similar in principle. The G4 proposal The G4 (Germany, India, Brazil, and Japan) believe the UN Security Council structure is out of date. There is an imbalance of influence in the Council that cannot be righted with only non-permanent members joining the UN. Their position is that expansion in both categories is crucial to demonstrating the balance of current global realities. And that it is unacceptable that entire continents, such as Africa, are excluded from permanent seats on the Council (The Economic Times, 2021). The G4 proposal suggests adding six new permanent members to the Security Council (two seats each for Asia and Africa and one seat for the Western European and Others Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Group respectively). They would also like to see four or five non‑permanent members added to the Security Council (one seat each for Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and one or two seats for Africa). They have also proposed several reforms to the working methods, including that new members initially give up the right of veto and that the issue be resolved at a review conference 15 years after the amendment of the Charter kicks in (Federal Foreign Office, 2022). L.69 Group The L.69 Group is a cross-regional grouping of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific pushing for lasting and comprehensive reform of the UNSC. The L.69 Group is “bound by the firm conviction that expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of UNSC membership is imperative to better reflect contemporary world realities” and achieve a more accountable, representative, transparent, and relevant UNSC (IAS Parliament, 2022). The L.69 Group supports the Ezulwini Consensus, including that the veto should either be abolished or extended to all permanent members. The group proposes adding six new permanent members, two from Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America and the Caribbean, and one from WEOG. Additionally, L.69 advocated for a rotating non-permanent seat for small island developing states (SIDS) (ISI, 2020). The Arab Group The Arab Group, which is made up of 22 members, supports a real and comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council. The group believes the Council needs to be made more representative, transparent, neutral, and credible. It continues to promote its position of gaining a permanent seat for one of its members and calls for a fairer Arab representation in non-permanent UN Security Council seats. The group points to objective criteria – the Arab population density, and the number of Arab countries in the UN and Arab-related conflicts often found on the Council’s agenda – as compelling factors in this decision (Hatim, 2021). Uniting for Consensus The Uniting for Consensus group of 12 countries, nicknamed the Coffee Club, wants the proposed UNSC non-permanent membership expanded from 10 to 20 members, serving for a two-year term, in addition to the five permanent members. The 20 non-permanent members would be elected as follows: six from Africa; five from Asia; four from Latin America and the Caribbean; three from Western Europe and Other States; and two from Eastern Europe. Each geographical group would decide on arrangements for re-election or rotation of its members, including a fair subregional representation. The group also calls for more transparent, inclusive, and accountable working methods in the Council. For instance, restraint on the use of the veto; improved decision-making and performance processes; greater access to information; adequate consultation and cooperation between the main UN bodies (UN, 2005). Lack of reform holds danger for proliferation There is a concern with regard to no movement, the non-ability of the UN to reform itself. The lack of UN representivity and its inability to solve global issues, and the sense that it is the P5 that drive the process, has resulted in the proliferation of alternative regional and transnational blocs. There are additional expansions in the pipeline. A lack of reform will aid the formation of alternative multilateral fora, which holds the danger that it may well feed into narrow regionalism that has the potential to result in polarisation. We have witnessed the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement, the formation (and now on the cards, proposed expansion) of BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, etc. We have seen how the BRICS bank and other initiatives have come to augment the Bretton Woods Institutions. The development of these blocs in itself should not be unduly criticised, they are good initiatives and overlap in some ways with the work of the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a forum of 120 countries not aligned with or against any major power bloc, has ceaselessly battled alongside the UN against oppressive foreign occupation and domination to ensure those vulnerable to these attacks have their inalienable right to self-determination and independence preserved (GoI, 2012). BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is important in bringing together the major emerging economies of the world. Although primarily their focus has been on inter-BRICS financial, trade and economic cooperation, they have become synonymous with defending global governance, economic globalisation, free trade, and climate action. They are also well positioned to stand side by side with the UN in efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (UN News, 2017). There is also considerable overlap in the goals and strategies of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Many of the UN agencies are in fact involved in the BRI, which is integral to the SDGs as a primary vehicle for sustainable projects, sources of green finance, and poverty alleviation initiatives across Europe, Asia, and Africa (Lewis et al., 2021). However, the fear is that, should these countries continue to feel excluded, overridden and marginalised from the decision-making processes of the UNSC, they could morph into alternative geopolitical multilateral institutions competing against the UN processes. Failure by the UN to reform would feed into the narrative of an increasingly irrelevant organisation clinging on to old-world structures and processes, with a growing sense of disenfranchisement amongst many of its members. This would obviously not bode well for global coordination against worldwide threats, such as, for example, climate change. It is the author’s considered view that inclusive multilateralism and natural justice should be the focus. These are, after all, the noble values enshrined in the UN Charter that inspired the world in 1945. But multilateralism should be built on the principles of equality, inclusiveness, and fairness. And the current UN system, it is argued, is not. Concerns relating to non-reform have lingered for too long Concerns about the effectiveness of the Security Council have festered for decades. In 1993, then Secretary General Kofi Annan, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, called for “radical reform” of the UN system, acknowledging that the United Nations no longer meets the needs of its members. Annan stated: “We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.” He added, “I believe the time is ripe for a hard look at fundamental policy issues, and at the structural changes that may be needed in order to strengthen them.” Annan criticised the US' pre-emptive strike doctrine, which he called a challenge to the UN's founding principles. But he said the organisation must show it can act effectively when member states have security concerns. The secretary general formed a high-level panel to advise on how the UN could better respond to new threats to security posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (McMahon, 2003). Former UNSG, Ban Ki-moon said at the 70th UN General Assembly, “Reaching our sustainable development goals means organising ourselves better. Let there be no more walls or boxes; no more ministries or agencies working at cross-purposes. Let us move from silos to synergy, supported by data, long-term planning, and a will to do things differently” (Ban, 2015). In the corridors of the UN, they are aware of the problems at the heart of the institution and what needs to change. And they are mindful that there are different modes of reform (far-reaching versus modest). This applies to both structural and working methods reform. The UNSC must be enlarged, ideally with more permanent members possessing a veto. Alternatively, it should do away with the veto entirely and develop mediation and effective decision-making processes. These need to align with the principles of equity, representativeness, efficiency, equality, democracy, and geopolitical and economic realities of the world today. But reform stubbornly stagnates. On 28 June 2022, Loraine Sievers, Director of Security Council Procedure, told the Council that “its outdated working methods needed improvement in order to create a transparent, nimble 15-nation organ capable of tackling contemporary global challenges”. She said that fragmentation within the Council due to geopolitical troubles has placed it under serious scrutiny, exposing the truth about the powers the Council actually holds. Transparency with regards the Council’s proceedings is also an issue, she said. “It is you, the present Council members, who have full control over how to strike this balance between the public and private.” She believes the opacity encircling the workings of the Council has the potential to reduce a sense of trust and legitimacy. But if the Council, in good faith, remains open about its working methods, this could warm up the relationship with the wider membership, nurturing cooperation (UNSC, 2022). Sievers presented wide-ranging proposals that included the use of the veto, the system of drafting resolutions, and reforming the sanctions regime. Yet the Sievers proposals show that the concerns of SG Kofi Annan have not been acted upon since 2003. The question is: Will reforms be enacted now, and if not, what will propel the P5 to act in the wider interest of humanity, rather than in their national (self) interest? The reform priorities We know what is necessary. The UNSC needs to be reformed. It needs to be expanded in a manner that promotes greater regional inclusion. Most of the literature points to this aspect as the most focussed-on element of the reform discussion. Currently, entire regions continue to be excluded – notably Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean – from the permanent membership category. The 15‑member Council must be expanded beyond the current five permanent seats and its non-permanent membership to include nations from the north and south; big and small states; strong and weak; rich and poor. But it can be argued that as important as regional inclusion is – in that it ensures enriched discussion, more inclusive decision-making, and holistic consultation – the most important, is to tackle P5 veto rights. Often, competing self-interest between P5 members results in paralysis of UN processes, meaning that the endgame is zero action. For years, Russia’s veto power has stymied resolutions against its military terrorising of Ukraine and Syria (Falk, 2022). The UNSC could not even pass a resolution on the all-important topic of Covid-19 because of the United States’ insistence that there be no reference to the WHO. Similarly, when discussing the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, no substantive discussion was possible due to opposing resolutions by Russia and the US (Roth, 2019). The contention is that the principle of recusal should apply if a veto power is the subject of discussion; it is not the case currently. The principle of recusal says that any party who has a self-interest in, or is biased or prejudiced against, a matter on the table for discussion should voluntarily refrain from participating for the purpose of avoiding a conflict of interest. It cannot be right – it goes against all principles of natural justice – for a P5 country to exercise its veto right on a resolution in which it is the topic of discussion. It cannot be player and referee at the same time. In any judicial system around the world, where there is a conflict of interest, the conflicted party needs to recuse themselves from the discussion and decision. Not so in the UNSC. It is this single issue that is causing the greatest harm to the credibility of the UN, and which is the prime driver of the perceived and real credibility and trust deficit. And an appeal mechanism needs to be found, at least as relates to UNSC decisions that are not supported by the majority in the General Assembly. It could be that UNSC decisions not supported by a motion in the General Assembly, may be reviewed by the General Assembly, or some other body, and amended or sent back by means of a super-majority decision. It could be an alternative mediation mechanism. It could be something else. But history has taught us – and the South African story is a prime example – when a minority continues to inflict its views on the majority without a credible means of mediation, trouble looms. So, it is clear from the decades-old debate, that the UNSC and the P5 veto rights need to be tackled to address the credibility and trust deficit. Further research and consultations are not necessary to figure out what needs to be reformed, nor what the reforms should look like. We all know what needs to be done. The prospects for reform The question arises as to what is feasible given the prevailing power dynamics? The P5 will be reluctant to cede power. Truthfully, they are not about to. So, does it even help to waste time and resources on the topic? It seems that it is the P5 themselves who have to come to the conclusion that it is necessary. There is no other overriding mechanism. We have to appeal to their sense of justice. We need to get them to understand the danger of polarisation and what it holds for world peace and development. Only when the P5 come to this insight, will reform advance. Countries need to heighten their diplomatic efforts in this regard. In light of the above, perhaps rather than a wholesale overhaul, a more sensible – and probably more realistic – way to tackle reform would be to follow a piecemeal approach. Given the current political situation, demands for far-reaching reforms targeting changes to the UN Charter, however well they may sound, are unlikely to provoke solidarity or movement amongst UN member states. But partial measures taken over a period of time, such as reforming the working methods to increase their effectiveness and efficiency, may just be the ticket to change. It is proposed that the P5 be directly engaged about the veto power, with careful consideration of the political will and interests of these member states. The options need to be seen as cost-saving or, at least, cost-neutral. Two main proposals vis-à-vis the veto power stand out. The first is not to eliminate, but to limit the veto. Mexico and France have proposed to retain the veto power, but argue that the veto should be restricted in cases where urgent intervention by the UN is required – for instance, when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent the prevailing paralysing inaction (UN, 2022). The second option is the idea that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should have the authority to override any veto of a P5 member. This super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eighths of the membership vote. In a similar vein, former Colombian Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Derviş have proposed “a large double majority – representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population – to override a veto” (Friedman, 2022). Considering the resolute reluctance of the P5 to relinquish their veto power, such a proposal may be a tall order. Another angle to use in trying to convince the member states of this piecemeal approach, is to bring their attention to the real threat of increased proliferation of competing regional and international organisations. If the P5 members continue to wield their power in selfish ways, they may end up losing it altogether, as other states withdraw their support. A partial measure – an olive branch, if you will – should be offered to appease aggrieved states, in the form of either modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories, or a rotational format. The UK supports the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, which would bring total membership into the mid-twenties (ISS, 2022). And may keep the wolves at bay, for us all. Conclusion As difficult and as near impossible as it seems, this should not inhibit our ambition for meaningful change and reform at the UN. Reform is the right thing to do and will assist with peace, security, and sustainable development. And the UN is worth saving. Despite all its faults, the UN remains a relevant force. It has helped ward off hunger, poverty, and violence for hundreds of millions of people. It leads the fight against climate change. Its agencies take care of approximately 60 million refugees and other vulnerable people across the world. UN observers help ensure free and fair elections worldwide. Its peacekeepers have intervened in conflicts where few countries would consider doing so alone. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has ensured the limitation of nuclear weapons. It also remains relevant in terms of providing an enormous range of basic services that people take for granted. And while there are a growing number of alternative platforms where world leaders can engage in multilateral cooperation, there is no entity that can equal the established capacity of the UN and its agencies across the globe (ISI, 2020). It seems we need to find the sweet spot between structures and processes within the UN, where power can be shared fairly for the benefit of all humankind. And we need to find it soon. The geopolitical world is shifting rapidly, and we are faced with ever-increasing global threats, creating enormous uncertainty within the international system. The danger of a major collapse is real. Climate change, specifically, the great equaliser, will not wait for us to come to a consensus on who is more worthy of holding the power. It is our UN. We must persist. The global challenges are too urgent and too great for us to give up. We must make it work. Humanity is relying on us to get it right. References Acer, Y. 2022. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/reformsr/231604#:~:text=The%20G4%20proposal%20of%202005,the%20Charter%20enters%20into%20force. [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Friedman, U. 2022. How the UN Security Council Can Reinvent Itself. [Online] Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/un-security-council-russia-ukraine/661501/ [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Gardiner, N. 2007. The Decline and Fall of the United Nations: Why the UN has Failed and How it Needs to be Reformed, Macalester International, 19(9). Government of India (GoI). 2012. History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. [Online] Available at: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Hatim, Y. 2021. Arab Group Wants Permanent Seat at UN Security Council. [Online] Available at: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2021/01/333506/arab-group-wants-permanent-seat-at-un-security-council [accessed: 7 October 2022]. IAS Parliament. 2022. Prelim Bits 25-09-2022 & 26-09-2022 | UPSC Daily Current Affairs. [Online] Available at: https://www.iasparliament.com/current-affairs/prelim-bits-5/prelim-bits-25-09-2022-26-09-2022-upsc-daily-current-affairs [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2020. South Africa’s position on United Nations reform. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/south-africa-s-position-on-united-nations-reform [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 2022. Russia’s war in Ukraine revives calls for Security Council expansion. [Online] Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/russias-war-in-ukraine-revives-calls-for-security-council-expansion#:~:text=The%20United%20Kingdom's%20(UK)%20ambassador,African%20representation%20on%20the%20Council. [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Lewis, D.J., Yang, X., Moise, D. et al. 2021. Dynamic synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, Journal of International Business Policy, 4: 58-79. McMahon, R. 2003. UN: Path To Reform Complicated By Differences On Iraq. [Online] Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1104564.html [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Pruitt, S. 2018. 10 Memorable Moments in United Nations History. [Online] Available at: https://www.history.com/news/10-memorable-moments-in-united-nations-history [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Republic of Türkiye. 2005. Turkey´s Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. [Online] Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-priorities-for-the-60th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly.en.mfa#:~:text=Turkey%20believes%20that%20a%20comprehensive,must%20ensue%20within%20the%20Council [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Roth, R. 2019. Inside the UN Security Council's double veto on Venezuela. [Online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/28/ americas/venezuela-un-security-council-intl/index.html [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Santamaria, C. 2020. The UN turns 75 – Is it still relevant? [Online] Available at: https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-un-turns-75-is-it- still-relevant [accessed: 7 October 2022]. The Economic Times. 2021. Indispensable to reform UN Security Council, make it more legitimate, representative: G4. [Online] Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/indispensable-to-reform-un-security-council-make-it-more-legitimate-representative-g4-nations/articleshow/86446634.cms?from=mdr [accessed: 7 October 2022]. The Guardian. 2015. 70 years and half a trillion dollars later: what has the UN achieved? [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations [accessed: 7 October 2022]. The National WWII Museum. 2020. Great Responsibilities and New Global Power. [Online] Available at: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/new-global-power-after-world-war-ii-1945 [accessed: 7 October 2022]. United Nations (UN). 2005. ‘Uniting for Consensus’ Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly. [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm [accessed: 7 October 2022]. United Nations (UN). 2022. General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Aimed at Holding Five Permanent Security Council Members Accountable for Use of Veto. [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12417.doc.htm [accessed: 7 October 2022]. United Nations Peacekeeping. 2022. Where We Operate. [Online] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate [accessed: 7 October 2022]. United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2022. Working methods of the Security Council - Security Council, 9079th meeting. [Online] Available at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1f/k1fncdy0el [accessed: 7 October 2022]. UN News. 2017. 'BRICS' countries well placed to help lead global efforts to tackle hunger – UN agency. [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/559662 [accessed: 7 October 2022]. World Economic Forum (WEF). 2018. 5 facts you need to understand the new global order. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/five-facts-you-need-to-understand-the-new-global-order/ [accessed: 7 October 2022]. World Food Programme (WFP). 2022. WFP at a glance. [Online] Available at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-glance [accessed: 7 October 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was requested to contribute towards an extensive review of local government being undertaken by City Insights on behalf of the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). The ISI’s input focused on the model of local government, which reviewed the Policy and Legislative Framework, key focus areas such as demarcation, elections and political participation. The ISI’s recommendations included issues, such as, amongst others: Improved public participation mechanisms Reviewing the Municipal Electoral Act to provide for coalition arrangements and constitutional eventualities The need for assessing the effectiveness of coordination between the three spheres of government Strategies to improve continuity of councillor representation and executive competencies

On Tuesday 20 September 2022 the Inclusive Society Institute hosted another successful Constitutional training workshop. This time at it was the turn of Voortrekker High School, in Wynberg. The workshop titled “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know your Rights and Responsibilities” is aimed at young adults who are either in their final years of school or who have recently completed their schooling. The workshop aims to raise awareness of how young people can apply the Constitution in their day-to-day lives. Though the Constitution seemed distant and inaccessible to the learners of Voortrekker before the session, many reported to have gained considerable insight from the workshop while some suggested that they now felt inspired to contribute to civil activity and others to study law. The next workshop will take place at Westerford High School on 18 October.

On Tuesday, 13 September 2022, the Inclusive Society Institute launched its Constitutional awareness programme at Herzlia High School in Cape Town. The new workshop, appropriately titled “Taking the Constitution to the people: Know your Rights and Responsibilities”, will systematically be rolled out to the youth, primarily at high schools, over the next year. The goal of the workshop is to enable students to gain an understanding of the history of the South African Constitution, how it was created, how it is structured, and how it applies to our day-to-day lives. This practical course is designed to empower citizens with knowledge about the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and guide them on how they can use it in their day-to-day lives.

In response to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs’ invitation to make a submission on the Electoral Amendment Bill that is currently before Parliament, the ISI forwarded its comments on 16 September 2022. The ISI is promoting a Multi-Member Constituency model, which is diametrically opposed to that contained in the Bill. The Institute is however following a pragmatic approach by proposing a two-step approach to the electoral reform. Step one would entail passing the current legislation before Parliament, which is a minimalistic adjustment providing for the current PR system to continue with a provision for independent candidates to also stand for election to the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures. This should be for the 2024 general election only. The second step, the ISI proposes, should be broader reform in time for the 2029 general election, which should provide for some form of constituency representation. Furthermore, the ISI is of the view that the current Bill before Parliament is not constitutional. It has made proposals to the Portfolio Committee to remedy the clauses deemed not being able to pass constitutional muster. The Institute full submission, legal opinion and electoral proposals can be accessed by following the links below: [Click here for submission] [Click here for legal opinion] [Click here for the ISI’s electoral proposals]

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2022 An analysis of local economic development with local government: A case study of the City of Ekurhuleni by Nondumiso Alice Sithole Msc. Public Policy & Management, LLB, Property & Investment Practice Law (Postgraduate Cert.), Legislative Drafting Abstract This article examines the role of Local Economic Development (LED) in the context of the local government or municipalities in South Africa, with the City of Ekurhuleni as its case study. It explores various policies and methods that can be implemented as possible positive interventions to redress high unemployment and challenges associated with creating thriving and sustainable township economies, both formal and informal, which will be instrumental in reducing unemployment and poverty amongst local communities. The objective of the paper is to examine what ought to constitute LED at the grassroots level of South Africa’s economy and, more specifically, where local township developments are concerned. The research design used a qualitative approach wherein data were collected by means of a review of the City of Ekurhuleni’s public documents and reports, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles focusing on the topic. The findings point to the fact that municipalities in general need to make a concerted effort in providing a conducive and favourable environment for informal traders, and the informal sector at large, in order for this sector to establish and create sustainable businesses. It is only then that the informal sector could make an advanced impact in terms of LED, by contributing positively towards the growth of local economies. Introduction Local Economic Development (LED) is a grassroots-based approach to economic development. It encourages people, or stakeholders, in a local context, usually the local government sphere, to work together to achieve sustainable economic growth and development, which has positive economic benefits such as improved quality of life for all residents. Local government has a range of roles and responsibilities in relation to social and economic development. It promises to be more suitable and relevant to implementing policies associated with the general concept of local economic development (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, n.d.), as local government has an important role to play in creating a favourable environment for local businesses’ development and success. At the heart of a successful LED policy and strategy is a partnership between the business sector, community interests, and municipal government (Sebareng, 2016: 4–5). Some municipalities have established LED forums, which can include NPOs and NGOs alongside organised businesses. The objectives of these forums, amongst others, include encouraging private investment in the local jurisdictions; creating and retaining jobs for the local communities; expanding the tax base and contributing towards increasing the general level of economic well-being of local communities. In sum, the goal of these forums revolves around enhancing economic growth, the creation of employment and, ultimately, improving the quality of life for local inhabitants (Sebareng, 2016: 4–5). Often, LED tends to embrace a pro-poor policy orientation. It is also associated with situations where municipalities work with local community structures to create environmental awareness and maintain clean and hygienic public spaces. A case in point, consider recent LED initiatives focusing on informal economic business, where informal employment was created through recycling and retail activities carried out in open spaces and on street pavements (Garane, 2021). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) recognises and endorses the importance of local government as a crucial instrument to pursue economic development. Section 152 and Section 153 (a) state that "a municipality must structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community”. Here, the Constitution defines the municipality’s scope, mandate, and function to carry out obligations associated with LED. Beyond the Constitution, LED is justified by a vast legislative and policy framework empowering local governments to pursue the goal of economic development. For example, the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 23–36) further corroborates the government’s duties of advancing LED as enshrined in the Constitution. The Municipal Systems Act of 2000 provides core principles, mechanisms, and processes that are essential to “enable municipalities to work progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of their local communities” (Act 2003: 3). To pursue LED, municipalities are legally required to have Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). For instance, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) has the primary aim of providing all spheres of government with a framework relating to the establishment of policies and systems for planning and land use management. All municipalities must approve and adopt a single land use management scheme, from 1 July 2015, with the purpose of promoting economic growth, social inclusion, efficient land development, and minimal impact on public health, the environment, and natural resources (Dykes Van Heerden Group of Companies, 2020). The Business Act 71 of 1991 is another important legislation that promotes LED. The primary objective of this legislation is to empower municipalities with the mandate or right to allow and/or restrict areas where trading is permissible. Secondly, the Business Act provides for various categories of businesses to be compelled to have a trading permit or a business license before they can operate legally (Garane, 2021). There are other policies, frameworks, bylaws, and guidelines aimed at aiding and transforming economic development at local government level. The most recent development in terms of proposed legislation is the newly drafted Gauteng Economic Bill, which aims to structurally transform the Gauteng economy, to bring the historically disadvantaged majority into productive mainstream activities as owners, wealth creators, and asset builders (Siwela, 2020). The Bill also seeks to revitalise and streamline the township economy and move towards new ways of authentic empowerment for township and black-owned businesses. The Bill aims to make certain activities easier for township entrepreneurs and enterprises by making it more affordable and easier to establish, register, and operate businesses. The Bill intends to loosen red tape, remove bottlenecks, and improve the ease of doing business for township enterprises (Siwela, 2020). The mammoth task to promote LED and provide basic services as required by the Constitution has not only put local governments under severe pressure, but also under scrutiny by the communities that they are meant to serve. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that local governments have played thus far in planning and promoting LED in a broad sense, looking at the position of some metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. For the sake of focus, the paper will limit itself to the case study of what has been done in the City of Ekurhuleni to address socio-economic challenges faced by its local communities. In terms of research methodology, this paper takes a qualitative approach. Specifically, it is desktop and literature-based where it explores the concept of local economic development. It also considers the mandate of local governments and the challenges that have influenced effective and successful LED planning and implementation in the City of Ekurhuleni. The third section focuses on how local government feeds into the informal and formal sectors of local communities practically speaking, taking into consideration the achievements or non-achievements of the City of Ekurhuleni. The final section considers possible solutions that may be adopted and/or utilised to reinforce and reinvent ways in which Ekurhuleni and municipalities in general are to provide effective support where LED is concerned, looking at the introduction of the New Gauteng Township Economic Bill, etc. Background The apartheid government centrally organised and managed all the resources; it was responsible for the entire economy, planning and execution. The result was that local municipalities did not have a role to play in matters of extreme importance, or rather, matters that pertained to economic development planning. If they played a role, it was a very small and insignificant one. There was clear neglect of the majority of the areas where most of the population lived (SALGA, 2010: 3). After 1994, however, there was a major shift. National government placed an emphasis on grassroots initiatives and the participation of local communities. This meant that local government had to assume a wider range of responsibilities and was assigned with core developmental functions, namely, “to (a) structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes in order to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community; and (b) participate in national and provincial development programmes”. After the December 2000 local government elections, every piece of land within South Africa fell under a particular jurisdiction of a municipality. Thereafter, concepts as well as strategies had to be developed in respect of the context of this new position, which was more inclusive and supportive of local economic development (SALGA, 2010: 4). For an organisation or institution to achieve its objectives with respect to a particular mandate or core function and intended outcomes, it is fundamental to understand and define what must be achieved from the onset. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines the purpose of LED as follows: LED is to build the municipality of a defined area to improve its economic future and the quality of life for inhabitants. Local development makes an important contribution to national economic performance and has become more critical with increased global competition, population mobility, technological advances, and consequential spatial differences and imbalances. Effective local development can reduce disparities between poor and rich places, add to the stock of locally generated jobs and firms, increase overall private sector investment, improve the information flows with investors and developers, and increase the coherence and confidence with which local economic strategy is pursued. This can also give rise to better diagnostic assessment of local economic assets and distinctive advantages, and lead to more robust strategy assessment (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.). Similarly, the commonwealth local government forum defines LED as a central part of developmental local government. It is a process that brings together different partners in the local area to work together to harness resources for sustainable economic growth. Local economic development is increasingly being seen as a key function of local government and a means of ensuring that local and regional authorities can address the priority needs of local citizens in a sustainable way. There is no single model for LED – approaches reflect local needs and circumstances (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2021). LED is a process by which public, business, and non-governmental sector partners collaborate to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation (Murphy, 2006: 1). There is no universal agreement on the concept of LED. Hence, the concept is open to a variety or even competing interpretations, including both pro-poor and pro-development economic development approaches. Amongst some municipalities, there is still confusion about the LED department’s role, and LED is to a certain extent not considered a high priority (South African Cities Network, 2019: 8). There is, however, a common element of what LED purports to accomplish and that is to economically develop the communities that they are directly governing or in close proximity to. The aim of LED is to enhance and create a conducive environment to drive local initiatives and promote welfare and business development within the community (Garane, 2021). LED must deal with the formal and informal economy on a parallel basis and must ensure support from the formal sector for the informal sector (Frank, 2021). It is now a well-established principle that all municipalities are required to draft an annual and five-year Integrated Development Plan, with the main purpose of planning and implementing the policies and programmes of an LED strategy. Municipalities’ economic development plans are captured through IDPs, with the key mandate being, in general, the promotion of LED, community empowerment, and redistribution through the provision of policymaking and direction. Municipalities are required to develop and ensure the enforcement of bylaws. They also need to develop processes to regulate land in a manner that aims to minimise costs of conducting business, while also optimising the inclusion of local communities (SALGA, 2010: 5–6). Municipalities have an overarching role in respect of LED; they must develop and provide an enabling environment for residents and businesses to have access and prosper through LED plans and must adopt a balanced approach to “pro-poor” and “pro-growth” (Meyer, 2014: 624–634). The standard view is that at the core of LED is the idea that growth and development require an effective local government that will administer policies, programmes, and projects (SALGA, 2010: 5–6). For successful LED, local governments should strive to cultivate an environment where they do not only roll out projects to communities or informal traders in townships but also ensure that there are continuous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place that will offer support in various forms. The support can be mentorship or partnerships with firmly established private institutions, where local governments facilitate ongoing contact of business owners in the informal sector. Municipalities are to be the main initiators and/or activators of economic development programmes through public spending, regulatory powers, and (in the case of larger municipalities) their promotion of industrial, small business development, social enterprises, and cooperatives (SALGA, 2010: 4). The role of a regulator has become extremely important with the establishment of increased private enterprises in respect of economic development. This is an imperative function for LED, and local municipalities are the most appropriate for this role (Mashamaite, 2018: 122). Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Synopsis Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality is one of the largest metropolitans in the Gauteng province and one of eight metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. It is also one of the most densely populated regions in Gauteng, having a population of over 3, 3 million, with a youthful skills base. The municipality’s vision for its future rests on the implementation of its bold vision for social and economic transformation. Ekurhuleni’s economy makes up 21% of the total economic output of the Gauteng province, equalling 7,7% of the national production (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2019). It accounts for a quarter of the province’s economy and is said to contribute to over a third of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), through its production of goods and commodities. The municipality has a structural advantage over other local authorities in the province in that many of the production plants are located in Ekurhuleni. Manufacturing in the municipality accounts for just below 20% of Gauteng’s GDP and 28% of the total production. Due to its large concentration of industry in relation to figures nationally, and even in Africa, the municipality is often referred to as “Africa’s Workshop” (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2005). Ekurhuleni is also known to be the country’s manufacturing hub due to its location. It was historically a mining region but is now largely known for its accessibility to critical centres in the province. It has developed an impressive transport network of roads, airports, railways, and telecommunications, putting the municipality at the forefront of transportation in the country (Mabogoane, 2016: 5). The OR Tambo International Airport, which is a vital asset, positions the municipality as an international aviation node. Furthermore, the local municipality has sophisticated logistics and distribution infrastructure within its jurisdiction (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2019). The municipality’s planners developed a core strategic concept, the Ekurhuleni Aerotropolis – a part of the broader National Strategic Infrastructure Plan (NSIP) – that was meant to be at the heart of a broader programme of urban revitalisation (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2019). The aerotropolis master plan was approved in November 2017 and a surge of investments and job creation were projected and expected by the municipality as a result of this development strategy. From the above, one can infer that due to its diverse and extensive economy, its local inhabitants and the municipality should be thriving much more, economically, as compared to its counterparts within the Gauteng province. But this paper shows that the levels of poverty-stricken communities and the unemployment rate in Ekurhuleni have instead progressed to extremely high levels. In addition, Ekurhuleni has become an area where there is a low education rate, which has led to a skills shortage (Motsapi, 2022). The IDP of the municipality demonstrates that the unemployment rate in Ekurhuleni increased from 2009; it stood at 26.6% in 2006, but by 2015 it had risen to 29.7%, pointing to the fact that the lack of vigorous LED continued to be a key factor. The unemployment in Ekurhuleni has consistently been higher than the provincial and national figures (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2018: 12). Identified / Current Challenges within the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality There are a variety of factors that contribute to the challenges and complexities that slow down the municipality’s economic development. Firstly, it does not have a primary or core distinguishable identity, for example, Johannesburg is known as the “City or Place of Gold”. From the outset, Ekurhuleni’s institutional arrangement and its encompassing areas were never planned as a single functioning unit. Instead, it was formed as nine separate and independent local authorities with different needs, resulting in a municipality that is spatially fragmented (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2005: 5-6). One can refer to this “identity” as a unique, inherited collection of assets, history, traits, and culture that distinguishes it internally and externally, and has the potential to unite people and a place (Clark, 2020). Some metropolitan councils developed their identities around a core area, or “drawcard”. For example, Cape Town, which is known for its central business district (CBD) area and is thus a top national and global destination; and Johannesburg, which is known as the “Municipality of Gold” and is the hub of economic activity. Secondly, the apartheid settlement patterns persist, where the residential areas are situated on the periphery of the urban areas (Mabogoane, 2016: 9-10), often far away from job opportunities and social amenities. The last decade has seen widespread expansion of informal settlements, especially within the mining belts of the municipality near the CBDs and older industrial areas (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2005: 8-9). It has been suggested that linked to the core of LED is the notion of nodes and corridors within developed areas. The rationale behind this approach, is that the nodes and corridors are strategically linked to the identification of areas for development that were used during the apartheid era to spatially separate communities. For example, for an effective public transport system, gaps were created between communities as a result of buffer zones to separate race groups (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2005, p. 14). Therefore, it is recommended that efforts aimed at optimally developing areas such as Leeuwpoort and Ramaphosa informal settlement should be strengthened. The influx of immigrants into the above informal settlements and continued migration of people in search of employment, demonstrates the fact that rural-to-urban migration is an ongoing activity. This migration remains a key challenge that is exacerbated by underlying historical pre-1994 spatial settlement arrangements. The increase in informal settlements has led to increased informal trading, much of which remains unregulated (Metroplan Town and Regional Planners, 2012, p. 7). The probability of the population trading in illegal or counterfeit goods in these areas increasing due to migrants’ need for survival is high and, therefore, it is something that will remain an ongoing challenge. Recent Statistics South Africa research found that 216 companies (mostly SMMEs) across various sectors were liquidated in March 2021, compared to 178 in February 2021 – an increase of 21%. Liquidations at this rate and the trading in counterfeit goods exacerbate South Africa’s unemployment, which by the broadest definition is approximately 40% (Pozniak, 2021). The rapid growth of the city’s forced urbanisation has the potential implication of over-population, which directly affects the city’s ability to plan, budget, and deliver services to its citizens. Moreover, the competition for over-stretched resources could have unpalatable social and economic implications for citizens, its institutions, and its ability to respond timeously and adequately. Township Economy South Africa is facing serious social and economic challenges. The country has a spatial plan that is not properly integrated to logistically connect the rural, township, and city areas efficiently. This fragmented spatial ‘ordering’ poses a serious challenge to economic development, with one of the upshots being the negative impact it has on the informal settlements. The City of Ekurhuleni’s informal sector or labour markets – such as the car washes, shisa-nyamas, salon stalls, etc. – do not have adequate support for their survival, let alone to thrive as sustainable businesses contributing to economic growth. A key challenge, it seems, for the City of Ekurhuleni has been to uplift small informal businesses in townships and to register them as formal private businesses (Ekurhuleni, 2020, p. 25). There are serious material and economic inequalities within the municipality, including the disparity in investment between the informal business sectors in the townships versus the businesses in the formal sector, or mainstream businesses. Another point of concern is that most of the nine towns within the jurisdiction of the city are to some extent characterised by urban decay and deterioration of the physical environment (Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, 2005: 8). Moreover, the disturbing phenomenon of buildings in the inner town or cities being “hijacked” and operated by criminal characters is a grievous obstacle to attracting investors. Ekurhuleni loses millions in revenue as a ramification of illegal occupation and misuse of municipal infrastructure by consumers who do not pay for services. The municipality does not have a critical tool, a bylaw, in place to deal with issues pertaining to hijacked or deteriorated properties within its inner cities, rendering it incapable of addressing issues arising from the urban decay and other challenges emanating from these problems. The responses by the municipality in dealing decisively with the enforcement of some of its bylaws have failed, especially in the eviction of illegal occupants, who do not pay rates and taxes, adding more pressure to an already burdened system of revenue collection (Motsapi, 2022). Furthermore, other relevant legislation that would provide processes to manage imperatives identified have thus far proven ineffective. The flagship projects identified in the IDPs as urban regeneration – the Germiston Urban Renewal Programme and urban renewal in Kempton Park (South African Cities Network, 2014: 36) – need to be vigorously implemented. Revitalisation of Manufacturing The manufacturing sector in Ekurhuleni remains one of the largest in the province, accounting for 21,5% of the gross value addition, and 27.9% of the overall gross value addition in Gauteng, in 2017. The manufacturing rate currently sits at 20,5% (Ekurhuleni, 2020: 21). The industry has been hard hit by the consequences of Covid-19, as reported in GDP reports stating that the sector suffered a 74,9% financial downturn. This sector-wide drop includes iron, steel, non-ferrous metal products, metal products, and machinery – it has all contributed to a total of 11% to the overall 51% decline. As the central location in respect of the production of metal products, machinery and plastics, accounting for around one-third of total South African output in these sectors, the municipality’s economy suffers when these sectors perform poorly (Roberts, 2011: 2). The city has a mammoth task to revitalise the industry and ensure that they are proactive in taking the lead to restore the manufacturing sector, particularly where matters of compliance by firms is concerned. The city should not be slow to engage big industrial players, to obtain an understanding of how they have been able to survive or navigate the pandemic. Such interaction would assist the city to best ascertain how to assist them, thus ensuring their continued existence in the LED region and securing of jobs (Motsapi, 2022). Another key element in Ekurhuleni is agriculture, which only contributed 0.4% to the GDP of the municipality. It is the sector that contributes the least to the economy of the municipality, bringing in a meagre R1.22 billion or 0.42% of the total GDP. That said, the sector experienced growth between 2008 and 2018, with the highest growth recorded in 2017 and an average growth rate of 13.4% (Ekurhuleni, 2020: 23). The city was able to identify land that could be used for agricultural purposes through its “rapid land release programme”. Historically, it has been women who have relied heavily on the agricultural sector for the alleviation of poverty not only in their homes, but also in their direct communities. In Africa, women in rural areas constitute most of the agricultural labour force in small-scale subsistence farming, and globally, make up 43% of the agricultural labour force (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2022). It is an undervalued sector that ought to be used to re-evaluate women's role and any other individuals that demonstrate commitment to and potential for being economically active as entrepreneurs or small-scale farmers, which might have the consequence of reducing poverty. The city, like other municipalities, is lagging in strategically repositioning agriculture as a sector that can provide viable economic and growth opportunities rather than merely being a subsistence sector. There has been steady progress in respect to the municipality making land available for farming purposes – 11 farms were handed over to successful bidders in August 2021. The municipality urged upcoming farmers to pair themselves with experienced farmers (Matsimela, 2021). Ongoing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the programmes and projects rolled out by the municipality lack visibility. Its economic development department needs to continuously conduct skills audits to verify whether they have the requisite human capital with the relevant expertise. It is also essential to consistently update the database with external stakeholders that the municipality can partner with. Legislation that is meant to regulate the informal sector or informal trading more often does not actually assist them. It is more onerous on informal traders from a compliance perspective and, therefore, makes it more challenging for them to get consent for use and other crucial permissions such as permits to operate their businesses. One major reason being that various red tape serves as a bottleneck rather than regulating or easing the integration of the informal (ergo, township) economy into the mainstream economy. Furthermore, the Constitution enjoins the municipality as one of the levels of government that must facilitate LED, whereas the legislative authority in terms of decision-making pertaining to issues of importance relating to LED, lies in the hands of the provincial and national government. As an example, the National Disaster Regulations provide for the suspension of issuing of permits, whilst municipalities are required by law to regulate the granting and/or declining of permits (Motsapi, 2022). The above is an inhibiting factor for most municipalities. Consequently, municipalities have to explore the option of powers being assigned to them by a higher structure of government for key areas when, in fact, the enforcement, regulation, and implementation ought to primarily be entrusted to local levels of government. Proposed Interventions by the Gauteng Township Economic Bill There is significant spatial inequality in the spread of economic opportunities in the suburban areas versus township areas in South Africa, and in the ability of townships to contribute to growth, being located far from urban towns’ economic hubs. The newly drafted Gauteng Township Economic Development Bill (the Bill) is aimed at redrafting how townships are regulated and governed to transform them into zones of widespread job-creating commercial activity. The Bill will set up procurement rules and programmatic support that will allow government and its main contractors to buy from large groups of township-based firms. The province further proposes the establishment of a Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) Fund to provide wholesale, blended finance to intermediaries that can de-risk lending to township-based firms, including community banks (Constitution Hill Blog, 2021). One is not certain, though, whether this is a response to key challenge(s) with the current procurement processes in place, particularly the 30% regime for small emerging companies to partner with established businesses. A key observation is that the manner or structure of the procurement legislation in place serves to enrich individuals more often, instead of the actual creation of more employment for the needy (Motsapi, 2022). Ekurhuleni has for the past couple of years encountered its own challenges in enforcing and effectively implementing SPLUMA along with its own land-use schemes and other bylaws aimed at dealing with economic matters. The municipality is still attempting to create an environment wherein it will be conducive to and hassle-free for the ease of conducting or operating businesses (Motsapi, 2022). Therefore, any additional prescriptive production of legislation – in the form of the Bill and the proposed legislation – will in effect over-burden the municipality. The Bill must ensure that clauses contained therein are not in conflict with other regulating tools that are aligned to the existing framework and legislation, otherwise the result may lead to inefficiencies. Ekurhuleni, like other municipalities, drafts its own IDP and allocates funding according to its current challenging landscape. The Bill makes proposals that will potentially impact on the already highly fragmented geography. This poses a huge problem for an infrastructure policy framework and may cause further challenges. It is difficult to foresee how it will aid in the development of the municipality’s economy. Therefore, it seems that Ekurhuleni, like other municipalities, still needs to get the basics right in terms of the smooth operation of current systems and processes in place with respect to land use development, and other ancillary issues related to economic development, before it can think of implementing new laws. It is up to municipalities to work diligently, continuously, and consistently at capacitating its officials, who must always be made aware of the legal frameworks regarding the transfer of any land belonging to the government. They must be trained on the varying policy initiatives for the disposal of state-owned land, which may ensure that processes in respect of land are seamless and negotiations around the releasing of available land, easy (South African Cities Network, 2014, pp. 6-7). A key challenge in relying on land as a resource to tackle LED, is the profusion of un-rehabilitated land, specifically in areas where a lot of mining has taken place (Motsapi, 2022). The municipality must, then, know how the land within their jurisdiction is managed – proper records of audits of usable land and that which is not usable must be kept updated. Its property-related departments should work synergistically in identifying various land parcels and continuously reporting on issues around land to the provincial and national governments. The National LED Framework 2018-2028 sets out an expanded vision that identifies, with high levels of certainty, what needs to be done in order to progress towards a more successful form of LED. This is underpinned by the necessity to advance and deepen the country’s understanding of LED, its function in national, regional development and growth in South Africa (Cogta, 2011). The framework is anchored on six core policy pillars that are supposed to influence the design, development, and implementation of LED and what it hopes to achieve: (1) building diverse and innovation-driven local economies; (2) developing inclusive economies; (3) developing learning and skilful economies; (4) enterprise development and support; (5) economic governance and infrastructure; and (6) strengthening local systems of innovation (Cogta, 2011). Ekurhuleni still has a lot of work to do for it to elevate the status of its township economy to that of its mainstream business characterised by robustness and efficiency in their operations. The duty of the municipality to develop thriving local economies and further position them for specifically designed and packaged government interventions, is not being fulfilled at the desired pace. However, the provincial government has at least developed the Gauteng Township Bill, with a view to accelerating these kinds of interventions and bringing about the required change. The municipality’s promotion of regional LED has been slow when it comes to the revitalisation of industrial parks, which are central economic nodes. Covid-19 made it even more challenging to measure any growth in this sector. Municipalities have a clear responsibility in terms of the Constitution to carry out their mandated functions in a manner that promotes local economic and social development. Most municipalities regard the critical element of LED to be an economic one, specifically the optimum utilisation of local resources to achieve reasonable and sustainable growth objectives (SALGA, 2010). Scholars, such as Bartik (2003) and Trah (2004) propose the following fundamental approaches to LED strategy design: conventional or traditional approaches that assert that the key to prosperity is attracting investment (primarily manufacturing), through allowances such as tax breaks, cheap land, and even direct financial rewards, in return for locating in an area. The output of this for municipalities ought to be the creation of jobs through investments; the increase of urban efficiency by local authorities being able to increase urban productivity, through lowering the cost of living and doing business in the locality. The municipality must, to a reasonable and sustainable degree, be willing to cut taxes and service charges to allow businesses to grow. It should privatise some non-core services, if and where possible. Efforts must be made to ensure equitable distribution of human resource development, which has positive consequences in terms of attracting and use of investment. Municipalities must provide and give support to the establishment of local training bodies and require that firms provide a minimum amount of training to their employees; community-based approaches that emphasise the importance of working directly with low-income communities and their organisations; and, lastly, entrepreneurial-competitive approaches that emphasise the importance of local comparative advantages and small businesses in job creation. Local authorities must play a pivotal role in identifying growth sectors and in supporting businesses through research, consultancy, premises, technical infrastructure, and even loans or grants (Waldt, 2020: 5). Situational Analysis The World Bank defines LED as “the process by which public, business and non-governmental sector partner’s work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation”. There are, however, several criteria or principles for measuring economic development, although none provides a satisfactory and universally acceptable index. There is no single approach to LED; each locality must develop an approach that is best suited to its local context. The National Framework for Local Economic Development in South Africa 2006-2011 identifies the following as key principles underlying LED: it must create and prioritise job creation and poverty alleviation within their local communities; may target previously disadvantaged people, marginalised communities and geographical regions, black economic empowerment enterprises, and SMMEs to allow them to participate fully in the economic life of the country; must use local resources and skills and maximise opportunities for development; must improve quality of life by promoting local ownership, community involvement, local leadership, and joint decision-making; must involve local, national, and international partnerships between communities, businesses and government to solve problems, create joint business ventures, and build local areas. Bartik (2002: 6) proposes that the type of evaluation of LED policies most needed is estimates of the impact of the policies on desirable local economic outcomes, or “outcome impact” evaluation. Programmes that provide a service or financial assistance to enterprises may be evaluated using the control and treatment group type of experiment. The analysis can be accompanied by surveys and focus groups to determine whether the organisation achieved its objectives or not. The surveys can be used to determine the effects of the programme on business decision-making for the organisation, or rather, in this case, the municipality (Studies in Poverty and Inequality Alleviation, 2013). A more commonly used criteria of economic development are increase in national income, per capita real income, comparative concept, standard of living, and economic welfare of the community. Ekurhuleni is still a major economic and social role-player in South Africa by means of its strong industrial characteristics and contribution to the national economy, and the size and extent of its population. The municipality contributed 19.67% to the Gauteng GDP of R1.7 trillion in 2018 and is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 1.75% from 2018 to 2023. Gauteng and South Africa are projected to grow at 1.72% and 1.60% respectively (City of Ekurhuleni, 2021-2022: 26-27). The above demonstrates that the municipality is still a main contributor nationally. Research conducted by it revealed that the average annual household income within the municipality is R29 400, which is about the same in Gauteng, and South Africa (City of Ekurhuleni, 2021-2022: 25). However, there are still critical areas where the municipality is lagging behind in improving the lives of its population. For example, the exceedingly high unemployment rate, which stands at 30.1% – 1% higher than the provincial and national levels (City of Ekurhuleni, 2021-2022: 46). In summary, there is a substantial percentage of the population that are still living in informal dwellings, 18.7%, which is higher than the figure for Gauteng (City of Ekurhuleni, 2021-2022: 24). Clearly, the municipality still has a great deal of work to do towards achieving its local economic objectives. Recommendations Firstly, it is necessary as a basis for the city to conduct a desktop re-evaluation of all its current policies, legislation, programmes, projects, all relevant operational systems, and initiatives pertaining to economic development. The results of the SWOT analysis – a strategic planning and management technique used to help a person or organisation identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related to business competition or project planning – will identify the areas that need intervention and perhaps even what those interventions must be. Secondly, the historical context of Ekurhuleni means that its institutions at the metro level are weak. The bringing together of nine different towns, which were largely rivals, meant that the common institutions had to be built in order to bring uniformity (Roberts, 2011: 16). These central institutions are not well defined and operational in the city. The leadership at the helm of the city should strive to advocate a change in the mind-set of officials, who should by now have completely moved away from the mind-set of the previous dismantled municipalities (Frank, 2021). With the marketing of a single city, and the employment of staff who are not from the previous municipalities, there is now a need for the city’s departments to work in a coordinated manner to achieve the objective of LED. A clear network of institutions is imperative for the city to be able to realise the collective benefits of the different towns or regions. The effect should be the sharing of crucial skills, technical know-how, thereby assisting with developing resources that are urgently needing to be upgraded. The “network of institutions” – the internal networks of the city and public-private partnerships with the various groups of enterprises – can be motivated through incentive measures and skills development for employees who are tasked with implementing the government policies and rolling out effective service delivery. According to Roberts (2011: 2), the balance of power must come through building or rebuilding more coherent bodies representing interests of downstream manufacturing, small to medium enterprises, empowerment, and equity objectives. The city should also invest in facilitating the fostering of these connections, as the governance of these inter-firm relationships is vital to the development of local industries. In addition, the city must attempt to meet private companies halfway by putting in place incentives such as “payment holidays” from rates/taxes, to attract new investors and keep investors developing within its borders (Motsapi, 2022). Thirdly, the Economic Development Department must have a functional division that is able to formulate, implement, and monitor policies seeking to revitalise, create, and manage an informal economy, actively targeting poverty alleviation and wealth creation. Individuals must have a fair opportunity to transition from the informal economy to the formal economy, and local government is ideally placed to facilitate this process (Frank, 2021). This division must, along with other departments, also dedicate time to the issue of rebuilding decaying or hijacked building infrastructure, with the intended outcome of attracting investors. The city could identify properties to purchase and turn into low-cost housing or even rental stock. In addition, the identification of land parcels, through land audits, to be utilised for various purposes including agricultural development, is also vital (Frank, 2021). The city should consider the establishment of a committee or task team mandated with property-related issues as well as enforcement of its bylaws with regards to building contraventions. A collaborative approach should be adopted, where the landlords or owners are made part of the task teams or committees, as they are essential in the reclaiming of hijacked and decaying buildings. With regards leasing land to emerging farmers to invest, promote, and regenerate the agricultural economy, the municipality needs to develop appropriate measures to support stable capabilities, tutoring, collective learning, and upskilling. The city should foster a proactive leadership role in facilitating the fast-tracking of land use applications and the granting of consent for informal traders that conduct businesses in the townships. There should be consistent training and development of individuals at the frontline of assisting the public with information regarding applying with council to open businesses, whether informally or formally. A key priority should be holding information workshops with the public to educate them in general with regards to applications and processes (Frank, 2021). The municipality also needs to use the legislative tools available – such as Chapter 7 of the Constitution, SPLUMA, and the Regulations of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) – to include the informal economy in the formal economy. The regulations of the PPPFA obligate the municipality to provide for subcontracting of at least 30% of a tender, which value exceeds R30 million. This regulation has created a superstructure for targeting the informal economy, but, as yet there is no policy developed by the municipality to implement these regulations effectively (Behari, 2021). Furthermore, the supply chain policy ought to be reviewed to make it applicable, and inclusive of the informal sector. Pending the finalisation and/or adoption of the Gauteng Township Economic Bill, the municipality should revise its town planning scheme, and implementation of SPLUMA should also make provision for the development of the informal economy. Currently, there is a tendency to deal with many informal businesses as contraventions of the town planning scheme. Where appropriate, land use in terms of consent must be considered. The city should propose to provincial and national government that it should be assigned with competent powers in terms of the Constitution in areas where it is required to regulate by law, as it is municipalities who in fact govern their communities at grassroots level. Therefore, municipalities, in certain key areas, should have the same powers as other levels of government, lest the lack of powers hinder service delivery in urgent situations. In areas where municipalities have proper infrastructure and can supply electricity, they should be given those rights. SALGA is currently seeking that municipalities be granted exclusive rights by the courts to distribute electricity within their boundaries to bolster revenue collection. Conclusion According to studies, the size of Ekurhuleni’s economy and its location within South Africa’s economic heartland of Gauteng does not appear to have translated into strong local economic development. The literature review suggests that robust economic development policies have an essential role to play in the planning and provision of sustainable support for building technical abilities, capacity in terms of appropriate skills, resources, and infrastructure. We also noted the importance of a coordinated approach that is responsive to evolving global technology and adapts industrial and agricultural policies as well as skills development frameworks, to ensure both the formal and informal economies realise the benefits. The formal sector is an easier category to “manage”. A large part of the budget and effort is devoted to the formal sector, as this is one of the primary bases for raising rates and sales of utilities. Whereas there is a tendency to either neglect or minimise the importance of the informal sector. One of the legacies of apartheid is the lack of economic development in previously designated black townships and rural areas. Poverty is a significant driver of the informal economy. Not all informal settlements are poor, but most of the inhabitants are indeed indigents and require social safety nets. It is thus crucial that some sort of formalisation of some of the habitable settlements becomes a key priority. It is imperative that the municipality’s Human Settlement Department is consistent and tightens up efforts in its process to identify settlements that can be upgraded or, alternatively, transitioned for the land to be bought and/or expropriated. (Motsapi, 2022). The objective of any human being to earn a living is not primarily to make a profit, but to provide shelter and feed a family. Left neglected and unregulated, the informal economy has the potential to become a source of nuisance and lawlessness. Most often the reaction from the municipality is to seek legal recourse and shut down informal businesses. This practice is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. The local economic problem is at times further exacerbated when documented or undocumented foreigners set up informal businesses in townships and exploit the market or economy, adding to the imbalanced competition within the informal sector. Left unattended, the informal economy could become unmanageable and may not contribute effectively to addressing the crisis of poverty for thousands. References Act, M. S. 2000. Regulations on appointment and conditions of employment. In Municipal Systems Act. s.l.: s.n. Anon. 1995. Front Matter. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-10-14-gauteng-municipalities-have-a-20-vacancy-rate-among-senior-managers/ [accessed: 4 June 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Inclusive Society Institute Research Team SEPTEMBER 2022 Content Overview Background President Ramaphosa sets the scene at the NPC Macro-situation for consideration The global environment Domestic landscape National Policy Conference deliberations Organisational renewal Political party modernisation and reform Electoral Reform State/local government Economic Transformation Universal Basic Income Grant (BIG) Social Transformation Peace and stability Fight against corruption and State capture Conclusion Projections of where South Africa is currently situated ISI views: The way forward Appendix Snapshot of academics’/analysts’/journalists’ Comments Prof Richard Calland (Public Law, UCT)(2022) Duma Gqubule (economist)(2022) Rebecca Davis (journalist, Daily Maverick)(2022) Prof Susan Booysen (political scientist, author and analyst)(2022) Anton Harber (2022) References Cover page photograph source: https://mg.co.za/opinion/2022-07-28-anc-policy-conference-the-iceberg-moment-is-upon-us/ Overview Background The 6th National Policy Conference (NPC) took place from 29-31 July 2022 at NASREC, Johannesburg, in the year that has been declared by the ANC as ‘The Year of Unity and Renewal to Defend and Advance South Africa’s Democratic Gains’. The NPC was truncated from five to three days, with one of the reasons for this being a lack of resources. The Conference is held in compliance with the ANC Constitution, which states that “the NEC may convene a Policy Conference, as a recommendation-making body on any matter of policy, whenever it deems it necessary, but the NEC shall convene a National Policy Conference at least six months before the National Conference to review policies of the ANC and to recommend any new or to amend any present policy for consideration by the National Conference”. The ANC Constitution provides that the Policy Conference should be preceded by the National General Council (NGC). This would have taken place in 2020 but was cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. President Ramaphosa, in his opening address, said that the NPC “in many ways is a defining moment for the ANC and for our country”. President Ramaphosa also stated that the delegates “carry the responsibility to shape policy proposals that will deepen the renewal of our movement and hasten the transformation of our society”. Many liken this moment to the “consultative conferences” of Mogorogoro (1969) and Kabwe (1985) when the ANC faced deep crises in its ranks. There were calls to hybridise the NGC and NPC, where an “organisational review” would be presented. This would allow a review of the performance of the NEC and officials, including that of the President. It has been suggested that political motives prompted these calls for a hybrid conference. Historically, the 2005 NGC is legendary for the revolt against then ANC President Mbeki and the recall of Jacob Zuma after his dismissal as deputy president of the country. In December 2007, the Jacob Zuma slate triumphed against the Thabo Mbeki slate by a 60-40% margin. On the eve of the NPC, the National Working Committee (NWC) turned down the request for hybridisation. Some delegates tried to re-raise these issues at the NPC but could not muster sufficient support. President Ramaphosa sets the scene at the NPC In his opening address, President Ramaphosa set the tone for the NPC, when he said that “our deliberations over the next few days, the resolutions we will adopt at our 55th National Conference, and the actions that we then take, will determine the fate of our movement and indeed the direction of our country. This Policy Conference should be seen as a festival of ideas, where the ANC lives up to its role as the leader of society by developing policies that relate to the lived experience of our people where they live to shape the trajectory of our country. We have exhibited discipline in our discussions and our exchanges at branch, regional and provincial level in preparation for this conference. This should underpin our approach to discussions and exchanges at this conference. Many in the media expect this to be a conference where we will fight amongst ourselves and differ widely on a variety of matters of politics and ideology. We will demonstrate, in accordance with ANC tradition, that where we might have different views and approaches on various matters, we are always able to build consensus and emerge with coherent policy positions.” The President, in his political overview, noted that the ANC was at its weakest ever. He also outlined the myriad of challenges the ANC faces and that need to be addressed in order for our society to flourish. Macro-situation for consideration South Africa has been afflicted by poor economic growth since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This has not improved the country’s socio-economic conditions, which are characterised by anaemic economic growth, unacceptably high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, corruption and malfeasance, gender violence, rising insecurity, and low trust and social cohesion in society. Policy proposals need to address these challenges and unlock cooperation amongst social partners to improve matters. The question needing to be answered is: How is it that South Africa, which has one of the highest spending budgets for education and health, suffers from such poor outcomes in those areas? Our social safety framework is globally lauded as one of the most comprehensive in the world. However, our development must be shifted so that it can become more inclusive and sustainable. The global environment If we thought 2020 was a momentous year, with the outbreak of the novel Covid-19 virus, 2022 appears to be equally so. The global public health crisis triggered by the pandemic quickly turned into the largest global economic crisis in more than a century, resulting in major setbacks to growth, increased poverty rates, and widened inequality. The economic slowdown – equivalent to a mini-recession – induced by Covid-19, is now coupled with the rise in inflation, increases in energy, food, fertiliser, etc. There has been a tightening of interest rates to counter rising inflation, deeply impacting real incomes and consumer spending. Particularly, there is concern about rising food prices, given its disproportionate impact on the poor. The world faces a volatile situation, unprecedented in recent history. In May, England’s Central Bank Governor, Andrew Bailey, warned that the catastrophic food prices could have a disastrous impact on the world’s poor for a long time. He went on to say that “this is the biggest test of the monetary policy framework in 25 years. There is no question about that” (Elliot, 2022a). Also in May, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, António Guterres, cautioned that a potential global food crisis could last years if it goes unchecked, as the World Bank announced an additional $12 billion in funding to mitigate its “devastating effects”. Guterres said shortages of grain and fertiliser caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, warming temperatures, and pandemic-driven supply problems threaten to “tip tens of millions of people over the edge into food insecurity”, as financial markets saw share prices fall heavily again on fears of inflation and a worldwide recession (Guterres, 2002). Speaking at a UN meeting in New York on global food security, Guterres said that what could follow is “malnutrition, mass hunger and famine, in a crisis that could last for years”, as he and others urged Russia to release Ukrainian grain exports. He said he was in “intense contact” with Russia and other countries to try to find a solution. Guterres further stated that “the complex security, economic and financial implications require goodwill on all sides for a package deal to be reached”. Together, Russia and Ukraine produce 30% of the world’s wheat. Before the invasion in February, Ukraine was seen as the world’s breadbasket, exporting 4.5m tonnes of agricultural produce per month through its ports – 12% of the planet’s wheat, 15% of its corn, and half of its sunflower oil. Prices have skyrocketed. The UN’s food and agricultural price index reached an all-time high of almost 160 points in March before falling 1.2 or 0.8% in April. In the words of UNSG Guterres: “Let’s be clear: there is no effective solution to the food crisis without reintegrating Ukraine’s food production”. World Food Programme Head David Beasley said at the summit: “The world is on fire. We have solutions. We need to act, and we need to act now” (Farrer, 2022). Countries such as Egypt and Tunisia rely heavily on exports of Ukraine’s wheat and cooking oil. Sri Lankans have suffered months of severe shortages of food, fuel, and medicine – as well as long power cuts – after the country burnt through foreign currency reserves needed to pay for vital imports. This led to mass protests and the forced resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the Cabinet. Subsequently, then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced to resign and was replaced by former six-time Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe (with one seat in Parliament). There have been warnings that this could create a domino effect globally, and protests in many other countries, particularly around high food and energy prices (Elliot, 2022b). Prof Carmen Reinhart, Chief Economist of the World Bank, says in the 2022 World Development Report, “It’s time to prioritise early, tailored action to support a healthy financial system that can provide the credit growth needed to fuel recovery. If we don’t, it is the most vulnerable that would be hit hardest” (World Bank, 2022). The outbreak of hostilities between Ukraine and Russia has made the world more crisis-prone and unpredictable. The most recent sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Straits around Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi’s visit, has accelerated tensions between the USA and China. This event is as momentous as the dissolution of the Eastern Block, which signified the end of the Cold War. This ushered in the era of globalisation and ostensible good growth prospects for the globe. A new Cold War appears in the offing and will reshape the global political and economic environment for the foreseeable future. In the intervening period, the world has witnessed events that have altered global affairs drastically, from the dissolution of the USSR, the rise of globalisation – predicated on an international liberal world order – to the outbreak of the Covid-19 virus and various wars over the years. The much-trumpeted globalisation process has been weakened by the effects of increased levels of inequality, the rise of nationalism/illiberalism, the hollowing out of democracy, trade conflicts, climate change induced disasters, the coronavirus pandemic, and now, the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The world has also witnessed the rise of Asia in general – and China in particular. With its large, populous countries, Asia has seen the centre of gravity of economic activity shifting from West to East, thereby challenging the US-EU global dominance. Its economic development is regarded as unprecedented and hundreds of millions of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty in record time. The “pivot to the East” of the USA was in the main to prevent the rise of a rival to its pre-dominant global super-power position. This has been the stated position of the US, from the 1990s onwards, with the release of its revised 1992 national security paradigm. The world has also witnessed the waning in influence of multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The United Nations has been dysfunctional in resolving global flashpoints as events showed in Libya, Yemen, and now, the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This dysfunctionality of the UN has resulted in a move away from multilateralism towards unilateralism and a focus on regional blocs, which has led to further polarisation globally. It is the view of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) that this strengthens the need for UN reform, inclusive of its Charter and especially the security council mechanism. All the multilateral bodies do not reflect the world as of 2022, but still, by and large, the post-WWII geo-political balance of power. This needs to change sooner rather than later, and not merely incrementally. On the BRICS front, its character has changed since its inception. The BRICs concept was coined in November 2021 by then-Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neill. It was premised on the idea that the “world would be shaped over the coming decades not by Europe and America, but by growth in Asia and the emergent markets” (Tooze, 2021). The intention behind BRICS was to open up policy space for governments, especially in the developing world, to pursue more independent paths to sustainable economic development. However, the reactions to the initial four BRICS members varied: “There was delight in Russia, bafflement in China, cynicism in Brazil and indifference in India” (Tett, 2010). The economic progress of BRICS has been impressive; between 2000 and 2011, they more than doubled their share of the global economy from 8% to 19%. Several countries – including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Argentina – are engaged in the BRICS membership process. And overtures have been made to Indonesia, UAE, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand, and Kazakhstan to attend development meetings. It should be borne in mind that BRICS brought “together a mix of democratic and authoritarian regimes, with very different societal structures, resource bases, developmental trajectories, and historical traditions” (Narlikar, 2020). The addition of more countries, most not known for their democratic credentials, might exacerbate these divisions. Already, the Covid-19 pandemic has illuminated the fault lines in BRICS and ongoing global realignments. In conclusion, we agree with Prof Jim O’Neill’s (2021) view that “what the world really needs is what we called for back in 2001: genuinely representative global (economic) governance”. This raises the question of what South Africa’s position will be on these vexing issues. Africa has witnessed increasing instability and conflict over the last period. It also needs to simultaneously diversify its economies, lessen its dependence on commodities that are prone to cyclical movements, and re-industrialise. These developments play out against the backdrop of a weakened AU and coup d’états in 2021, mainly in West Africa, ongoing tensions in Libya, Chad, CAR, the DRC Sudan and Ethiopia, rooted principally in a challenge to manage diversity. The Sahel region, Nigeria, Somalia, and Mozambique experienced conflicts flowing from jihadist’s actions. These are worrying trends that require urgent attention and resolution. Africa does not appear to feature on the global agenda of formations like the G7, etc. We should guard against Africa becoming the playground of superpowers again, as was the case during the Cold War; this time more as a scramble for resources and spheres of influence by the “great powers”. Africa should resist being pulled into one, exclusive sphere of influence. The continent should focus on trade and investment opportunities that foster its sustainable development. The new frontier of extractive industries will be for raw materials for renewable energy, of which Africa has in abundance. As Europe accelerates its renewable energy, weaning itself off Russian gas and oil, the appetite for raw materials will explode. Africa should engage the West and the East on its terms and what is in its interests, what the Inclusive Society Institute refers to as “triangular engagement”. With reference to the NPC’s International Relations paper; the paper is long, but short on specifics and the strategic position of South Africa vis-à-vis the continent and the globe. The following paragraph is illustrative of this non-specificity. “Our commitment to the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 as an expression of the aspirations of Africans, is central to the view that the silencing of guns on the continent is as much a security matter as it is a governance and development imperative. In this context, the full operationalisation of the AfCFTA; the further strengthening of NEPAD and the operationalisation of the tripartite free trade area between SADC, COMESA and EAC remain of great importance.” Domestic landscape The situation at home has been equally challenging following the onset of Covid-19 in 2020. The ANC’s electoral fortunes have been on a downward trajectory over the last few elections, with the exception of the 2017 national election. The ANC also suffers from a significant trust deficit amongst the populace. The poor turnout at the pre-NPC gala dinner was illustrative of how the ANC’s standing has decreased. This is in addition to the financial crisis that the party suffers presently. During the 2019 provincial elections, the ANC declined by 10%, depreciating its majority to a precarious 54.21% of the vote. In the 2021 local government elections, the ANC’s support declined to 47.21%. If this trajectory continues, the ANC could slip below 50% in the 2024 general election, necessitating a coalition arrangement. The ANC is also at risk in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Northern Cape, and Nort West. It is already in opposition in the Gauteng metros, even though it garnered the highest percentage. Most opposition parties appear determined to unite against the ANC and keep it out of power; this trend is likely to remain. The latest Ipsos poll (published in August 2022) confirms the decline. Whilst the ISI’s interpretation of the poll does not share the view that the ANC support could decline to as low as 42%, nor that it can be removed from government, it does suggest that it is currently hovering around the 50% mark. In a medium voter turnout scenario, the ISI is of the opinion that the ANC would garner between 48-50% of the national vote should an election be held now. Therefore, given that ANC support is hovering at around the 50% mark, they would most probably be able to form a government on their own. But if not, there are several potential coalition partners, with similar policy orientations, that could push them over the 50% mark that is required to form a government. In the Institute’s view, no opposition party will be able to form a coalition government without the inclusion or support of the EFF, whose support is currently in the region of 12-13%. Therefore, any coalition government that is formed to oust the ANC will likely suffer from policy incoherence. This will result in governance instability and/or unpredictability. Tshwane, Johannesburg, and Nelson Mandela are all undergoing permutations of these failures. Although unlikely, should such a coalition be formed, similar failures are sure to be repeated at the national level (and provincial level, where applicable). Accordingly, the ISI does not see an election that offers two coherent policy options. There appears to be a choice between, on the one hand, unpredictability and instability, and on the other, continuity and predictability. Both, it could be argued in the current environment, have downsides. South Africa is far from where it needs to be. So, should the ANC wish to retain its lead position, it is incumbent on them to prove their commitment to real renewal and sensible growth-centred policies. This commitment to build the necessary trust capable of convincing the electorate that it will not be business as usual, or the lack thereof, will become evident during the ANC National Conference scheduled for later this year. Despite significant progress over the years, the ANC is faced with a number of critical challenges, which have led to the erosion of electoral support and confidence in the ANC as a leader of society. The policy documents note some the following factors: Low economic growth and a parlous fiscal situation Unacceptably high levels of inequality, unemployment, and poverty Widespread corruption, malfeasance, and underperformance A lack of planning, coordination, implementation, and accountability for the work in government and the achievement of policy goals Poor political will and leadership, and failure to implement the ANC’s policies and programmes Failure to respect the values of the organization; serving the community and addressing their concerns is subordinated to factional interests Violent protests and assassinations fueled by rival factions, some of which are institutionalised Lack of accountability, accessibility, and transparency by ANC deployees, including poor communication with communities, lack of transparency, weak or ineffective ward committees Declining service delivery and poor municipal financial management Declining support for the ANC in elections across all spheres of government July 2021 unrest and looting, mainly in KZN and Gauteng. National Policy Conference deliberations Discussions at the Policy Conference were based on discussion papers contained in the Special Edition Umrabulo, published in May 2022, and three discussion papers on State Capture and Corruption, Migration, and Gender and Women’s Emancipation (Vol II). The last revision of Through the Eye of the Needle, published in the Special Edition Umrabulo for the proposed 2020 NGC, was circulated on 30 July 2022 at the Conference. Presentations were made on the following four overarching topics to assist discussions in the commissions: Strategy and Tactics, and Balance of Forces; Organisational Renewal; State Capture and Combatting Corruption; Gender Equity and the Emancipation of Women. These are regarded as transversal issues and the first two as scene setting. They were discussed simultaneously in all eight commissions and encapsulated in one report back. The other eight papers were discussed separately on the day in each of the eight commissions, with a separate report back: Commission 1: Peace and Stability Commission 2: Social Transformation Commission 3: Education, Health Science and Tech Commission 4: Culture and Heritage Commission 5: International Relations Commission 6: Legislature and Governance Commission 7: Communications and Battle of Ideas Commission 8: Economic Transformation What follows is a critique of a number of these papers. Organisational renewal Organisational renewal of the ANC is pivotal for its future and the country’s. The 54th ANC National Conference in 2017 resolved that: “Organisational renewal therefore is an absolute and urgent priority, and we may go as far as to say, to the survival of our great movement.” Moving from being a liberation movement to “moving into the seats of power” of government has attracted all kinds of careerists, many of whom are there for their own selfish interests and are ANC in name only, if that. Being in government has brought many negative elements, ranging from gatekeeping; influence of money politics in elections; swelling of ranks by careerists and opportunists; putting the interests of individuals ahead of the organisation and society; growing levels of malfeasance and corruption; poor service delivery; a distant, out of touch, inward-looking ANC unable to be effective agents of change and connect with communities; decreasing levels of trust and credibility in the ANC. This has resulted in the ANC losing support, most deeply illustrated in the recent November 2021 local government elections, where ANC support dropped below 50% in a number of metros. This is a huge warning signal for the coming 2024 national elections. At the NPC, the ANC vowed that the behaviour of members and leadership would be ethical and that unsavoury elements would be removed from its ranks. It further committed to the renewal, re-engineering, and revitalisation of the ANC, so it can remain true to its principles and objectives. Stricter requirements for the membership application have been suggested, which could see members reapplying and vetted before joining the party. The latest Ipsos poll (August 2022), previously alluded to, confirmed a further decline in support for the ANC. Respondents articulated being despondent about the state of affairs, largely driven by the increasing “cost of living”, occasioned by high prices. That said, Ipsos Director Mari Harris notes that the ANC’s downward spiral is not any other party’s gain. This suggests that new [coalition] councils have not made a difference. Harris said that she would be surprised if the ANC gets more than 50% in the 2024 national election. She remarked that the party achieved 47% of the vote in the local government elections and appears to have subsequently further lost support. “The slide is going in the wrong direction,” she said (Haffajee, 2022). In 2021, the ANC introduced the “step-aside clause” (SAC) and continues to strengthen these measures. The SAC was the most observed issue by journalists and analysts as a bellwether of the ANC’s commitment to renewal and change. It was further viewed by many as a personal test of the President’s standing in the party. It was also seen as a proxy battle for divergent views/groupings in the ANC. In the end, there was overwhelming support for the SAC by the delegates, with minority dissension. One of the main critiques from these ranks is that the policy is not being consistently and fairly applied; that some are selectively targeted in the ANC. Another critique of the SAC is that those implicated can wait for years, in a sort of no man's land – neither guilty nor exonerated – before they are tried and convicted or acquitted in a court of law. An example is that of Danny Msiza and Florence Radzilani (the VBS issue) in Limpopo, who have still not been charged more than three years after the initial allegations. This points to weaknesses in the justice system. President Ramaphosa, in his closing address, stated that they are cognisant of this criticism and will address it. Political party modernisation and reform It is recognised that the modernisation of the ANC is necessary, but that it will not be easy to accomplish. The ANC describes itself as a “liberation movement” with the aim to achieve the liberation of South Africa from it previously undemocratic, unjust, and unequal history. It has continued to couch itself as a “broad church” catering for many different ideological and class positions, underpinned by variegated ideas on its raison d’être, ethos, and philosophical outlook. At election time, all potential voters are targeted, not sections of the population, irrespective of the result. However, since 1994, the party now exists in a constitutional democracy. And despite some of the negative pre-1994 societal features stubbornly prevailing today, the question has been posed: Why is the ANC so reluctant to make the transition to a modern, flexible, more streamlined political party? After all, its character displays all the elements of hierarchy, participation, and consensual decision-making. Given the travails that the party is experiencing, it is inevitable that the ANC will have to adapt and transform into a more modern version of its traditional form; this will be an inescapable process, despite ongoing resistance and reluctance. Electoral Reform On 11 June 2020, the Constitutional Court declared that the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 is unconstitutional to the extent that it states that adult citizens may be elected to the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures only through their membership of political parties. Parliament was given 24 months from the order to remedy the defect giving rise to the unconstitutionality. To date, the defect has not been remedied and 2024 is not far away with regard to election preparation. It is recognised that there is not enough time to bring in the directly elected element for the 2024 national and provincial elections, as there would still need to be constituency delimitation, inclusive of consultation, etc. It is therefore acknowledged that the 2024 poll will have to be conducted according to the existing system, with the proviso that changes will occur for the 2029 election. The debate in Parliament on this matter has shown that the majority party intends to adopt a “minimalist” position with reference to changes to the Act. The Inclusive Society Institute has a research paper out on remedial proposals and has been engaging role-players in civil society, Parliament, the Ministry of Home Affairs, amongst others. Moving forward, some of the proposals mooted in the 2003 Slabbert Electoral Reform Task Team with reference to a mixed system, will be beneficial for this electoral reform aspect. It is our view that the following two views should be heeded with reference to the envisaged electoral changes: “changing electoral systems is dauntingly complex” (Butler, 2022) and “long-term decisions should not be made under such time pressure” (Grootes, 2022). Therefore, given the current realities, the ISI supports a two-step approach. The first being the proposed minimalist approach, aimed at simply accommodating the Constitutional Court judgement requiring that the Electoral Act be amended to allow for independent candidates to contest national and provincial elections. This should be in place for the 2024 general election but should also expire at the time of the 2029 general election. The second step should be more comprehensive electoral reform in time for the 2029 general election, which should allow for a form of constituency-based elections. The ISI has proposed a Multi-Member Constituency model. State/local government The ANC has achieved substantial improvement in state transformation since 1994, with the establishment of strong democratic electoral systems, regular elections, and the ongoing transformation of the state into a people-centred organ. However, state capacity and delivery leave a lot to be desired, particularly at local level. Local government structures are dysfunctional – many towns have potholes, leaking taps (many towns losing up to half of their water this way), piles of rubbish on streets, weak lighting, to name a few. In fact, in his opening address, the President noted that in June 2017, eight municipalities were under administration. By June 2021, 23 municipalities were under administration, and by February 2022, this number had further increased to 33 municipalities. The finance ministry foresees that even more municipalities will require intervention. The President noted that many of these challenges arise from poor management of the political-administrative interface, weak oversight, poor accountability, and inadequate consequence management systems. There is also a shortage of skilled leadership and management, and widespread fraud and corruption. The NPC stated that a national framework on the professionalisation of the public sector will be finalised soon. This framework proposes a stronger emphasis on merit-based recruitment and appointments. Some good news is that significant progress has been made in achieving the country’s developmental goals. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targeted to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to basic services”, an accomplishment that South Africa managed to attain by 2011, four years ahead of the global target (United Nations, 2015). A disquieting development, however, is that the ANC has fallen behind on the SDG scorecard. The Afrobarometer Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) scorecard in September 2021 showed that there has been regression in certain policy areas. It shows that South Africa has made progress on climate action, but lost ground on poverty, hunger, and perceived corruption in institutions. These citizen assessments can be compared to official UN tracking indicators. The Afrobarometer SDG Scorecard, which provides citizens’ assessments of South Africa’s progress over a recent five-year period on important aspects of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, also reveals that the country is doing worse on access to health care, clean water and electricity, unemployment, economic inequalities, and trust in state institutions. The country has made no progress on gender equality, increasing access to education, and reducing payment of bribes for public services. Economic Transformation The NPC document states that the ANC’s strategic approach to economic transformation is guided by the Freedom Charter’s injunction that “The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth”. The Commission acknowledged the hardships caused by the current economic challenges of stagnating growth, falling investment, rising prices and unemployment. The economic document states that the key pillars for turning the economy around involve accelerating the implementation of the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan to increase infrastructure investment, improve energy security, and provide wider access to improved data services; strengthening industrial policy to support the growth of the manufacturing and services sectors; prioritising youth employment, with an emphasis on public employment programmes; accelerating land redistribution; and expanding trade with Africa countries. Fiscal policy should target our rising national debt and ensure better alignment with the broader industrial development objectives. Industrial policy should prioritise the modernisation of industrial tooling and skills development to ensure the competitiveness of local industrialisation. The industrial base should be re-built and broadened to turn around the de-industrialisation of our economy. A call was made for the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) to implement monetary policy in a balanced manner. It must not merely target inflation, but should consider growth, employment, and exchange rate factors in its modelling forecasts. And then there is Eskom, which represents the biggest policy challenge for government to resolve, as it impacts on the economy and society as a whole. Things have deteriorated, instead of improving over the last few years. Restoring energy security will be critical for lifting confidence, investment, and job creation. The Commission supported the recent interventions announced by the President to stabilise Eskom. The two primary objectives of this energy action plan are to improve the performance of Eskom’s existing power stations and to add new generation capacity to the grid as quickly as possible. Eskom’s unsustainable debt problem must also be resolved. The need for a diverse mix of energy sources and a just transition to a low-carbon economy that ensures energy security, protects jobs and livelihoods, and does not compromise South Africa’s industrial development, was highlighted. On the whole though, it is known that there is an excess of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa – in fact, there are over 700. SOEs should play a vital role in terms of the direct services they provide, but many are mired in serious difficulties with regard to finances, governance, delivery, and so on. It is generally recognised that a consolidation of SOEs is necessary and only those that fulfil a useful function of the economy and society should be maintained. Furthermore, many SOEs will struggle to continue existing in a dynamic and efficient environment. The Auditor-General has highlighted this parlous state of affairs: “The ongoing financial and operational crises faced by a number of major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) casts doubt on their practicality and survival. Total SOE debt stands at a staggering R692.9 billion. The most recent budget review indicated that SOEs have reported poor growth, high costs and elevated debt servicing costs, and several appear to be at risk of defaulting on their debts. Prospective reforms and increasing private-sector participation provide some hope for South Africa's SOEs” (AGSA, 2021). Eskom alone owes more than R400 billion. The unsustainable fiscal position of many SOEs cannot continue, given our strained economic position. Government has acknowledged that a consolidated structure and funding model is urgent for the health of most SOEs. Improving corporate governance, clarifying and tightening the mandate, shareholder structure and reporting lines, and general restructuring of SOEs are some of the essential reforms required to turn these entities around. Many of these reforms are contained in recommendations by the Presidential SOE Council as highlighted in the 2022 SONA. The NPC proposed that perhaps the time has come for SOEs to migrate from the Department of Public Enterprises to relevant line function ministries. It is the view of the Inclusive Society Institute to also consider whether the Public Works Department (DPW) is still fit for purpose. It may be more efficient to also transfer infrastructure development and maintenance from the DPW to the line departments. Regarding South Africa’s energy policy, there was not much discussion on the “Just Transition” required to move us away from our coal dependence and towards cleaner energy to assist in the global fight against the climate crisis. Post COP26, the governments of South Africa, Germany, France, the UK, USA, and the EU announced a new, ambitious, long-term Just Energy Transition (JET) Partnership to support our country’s decarbonisation efforts. The JET Partnership aims to accelerate the decarbonisation of South Africa's economy, with a focus on the electricity system, to help it achieve the goals set out in the updated Nationally Determined Contribution emissions goals. It will mobilise an initial commitment of $8.5 billion for the first phase of financing, including mobilising the private sector. On another key point, the NPC reaffirmed the policy of land expropriation without compensation. Although the ANC has not managed to get the Bill passed over the last five years, as it requires a two-thirds majority, President Ramaphosa endorsed it in his closing address, saying, “We must use available means, including the new Expropriation Bill, to accelerate land redistribution.” The ANC also reaffirmed its position that the South African Reserve Bank should be nationalised. The 54th ANC Conference in 2017 resolved that the SARB should be fully publicly owned, but this has not come to fruition. In the view of the Inclusive Society Institute, the call for the SARB to be fully publicly owned and the effect thereof is, in itself, neither here nor there. Rather, the ISI believes the mandate, more than the ownership of the SARB, is the key element with regard to effective monetary policy. Some have also asked whether the costs are feasible and whether the debate serves any useful purpose at this juncture and given the state of our economy. Furthermore, the Policy Conference strongly confirmed previous resolutions on the fundamental imperative and urgency for the establishment of a State Bank. In light of the feasibility study already done in this regard, government was urged to move with speed in implementing the ANC’s resolution by finding a way of capitalising the bank. The Inclusive Society Institute is currently undertaking research into the applicability and feasibility of a State Bank for South Africa. If the objective is to address failings in financing emerging black businesses, factors that need to be considered in the policy discussions, apart from how it can be capitalised, and risks mitigated, are: Since a State Bank may not be exempted from the Financial and Fiscal Commission’s rules and procedures, nor the international banking regulatory authorities, what is it that will differentiate the State Bank from the other retail banks? For example, what room is there for deviating from the current lending criteria of the commercial banks? Could the ruling party’s objectives regarding the implementation of a State Bank be satisfied via other avenues, for example, in partnership with commercial banks, through government guarantees? In the 2022 February SONA, the President committed to developing – within a hundred days – a Social Compact between the key social partners. To date, that has not happened. Feedback from social partners indicates that progress has been slow at NEDLAC and that there is no imminent breakthrough to seal the deal. Cosatu, for example, is totally against the “wage moderation” motion in the proposed Social Accord document. Business is sceptical about government’s commitment to stick to agreements, as evidenced by past experiences. They also want to have assurances that funds will reach the intended targets. A lot of work still needs to be done behind the scenes to make the Social Accord a reality. The recent social sector dialogue was a disappointment, as it was seen by most as a mere tick-box exercise by government, rather than a meaningful interchange. The view of the Inclusive Society Institute is that the current socio-economic crisis demands much deeper consultation. The current dialogue should be considered no more than a process aimed at identifying the issues and themes requiring comprehensive negotiation. The Institute is of the opinion that, given the critical situation the country finds itself in, a CODESA-type process needs to be embarked upon. There has been criticism that the economic proposals make scant reference to fiscal and monetary policy, and that many of the proposals are not very specific or time-bound. They have been presented as a re-hash of old proposals and not containing new, innovative ideas to launch the economy onto a higher and more sustainable growth trajectory. This is the key to turning the fortunes of the country around, ushering in greater prosperity and equality, lowering crime and corruption, and forging greater social cohesion. The very same faults have also been spotlighted in relation to most of the other policy documents. Universal Basic Income Grant (BIG) The NPC came out in support of the introduction of the universal Basic Income Grant (BIG) to meet basic needs and reduce income inequality, based on the principle of universalism and indexed to the Food Poverty Line. Currently, there do not seem to be many dissenting voices on the need for additional income support – and those few who are objecting, especially from business, have homed in on the issue of cost (affordability). The deteriorating socio-economic situation, higher inflation coupled with a tightening monetary policy cycle, and the very real prospect of unrest, is concentrating minds on the necessity for more comprehensive social protection measures. The finance ministry has referenced a “jobseeker’s grant”, while the Department of Social Development has punted a wider basic income transfer measure supported by many civil society groupings. The Presidency is also seized with this matter. The detrimental economic effects induced by the Covid-19 pandemic have been particularly severe on the lower-income groups in South Africa and unemployed persons, many of whom are dependent on other household members for their subsistence. As a result, the debate on the feasibility of a basic income grant has received new impetus, especially in the wake of the implementation of the Social Relief of Distress Grant (SRDG), commonly known as the Covid-grant, which has proven to be fiscally affordable, despite the need to keep a watchful eye on the stability of the country’s public finances. Several studies have been undertaken in recent years to gauge the likely poverty-reducing impact of a permanent extension of South Africa’s welfare grant system, which is widely acknowledged to be one of the most effective in the developing world. Over the past decade, few developing countries in the upper-middle income group have matched South Africa in the quest to reduce the prevalence of poverty, whilst the country also ranks in the top-four regarding the indicator for per capita job creation via public works programmes. Impact studies have nevertheless mostly been restricted to the areas of poverty reduction and lowering the level of income inequality. Recognising the dearth of empirical economic analysis of social protection policies in South Africa, the Inclusive Society Institute commissioned such a study early in 2022. The main objective of the study is to determine the economic impact of a BIG that is fixed at the food poverty line (currently R624 per month), via econometric modelling. Additional sections include a detailed analysis of the evolution of social grants in South Africa, as well as a comprehensive overview of progress with achieving the aims of social protection measures in developing countries (including South Africa). The study is at an advanced stage of completion and preliminary findings include the following: South Africa’s sterling performance with regard to the coverage of Social Protection Programmes (SPPs) at 99% is particularly impressive when juxtaposed with the global average for developing countries of 56% (as determined in a 2018 World Bank study). South Africa is also ranked first amongst developing nations for the key performance indicators of poverty reduction and adequacy of SPPs and is ranked second for the ratio of government expenditure on social protection to GDP, namely 4.3%. Georgia is ranked first at 6.6% and the developing world average is 1.4%. The evidence from econometric modelling (via two different methodologies – vector autoregressive [VAR] and autoregressive distributed lag [ARDL]) confirms the existence of positive effects on aggregate economic output (measured by the GDP), which also translates into higher fiscal revenue for government. International evidence points to superior outcomes of SPPs when linked to workfare and other conditionalities in the areas of human capital formation. Opportunities exist in South Africa to consider such amendments, especially with regard to a proposed BIG. The latter should ideally be targeted at unemployed persons that are listed in an official registry, which also contains information on their educational attainment, skills levels, and work experience. A universal BIG will not be able to match the poverty-reducing impact of a targeted BIG and will also dilute the value of the relevant cash transfers, whilst potentially creating fiscal instability during periods of slow economic growth. Social Transformation This section covers a wide range of issues, from social cohesion and nation building to safety of women and children; eradication of substance abuse and gangsterism; promotion of sports, arts and culture; and the empowerment of vulnerable groups. To begin with, from May 2020 to April 2022, the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant of R350 per month for adults aged 18-59 has been delivered to those with no income. In a short space of time, it reached six million new individuals who had no access to a grant. This includes the top-up of existing grants, for example, the Caregiver Social Relief of Distress (CSRD) grant. Over the last few months, however, problems have been encountered with the provision of this measure. There has been non-payment for two months or more, which is totally unacceptable. Another area of concern is that of the National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill. In May, Parliament’s health committee voted in favour of a motion of desirability for the NHI Bill. This represents the first important building block for the vision of universal health coverage, but many questions and concerns remain regarding the roll-out of the NHI policy. Covid-19 has highlighted the parlous state of our public health system, even in the economic powerhouse of Gauteng. It has been claimed that steps have been taken to address the management of the health care system and other challenges, yet there are continuing reports of dysfunctionality, especially in the Eastern Cape. Indeed, reports show that medical personnel are resigning in increasing numbers due to the unsatisfactory conditions in hospitals. The Inclusive Society Institute research on the NHI affirms some of the challenges that exist in the health care system. It supports an NHI and believes it can work, provided that certain of the Institute’s reservations are accommodated. It has identified four key elements that currently need to be addressed in the NHI Bill before Parliament: The proposed mechanisms for supporting governance (and their potential weaknesses). The ISI is of the view that, in contrast to the NHI Bill’s position that the Minister appoints the Board and CEO, the Board appointments must rather follow a public participation process, and that the CEO must be appointed by the Board. The role of medical schemes in the short to medium term. Medical aids should be permitted to provide continued coverage of all procedures, also those covered by the NHI. Whilst all citizens will be required to pay NHI levies, medical aids should, at least until the NHI is fully functioning and sufficient public trust has been achieved, be allowed to provide top-up insurance for private care. The evidence for and against competition amongst funds and the core recommendation emerging from the German experience: to not break anything in the health system until you have built the replacement. The ISI’s view is that, in order to moderate costs and mitigate corruption, competition needs to be built into the system. The NHI Bill proposes a single fund, whilst the ISI proposes a number of public funds in the event of private medical aids being phased out of the sector. It was agreed that there is an urgent need to build and restore trust in the health system – which is intimately tied to questions of the pace and sequencing of reform. Without public trust in the NHI, government will not get the buy-in from society. On another front, concern has been expressed about the decline in research and development (R&D) over the years. This is the case in business investment and inadequate government investment, and in SOEs. The documents note that new innovations and invention of new technologies have to be more vigorously promoted. They further note that good progress is being made in the implementation of policies and programmes towards achieving good quality teaching and learning outcomes. There is no independent verification for this claim though; progress is claimed in the creation of employment opportunities for the youth that are neither employed nor participating in education and training (NEET). Lastly, delegates pushed strongly for the continued empowering of women economically, politically, socially, and culturally. The NPC called for the application of overarching equality legislation that ensures that procurement processes more effectively empower women on the economic front. Peace and stability This discussion document refers to the importance of the rule of law, improved levels of safety and security, and effective protection of economic infrastructure. For South Africa to succeed, it notes that government must deal decisively with corrupt elements, transgressors, those who prey on women and children. Crime is not merely making communities unsafe and unstable, but it is also undermining investment prospects and our economic performance. The July 2021 unrest experienced in mainly KZN and Gauteng was referenced. It resulted in billions of rands in damages, loss of business confidence, and the killing of 384 people. A year later, only minor figures have been charged in connection with this catastrophic event. Both the Peace and Stability and the Balance of Forces documents state that this event represented an assault on the legitimate organs of state, with the intention to remove a democratically established government by extra-constitutional means. The multiple failures of the country’s State Security apparatus are noted. This further undermines state authority and adds to the narrative of a failing state. An expert panel, chaired by Prof Sandy Africa, was established by the Presidency to look into these security forces and intelligence failures. At the 2022 SONA, a promise was made that more police will be appointed and that there is a renewed emphasis on community policing forums; ANC branches have been asked to play a central role in these forums. It is the view of the Inclusive Society Institute that a national criminal justice system dialogue is needed to turn things around in this sphere and restore effectiveness and confidence. Fight Against Corruption and State Capture Corruption is a cancer in the ANC and South African society that must be destroyed. A key litmus test will be how the ANC responds to the Zondo State Capture Report and whether it will stay the course where the NPC document notes that, “we may find some of the observations and findings unsettling, and there may be some assessments that we disagree with, but we must engage honestly and openly with all aspects of the Commission’s report”. There is a need to retain momentum and further strengthen anti-corruption measures to which the ANC claims commitment. But the justice system is weak and takes forever to press charges against those accused of corruption, years in fact, when there are many “low-hanging fruits” that can be plucked from the myriad cases in existence. The Zondo Commission was established in January 2018 as a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, flowing from a resolution of the 2017 ANC Conference. The terms of reference of the Commission were mainly to investigate allegations of state capture, corruption, and fraud. However, many of those fingered in the Zondo Commission have still not been charged, more than four years later. This is a totally unacceptable state of affairs. The ANC has called on all South Africans to engage with the Commission’s report and to re-build the state and a society governed by the values of the Constitution and the rule of law. Within four months of receipt of the Zondo report, the President must formally submit the report to Parliament together with implementation plans on the Commission’s recommendations. Conclusion Projections of where South Africa is currently situated As a snapshot of some of the comments by journalists and analysts shows, most views on the NPC are negative. They suggest that there is not much that is new in the policy proposals and that these proposals are often just a regurgitation of old ideas couched in new rhetoric. The terminology, especially with reference to the Balance of Forces and Strategy and Tactics papers, is framed in archaic, impenetrable language that is difficult to understand in the current conjuncture. Most of the papers are also overly long and not specific and time-bound. There is a great deal of cynicism in the country about the current state of affairs. The prevailing sense is that the country has stagnated and suffered reversals in many policy areas. There is a strong view that the ANC has messed up and is bereft of new, innovative ideas on how to unlock our socio-economic gridlock and make partnerships with social partners work for the benefit of the country. This is leading to a growing trust deficit between society and the ANC. In the latest Ipsos poll (published 15 August 2022), 52.9% of respondents were of the view that the ANC could not be trusted. Even amongst ANC respondents, this was high – 40.89%. The ANC is seen as an aging, male-dominated political party out of synch with a predominantly young country. In its own publications, the party says that it is weak on implementation. These are issues that the ANC will need to address in order to ensure its own longevity and electoral sustainability. ISI views: The way forward In 1994, South Africa ushered in a democratic dispensation and a universally recognised Constitution, founded on fundamental human rights for all citizens. In the ensuing years, there were significant advances, and reversals, resulting from the 2008 Great Financial Crisis period and negative internal developments in the ANC and the country. And all happening against the backdrop of a contradictory global balance, characterised by shifts in economic power and tendencies towards populism, authoritarianism, militarism, and now, another heated Cold War. The world has become a more uncertain, unstable, and insecure place and conflict, unrest, and immiseration is on the rise as a result of the worsening socio-economic climate, evidenced by much higher inflation rates and the worst “cost of living” crisis in decades. On the global front, South Africa needs to more clearly define its national interest, in our foreign policy, based upon our foundational constitutional values. President Ramaphosa, in the introduction to the policy papers, threw down the gauntlet to the NPC when he said that the ANC’s priority “has to be the improvement of the quality of lives of people, rather than an often narrow, internal party focus”. The NPC deliberated on an extensive number of policies with the ostensible aim to improve society and the quality of people’s lives. The smooth denouement of the NPC, despite many predictions to the contrary, is a positive development for the ANC and the policy process, despite the shortened period for discussion and debate. It should be noted that nothing is straightforward, and the situation is fluid, four months out from the December conference. As the August 2022 Ipsos poll suggests, the support for the ANC is still tracking negatively and coalition arrangements appear to be in the offing at national and various provincial levels. What awaits potentially post-2024, is instability and chaotic scenarios in governance arrangements. Only time will tell, in December 2022 and then in 2024. The challenge will also be in whether the outlined policies will bear fruit to make South Africa more stable, prosperous, sustainable, and flourishing. Implementation has to substantially improve at all levels of society, but particularly at local level, through a more focused, caring and efficient state bureaucracy, to achieve these laudable objectives. It is the view of the Inclusive Society Institute that the next period must be focused on uplifting the economy, creating jobs, including restoring energy security. The “cost of living” and rising prices, especially in energy and food prices (inflation problems), will not make things easier. Also important is strengthening social cohesion, including making people – especially women and children – feel safer in society. The country cannot afford a repeat of the destabilising July 2021 riots and looting. The entire criminal justice system needs to be overhauled. This requires an urgent national dialogue, which the ISI believes should be convened by the President as a matter of urgency. The conclusion of the Social Accord is essential, but it must go beyond the economic sphere; something akin to the early-90s negotiations process, but as a reset now, for the future. State performance, at all levels, but especially at local level must be drastically improved. Trust in the democratic system and adherence to our constitutional values must be respected and upheld by all, especially those in positions of influence. Policies must be clear, focused, and implemented assiduously to counter the sense of “drift” in the country. The focus must be on a few key policy areas, with measurable timeframes ideally, not long shopping lists. There is no time or space for delays on the implementation front. Government, together with business, labour movement, and civil society formations must work together to put the national interest first and rise above sectional interests. Equally, the governing party must rise above a “narrow focus on internal party matters”, as President Ramaphosa said in his introduction to the policy documents. The focus on the key issues needs to be bold, innovative, resourceful, with less talk and more decisive action in government and at all levels of society. Appendix Snapshot of academics’/analysts’/journalists’ Comments On Thursday 21 July, the eve of the NPC, former President Thabo Mbeki, spoke at the memorial service for ANC Deputy Secretary General Jessie Duarte, in Johannesburg. Mbeki made some telling comments that were seized upon by the media and analysts. Lamenting the ANC’s inability to counter soaring unemployment and poverty, he said: “As a matter of fact, we don’t have a national plan to address these challenges … There is no national plan to address the challenges of poverty, unemployment, inequality. It doesn’t exist.” He also noted that the Social Accord, despite the commitment of President Ramaphosa, has not been finalised in the 100-day period since SONA. In a subsequent interview, Mbeki said his comments were not intended as an attack on the administration of the current president. However, the comments did end up having the desired effect of bringing about movement on various policy fronts by the Presidency and government. Prof Richard Calland (Public Law, UCT) (2022) I asked three of the policy and process junkies to give me one policy innovation that had emerged from the National Policy Conference. There was nothing new, they admitted. One of them said that a few in the ANC leadership are waking up to a certain reality – to achieve either the goal of saving the ANC from electoral defeat or for saving the economy. For the rest it was about holding the ANC together. At a time of mounting crisis, when old ideas have failed, a viable political party of government has to come up with something new, otherwise its demise is inevitable. Did the National Policy Conference in any way respond to this crisis? No. The ANC is now an empty vessel, both policy-wise and politically. It can neither hold the centre nor lead society. The ANC’s future lies behind it, as last weekend amply demonstrated. The next election will mark the start of a new era – of greater electoral competition (and instability and uncertainty) – and the end of an old one, of ANC dominance. Everyone needs to start preparing for this transition. Duma Gqubule (economist) (2022) Gqubule wrote that ANC conferences are a waste of time for anyone who follows macroeconomic policy, because they never discuss such issues, and nothing changes. The party suppresses the will of its branches and gives no explanations to them for why it cannot implement previous resolutions. This means ANC resolutions are just suggestions. Rebecca Davis (journalist, Daily Maverick) (2022) Ahead of the ANC’s national policy conference, its discussion papers reveal an entitled, paranoid party that seems increasingly out of touch with current realities – and with democracy itself. Against this backdrop, the party’s policy papers – heavy on ideology, but low on sensible ideas – seem woefully inadequate to address the country’s problems. If a national plan to address the challenges of poverty, unemployment, inequality, the thousands of delegates expected at the ANC policy conference might have difficulty measuring its effectiveness. The discussion papers state that no data or reports are available to assess, for instance, whether language policies relating to the school curriculum have been implemented. They state that there is no information available on how many mobile schools and mobile clinics there are in SA, or whether learners are being provided with transport. In the absence of such information, how are delegates supposed to assess whether key ANC policies are working? Perhaps as a tacit acknowledgement of the impossibility of such a task, the papers also recommend that ANC policies should only be reviewed every decade, rather than every five years as is currently the case. In addition to the fact that the party lacks a coordinated plan of action to tackle issues such as unemployment in a practical way, the papers contain no shortage of scattered and impractical suggestions regarding all manner of South African challenges. At certain moments, the policy papers give the impression of having been written by ageing academics. Prof Susan Booysen (political scientist, author, and analyst) (2022) The governing ANC’s policy proposals don’t inspire confidence. South Africa is in the throes of an unprecedented, multifaceted socio-economic crisis requiring substantive, impactful policy interventions. Yet, I wonder if it actually appreciates the enormity of the problems facing the nation. The policy deliberations and proposals fell hopelessly short of addressing the country’s pressing problems. The subdued conference exposed a deficit of new policy thinking, and failed to provide solutions. It certainly did not live up to party leader and national President Cyril Ramaphosa’s declaration in his opening address that the conference would be a defining moment for the ANC and the country. In my view, there were mismatches between the crises facing the nation and proposed solutions. There was a flood of small – or partial – stabs at big problems. A few big ideas came with the proviso that they may be “not affordable”. The deliberations were characterised by disingenuous, counter-factual policy pronouncements, and de facto denials of the ANC’s culpability in causing many of the current problems facing the country. Foremost was the country’s high levels of unemployment. Beyond recognition of the problem, nothing new emerged. The conference bore testimony to fact that the ANC remains confused about its role. It has governed the country for nearly three decades, but often protests against its own government. There was no shortage of disingenuous policy statements. On the July 2021 unrest, which cost over 350 lives, the conference concluded that it was the work of those ideologically opposed to the ANC’s advances in government. The conference offered no recognition that ANC internal factional politics had wreaked the havoc. Regarding the dysfunctionality of local governments – most of which are run by the ANC – the proffered solution was the government’s district development model. There were more unconvincing platitudes on Eskom, to pursue a state-owned bank, nationalise the SARB, and promote local production of pharmaceuticals. The poverty of policy ideas on offer was expected, given the ANC’s existential crisis. It is at its weakest moment ever, as Ramaphosa confessed in his opening address. All in all, the lack of sound policy proposals to address South Africa’s myriad challenges may suggest that the ANC has given up hope of making a difference to people’s lives. If people’s hopes of it delivering a better future also dissipates, the party’s decline will be sealed. This will mean that the ANC, while probably remaining the biggest party, will increasingly fail to garner outright majorities and be forced into increasing numbers of unstable coalition governments. Anton Harber (2022) Once armed with a carefully considered package of policies, the party now repeats vacant rhetoric. If you want insight into the state of the ANC, read its media and communications policy document from last weekend’s conference. Ignore that it is a scrappy document nobody bothered to edit before it was put into the special edition of the party’s online journal, Umrabulo. You can skip over the occasional incoherent paragraph. From what is left you will find that this is an organisation disconnected from reality, short on new ideas, but still strong on vacant revolutionary rhetoric. Here’s an inspiring sample: “Ownership of the media assets remain the most powerful strategy adopted in SA and protected by the Constitution, and provided for in various pieces of legislations. The idea of ownership of assets is not only driven by market interest but also hegemony and influencing the agenda in the battle of idea, what gets broadcast.” [sic, sic, sic] The document is headed, as it has been for many years, “The Battle of Ideas”, positioning the ANC as an organisation involved in a perpetual ideological war against enemies in the media. The media, it seems, is not a place to share and swap and debate ideas and information, not a tool to promote your own information or to hear what people outside Luthuli House are saying, but a front in the war against the ANC’s omnipresent and omnipowerful enemies. This “must be fought like a real war”, it says, with the purpose of “attaining political hegemony”. You might think 28 years in power indicates you have achieved some form of dominance in the political arena, but this is the same phraseology carried through from the ANC’s earliest documents, when its leaders arrived back from exile to face a critical and often unfriendly media. Nor does the ANC recognise much differentiation in the media, using the lazy approach of grouping everyone together without acknowledging that there is a range of quite different outlets doing different kinds of work with different standards. You might gain hope if the enemy they were arming themselves against was corruption, lack of implementation or state ineptitude. No, the three enemies are “the SA counter revolution”, “neoliberal forces” and “world imperialism”. It is not clear if these forces are internal to the ANC or outside enemies, though I suspect they are all over, like ghosts in the night. Interestingly, what is not in the document is the long-standing complaint that the print media is untransformed. There is only one paragraph that talks of the need to review and complete the transformation charter, and I had to struggle to remember this long-buried document. While you and I might worry about rebuilding the SABC’s financial health and political independence, the mess-ups in the transition to digital broadcasting that threaten to leave many without television coverage and the dysfunctionality of the Media Development and Diversity Agency, these do not appear to be major concerns for the ANC. We might hope the governing party would address the extent to which the State Security Agency messed with — and severely undermined — journalists during the Zuma presidency. We could wish it would deal with the reports of journalists facing worrying levels of threat and harassment, online and in the field, often from the police. The rest of the world might be debating how to deal with the dominance and power of the social media giants and their effect on local media and journalism. But no, there is just a passing call for print and digital media and the Government Communication and Information Service (not the government itself) to “implement measures that protect [these] sectors”. The SABC, the ANC argues, should be a pure public broadcaster with no commercial interest. It should be funded both from the fiscus and from a household levy, a confused mishmash of wishful thinking. The ANC proposal to deal with the sad state of community media is to license fewer stations, as it argues the sector cannot sustain the competition between stations. You have to remind yourself that this was a body that came to power with a carefully considered package of policies and proposals on the media that laid the ground for rich and important debate about the shortfalls of the sector. No longer. Equally dismal was the questioning by journalists at the post-conference briefing, which also showed little grasp of the major issues facing the sector. References Afrobarometer. 2021. New Afrobarometer SDG Scorecard shows South Africa doing better on climate action but worse on poverty, hunger, and corruption. [Online] Available at: https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/press-release/South%20Africa/news_release-afrobarometer_releases_sdg_scorecard_for_south_africa-1sept21.pdf [Accessed: September 6, 2022]. ANC, 2020. NGC2020 Discussion Documents, Umrabulo Special Edition. [Online] Available at: https://www.ortamboschool.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-UMRABULO-SPECIAL-EDITION-draft-16112020.pdf [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. ANC, 2022. 6th National Policy Conference Report. [Online] Available at: https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/88865_6th_npc_report.pdf [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). 2021. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/may/16/apocalyptic-food-prices-will-be-disastrous-for-worlds-poor-says-bank-governor [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Elliot, L. 2022b. Sri Lanka is the first domino to fall in the face of a global debt crisis. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/09/sri-lanka-is-the-first-domino-to-fall-in-the-face-of-a-global-debt-crisis [Accessed: September 6, 2022]. Farrer, M. 2022. Ukraine war has stoked global food crisis that could last years, says UN. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/19/ukraine-war-has-stoked-global-food-crisis-that-could-last-years-says-un [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Gqubule, D. 2022. ANC conferences are a waste of time for those who follow macroeconomic policy. 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Lehohla, P. 2022. The merry go round of economic policy. [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/the-merry-go-round-of-economic-policy-651dd8df-4400-4872-9d76-be8be93914d7 [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Lodge, T. 2005. The ANC and the Development of Party Politics in Modern South Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 42(2): 2004. Narlikar, M. 2020. Knowing one’s friends and allies: The politics of the BRICS amidst the pandemic. [Online] Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/knowing-ones-friends-allies-politics-brics-amidst-pandemic-67932/ [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. O’Neill, J. 2021. Will the BRICS Ever Grow Up? [Online] Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brics-20-years-of-disappointment-by-jim-o-neill-2021-09 [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. O’Neill, J. 2021. The BRICS at 20. [Online] Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brics-first-two-decades-and-today-by-jim-o-neill-2021-01?barrier=accesspaylog [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. O’Neill, J. 2021. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. [Online] Available at: https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Ramaphosa, C. 2022. Opening Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa to the 6th ANC Policy Conference. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/opening-address-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-to-the-6th-anc-policy-conference-28-july-2022/ [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Ramaphosa, C. 2022. Ramaphosa's Closing Address at ANC Policy Conference. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/opening-address-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-to-the-6th-anc-policy-conference-28-july-2022/ [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Slabbert, V.Z. 2003. Report of the Electoral Task Team. [Online] Available at: https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/Van-Zyl-Slabbert-Commission-on-Electoral-Reform-Report-2003.pdf [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Tett, G. 2010. The story of the BRICS. [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/112ca932-00ab-11df-ae8d-00144feabdc0 [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. Tooze, A. 2021. BRICS, twenty years on. [Online] Available at: https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-55-brics-twenty-years-on [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. United Nations. 2015. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015. [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf [Accessed: September 6, 2022]. World Bank. 2022. World Development Report 2022: Finance for an Equitable Recovery. [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2022 [Accessed: September 1, 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Prof Zweli, and its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, met with Hon Bettina Lugk, a member of the German Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee, on 13 September 2022. Hon Lugk was accompanied by Hon Ulla Schmidt and Hon Dagmar Freitag, former members of the Bundestag. Hon Schmidt, a former Minister of Health, who oversaw the implementation of the German National Health System, has been intricately involved in the ISI’s research into the proposed NHI in South Africa, and Hon Freitag has been an active participant in the Institute’s social democracy dialogues. The objective of the meeting was to appraise and update both sides on political developments within their countries and to chart a way forward for further interaction and cooperation between themselves and the broader social democratic movement. Areas of mutual concern included the rise of the far right, populism, such as xenophobic incitement, and a decline in public trust in democracy, which threatened social cohesion and stability. Social democrats from across the globe needed, now more than ever, to constructively seeks solutions to ensure social justice and cohesion. It was agreed that channels of communication and cooperation needed to be maintained and further strengthened.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. All records and findings included in this report, originate from a panel discussion on developing a new economic blueprint for South Africa, which took place in August 2022 Author: Mariaan Webb, Creamer Media Writer Edited by: Daryl Swanepoel AUGUST 2022 Content Abbreviations & acronyms Introduction Identifying weaknesses • Inadequate understanding from government • Insufficient public- and private-sector cooperation • Volume over value focus • Price-differentiation strategies • Policy implementation challenges • Domestic airline failures • Aviation certification delays • Monopolistic tendencies • Brand reputation neglect • Infrastructure failures Suggestions for fostering growth Conclusion References Abbreviations & acronyms ACSA Airports Company South Africa GDP gross domestic product ISI Inclusive Society Institute SMME small-, medium-sized and microenterprises Stats SA Statistics South Africa SA Tourism South African Tourism TSA Tourism Satellite Account UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council Introduction Tourism is of vital economic and social importance to many countries around the world. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to drastic changes in people’s mobility, travel and tourism accounted for one in ten jobs (330-million) globally and 10.30% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) (WTTC, 2022a). Tourism is also a valuable contributor to the South African economy. Measured against other industries, tourism’s direct contribution to GDP is bigger than either agriculture, utilities (electricity, gas and water) or construction. The ‘Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) for South Africa’ report, compiled yearly by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), states that the sector’s direct contribution to GDP was 3.70%, or R209-billion in 2019, before the pandemic crushed the sector (Stats SA, 2021). To measure total contribution of travel and tourism to GDP, TSA relies on data from the World Travel and Tourism Council’s (WTTC’s) country report for South Africa. WTTC calculates the sector’s direct and indirect contribution to the economy in 2019 to be 6.90%, or R363.20-billion (Stats SA, 2021). Direct contribution of tourism to GDP: 2015 – 2019 Source: Tourism Satellite Account for South Africa, Statistics South Africa Travel restrictions implemented by countries to stop the spread of Covid-19 had a major impact on the tourism industry, cutting across all subsectors, from accommodation to aviation. South Africa’s borders were closed from the end of March 2020 to September 2020, preventing tourists from visiting the country. The emergence of new variants of Covid-19 in June and July 2021 also impacted on tourism as many countries prevented their citizens from traveling to South Africa. The UK government, for example, developed a red list, which comprised countries to which its citizens were prohibited from travelling. South Africa was on the red list from May 2021 to October 2021. The WTTC country report estimates that the total contribution of travel and tourism to GDP declined by 55%, to R180-billion, in 2020. As pandemic restrictions eased, tourism rebounded and is estimated to have contributed about R195.20-billion to South Africa’s GDP in 2021 (WTTC, 2022b). Tourism has been identified in the National Development Plan as being of economic priority given it is a labour-intensive sector that could contribute to achieving job creation targets. However, despite its recognised potential, the industry believes that government does not fully recognise or value tourism’s importance as an economic contributor. The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in collaboration with the Tourism Business Council of South Africa, convened a tourism sector dialogue in June 2022 as part of a broader research project to develop a New Economic Blueprint for South Africa. The dialogue was attended by a wide range of organisations representing various subsectors within the tourism industry in the country, including the hospitality sector, the airline industry, travel agents, destination marketing agencies and hotel, resort and game lodge establishments. This report gathers the tourism industry’s views on what South Africa must do to remove constraints to economic growth and development in the sector and offers suggestions on what could be done to accelerate and expand tourism’s contribution to GDP growth. Identifying weaknesses Inadequate understanding from government Although statistics highlight the sizeable contribution of tourism to the South African economy, there is a view that government does not fully recognise the importance of tourism to the country’s economy. Having a national Tourism Ministry is not enough and the success of the industry has relied on various departments working together. There is often a lack of trust between departments, preventing government from operating efficiently. Inefficiencies in departments, often other than tourism, can have major implications for the industry. For instance, the Department of Transport’s backlog in issuing operating licence renewals to tour operators, or the regulations imposed by the Department of Home Affairs when it introduced unabridged birth certificates for minor children travelling through any port of entry, can have unintended consequences for tourism. While government must do more to show its understanding of and appreciation for tourism, the industry is also required to accelerate processes of inclusion and black economic empowerment so that owners and operators better reflect the racial demographics of South Africa. Insufficient public- and private-sector cooperation Although the Covid-19 pandemic has assisted in fostering closer cooperation between the public and private sectors, this is an area that remains of great concern to the industry. There is a lack of collaboration between the Department of Tourism, its marketing arm, South African Tourism (SA Tourism), and the private sector in crafting tourism strategies. For instance, there is a view that marketing strategies are developed from a political angle rather than with a commercial slant and, therefore, lack sufficient opportunism. Focusing too much on BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is perceived to be politically opportunistic, but it does not deliver the commensurate commercial dividends. Volume over value focus Government’s tourism growth agenda focuses too much on volume, and not enough on value. SA Tourism’s aspirational target is to reach 21-million tourist arrivals by 2030, although that goal had looked out of reach even before the Covid-19 pandemic. SA Tourism now believes that attracting 14.80-million visitors is a more “realistic target” for 2030 (SA Tourism, 2021). However, the consensus was that instead of focusing on visitor numbers and trying to be “everything to everyone”, South Africa must position itself as a destination that attracts “valuable” visitors who spend money throughout the value chain. It must also guard against overtourism or placing its infrastructure under pressure. Price differentiation strategies Safari camps, luxury lodges and many other supreme tourist destinations dropped their prices and offered South Africans discounted rates when international travel was not possible while Covid-19 travel restrictions were still in place. To revive the tourism industry, price differentiation strategies must be employed more broadly to encourage South Africans and other Southern African Development Community residents to explore the country. The Industrial Development Corporation, in partnership with SA Tourism and the Tourism Business Council of South Africa, recently launched a travel campaign to that effect. As part of the campaign, South Africans will be able to secure discounted rates of up to 35% to selected destinations across the country (Engineering News, 2022). Financial constraints mean that more South Africans are opting to take local holidays than travelling overseas. A recent poll by consultancy group Travel Lifestyle Network indicated that 67% of those canvassed have a domestic holiday once a year or more and 22% once every six months. With the rising cost of living, price is going to be a key differentiator to attract consumer spend in the remainder of 2022 and 2023 (Business Day, 2022). Policy implementation challenges South Africa has an abundance of policy documents, positions and pronouncements, but often these do not yield the desired results, owing to a lack of consistent implementation. The lead up to the 2024 general election will likely compound implementation challenges, as a new government will be elected in less than a year-and-a-half. Implementation success hinges on continuity and a new administration may pursue or prioritise different interests. Domestic airline failures The failure of Comair, the operator of low-cost carrier kulula.com and British Airways, which it operated under a licence agreement, was a major setback for the tourism industry. The company was responsible for 40% of domestic airline capacity before its closure in June 2022 (BusinessTech, 2022). Comair failed to secure funding to stay airborne after being impacted on by global pandemicrelated travel restrictions. However, the group’s problems started before Covid-19, when the Boeing 737 Max aircraft was grounded, and its fleet-renewal programme pushed up debt and debt service costs. Placing South African Airways (SAA) in business rescue in 2020 was another major setback for Comair, which at the time was still owed R790-million by the State-owned carrier as part of a Competition Commission settlement. SAA ran an incentive scheme for travel agents in the early 2000s, which was found to penalise Comair. After SAA went into business rescue, it was ruled that Comair could get back only 7.5c in the rand of the R790-million still owned to it by SAA (Fin24, 2022a). SAA itself resumed operations only in late 2021, having been in business rescue for almost two years, which had a substantial impact on business and leisure travel. SAA’s predicament was caused by several issues, including political interference and leadership turmoil. The liquidation of Comair has substantially reduced domestic seat capacity, exacerbating a crisis in the industry, which over the past two years also lost low-cost carrier Mango Airlines. While other operators will eventually fill the gap left by Comair and Mango, capacity constraints have pushed up ticket prices, further hampering the tourism sector’s recovery from the pandemic. Operators of domestic airlines have warned that ticket prices will remain high owing to the price of fuel (Fin24, 2022b). Aviation certification delays Authorities are slow to process aviation certifications, which is a significant obstacle for the air travel industry. Every aircraft that an international airline uses on a route to South Africa must be registered and this process is taking too long. An aviation sector participant in the ISI dialogue indicated that it takes the South Africa Civil Aviation Authority several months to issue an airline operating certificate, compared with six days in Germany, for instance. Monopolistic tendencies Some of the key services pertaining to aviation and airports, such as Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) and Air Traffic and Navigation Services, are monopoly State-owned entities. There is no visibility on how ACSA, for instance, is ensuring that it gets the most out of its existing assets. Brand reputation neglect There is concern about the ongoing damage to the South African brand as a safe and welcoming tourism destination. Civil unrest and violent crime, especially near popular tourism sites, such as the Kruger National Park, exacerbate perceptions that South Africa is an unsafe destination. Infrastructure failures Delipidated road infrastructure and poorly maintained buildings do not support tourism growth. Many small towns near or on route to key tourist sites are in decay due to poor service delivery and inadequate maintenance resulting from municipal failure. Tourists no longer support towns where streets are riddled with potholes and litter is strewn everywhere. The poor quality of provincial roads in popular tourist hotspots is also of concern. Tourism industry participants have been complaining for years about the poor state of roads in the picturesque Mpumalanga Lowveld, for instance. Suggestions for fostering growth Focus points to accelerate tourism industry growth Conclusion Tourism continues to recover at a strong pace following the Covid pandemic. Globally, destinations welcomed three times as many international arrivals in the first quarter of 2022 as in the same period of 2021. The World Tourism Organisation’s ‘UNWTO World Tourism Barometer’ forecasts that there will be a gradual recovery in tourism throughout 2022, as more destinations ease, or lift, travel restrictions and pent-up demand is unleashed (UNWTO, 2022). South Africa’s tourism figures are also encouraging, with tourist accommodation income rising by 83% in the first quarter of 2022. Income from hotel accommodation doubled in the first quarter, compared with the same quarter of 2021 (Stats SA, 2022). For South Africa to take full advantage of the tourism rebound, collaboration between government and the industry is of critical importance. The country must pitch itself to the right clients and polish its brand to ensure that visitors choose or continue to choose South Africa, and that when tourists do arrive on South African shores they enjoy a world class experience, with full safety and security and supported by adequate tourism-related infrastructure and facilities. 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It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za