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Photograph source: click here The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) on Wednesday, 17 August 2022, hosted a roundtable discussion on addressing xenophobia in South Africa. Participants represented a wide range of public and civil society organisations. Presentations were made by: Dr Steven Gordon, representing the Human Sciences Research Council Mr Diego Itturralde, representing Statistics South Africa Professor Loren Landau, from the African Centre for Migration and Society Ms Sharon Ekambaram, representing Lawyers for Human Rights Ms Danaline Franzman, representing the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Consideration was given to the factors that drive xenophobia, interventions that are needed to reframe plans beyond the National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia, an assessment as to whether the immigration laws and policies are fuelling xenophobia, how to address the dichotomy in responses by state actors, and on how to address inconsistency in state responses. It also considered measures to align legislation and policy to ensure consistency in action.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the Electoral Reform Indaba, that was hosted by Defend Our Democracy, My Vote Counts, Rivonia Circle, CASAC and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation. A total of 130 civil society organisations attended the gathering at the Braamfontein Recreation Centre in Johannesburg. Discussions focussed on: Options for electoral reform, now and in the future The strategy with regard to the current electoral reform processes under discussion in Parliament The state of readiness for the 2024 election What was clear from the discussions was that civil society was not in support of the current Bill before Parliament, in that it does not bring about fundamental electoral reform. It is a minimalistic approach aimed only at accommodating the Constitutional Court judgement requiring Parliament to provide for independent candidates to participate in provincial and national elections. Civil society expect far more reform. Reform that improves accountability, representivity and a constituency-based system that will bring elected public representatives closer to the electorate. The Indaba resolved to embark on a broad public mobilisation campaign to demand such reforms in time for the 2024 national election.

The Communications Directorate of Turkiye’s Presidency organised a panel discussion in Cape Town on 30 August 2022 to discuss reform of the United Nations (UN). The discussion was moderated by Turkish scholar, Mursel Bayram. The panel brought together Turkish Professor, Suay Nilhan Acikalin, South African political analyst, William Gumede, Zaheer Laher, the acting Chief Director of the UN Peace and Security's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute. The meeting was also addressed via video panel by Turkiye's Presidency Communications Director, Fahrettin Altun, who said that although the UN has made significant contributions to peace and stability in various geographies of the world since its establishment, it needs reform. Mr Swanepoel’s contribution pointed to the current deficiencies within the UN system, and focussed on the need and motivation for UN reform. He also interpreted South Africa and Africa’s position on such reforms. He made a number of proposals on what such reforms could entail, such as redefining the veto powers, and he cautioned against a delay in reforming the UN, specifically the Security Council, in that it is contributing to a proliferation of alternative multilateral fora and geo-political polarisation.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, together with Professor William Gumede, a member of the ISI’s expert panel on electoral reform, met with the Minister of Home Affairs, Hon. Aaron Motsoaledi, on Monday, 29 August 2022 to discuss lingering concerns with regard to the current Electoral Amendment Bill, serving before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs. Civil society remains concerned about the constitutionality of the current Bill before Parliament, which, if an amenable compromise is not reached, threatens to derail the 2024 general election. Whilst civil society stood ready to find an extended pathway to broader electoral reform, they insist on the current Bill being constitutional and they require convincing assurances that meaningful and comprehensive electoral reform will be implemented by no later than the 2029 general election.

Since the last engagement of the Expert Panel, much has happened with regard to on the development of a new electoral model for South Africa: The Institute’s report was concluded and widely promoted to other civil society organisations, the Independent Electoral Committee, the Ministerial Advisory Committee, Parliament, the Minister of Home Affairs and the media. The Electoral Amendment Bill was tabled in Parliament, which Bill does little to promote reform in that it follows a minimalistic approach. That said, the Institute’s engagement with the Minister was constructive in that there is an acknowledgement that broader reform is needed. It is not being done now given the Constitutional Court’s deadline which is prohibitive in terms of what can be achieved in the short term. The Institute proposed a two-step approach, namely, minimalistic amendments in the short term with a commitment to embark upon a process to achieve broader reform for elections post-2024. The Zondo-Commission of Enquiry into State Capture has also recommended that Parliament give consideration to a constituency-based electoral model as well as a directly elected President. With the aforementioned in mind, the Institute convened the Expert Panel on 23 August 2022 to: Give feedback on the journey travelled so far and the roadmap going forward To discuss the merits and demerits of a directly elected presidential electoral system. The purpose was to shape the Institutes thinking on the topic.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. Authors: Percept and 71point4 Editor: Daryl Swanepoel 7 February 2022 Executive summary “What does inequality, poverty and socio-demographic change look like in South Africa – at present, and over the past 27 years of democracy?” This report aims to address that question. To do so, we take a multidimensional approach to assessing inequality (as well as poverty and socio-demographic change), considering inequality in eight dimensions, namely: Economic, Education, Health, Living Conditions, Social and Cultural, Physical Security and Legal, Political, and Environmental. For each of the dimensions, we review the literature and analyse data from various sources to provide a view at present, as well as over time. Our approach moves one beyond referring to a Gini coefficient metric to answer the question of inequality. A shift towards a multidimensional framing of poverty and inequality in South Africa lends itself to a more comprehensive description of what has, and has not, been achieved during the new democratic dispensation. By interrogating the changes made in South Africa in a more granular way, the lived experience of South Africans may be better understood and reflected on. The approach also allows the drivers of inequality to be identified. In this way, levers of change and opportunity can be described, and poverty can be tackled more comprehensively. Where useful, we rely on frameworks to consider how all of the mentioned dimensions link together. Some dimensions relate to ‘fundamental capabilities’ (like equal access to health, education, and economic participation). Others relate to ‘functionings’ (like health and education outcomes, and income and wealth). And yet others relate to ‘conversion factors’ (for example, personal, socio-political and environmental circumstances), where the latter may influence both capabilities and functionings. Following the above approach, key summary points from each section (dimension) are: Economic inequality: We analyse this in various ways, including by looking at income and wealth inequality, inequality in living standards, absolute levels of poverty, and employment statistics. This interrogation of the data follows others’ findings that the aggregate Gini coefficient has not changed significantly over time, which we also find to be the case. We further show that within-group racial inequality has increased, especially for Black African and Coloured individuals. In line with others’ findings, we find that most of the inequality is linked to the labour market: both extremely high unemployment and the distribution of wages drive most inequality in South Africa. There is no clear evidence that inequality has improved over time by taking a generational lens. The evidence on whether the inclusion of older generations (>65 years) in income inequality calculations lead to higher inequality is inconclusive. While population growth has been decreasing over the post-apartheid period, it is still higher than in comparable upper-middle-income countries. Population growth also manifests in household structure. Most South African households are extended family households, and these are also the poorest households on a per capita income basis. Single parent households follow with a low per capita income level, as such fertility rates (even though relatively low) may still not be at the desired level for South African women. Inequality is lower among households with at least one person employed, but only marginally so (relative to the aggregate nationalpicture). Removing the top 1% of households (by income) also does not make a major difference to inequality. Absolute levels of poverty remain high. In 2015, 13.8 million people fell below the food poverty line; and in 2019, 11% of households reported that at least one person went hungry in the last 12 months. Education inequality: We show that access to education and attendance has improved over time, at all levels. It has in some way reduced inequality in education, but there is still room for improvement. Despite this, the proportion of individuals that complete matric is low (less than half of those who start Grade 1 in a certain year matriculate successfully 12 years later), and this (lower levels of education) has serious implications for chances of employment, as the data show. Most concerning, however, is that the quality of (public) education remains low. It is evidenced by data on outcomes and infrastructure – which often points to the weak conversion of resources into learning outcomes as the main driver. Health inequality: Like the picture on education, we see that access to health has increased over time, but that this has not translated into meaningful outcomes for beneficiaries due to poor quality of services. As with education, health also does not occur in a vacuum; many other socio-economic factors matter (outside of the health and education system) in working toward outcomes. Overall, health and education inequalities remain high, and follow socio-economic and racial lines. Living conditions inequality: Like other resources, a clear socio-economic divide exists for housing access. Despite improvement in access to housing over time, including by means of subsidies from the government, many do not have adequate housing. For the 6.8 million households who reportedly have a monthly income of less than R3,500, 64% reported having inadequate housing – defined as informal or traditional houses, dwellings with no flush toilets, and households with more than two people per room. This picture improves slightly for those higher up in the income bracket, but improvement is mainly seen when the household income breaches R15,000 per month (generally the top fifth of households). Access to water, power and sanitation has improved over time, although there is still room for improvement. Social and cultural inequality: While it is difficult to measure this accurately, we were able to elicit some notable findings. They show to which degree South Africans don’t interact with others who are different in some way, how many South Africans report feeling alienated, how factors such as gender link with poverty, and how South Africans perceive social cohesion to have changed over time. Physical security and legal inequality: It is clear from evidence on these points that access to physical and legal security, and the impacts thereof, vary significantly by gender, age and geographical location. We discuss the concerningly high statistics of issues such as violence in this section. Political inequality: Despite South Africa’s democratic system, the voices of individuals are not always heard. According to the data, many also perceive that they cannot discuss their political views freely, and at present, more than 8% of people feel that they cannot vote without feeling pressured. Environmental inequality: In this final section, we discuss pollution and transport inequalities. Poorer people tend to be significantly more exposed to pollution, often because of residing closer to mines, refuse sites, sewage sites, and main transport roads. We also show the data on inequalities in access to different forms of transport. This indicates the high proportion of people whose mode of transport to health facilities is walking (possibly suggesting transport as a barrier in other areas of their lives, such as in accessing work opportunities). Overall, we find that the picture of inequality in South Africa is deeply pervasive and entrenched, and it is difficult for many to truly access and participate in society and the economy, which would allow them a chance to improve their own and others’ well-being in their lifetimes. Despite this, there are examples of progress that deserve to be highlighted. In the past 27 years, South Africa has, for example, expanded its welfare grant programme, housing programme, water and sanitation infrastructure, and access to schooling and healthcare, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable. Unfortunately, the gains made are insufficient to improve the overall well-being of the majority of South Africans in a meaningful way. Grants are not enough to support recipients, housing and infrastructure programmes are not keeping pace with population growth and urbanisation, and the quality of basic services – including those relating to water, sanitation, health and education – are often suboptimal, resulting in inferior outcomes and services. Content Executive Summary List of figures List of tables List of information boxes Acronyms and abbreviations 1. Background and purpose 2. Conceptual framework – assessing multiple dimensions of inequality 3. Note on data sources 4. Inequality for whom? 5. Economic inequality 5.1 Overall income: inequality and poverty 5.2 Inequality in sources of income 5.3 Post-tax income inequality 5.4 Inequality in post-government expenditure (post-transfer) income 5.5 Inequality in Living Standards 5.6 Nutrition and hunger 5.7 Wealth 6. Education inequalities 6.1 Early Childhood Development 6.2 Basic Education 6.3 Tertiary Education 6.4 How does education link to employment and income? 7. Health inequalities 8. Inequalities in living conditions 8.1 Housing 8.2 Electricity, water and sanitation 8.3 Digital connectivity 9. Social and cultural inequalities 10. Physical security and legal inequalities 11. Political inequalities 12. Environmental inequalities 12.1 Pollution inequalities 12.2 Transport inequalities 13. Linking the many dimensions of inequality: Conclusion References List of figures Figure 1: Framework for assessing multiple dimensions of inequality using a capability approach[2] Figure 2: Growth in the number of individuals and households in South Africa, 2001-2019 Figure 3: Household sizes and differences in the measurement of income across household surveys, NIDS 2014/2015 vs. Living Conditions Survey (LCS 2014/2015) Figure 4: Average annual percentage population growth, 1985 – 2020 Figure 5: Distribution of households by household structure type (total SA population) Figure 6: Personal income tax contributions in 2018 Figure 7: Racial composition of post-tax income groups, 2019 Figure 8: Total individualised transfers received by pre-tax income group Figure 9: Households' main income source by LSM group Figure 10: Reported levels of household hunger (17.2m households) Figure 11: Household wealth (Rand billion) according to data of the South African Reserve Bank (2020) Figure 12: More accurate estimate of household wealth (2020, Rand Billion) Figure 13: Residential properties on the deed's office registry by value Figure 14: Linkages to the labour market and access to financial assets (wealth) through employment for the economically active Figure 15: Educational attendance by age and reasons for non-attendance Figure 16: Percentage distribution of education attainment for individuals 20 years and older, 2002-2018 Figure 17: Share of population by highest level of education and age group, 2020 Figure 18: Share of population aged 25-64 by highest level of education and race, 2010 and 2020 Figure 19: Demographic shift in young graduate (<35 years) profiles by race and gender between 2008 and 2020 Figure 20: Proportion of the unemployed by education level Figure 21: Narrow rate of unemployment by highest level of education Figure 22: Educational profile (highest level of education of the economically active population, by race Figure 23: Relationship between highest level of education and unemployment rate for the economically active, by race (2021) Figure 24: Narrow rate of unemployment for young graduates (2008-2020) Figure 25: Means of transport to health facility by geographic location (total households=17.2m) Figure 26: Reason for not using closest healthcare facility (by geographic location) Figure 27: Medical scheme membership by race group Figure 28: Number of households living in different types of housing, 2001-2019 Figure 29: Number of households living in different types of housing, 2015/2015 List of tables Table 1: Mid-year population estimates 2021 by province Table 2: South Africa's age distribution Table 3: The Gini coefficient for the period 2007-2019 calculated from various data sources (tax and household surveys) Table 4: Comparing the Gini coefficient for all households vs. households excluding the top 1% of income households Table 5: Gini coefficient for individuals aged 65 and younger vs. individuals older than 65 Table 6: Inter-group Gini coefficient for those aged 65 and younger (excluding those aged older than 65) Table 7: Median and average monthly per capita incomes of households, by household structure Table 8: Gini coefficient for employed households, all individuals and all households Table 9: Gini coefficients by population group for households with at least one member employed Table 10: Number of registered taxpayers vs actual number of tax payments received, 2016-2020 Table 11: Afrobarometer responses about a survey on voting freedoms without pressure Table 12: Different fuel sources used for cooking, by population group, 2003 & 2019 Table 13: Population groups' modes of transport to healthcare facilities List of information boxes Info Box 1: Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on social grants Info Box 2: Living Standards Measure Info Box 3: Patient treatment journey Info Box 4: Gugulethu street committee leader Info Box 5: Pollution near coal mines Acronyms and abbreviations ECD Early Childhood Development GBV Gender-Based Violence GEMS Government Employee Medical Scheme GHS General Household Survey IES Income and Expenditure Survey LASA Legal Aid South Africa LCS Labour Conditions Survey LSM Living Standard Measure MDR-TB Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis NIDS National Income Dynamics Study NIDS-CRAM National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey OHS October Household Survey QLFS Quarterly Labour Force Survey SAARF South African Audience Research Foundation SARS South African Revenue Service StatsSA Statistics South Africa TERS Temporary Relief Scheme TIMSS Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 1. Background and purpose “‘Inequality’ has been likened to an elephant: you can’t define it, but you know it when you see it.” (Fields, 2002)[1] Almost three decades have passed since the fall of apartheid, and income inequality persists. Economic growth, equity and social cohesion in South Africa are generally considered poor or regressive despite considerable policy reform aimed at improving these outcomes. The media and political publications continue to place emphasis on income disparities using aggregate income inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient. While important, this seemingly one-dimensional view of tracking progress post-1994 risks missing out on the dimensions of inequality that could become levers of change if properly understood. Strides have been made in terms of achieving equity in access to services – particularly in the areas of education and health – and these should be acknowledged. At the same time, these strides have not translated into meaningful shifts in outcomes. It is therefore critical to understand the drivers of inequality to ensure that government policies and civil responses achieve the most optimal impact. A shift towards a multidimensional framing of poverty and inequality in South Africa lends itself to a more comprehensive description of what has – and has not – been achieved during the new democratic dispensation. By interrogating the changes made in South Africa in a more granular way, the lived experience of South Africans may better be understood and reflected. The approach also allows the drivers of inequality to be identified. In this way, levers of change and opportunity can be described, and poverty can be tackled more comprehensively. This report takes a deeper look at multiple dimensions of inequality and how it has changed in South Africa over the last 27 years. Priority pathways out of poverty and inequality traps are described in a separate report. 2. Conceptual framework - assessing multiple dimensions of inequality We use various dimensions and metrics to describe and measure inequality. For the purpose of this report, we will be evaluating inequality based on the capability approach taken to the multidimensional inequality framework (explained later in the text) typically used in the broader Human Development context.[2] While the exact dimensions of any multidimensional framework can vary somewhat, we opted to interpret typical dimensions presented in the literature in a way that allows for more concrete analysis given limitations on data availability. “Through the capability approach the Human Development approach redefines the concept of well-being instead of on survival means.” (Bucelli and McKnight, 2021)[2] Figure 1: Framework for assessing multiple dimensions of inequality using a capability approach[2] The framework provides a systematic approach to evaluating eight dimensions of inequality, while emphasising the interconnection between all dimensions.[2] These interconnections are based on Sen’s capability approach. The capability approach distinguishes between conversion factors (drivers of multidimensional inequality), capabilities and functionings.[2] Conversion factors influence the degree to which advantage or disadvantage can move between the individual domains of inequality, some of these being capabilities (e.g. learning and education) and other functionings (outcomes – e.g. health). An environmental factor such as pollution is an example of a conversion factor that can drive the degree to which inequalities are transferred between domains – for example, from health to economic, if individuals are no longer able to work due to ill health because of pollution exposure. The progress (or lack thereof) made in each dimension of the multidimensional inequality framework will be explored using a variety of metrics to provide a comprehensive understanding of inequality in South Africa. 3. Note on data sources Our analysis makes use of various data sources (household surveys, public sector administrative data sources and private sector data sources) to ensure that our evaluation is as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, this approach ensures robustness since each data source has its own strengths and weaknesses. The underlying data used in this report and quoted in other reports is mainly derived from survey data sources. In some cases, it is possible to calculate income (personal, household and/or per capita income) from these surveys. However, incomes may be poorly reported in surveys – in some cases because respondents deliberately misstate their income and in others because incomes are inherently unstable and difficult to report on. For this reason, many researchers prefer to use expenditure data rather than income data for analysis. At the same time, the household unit itself is not well-defined or stable, which further complicates deriving per capita income measures. 4. Inequality for whom? The starting point for any discussion on inequality is defining the population for whom inequality is being measured. An inequality assessment presupposes a distribution of resources relative to a given population within which the ranking of resources relative to individuals can be done. According to the 2019 General Household Survey (GHS), the most recent version of the survey for which data is available, there are 58.4 million people and 17.2 million households in South Africa. The number of households in South Africa grew at 2.4% per annum while the number of individuals grew at 1.5% per annum between 2001 and 2019. This discrepancy is driven to a large degree by the continued growth in one-person households, a phenomenon commonly associated with urbanisation, and in South Africa, with migration and employment patterns. The growth in households has clear implications for service delivery; an increase in the number of households implies a need for more dwellings, albeit smaller, and more infrastructure to service these dwellings appropriately. Figure 2: Growth in the number of individuals and households in South Africa, 2001-2019 Sources: Census 2001, Community Survey 2007, Census 2011, Community Survey 2016, GHS 2019 Growth in population and households is also not evenly distributed across the country, with noticeably higher population growth in better-developed areas, as individuals migrate to access jobs, better-quality housing, education and healthcare. The latest mid-year population estimates published by Stats SA in July 2021 indicate that Gauteng has seen net in-migration of almost one million people between 2016 and 2021, with the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Kwa-Zulu-Natal experiencing net out-migration of 320,000, 189,000 and 84,000 people respectively. Table 1: 2021 mid-year population estimates by province Source: Stats SA 2021 Recent statistics also show that 10% of the national population was aged 4 and under, 25% aged 12 and under, and 50% aged 26 and under (see Table 2 below). Table 2: South Africa's age distribution Source: NIDS Wave 5 (2017) 5. Economic inequality When viewing inequality through a capability lens, income and wealth are not ends in themselves but serve as means to achieve welfare and freedom.[3] Because this report uses a multidimensional inequality framework underpinned by a capability approach, income and wealth inequality in South Africa is explored from the perspective that it contributes to suboptimal functionings among those at the bottom end of the distribution. Income can be considered anything that makes consumption possible[4] and therefore, its sources are vast and varied. However, it is useful to categorise income according to its factor source (the factor of production used to generate the income): labour income (wages and salaries), capital income (capital gains and interest), income from entrepreneurship (profit) and land (rent). Understanding the dynamics and structural nature of the factor markets that generate these incomes is essential to figuring out the inequality story. Appreciating these complexities of factor markets also helps with accepting that income inequality is ‘sticky’ (slow changing). Another important source of income in the South African context is transfers from the government in the form of social security grants. Spending on income grants and taxation are fiscal tools used by governments to improve distributive outcomes in the short term. One way to determine the impact of these direct interventions in reducing income inequality is by measuring primary (pre-tax and pre-government spending) income and comparing it to post-tax secondary income (post-tax and post-government spending). Although it’s more difficult to measure than income, we also consider the distribution of wealth in South Africa because of its potential to generate longer-term intergenerational benefits. 5.1 Overall income: inequality and poverty South Africa has been labelled as one of the most unequal countries globally for decades. This is due to the strong focus placed on the Gini coefficient as the primary measure of inequality, which has remained persistently above 0.6.[5] The 2019 Stats SA inequality report[6] that reviewed progress in inequality reduction in post-apartheid South Africa arrived at the same conclusion. It revealed that there had been no substantial change in South Africa’s Gini coefficient during the post-apartheid period. Even though the report[6] also considered non-income dimensions of inequality and numerous measures of inequality, South African media and political organisations focused exclusively on the aggregate Gini as a summary measure of inequality. Throughout this report, we will draw attention to improvements in inequality in other dimensions, where it exists. But ultimately income inequality – as measured by the Gini, in particular – remains the most widely reported and considered measure when assessing post-apartheid inequality. Differences in both the reporting and consequently ultimate measurement of income reported by different households can make it difficult to accurately track income inequality. In the 2014/2015 Living Conditions Survey, one of the biggest household surveys in South Africa, 10% of households reported earning income of R30,000 or more per month. In the NIDS survey, a smaller panel survey conducted in the same period, only 6% of households reported earning income of R30,000 or more. Likewise, at the other end of the market, according to NIDS 2014/15, 38% of households earn less than R3,500 per month, compared to 41% as reported by the Living Conditions Survey. The Gini coefficient for these surveys is 0.6. Figure 3: Household sizes and differences in the measurement of income across household surveys, NIDS 2014/2015 vs. Living Conditions Survey (LCS 2014/2015) Sources: NIDS 2014-2015, Wave 4; LCS 2014-2015 Nevertheless, the reporting errors in and between surveys are typically not large enough to alter the pattern of extreme inequality shown by survey data. For example, while the NIDS, LCS, GHS and SARS tax statistics all provide markedly different estimates for the Gini coefficient, they leave no doubt that South Africa is characterised by extreme income inequality (Table 3). The Gini coefficient is lowest when administrative tax data is used (varying between 0.41 and 0.50 between 2007 and 2019). Data from the GHS shows Gini coefficients between 0.56 and 0.62, while the NIDS data (using a smaller sample) has Gini coefficients varying between 0.61 and 0.7. The LCS is not regularly repeated. Table 3: The Gini coefficient for the period 2007-2019 calculated from various data sources (tax and household surveys)[1] Some critical data sources, such as the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), do not include sufficiently useful income measures (household income). Even where personal income data is collected from the respondent, this data is not disseminated publicly. Where this is the case, the analysis uses other proxies to segment the market. Examples of these alternative proxies include Living Standard Measures (or LSMs, which themselves reflect key dimensions of inequality such as access to services), area or area type, race as well as education levels. The unit of analysis relative to which inequality is calculated varies throughout the report. Excluding the top 1% from income inequality calculations only marginally reduces overall inequality. The contribution of the top 1% of the income distribution is a topic of global relevance and concern.7 Removing the top 1% of the income distribution’s income from calculations of the Gini coefficient can indicate to what extent overall income inequality is driven by the phenomenon of the “top 1%”, as the literature often refers to this group. As shown in Table 4, excluding this group’s income from the Gini only marginally decreases overall inequality. It generally lowers the Gini from 0.60 and above to just below, although using GHS income data lowers it to as low as 0.52 – which is still a very high level of inequality. Given that good data on the total population’s wealth is not accessible, this exercise was not repeated with wealth data. Table 4: Comparing the Gini coefficient for all households vs. households excluding the top 1% of income households Sources: NIDS and GHS The evidence on whether the inclusion of older generations (>65 years) in income inequality calculations lead to higher inequality is inconclusive. Older generations have theoretically had more time to accumulate wealth from non-labour market income in the form of both financial and non-financial assets such as housing. However, different older population groups in South Africa would also have been more heavily subject to the inequalities generated by apartheid. Depending on the data source, the Gini coefficient for the population aged 65 and below can be higher or lower than the Gini coefficient for the population older than 65 years (Table 5). Data from the GHS generally shows a marginally lower trend in inequality for the population aged 65 and younger, while data from NIDS shows higher inequality among the population 65 and younger. The inter-group Gini coefficient for different South African race groups (Table 6) shows much higher inequality among Black and Coloured South Africans compared to White and Indian/Asian South Africans. Specifically for Black South Africans aged 65 years and younger, there also was a trend of increasing inequality in later years. Among Coloured South Africans, the inter-group Gini coefficient seems to have decreased between 2015 and 2019. This raises questions about which income distribution brackets within the group experienced increased or decreased incomes. Further investigation is required to answer this question. Table 5: Gini coefficient for individuals aged 65 and younger vs. individuals older than 65 Sources: NIDS and GHS Table 6: Inter-group Gini coefficient for those aged 65 and younger (excluding those aged older than 65) Source: GHS South Africa has experienced a population growth of between 1.2% and 2.3% over the past 36 years. The population growth rate has declined from an average of 2.2% per annum between 1985 and 1990 to an average of 1.2% per annum between 2015 and 2020. The country’s average population growth rate has typically been between the average of upper-middle-income countries’ growth rate and the lower-middle-income countries’ growth rate (Figure 4). Kenya, a comparator African country (but falling into the lower-middle-income category), has experienced a higher average population growth from 1985 to 2020, decreasing from 3.5% to 2.5%. All middle-income countries have experienced declining population growth rates over the period. This is likely due to the increased economic development of these countries and increasing access to education, family planning and other similar services. Figure 4: Average annual percentage population growth, 1985-2020 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2018 Population growth may play out in household structures (in an inequality context). Although fertility levels in South Africa (which contribute to decreasing average population growth rates) have been declining significantly, suggesting a strong fertility transition[8], average fertility may still be higher than women’s and households’ stated preferences. Stats SA recently (2020) published nationwide research in which they asked women who had a baby in the five years preceding the survey (conducted in 2016) whether they wanted to get pregnant at the time. If they answered no, they were asked whether they wanted to rather have a baby later (indicating that the birth may have simply been unplanned or mistimed) or did not want more children (therefore indicating that the birth was unwanted). Unwanted births are therefore births – as recalled by the women surveyed – where no additional birth was planned or wanted at the time of conception. Over 20% of total births from the prior five years were classified as unwanted according to this research. The underlying research also shows that another 34% of the births were mistimed. As we discuss below, this may also have implications, especially for younger mothers. These unwanted births show a decline with increasing education; in 2016 unwanted births to mothers with tertiary education (11%) was four times less compared to mothers with no education (46.3%). 26% of the unwanted births were birthed into households in the poorest wealth quintile and 13% into households in the richest wealth quintile. The highest number of unwanted births were found in the Eastern Cape, followed by KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga.[9] Various factors may contribute to these high levels of unwanted fertility, including low-quality contraceptive services in the public sector, and gender violence and inequality. Recent research indicates that the unmet need for contraception remains high – at 19% – for sexually active women, and at 15% for married/in-union women. This research also highlights the widespread dissatisfaction by both community members and healthcare providers with the level of family planning quality of care.[10] We discuss gender-based violence later in this report under physical security and legal inequalities, where it is found that among adult women in South Africa, 21% have reported experiencing physical abuse in their lifetime. While ideal population growth rates may be ambiguous and even controversial, the findings from stated preferences do provide insights into the possible links between population growth, poverty and inequality. The same report regarding unwanted births by Stats SA discusses that the disadvantages suffered by unwanted children may be in their health, early childhood development and potential future social and economic opportunities.[9] Similarly for parents (especially mothers), unwanted births may, dependent on the mother’s age at birth, limit one’s education, and job and income prospects, with possible knock-on effects for many other aspects that perpetuate inequalities. It is notable that there is also two-way directionality here (fertility influencing income and income influencing fertility), with other studies finding that higher education and income lead to lower fertility levels.[11] Teenage births may have declined over time, but StatsSA shows that in 2020 alone, approximately 34,000 births were to women aged 17 and younger. These births are likely to cause education interruptions and later entry into the labour market. In the same year, it was found that more than 60% of all births were registered without the details of the father. This percentage may change alongside legislative changes and there may be many reasons for this phenomenon, including choices by individuals not to marry (until now prohibiting the father’s details to be included on the birth certificate).[12] Nevertheless, it does raise the question of the prevalence of single parents and what implications this may have for poverty and inequality. In relation to inequality, population growth may indeed play out in household formation and different types of households’ average income and poverty levels. Figure 5 sets out the distribution of different types of households in South Africa in 2015, with 39% of South Africans living in extended family and/or non-related households and 11.9% of households being single-parent family households. Extended family/non-related households typically have larger sizes than the other households. Table 7 sets out the income per capita of each household structure. The median per capita monthly income of the extended and/or non-related households is the lowest of all household structure types at R1,283 per month, followed by single-parent family households at R1,462 per capita per month. Population growth which manifests in extended family/non-related households and in single-parent families (often female-headed) contributes to inequality in that these households typically share a limited set of resources among a large group of people, tend to be grant reliant, and these types of households typically don’t have good labour market links.[13] This type of household formation is both a result of poverty and inequality, as well as a contributor to future inequality. Figure 5: Distribution of households by household structure type (total SA population) Source: Living Conditions Survey 2015 Table 7: Median and average monthly per capita incomes of households, by household structure Data source: Living Conditions Survey 2015 COVID-19 has worsened the economic situation and will affect poverty and inequality. Given the pre-pandemic South African context of weak, non-inclusive economic growth and high unemployment rates, it is expected that the economic effects of COVID-19 may perpetuate existing income inequalities and poverty. In some cases, it may even reverse economic gains made amongst vulnerable groups over the past two decades (e.g., women, the previously disadvantaged). Recent studies already point in this direction. Findings from the nationally representative NIDS-CRAMc survey provide robust evidence of sharp increases in household and child hunger and insufficient money for food during the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which remained disturbingly high from May 2020 to May 2021.14 When considering the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the labour market - the source of labour income - gendered effects are already emerging. By March 2021, men’s employment and working hours reverted to pre-COVID levels but in contrast, women’s were below February 2020 baseline figures. Furthermore, inequalities in the time spent on childcare and in the income support for unemployed or furloughed workers endured during COVID-19.[15] When Statistics South Africa upper-bound poverty line is used, more than one out every two South Africans were poor in 2015.[16] While there had been a clear decrease in poverty (using the upper-bound poverty line) between 2006 and 2011 from 66.6% to 53.2% of the population, by 2015 poverty had increased to 55.5% of the population.[16] This meant that 30.4 million South African were living in poverty in 2015. A similar poverty trends report has not been produced by Statistics South African since 2017 but the impact of COVID-19 is likely to have exacerbated the poverty situation by a large quantum. 5.2 Inequality in sources of income Since the end of apartheid, a divergence between the top and bottom income deciles in real factor incomes (income generated through labour, capital, land or entrepreneurship) was seen.[17] The 13% increase in national income was largely due to a 30% increase among the highest decile, with an almost 50% increase seen in the top 1%.[17,18] In contrast, the average factor income has remained static in the middle 40% group, while the lower 50% has had a 30% drop.[17,18] Economic growth since the 2000s has primarily resulted in an increase in income among the high-income earners.[17,18] Increases among the lower 90% have failed to rise substantially, and returned to levels observed in 1993 during 2011 (on the back of the global financial crisis). However, the top 10% was largely unaffected during 2011.[17,18] Labour market income and large variation in labour market income play a very significant role in overall inequality. Work done by Stats SA and the French Development Agency found that roughly two-thirds of total inequality derives from inequality in labour market earnings and that half of this is related to the very high levels of unemployment in South Africa. The distribution of wage earnings among the employed also shows a long upper tail which increases overall inequality. In this report, a simple exercise was done to determine the relationship between inequality and access to labour market earnings. Inequality is lower amongst households with at least one employed member, but only somewhat (see Table 8). Compared to data presented for the total population earlier in this report, inequality among households with at least one employed member is only marginally lower than for the total population. This could be because having only one employed member is an insufficient threshold, also given the high variation and longer upper tail described in the income distribution. Using household survey data that contains only household income data (as opposed to personal income) limits the analysis that can be done to households where at least one member is employed. If income is spread between many household members, this reduces per capita income, but total income would still be higher than in households without any employment. The same pattern of lowest inequality within the groups of White and Indian/Asian South Africans hold here, with the highest inequality among Black and Coloured South Africans. Table 8: Gini coefficient for employed households, all individuals and all households Sources: GHS and NIDS Table 9: Gini coefficients by population group for households with at least one member employed Source: GHS 5.3 Post-tax income inequality Personal income tax contributions, a large source of tax income that enables government expenditure, are paid primarily by wealthy South Africans because of the progressive nature of the tax regime. As illustrated in Figure 6 below, the top quartile of earners contributed 73% of the total personal income tax collected in 2018. In 2018, there were about 22.2m registered taxpayers. 19.1m tax payments were received (Table 10), although only 5.9m taxpayers were assessed. Figure 6: Personal income tax contributions in 2018 Source: SARS data, 2018 Table 10: Number of registered taxpayers vs. actual number of tax payments received, 2016-2020 Source: SARS data, 2016-2020 Despite a progressive personal income taxation regimed and substantial changes in service delivery in the post-apartheid period as reviewed elsewhere in this report, racial inequality persists in South Africa. The White-to-Black income ratios remain high at 8 overall, and this divide is even greater when considering wealth.[17] A basic picture of the receipt of post-tax income by population share in 2019 is presented in Figure 7. In this figure, the population has been ranked by income from the lowest to the highest income receiving. After accounting for transfers and taxes, White South Africans account for a large proportion (50%) of the top 1%, indicating that they still receive far more income than their population share.[17,18] The slight reduction in racial inequality over the last two decadeshas largely been driven by the top 1% who are Black African.[18] The increase in incomes of Black South Africans falling in the top 1%and other higher-income groups have, however, increased within group inequality among Black South Africans. Figure 7: Racial composition of post-tax income groups, 2019[18] 5.4 Inequality in post-government expenditure (post-transfer) income Post-transfer income refers to income after government transfers (like social security) and expenditure on social services (education and health) have been taken into consideration. Measuring post-transfer incomes allows one to assess the impact of government transfers on primary income (pre-tax and pre government spending income), and whether it is progressive or regressive. Figure 8 below shows the share of total transfers in grants, education and health that have been allocated to various income groups from 1993 to 2019.[18] It depicts the progressive changes made by the South African government: Individualised transfers as a proportion of the national income have consistently increased in favour of the poor. There has been a relatively rapid growth in transfer income among the bottom 50% who received approximately 12% of the national income.[17,18] The middle income group also experienced an increase in transfers from 3.9% in 1993 to 5.3% in 2019.[17] This is compared to the 1% of national income received by the top 10%.[17] Overall, transfers have been made in the form of cash transfers or in-kind transfers.[17] Figure 8: Total individualised transfers received by pre-tax income group[18] 5.5 Inequality in Living Standards It is possible to consider economic inequality in terms of more than just income. One can also view it in terms of what people choose to buy with their earnings – as well as their everyday living standards, as captured by a measure that not only takes income into account, but also assets and access to services. The South Africa Audience Research Foundation’s (SAARF) Living Standards Measure aims to do precisely this (see Info Box 2). In a way, it’s a multidimensional economic measure. The 2014-2019 period saw households from the LSMs 6 and 7 become more reliant on grants and remittances as their main sources of income. Households in the highest LSMs rely largely on income through salaries, business profits and pensions, and the latter two have become more prominent in the past five years. More than 25% of households at LSM 5 and lower rely on grants as their main source of income. Remittances also play an important role for households in the lower LSMs (approximately 15% of these households’ main source of income), particularly in more recent years. Figure 9: Households' main income source by LSM group Source: SAARF 5.6 Nutrition and hunger Hunger is a sign of insufficient income to sustain good nutritional levels. It is closely linked to income, wealth and living standards. However, we treat it separately here, given its importance as an indicator of insufficient means to sustain a basic human need. In the latest General Household Survey (2019), 11% of all South African households reported at least one person going hungry in the past 12 months. 6% of households reported sometimes going hungry, while 2% said they often go hungry. These percentages are much higher for Black South African households, where 12% of households reported at least one person going hungry in the past twelve months, compared to less than 1% of White South African households. Hunger levels in South African households were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdown measures, which prevented many households from obtaining an income and ultimately, necessary levels of nutrition.[14] Figure 10: Reported levels of household hunger (17.2m households) Sources: GHS 2019 5.7 Wealth Inequality is often calculated using income rather than wealth data, given the complications of accessing wealth data. Recent work by Chatterjee et al.[19] however takes a quite novel approach, using alternative data sources such as tax data. In this study, the wealth-to-national-income ratio provides some context regarding wealth inequality. The South African wealth-to-national-income ratio has remained relatively stable between 2.5 and 2.8 following the end of apartheid.[19] However, the average wealth of individuals has fluctuated over time. Before the early 2000s, the real average wealth per adult stagnated at around R240,000 per person. It then rapidly increased by about 30%, before stabilising at R320,000 after the 2008 financial crisis.[19] Wealth is extremely unequally distributed. The top 1% of the population by wealth own 55% of wealth assets, while the bottom 50% have a negative net worth due to their liabilities exceeding their assets. Age appears to correlate strongly with wealth accumulation in South Africa. The average net worth of individuals increases linearly until age 55. Adults aged 50-55 are approximately 50% more wealthy than the national average. Following this, wealth generally plateaus. In each age group, the top 10% holds the majority of wealth (approximately 85%). It indicates that generational wealth plays a role in wealth accumulation over time.[19] A 2018 review showed that in 2018, financial and non-financial assets respectively amounted to two years and one year of national income. Pension assets represented the biggest component of financial assets (73% of national income), closely followed by equities and fund shares (51%), bonds and interest deposits (45%), and life insurance assets (35%).[19] Figure 11 indicates that this trend has remained consistent over time. Housing is the main driver of individual and household non-financial wealth today.[20] In 2020, residential property amounted to R3,061billion (25%) of household wealth according to official data of the South African Reserve Bank. However, this is likely a gross underestimation. Housing may account for up to R5,500 billion in household wealth, if theassumptions on the average values of houses are adjusted using data from the Centre for Affordable Housing (Figure 12). This adjustment would make housing the biggest source of wealth in South Africa. Figure 11: Household wealth (Rand billion) according to data of the South African Reserve Bank (2020) Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, June 2021 Figure 12: More accurate estimate of household wealth (2020, Rand Billion) Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, June 2021 The number of households living in formal housing increased by 6.3 million between 2001 and 2019 and is estimated to be around 14 million. While 14 million households live in what appear to be formal structures, there are only 6.6 million registered residential properties on the Deeds Office registry. 18% are valued at under R600,000, comprising a fifth of the value of residential property. The undervaluation of property, and in effect, underestimating the owner’s contribution to wealth, is likely to be a particular issue in the R600,000-or-less property category. [21–23] Figure 13: Residential properties on the Deeds Office’s registry – by value Source: City Mark data compiled by the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF) Financial assets are generally tied to formal employment and employment benefits such as pensions accessed through this type of employment. By the first quarter of 2021, only 14.5m of economically active people in South Africa were employed, of which 10.5m were formally employed. Unemployed workers, using the broad definition, constituted 10.4m, of which 3.1m were discouraged work-seekers. This means that out of a total base population of 24.9m economically active South Africans, 10.4m were unemployed, implying about four out of every 10 economically active South Africans were unemployed. COVID-19 and the associated lockdowns resulted in very large employment losses and a large growth in discouraged workers. However, between the first quarter of 2021 and the second quarter of the same year, there was a reduction in discouraged workers, reflecting the recovery of the post-lockdown economy.[24] Only 5.9m of formal sector workers had access to permanent employment which provided them with paid leave and access to some type of pension that would enable the accumulation of assets for retirement. Figure 14: Linkages to the labour market and access to financial assets (wealth) through employment for the economically active Source: QLFS 2021 Q1 6. Education inequalities In this section, we show that access to education has improved over time. It has gone some way to reduce inequality in education, but there is still room for improvement. Despite this, the proportion of individuals who complete matric is low, which has implications for employment. Most concerning however, is that the quality of (public) education remains low. Education does not occur in a vacuum and the broader socio-economic context in which a child is raised matters greatly. Below, we describe key indicators regarding the education system at different levels, before turning to the link between education and employment (income). 6.1 Early Childhood Development Education begins with early childhood development (ECD), which may be split into community-based ECD for children 0-4 years old, and Grade R, aimed at children 5-6 years old. Despite the fact that ECD centres receive subsidies from the government, access to this type of education is affected by parents’ ability to afford ECD programmes.[25] There are significant differences in the rates of access to ECD by race in South Africa. While 47% of young White children were not enrolled in ECD programmes, 63% of Black African young children were not enrolled. The percentage of non-enrolment is highest for Coloured children – at 72%. The cost of early childhood education as a barrier to access is more frequently reported as an issue by Coloured (5%) and Black African (14%) households than White households (3%). Nevertheless, in most cases, it is the choice of the parent or guardian not to send their child to an ECD centre.[21] On the supply side, studies point to the fact that ECD teachers are poorly paid, which affects the quality of personnel in ECD centres. Many centres also lack basic infrastructure. A 2013 ECD audit showed that 20% of national ECD centres lack adequate water, 25% lack adequate electricity, 26% lack adequate toilets, and 57% are overcrowded. Despite this, there have been improvements in ECD over time, with enrolment in Grade R more than doubling between 2003 and 2013 (300,000 to 779,370 students). This has implications for later education, with research showing that attendance of Grade R significantly elevates learning for the remainder of the child’s education. It is however mainly the case in higher quintile schools, with lower quintile schools showing no indication of benefits. Researchers suggest that this is due to differing quality of interventions.[26] 6.2 Basic Education Data from the GHS show high levels of school attendance across all ages, with a sharp drop-off from the age of 15 onwards. South African children are legally allowed to stop school attendance from the age of 15. By the age of 18, more than 70% of children are still attending school (see Figure 15). For those not attending, financial constraints and being too old or too young are most reported as reasons. Figure 15: Educational attendance by age and reasons for non-attendance Source: GHS 2019[21] The above picture of school attendance and completion across different levels has improved over time, as shown in Figure 16 below. This shows that the percentage of individuals aged 20 years and older who have attained at least Grade 12 has also been increasing consistently since 2002, growing from 30% in 2002 to approximately 45% in 2018 (seen by adding up the top elements in each bar). The percentage of individuals without any schooling decreased from 11% in 2002 to 5% in 2018. Figure 16: Percentage distribution of education attainment for individuals 20 years and older, 2002-2018 Source: GHS 201821 Figure 17 below shows the share of adults in South Africa by their highest level of education, broken down by age group. This again shows the positive shift that has occurred over an even longer time frame. 7% of those currently aged 55-64 report having had no schooling. This has dropped but is not eliminated. Of those currently aged 25-34 years, less than 1% report having no schooling. A similar trend shows for those with less than primary schooling. 19% of current 55-64-year-olds report having had less than primary schooling, while 3% of those currently aged 25-34 report the same. Overall, this picture shows that people are increasingly attaining higher levels of education, with significantly more people reaching and completing secondary school. Figure 17: Share of population by highest level of education and age group, 2020 Source: QLFS 2020 (2021)[27] Figure 18 below looks at the same QLFS data, comparing 2010 and 2020 data for adults (25-64 years old), but breaks this down by race. Black African and Coloured groups had the largest proportions of persons who have had some secondary schooling as their highest level of education. Meanwhile, the largest proportions of Indian/Asian and White people had secondary education (completed) as their highest level of education. This picture has improved over time, however to a large extent the inequalities persist. Figure 18: Share of population aged 25-64 by highest level of education and race, 2010 and 2020 Source: QLFS 2010 and 2020[27] Despite the above improvements, many still stop schooling before matric. 44% of the “class of 2017” successfully matriculated in the standard time, meaning that of the cohort of individuals who started Grade 1 in 2006, 44% completed matric in 2017. Various studies indicate similar outcomes, stating that of a cohort of students entering Grade 1, on average 60% of students reach Grade 12 within twelve years of schooling, 50% pass Grade 12, 14% attend university and 6% obtain a degree.[28,29] While the above focuses on education items such as educational attendance and shows some sign of improvement, the quality of education remains the greatest concern. Not all schools provide a similar quality of education and there are still distinctions in this that follow racial lines. The GHS of 2019[21] shows that 69% of White students attend private (independent) schools and the remaining 31% of White students attend public (government) schools. 94% of Black African students attend public (government) schools and the remaining 6% attend private (independent) schools. The quality of teaching is often challenging for teachers in public schools and most educators report that they lack sufficient training and have very large classes, making it difficult to teach. Absenteeism has also been a downfall for both teachers and students as a result of poor access to transport.[28] Despite international Minimum Norms and Standards for educational facilities, public schools still lack basic infrastructure. Approximately 19% of public schools have pit latrines, 77% of schools do not have a library, 72% lack internet access, and 42% do not have sporting facilities.[28] This has hindered educators’ ability to teach.[28] Inequalities are also highlighted by differences in test scores (education outcomes). Provinces such as Limpopo and the Eastern Cape have high rates of illiteracy, with 91% and 85% of children still being illiterate at age 9 years. This is compared to a national average of 75%.[28] Other studies show that the percentage of Grade 9s that perform above the low international benchmark of 400 in TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) is around 16-19% for public no-fee schools, 58-60% for public fee-paying schools, and 81% for independent (private) schools.[26] Public resources for school education have been reallocated to the extent that the racial and rich-poor gaps in public spending per child have largely been eliminated, although wealthier urban schools still have more highly qualified teachers, and therefore better-remunerated teachers, and fee-paying schools can supplement public resources through their school fees. Resource shifts have not eliminated infrastructural backlogs in education, but in most cases, they have also not fundamentally changed learning outcomes, because of weak conversion of resources to learning outcomes in much of the school system. In contrast to the above concerns, signs of quality improvement and consequent inequality reduction do exist. For example, analysis of matric performance for 2002, 2009 and 2016 show that the number of non-White students attaining a level of mathematics performance that would allow entry into engineering at university increased by 65%. These improvements occurred inter alia through the expansion of good mathematics performance across rural schools.[26] 6.3 Tertiary Education Despite the challenges mentioned above, higher education enrolment and completion has increased in the post-apartheid period, as already shown in some of the figures above. Figure 19 also shows the distribution of young graduates (degrees) by race, indicating improvement in this overall picture to align more closely with population demographics. Figure 19: Demographic shift in young graduate (<35 years) profiles by race and gender between 2008 and 2020 Source: QLFS 2008 Q1-Q4 and 2020 Q1-Q4[27] (data averaged within each year) In 2019, approximately 1.15 million students were enrolled in universities (953,000 public and 197,000 private), 880,000 in TVET colleges (710,000 public and 170,000 private), and 300,000 in community education and training centres.[30] 6.4 How does education link to employment and income? Figure 20 below shows that of the 6.7 million unemployed persons at the end of 2019, 56% had education levels below matric, followed by those with matric at 34.7%. Only 1.9% of the unemployed persons were graduates, while 6.8% had other tertiary qualifications as their highest level of education. This suggests that lower levels of education are associated with higher levels of unemployment. Figure 20: Proportion of the unemployed by education level Source: QLFS Q4, 2019[27] Figure 21 below shows the (narrow) unemployment rate for individuals of different educational profiles (highest level of education). This again shows that the unemployment rate is highest for those with lower levels of education. It also shows a consistent upward trend across education levels, meaning that having lower levels of education is increasingly associated with unemployment. It also highlights a significant increase in unemployment for all education levels, which is a concerning trend. Figure 21: Narrow rate of unemployment by highest level of education Source: QLFS 2008 Q1-2020 Q4[27] The educational profile of the economically active population (those employed or actively searching for employment) still differs significantly by race. Figure 22 below shows that almost 92% of economically active White South Africans have a matric qualification (43% + 23% + 25%, rounded) while approximately 51% of economically active Black African individuals have a matric qualification (34% + 12% + 5%, rounded). Figure 22: Educational profile (highest level of education of the economically active population, by race) Source: QLFS 2021 (Q1)[27] Figure 23 below shows the economically active population, split by highest educational level (x-axis) and race (y-axis), as well as absolute numbers (size of each circle) and percentage within each circle that are employed and unemployed. This shows that most of the economically active population is represented by Black African individuals with some high school or matric, but that for each of these groups, the rate of unemployment is also highest (42% of 39% respectively). Figure 23: Relationship between the highest level of education and the unemployment rate for the economically active, by race (2021) Source: QLFS 2021 (Q1)[27] (data for economically active only, based on expanded definition; data for those who have only completed primary school not shown) Figure 24 below also shows that even within the upper echelons of the labour force, those with a tertiary degree – Black African females, followed by Black African males – still experience the highest levels of unemployment. There may be many reasons for this, including the difference in the quality of education received by individuals, even within similar levels of education. Figure 24: Narrow rate of unemployment for young graduates (2008-2020) Source: QLFS 2008 Q1-2020 Q4[27] (data averaged over each year) 7. Health inequalities It’s important to understand health inequalities because of their direct bearing on people’s individual quality of life (being healthy or not) – and the spill-overs of its (dis)advantages to other domains of inequality.[2] This is more readily appreciated when one considers that in addition to the initial distribution of health entitlements and endowments, the key drivers of health inequality cut across multiple conversion factors: personal conversion factors (for example, age and gender), socio-political conversion factors (for example, stigma and institutions), and environmental conversion factors (for example, pollution and overcrowding)[31]. Collectively, these factors determine the extent to which dis(advantages) of health inequalities spill over into other domains, such as income inequality. Decades of systematic discrimination under apartheid – a key socio-political conversion factor in the South African context – left a legacy of health inequalities. What remains is a two-tiered health system: a private health sector that services those who can afford it, and a public health sector that services the majority who cannot afford private healthcare. Although the post-apartheid government made strides in increasing access to public healthcare,[32] access gaps remain[33] and the quality of the services provided is not on par with the private sector.[34–36] It is therefore unsurprising that poor health outcomes persist in South Africa, especially among the most vulnerable.[37,38] Before describing the more recent state of health inequalities in South Africa, it is important to reflect on the progress made since the end of apartheid. Since 1994, the South African government prioritised healthcare reform on its development agenda.[32] Improvements in the progressive spending of public healthcare were observed between 1995 and 2008.[39] In 1995, spending on public hospitals was pro-rich and only weakly redistributive for public clinics, but by 2008, spending on both public clinics and hospitals was pro-poor. Indicated by data from the 1995 IES/OHS and the 2008 NIDS, the utilisation of public health facilities increased dramatically over this period (1998-2005) for the poorest 20% of South Africans.[39] Additionally, government healthcare spending on the poorest 20% of the population increased from around 20% in 1995 to around 30% in 2008.[39]The government also increased access to healthcare for the poorest and most marginalised groups of society by expanding the healthcare facility network and abolishing user fees at the primary healthcare level.[32] The success of government interventions to redress financial and physical access to healthcare was also reflected in the low incidence of catastrophic costs and reduced travel time between 1993 and 2008.[39] Despite the post-1994 successes with increasing financial and physical access to care, room for improvement remains. Proxies of access to care vary significantly. In 2019, high rates of immunisation (83.5%) and availability of hospital beds (96.3%) demonstrated that there was adequate coverage of these parameters in South Africa.[33] However, the rates of antiretroviral effective coverage (42.5%), diabetes treatment care (37.9%) and health worker density (15.2%) remained low.[33] In addition to accessing a healthcare facility, the South African government set an 80% benchmark for the availability of medication in each facility.[40] In 2019/2020,[41] medication availability ranged from 78.2% to 93.7%, with a national average of 87.7%.[41] Despite an increase from the 2018 average of 84.7%, two provinces experienced medication shortages below the threshold: Limpopo (78.2%) and the Western Cape (79.9%). The North West also came in on the margin at 80.5%.[41] When it comes to decomposing inequalities in healthcare access by a geographical location, access to healthcare facilities shows a geographical bias, as demonstrated in Figure 25 below, which was generated using 2019 GHS data. Even though walking to a healthcare facility is the most common means of transport for most households (approximately half in both rural and urban areas), rural households use taxis to access care at double the rate of urban households (40% vs. 20%). Using taxis has cost implications, which may present barriers to early care-seeking. It is also interesting to note that using a bus to access care performs poorly in both relative and absolute terms: it ranks the lowest in terms of means of transport when compared to other modes, and its reported use is low (0-2%), irrespective of geographical location. These findings may allude to weak and/or unreliable public transport systems and highlight how environmental conversion factors may perpetuate or alleviate health inequalities. Figure 25: Means of transport to health facility by geographic location (total households: 17.2m) Source: GHS 2019 The geographical bias in access to care also emerges when analysing travel times to health facilities. While just over one in two households in urban areas reported travel times to healthcare facilities in less than 15 minutes in 2019, only one in five households could report the same in rural areas (see Figure 25 above). In rural areas, almost 80% of households take from 15 to 89 minutes to travel to a facility, while only about half of urban households reported the same travel time. Even if care is accessed and received, it is important to ensure that quality standards are upheld. The government implemented an Ideal Clinic benchmark for clinics in 2015 and only 9.2% of clinics achieved this status at the time.[41] It improved to 55.4% in 2018, but decreased slightly to 54.9% in 2019, indicating the challenge to ensure the sustainability of quality assurance initiatives. [41] Basic patient-centric conduct may improve the perceived quality of care by patients. These include being greeted by staff and having their condition adequately explained to them.[36] When simulated (mystery) pre-hypertensive patients were used in a study assessing the quality of care at primary healthcare facilities in South Africa, the latter was poorly performed. Among these standardised patients, 39% received no lifestyle counselling, and 25% did not receive a diagnosis or follow-up appointment.[35] Similarly, among standardised TB patients, only 43% were offered an HIV test and 54% did not have any contact tracing.[34] It is inevitable that demand-side proxies for poor healthcare quality, such as bad experiences or negative perceptions of healthcare services, will negatively impact health-seeking behaviours. More evidence of how client experiences at healthcare services feed into health-seeking behaviour is illustrated in Figure 26 below. According to GHS data, in 2019 the main reasons why households reported bypassing their closest healthcare facility was based on their preference for private healthcare, long waiting times and a lack of required medication. Although the reported proportion was almost twice as high in urban areas as in rural areas (46% vs. 23%), the preference for private healthcare ranked as the top reason for bypassing, irrespective of the household’s geographical location. This finding has financial implications for the poor, who need to pay out of pocket for private healthcare – and are prepared to do so, even when ‘free’ public healthcare is available. Figure 26: Reason for not using closest healthcare facility (by geographic location) Source: GHS 2019 Access to care and quality of care are in part dependent on access to private healthcare. At present, few South Africans (17%) are able to afford private healthcare.42 The Government Employee Medical Scheme (GEMS) has attempted to increase access to private medical care. The coverage of this scheme has grown over the years from 690,000 members and 1,807,538 beneficiaries in 201743 to 750,935 and 1,963,758, respectively, in 2020.44 Figure 27: Medical scheme membership by race group Source: GHS 2019 When disaggregating medical scheme beneficiaries by race (see Figure 27 above), the 2019 GHS survey shows that most of the White population (73%) belong to a medical scheme, followed by 47% of the Indian/Asian population. This skewed medical scheme membership by race is mainly driven by income disparities that remain closely linked to race. Most of the previously disadvantaged race groups simply cannot afford to belong to a medical scheme and rely heavily on the public health sector to meet their healthcare needs. What is evident from the literature presented above is that health inequalities in South Africa remain divided along socio-economic and racial lines. A recent study found that between 2001 and 2016, income- and race-related inequalities for life expectancy and health-adjusted life expectancy favoured those who were relatively better-off and non-Black race groups in South Africa.[45] Race-related inequalities in health-adjusted life expectancy in 2016 were smaller than in 2001. In contrast, income-related inequalities for the same health outcome showed the opposite trend: it was greater in 2001 than in 2016. These trends are suggestive of policy changes that led to the effective rollout of antiretroviral therapy. This shift reduced the health-adjusted life expectancy gap with non-Black South Africans, but simultaneously exacerbated income-related inequalities. Evidence linking income inequality, lifestyle choices and health outcomes in the South African context suggest that poverty-stricken households and communities may exist in environments that are unhealthy or perpetuate an unhealthy lifestyle. A 2017 study by Mukong et al.[46] found that smoking and alcohol use were positively associated with income-related inequality in health in South Africa. More specifically, alcohol consumption accounted for 27.83% of all measured inequality in health (compared to 7.35% for smoking). Differences in the chronicity of poverty also play a role in determining health outcomes in South Africa, with chronically poor children experiencing worse outcomes than those who go in and out of poverty.[47] Important correlates of these socio-economic child health inequalities include access to the labour market, maternal education, water and sanitation, and social norms (including the prevalence of female-headed households and the decision-making power of women in the household).[47] This highlights how inequalities in other domains can exacerbate inequalities in health, and vice versa. As expected, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic further demonstrates how socio-economic inequalities feed into health inequalities. A recent study by Shifa et al.[48] found that pre-existing socio-economic inequalities in South Africa were linked to inequalities in vulnerability to COVID-19 infection. More specifically, poor households were more vulnerable to infection, partly due to their living conditions. The study also goes on to show that irrespective of where poor households are located, these households are less likely to be able to protect themselves from contracting the virus.[49] The evidence presented above shows that pre-existing inequalities in South Africa, of which there are many, perpetuate health inequalities. 8. Inequalities in living conditions 8.1 Housing Like other resources, a clear socio-economic divide exists for housing. Wealthier individuals largely reside in affluent suburban areas with adequate utilities and services, while poorer people often inhabit townships. People living in townships who have an income have attempted to improve their homes by accessing loans. This is however a luxury that few can afford. Over the years, frustrations have often resulted in protests for basic housing and utilities. Figure 28 below shows the number of households living in different types of housing and how this has changed from 2001 to 2019. Formal dwellings have increased, and 82% of households currently reside in what might be considered as a decent house (basic brick/concrete block structure), up from 69% in 2001. Many however still reside in informal shacks or traditional dwellings. While 14 million households live in what appear to be formal structures, there are only 6.6 million registered residential properties on the Deeds Registry.[50] Figure 28: Number of households living in different types of housing, 2001-2019 Sources: Census 2001, CS 2007, Census 2011, CS 2016, GHS 2019[21–23] Government grants for housing have played a large role, with the percentage of households that report receiving a government housing subsidy increasing from 6% in 2002 to 19% in 2019. Over 10% of households in these state-subsidised houses however report that the roof or walls were weak.[21] More detailed 2015 data show that the proportion of inadequate dwellings decreases as household income increases. This is shown in Figure 29 below, with “inadequate” being defined as informal or traditional houses, dwellings with no flush toilets, and households that have more than two people per room. This suggests that despite formal housing increasing over time, many still have housing that is lacking in many ways. Figure 29: Number of households living in different types of housing, 2014/2015 Source: LCS 2014/2015 8.2 Electricity, water and sanitation Beyond housing, South Africans require adequate utility services to function and yet an urban versus rural and socio-economic divide still exists here. Access (connection) to electricity from the mains (the national power grid) was reported to increase from 77% of households in 2002 to 85% of households in 2019, albeit with major interruptions in supply. In terms of water, data show that 88% of households had access to piped or tap water in their dwellings (off-site or on-site) in 2019, slightly up from 84% in 2002. Many provinces however still lag significantly behind in this. For example, this statistic remains at 74% for the Eastern Cape. Reporting of water interruptions to supply of more than two days at a time, or more than 15 days over the year, varied by province, however more than a quarter of national households reported interruptions by this definition. Despite an overall improvement over the last two decades in access to water and electricity, the percentage of households with access has stagnated, and even slightly declined, over the last decade, because connections have not kept up with household growth. Access to adequate sanitation (toilets) has improved over time. 13% of households used bucket toilets or had no toilet in 2002, with this declining to 2% in 2019. Data also show that in 2002 62% of households had a flush toilet connected to a public sewerage system or a septic tank, or a pit toilet with a ventilation pipe. The percentage increased to 82% in 2019. This improved trend is however most common among urbanised provinces and areas.[21] Free basic services, including those mentioned above, are provided by the government to poor households, albeit that infrastructure or basic access constraints remain once affordability concerns are removed. 8.3 Digital connectivity Over time, access to phones and means of mobile and internet connectivity has increasing implications for inequality as it can help individuals to access many forms of information – including information about education, work searches and general participation in the economy. For this, a device and connectivity are needed – and for the latter, it often requires both mobile connectivity and data connectivity. Device (phone) access is currently high in South Africa, with only about 4% of households not having access to a mobile phone (or landline, although this form of access is minimal – 88% of households have only a mobile phone, no landline). Despite this, in 2019, only 9% of households reported having access to the internet at home. Another 63% reported having at least one family member who had access to the internet somewhere (at home, work, public hotspots, etc.).21 These figures are lowest for provinces like Limpopo (only 1.6% of households have access to the internet at home, and 43% via other locations) and the Eastern Cape (3.2% have access at home and 53% via other locations). This access is by any means, including mobile data on a mobile phone, with both affordability and coverage possibly being reasons why there is no access (this is not in the survey). While varying data sources will show slightly different figures, a gap of well over a quarter of national households that don’t have access to the internet is commonly reported. The above trends show inequality in living conditions and access to basic services. Living conditions impact other drivers of inequality – poor sanitation and limited access to water will impact health inequalities. Lack of access to power may impact many items, from having lighting for safety to being able to refrigerate basic foods. Digital connectivity may increasingly play a role in one’s ability to participate in the economy, and hence a socio-economic divide may also increasingly be seen here. And having decent housing may impact everything from one’s health, children’s ability to do homework, and one’s sense of identity – all of which may in turn impact economic development.[52] 9. Social and cultural inequalities Social and cultural inequalities in South Africa are difficult to measure (and subsequently under-researched) but remain important when considering the socio-political conversion factors that drive overall inequality. Marked differences in society along social and cultural lines – highlighted and entrenched during apartheid – continue to persist in post-1994 South Africa. Although inequality has been viewed through many lenses throughout this report, including gender and race, we add the note below with insightful data that elaborates on social and cultural identities. The social divide is evident in less than a third of South Africans who report that they often engage with people of a different racial group.[53] The Duclos-Esteban-Ray index measures the degree to which citizens feel alienated, and South Africa has had a consistently high result.[54] Poverty is also linked to social standing in many ways. Being female is linked to increased poverty, with 51.2% of female-headed households experiencing poverty compared to 31.4% of male-headed households.[53] Employment gender disparities still prevail in the labour market, resulting in higher rates of unemployment among women. Additionally, children, people with disabilities and Black South Africans face the greatest burden of poverty.[53] South Africa’s rich diversity can bring about tolerance if social cohesion is strong. Social cohesion, measured by the Social Cohesion Index, has improved over time. However, this change has been quite small.[53] Social cohesion has a strong link with access to basic services such as the provision of water, electricity and housing, indicating a link between equality in these parameters and social cohesion.[53] Social cohesion generally only improves when perceived improvements in these services are observed. The majority (70%) of South Africans feel as though inequality has not improved, or has in fact become worse over time.[53] This may have contributed to the very slow improvement in social cohesion over time. 10. Physical security and legal inequalities Physical security and legal issues are other prime examples of socio-political conversion factors – which are the key drivers of inequality. Experiencing safety – both in physical and legal terms – are necessary conditions to achieve well-being. For this reason, it is important to understand how different parts of South African society have been impacted by changes in physical security and legal conditions over the period under review. What emerges in the narrative below is that access to physical and legal security, and the impacts thereof, vary significantly by gender, age, and geographical location. Inadequate state provision of safety and security in post-apartheid South Africa has affected all its citizens adversely. The response to this state inefficiency tends to vary by geographical area, and therefore by socio-economic status (geographical areas are closely tied to socio-economic status and race due to spatial segregation of races during apartheid). In middle-class and affluent suburbs, the safety and security deficit has led to a demand for private home security services which continues to flourish.[55] At the other end of the socio-economic spectrum, Black African and Coloured townships afflicted with long-standing issues of gangsterism, violence and crime have formed street committees in the absence of dependable policing. These committees use a range of strategies – from peace-making to harsher forms of ‘street justice’ – to maintain a semblance of order.[56] However, the success of these localised responses to issues of safety and security varies, and physical security inequalities therefore persist along geospatial lines. Gender-based violence (GBV) has become a growing concern in South Africa. The economic vulnerability of women has been perpetuated by this incredibly high burden of violence. Among adult women in South Africa, 21% have reported experiencing physical abuse in their lifetime.[57] This is most often committed by an acquaintance or partner.[57] According to the first quarter 2021/2022 Crime Statistics for South Africa, sexual violence cases increased by 5% when compared to the 2019/2020 financial year (to adjust for skewed reporting in 2020/2021), with a 2% increase in rape cases over the same period.[58] The occurrence of GBV is linked to social and economic circumstances. Uneducated, unemployed, divorced and impoverished women are more likely to experience GBV.[57] This entrenches a cycle of poverty among these vulnerable women who may lose earnings while recovering from the mental, emotional and physical trauma of GBV.[59] In the President of South Africa’s State of the Nation address on the 17th of June 2020, he reported that violent crimes had increasedsince the COVID-19 Alert Level 3 took effect on 1 June 2020, especially cases of abuse of women and children. The most recent release of statistics for mortality and causes of death in South Africa (for 2018)[60] showed that assault was the second most common non-natural cause of death in the Eastern Cape (22.7%) and Western Cape (20%), the highest proportions compared to other provinces. When decomposing assault as a cause of non-natural deaths by age and gender, it remained the most prevalent cause among males aged 15–29 and accounted for 23.6% of deaths in this group. The data highlights how socio-political conversion factors like safety (or a lack thereof) intersects with health and economic domains and may further entrench inequalities in those groups of the population. During apartheid, the law was used as a tool to create and enforce various racial and gender inequalities. It is therefore unsurprising that in the post-apartheid period, South Africa has undergone an extensive revision of the law – guided by human rights – to redress these past inequalities.[61] The lag in developing gendered policies and substantive rights has perpetuated the economic inequalities that keep poor, Black African women on the bottom rung of the socio-economic ladder.[61] The post-1994 story of legal access is like many of the other domains covered in this report: there is progress in terms of capabilities, but it falls short of being realised (turning into a capability). Despite the development of the legislative framework of Legal Aid SA (LASA) and the right to legal assistance, many South Africans feel as though they are unable to access these services.[62] Citizens have noted that their demand for legal services is unmet and resources remain limited, especially for the poor or middle class.[62] For those who manage to access courts and legal services, administrative burdens delay processes and affect access negatively.[62] 11. Political inequalities Political inequality is defined generally as the unequal influence different groups or individuals have over the political decisions that concern them.[63] It also incorporates the inequality of outcomes of these decisions. Put differently, political equality occurs when each individual’s preferences are taken into account when political decisions are made.[63] This is necessary to ensure the democratic nature of the state. At the outset, it is worth mentioning that 1994 represented a massive change in political equality. This must be acknowledged when considering whether there has been an improvement or worsening in inequality since. One way a democratic country attempts to achieve political equality is by utilising a voting system. In this system, everyone can make their voice heard regarding which political leaders they believe represent their values most accurately. Issues of coercion may be experienced in varying degrees, and therefore appropriate measures should be taken to ensure freedom of choice and opinion when voting. In addition, the more layers of authority that are present in a democratic system, the greater the potential political inequality in a country.[63] This is due to the loss of direct feedback and input made by individuals that occurs when there are many hierarchical layers in a democratic system. In a democratic country, caution needs to be exercised to ensure that everyone’s voice can be heard. Several factors contribute to population perceptions of political freedom. These range from the basic freedom to vote, to the freedom to discuss political matters and be heard.[64] The data of the Afrobarometer survey, collected over several years, provides insights into these factors. The majority of participants indicated a high level of freedom regarding their perception of freedom (45.8% felt completely free) and their right to vote without feeling pressured (67.7% felt completely free).[65] However, many individuals felt as though they could not discuss their political views freely.[65] Over time, citizens have perceived their right to vote without feeling pressured as getting better. However, following 2016, responses indicating a perceived improvement decreased again (Table 11), where the survey question is, “In this country, how free are you: To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?" Table 11: Afrobarometer responses to survey question on perceptions of freedom to vote without pressure Sources: Afrobarometer 2002, 2006, 2015, and 2021 12. Environmental inequalities In terms of a multidimensional framework of inequality, such as the one applied in this report, environmental factors are considered a ‘conversion factor’.2 This is a factor that is viewed as a key driver of multidimensional inequality. They influence the speed at which individual resources become capabilities (real opportunities) and functionings (outcomes)2. In this section, we consider both pollution and transport as two such conversion factors. When these conversion factors have less inequality associated with them, they enable better lives for individuals. 12.1 Pollution inequalities The effects of population growth have become a global concern due to current levels of global warming. Of particular concern in South Africa is air pollution due to the use of coal power plants. South Africa has some of the world’s highest levels of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, both very dangerous pollutants.[70,71] Coal power plants are typically surrounded by relatively economically underprivileged areas (such as Middelburg in South Africa), where residents face enormous health problems that remain for generations as a result.[70,72] This has led to approximately 20,000 premature deaths annually.[70,73] The estimated annual value of the health impact and loss of productivity is $2.4 billion.[72] However, in this report, we are less concerned with the absolute levels of pollution and more about the relative effects of pollution on South Africans from different income groups. The legacy of apartheid still plays out today as impoverished South Africans, mostly Black, are still most likely to reside in areas close to mines, refuse sites, sewage sites, main transport roads and other forms of pollution.[74] There is a limited amount of quality data and literature about the inequalities in pollution exposure at the end of the apartheid era. It is therefore difficult to determine changes in inequalities in pollution exposure. However, it is evident from a range of often science-based literature that strong inequalities in different types of pollution exposure exist later in the post-apartheid period. Given limited data, it is unclear whether these have increased or decreased. However, it is known from international literature that controlling for pollution exposure when calculating income inequality tends to worsen income inequality measures.[75] In the United States, attaching a monetary value to air pollution creates effects similar to those of a regressive tax, so the poor lose income due to greater exposure to air pollution, while the rich gain income due to less exposure to air pollution.[75] Despite a significant expansion of the electricity networks, many South African households still use non-electricity sources of energy for heating and cooking. More than 70% use kerosene, coal and firewood for heating, lighting or cooking.[76] Continuous exposure to these fuel sources and their emissions are known to be associated with various forms of poor respiratory health,[76] generating further inequalities in another dimension for these households. However, as seen in Table 12 below, there has been a marked increase in the use of electricity from the mains as a cooking source for Black South Africans. From 2003 to 2019, the percentage use of this cooking source increased from 48.4% to 73.0%. A probable cause for this is the vast expansion of the electricity networks over the years to reach a greater population. There was also an increase in the usage of gas as a cooking source, for all population groups. Wood, paraffin, and coal saw a general decline in usage over this time. This implies a reduction in pollution from households that stopped using these cooking sources. Table 12: Different fuel sources used for cooking, by population group, 2003 & 2019 Source: GHS, 2003 & 2019 12.2 Transport inequalities Transport inequalities can best be understood by looking at differences in ownership of private transport as well as considering different absolute and relative amounts of money spent on transport and time spent on accessing public transport. Public transport is essential for ensuring that citizens who don’t own modes of private transport have access to employment and recreational activities.[77,78] South Africa has four modes of public transport: the railway system, the Gautrain and the bus system[79], with most citizens making use of minibus taxis as the fourth transport mode.[78] Despite the availability of various modes of public transport, safety, reliability and affordability still remain an issue.[80,81] In rural areas, access to transport is limited, while in urban areas, congestion is a challenge.[80] In order to tackle the problem of segregation between the areas where people live and work based on their socio-economic status, adequate transportation is required.[81] Using data from the GHS of 2010 and 2019, a comparison can be drawn on the differences in access and utilisation of transport methods over time. Specifically, the use of different transport methods to healthcare facilities indicates inequalities between South Africans of different race groups in access to various modes of transport. Table 13 below shows the changes in percentage utilisation of transport methods to healthcare facilities by different population groups. While 94% of White South Africans used their own transport (vehicle) to travel to access healthcare in 2019, only 12% of Black South Africans were doing so in the same year. However, there has been an increase in the use of own transport by Black South Africans from 7.7% in 2010 to 12% in 2019. Minimal use of trains to healthcare facilities is observed for all population groups and throughout the period in question. This, as well as the large percentage of people who walk to healthcare facilities, may point to the increase in the number of facilities in outlying areas, as long-distance travel methods such as trains and buses are seldom used. Additionally, this number may indicate that the trains in South Africa may be sub-standard in terms of efficiency, safety and proximity to services that matter to people. Table 13: Population groups' modes of transport to healthcare facilities Source: GHS 13. Linking the many dimensions of inequality: Conclusion As previously discussed in this report, the dimensions of inequality covered in this report have clear inter-linkages. Some of the dimensions are related to fundamental capabilities (like equal access to health, education, and economic participation) and how it transforms into functionings (like health and education outcomes, and income and wealth), while other dimensions are considered conversion factors (personal, socio-political, or environmental) which influence (positively or negatively) both capabilities and functionings. The very strong convergence of inequalities in all these dimensions does not bode well for South Africa and manifests as pervasive and deeply entrenched inequality. The evidence presented in this report makes it clear that inequality in capabilities and functionings – mediated by inequalities in conversion factors – remains persistently high. Despite this, there are a few stories of progress that deserve to be highlighted. Some of South Africa’s successes over the past 27 years include having the largest welfare grant programme in Africa, and incrementally expanding its housing programme, water and sanitation infrastructure, and access to schooling and public healthcare, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable. Unfortunately, the gains made are not enough to improve the overall well-being of the majority of South Africans in a meaningful way. Grants alone are not sufficient to support recipients and their family members, with the current value of the child support grant (R460 per child per month)[82] being far below the value of the recently adjusted food poverty line value (R624).[83] Policy talks about the expansion of the grant programme continue recognising that healthy unemployed men who do not reside in a household with children currently are not receiving any form of grant support. We cited evidence from in-depth research by Stats SA that two-thirds of overall inequality is related to the labour market, of which half is due to unemployment.[6] The other driver of inequality in the labour market remains the relative scarcity of advanced and specific types of skills. Unless the problem of the labour market and, adjacent to the labour market, the functioning of the education sector is addressed, inequality is likely to remain deeply ingrained in South African society. These should be the two biggest areas of policy concern for all South Africans. Even though public housing programmes are stalling, urbanisation continues at a rapid pace which cities are unable to keep up with. Those who have received housing from the government or who have invested in their own housing are often not able to unlock the full value of it from a wealth leveraging perspective, due to housing being under-valued and not always being registered with the Deeds Office. Issues of quality also need to be considered. While access to water and sanitation may have expanded, the quality of water and sanitation are substandard, and may possibly be deteriorating due to population pressures. Education and healthcare are two other important dimensions where the quality of services remain suboptimal as demonstrated in this report, despite very meaningful improvements in access, resulting in inferior education and health outcomes for those who access these services from the public sector. While there are many areas for improvement within healthcare, the provision of adequate contraceptive care for women may also assist in aligning pregnancies with women’s preferences. Access to effective contraceptives can therefore assist in greater equality for women and their children. Reduced gender-based violence and inequality is critical. The relationship between inequality and fertility is complex and likely bidirectional. However, there is an association that manifests in different ways, including early births for women which interrupts education achievement and delays access to the labour market, as well as the structure of households. What then has been achieved in the last 27 post-apartheid years? There has been a noticeable improvement in living standards and access to services for South Africans previously excluded from critical public services such as education, water and sanitation, health and housing. However, this has occurred without a concomitant increase in income. Improving well-being in South Africa will not happen spontaneously and it will not be an event. Instead, it will require all stakeholders – government, the private sector and civil society – to make a joint, concerted and patient effort to assist with the iterative process of working towards a more equitable society that enables all to optimise their capabilities and functioning. The evidence presented above shows that the government has indeed used the fiscal tools at its disposal to reduce poverty and inequality in some welfare dimensions, particularly related to access to services over the last 27 years, but massive room for necessary improvement remains, a chasm which must be breached if we are to flourish as a cohesive society. Meaningful changes in development require the contribution of the greater society, which in addition to the government, includes the market and civil society. Even though policymaking is the responsibility of the government, the market plays an important role in the allocation of scarce resources and the creation of employment that generates income. Civil society, which covers a broad sector, could focus on filling the gaps left by the government and giving a voice to vulnerable subgroups of the population. References 1. Fields, Gary S. The meaning and measurement of income inequality. 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Public Transport Interventions and Transport Justice in South Africa: A Literature and Policy Review. Southern African Transport Conference; 2015. Accessed September 30, 2021. https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/57779 81. Walters J. Public transport policy implementation in South Africa: Quo vadis? Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management. 2014;8. doi:10.4102/jtscm.v8i1.134 82. Yende SS. The R460 child support grant is far below country poverty line. News24. Published 2021. Accessed November 16, 2021. https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/the-r460-child-support-grant-is-far-below-country-poverty-line-20210912 83. Statistics South Africa. National Poverty Lines.; 2021. Accessed November 16, 2021. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012021.pdf - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Daryl Swanepoel AUGUST 2022 Content Introduction Literature review South African economy: Pre-pandemic (2008-2019) 2020 Pandemic damage 2020 Aftermath Current snapshot Structural reforms and proposals Mining SMME Manufacturing Construction Tourism Agriculture ICT Growth potential Conclusion References Introduction South Africa has the building blocks within its borders to support a prosperous and high-growth economy, yet the economy has been limping along since the 2008 financial crash (WB, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic pummeled the last bit of strength the economy had left right out of it (Dell, 2022). Despite government interventions and special programmes, unemployment and poverty have spiraled to record levels in recent years (Stoddard, 2022). For an economy to grow, business needs to expand, while putting more spending money in South African wallets. With this in mind, economists and industry experts have long called for government to stop with knee-jerk interventions and implement structural reforms to support sustainable growth instead (Mahlaka, 2021). These reforms would focus on, among others, policy and regulatory adjustments to support economic drivers by removing any operational obstacles in their way. South Africa has many sectors that could be identified as economic drivers: mining, tourism, agriculture, automated manufacturing, and the renewable energy sector, for example. Streamlining business operations while creating a supportive environment could see these sectors flourish, which will translate into much-needed economic growth. South Africa finds itself in an increasingly desperate situation. Government should, therefore, determine which structural reforms could be implemented the quickest while also having the biggest impact. Choosing the correct measures to implement this is equally important, as the country can ill afford to waste the limited resources it has left. It’s time to tap into the potential South Africa holds. Failing to do so and address the structural weaknesses will see the economy continue to limp until it collapses, taking millions of already struggling South Africans down with it. Literature Review South African economy: Pre-pandemic (2008-2019) In 2008, the US economy sneezed and the globe caught the cold. The American mortgage crisis wiped $2 trillion off of global economic growth (Merle, 2018). The calamity is now aptly referred to as the Great Recession. Most economies have since recovered from the crisis. More than a decade later, South Africa has, however, not been able to return to its pre-crisis levels. Apart from a short-lived boost thanks to the 2010 Soccer World Cup, the country continued to record lacklustre growth, increasing unemployment figures and spiralling debt levels since 2008 (WB, 2020), leaving South Africans ever poorer. And in 2019 the country was plunged into yet another recession, the third since 1994 (Sibeko, 2021). SA real GDP growth (annual %) Source: World Bank (WB, 2020a) SA unemployment (% of total labour force) Source: World Bank (WB,2020b) SA government debt to GDP Source: Trading Economics (TE, 2020) Real GDP per capita growth (annual %) Source: World Bank (WB, 2020c) A dip in commodity prices along with lower demand, especially from China, are among the external factors that hampered South Africa’s recovery (Faure, 2017). However, it has become clear that the main contributing factors to the country’s dismal economic performance is government performance. The deterioration of the South African economy coincided with Jacob Zuma’s term as president. His administration is characterised by deep-rooted corruption, as revealed by the Commission of Enquiry into State Capture. It’s this very corruption that eventually led to Zuma being removed from office in 2018 (Maseko, 2022). The steps taken by the Zuma administration that are widely believed to have had a negative impact on the South African economy include: A 2014 decision that led to South Africa having three finance ministers within a week (Motsoeneng et al, 2015) Stricter visa regulations (ENCA, 2014) Higher BEE requirements for the mining sector (Reu, 2020). Corruption further crippled state institutions, leaving them incapable of fulfilling their mandates (Soko, 2017). It also left various state-owned entities at the mercy of continued government bailouts at the expense of other spending priorities (Parliament, 2022). Business and investor confidence nose-dived as evidence of the widespread corruption and the state’s inefficiencies surfaced (Reu, 2016). As the country continued down this slippery slope, it finally lost its positive credit rating and was awarded junk status by the credit ratings agencies (Naidoo, 2020a). The country was no longer able to attract the necessary foreign or local investment to support economic growth. To this end, it was left with little choice other than to plunge the country into more debt just to support its spending programmes (Muller, 2019). South Africa’s infrastructure also bore the brunt of the Zuma administration. It has become clear that the upkeep of the country’s infrastructure was neglected either due to a lack of expertise or to corrupt activities (Mathews, 2021). Eskom is a sterling example of this. Since 2008, the country’s energy giant has been forced to implement rolling blackouts in a staggered manner. This was largely due to an ageing coal-fired power fleet and delayed (and poor) construction of new plants. Some experts believe Eskom’s inability to supply sufficient electricity is the biggest factor weighing the South African economy down. According to a report by the CSIR, blackouts between 2007 and 2019 have cost the South African economy between R154 billion and R326 billion (CSIR, 2020). 2020 Pandemic damage In 2020, South Africa entered an unprecedented event alongside the rest of the world. As the unknown strain of the coronavirus became prevalent, countries rushed to restrict the movement of people in an attempt to stop the spread. These lockdowns had a severe global economic impact and for a country like South Africa, who experienced a technical recession the previous year, it was devastating (UN, 2020). The pandemic wiped out between 1,5 million and 3 million jobs, while plunging the economy into its deepest recession in a century (Casale et al, 2020) (WB, 2021) (Naidoo, 2020b). The slowdown also had a knock-on effect on the government’s revenue, as SARS collected 12 per cent less (at R1,25 trillion) in tax revenue for the 2020/21 financial year. The damage suffered would’ve been much larger if it wasn’t for an upswing in commodity prices, which boosted mining profits at the time. 2020 Aftermath In an attempt to turn the country’s economic misfortunes around, President Cyril Ramaphosa launched a Reconstruction and Recovery Plan in October 2020 (Pres, 2020). The plan aims to use various levers to stimulate average economic growth of 3 per cent over the next 10 years, while creating 800 000 jobs over the medium term and unlocking R1 trillion in infrastructure investments. The last progress report on the plan was released in December 2020. A more recent update on the Employment Stimulus Package, which forms part of the overall plan, is available. According to a January 2022 progress report, just over 673 000 jobs have been created since the launch (Pres, 2022). The plan is in its second phase, with a cumulative target of creating 1,2 million job opportunities. This refers to the number of full- or part-time employment that could possibly flow from these developments. Although a positive step, these opportunities pale in comparison to South Africa’s unemployment figures, which were at crisis level even before the pandemic struck. Covid-19 and the subsequent lockdowns alone claimed at least 1,5 million jobs (Casale et al, 2020). Together with National Treasury, the Presidency also launched Operation Vulindlela in 2020 to ‘accelerate the implementation of structural reforms and support economic recovery’ (Pres, 2022b). Various ministers, departments and entities are working together to resolve economic hurdles. A dedicated Vulindlela Unit in the Presidency monitors the progress of the operation. It has set out the following 19 goals: Increase role of independent power producers # Restructure Eskom into generation, transmission and distribution entities # Improve energy availability factor on Eskom plants Address institutional inefficiencies in municipal electricity distribution management Increase available digital spectrum # Migrate from analogue to digital TV Finalise policy and policy direction on rapid deployment of electronic communications networks and facilities Improve water-use licensing processes # Strengthen regulation of water pricing and service standards # Finalise and implement the revised raw water pricing strategy Establish a national water resources infrastructure agency Address institutional inefficiencies in municipal water and sanitation services Corporatise the Transnet National Ports Authority # Improve competitiveness and efficiency of ports Establish a Transport Economic Regulator through the Economic Regulation of Transport Bill Implement third-party access policy and concession branch freight rail lines # Finalise and implement White Paper on National Rail Policy # Improve the regulatory framework for skilled immigration Implement e-Visa and visa waivers # * # indicates completion of target Some of the targets reached is merely the conclusion of policies, plans and other documentation. The effective implementation thereof remains to be seen. Current snapshot The South African economy continues its struggle to gain traction, as it no longer faces solely domestic hurdles. Inflationary pressures have accelerated globally due to increased consumer spending following the pandemic along with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (WEF, 2022). In May, the country recorded a CPI of 6,5 per cent, breaching the SARB’s target band (Stats SA, 2022b). As central banks across the world move to stave off inflation by hiking lending rates, the SARB is left with little choice but to follow suit to protect against capital outflows (Naidoo, 2022). The repo rate currently stands at 4,75 per cent, with further hikes to be expected. In Q1:2022, the country recorded an official unemployment rate of 34,5 per cent (Stats SA, 2022a). When taking discouraged job seekers into consideration, 46,2 per cent, or 11,7 million, South Africans are without a job. The economy has since recovered to pre-pandemic levels, with 1,9 per cent growth recorded in Q1:2022 – although some believe this might be as good as it’s going to get for the country this year (Stats SA, 2022c) (Stoddard, 2022). The return to pre-pandemic GDP figures is, however, little cause for celebration, as the country was already fighting for economic survival before the pandemic struck (with a technical recession recorded in 2019). Devastating floods in KwaZulu-Natal, increasing food and petrol prices, international and national geo-political uncertainty, and rolling blackouts will continue to curtail future recovery efforts. However, there are some structural changes that could have a significant positive impact on the economy if implemented speedily. Source: Stats SA (Stats SA, 2022d) Structural reforms and proposals The state of the South African economy is the result of economic and political mismanagement amid global turmoil. The evidence of economic failure is visible in the rising poverty and unemployment levels. Current GDP levels are nowhere near the required levels to change this trajectory. The potential for growth, however, is locked up by a series of structural constraints. To determine what these hurdles might entail, the ISI embarked on roundtable discussions with industry leaders from various sectors in 2021. The conversations revealed daily challenges to operations, struggles with governmental inefficiencies, and unworkable policy and regulatory environments. Not all of these constraints are necessarily deep-rooted issues and some can be resolved speedily. And should the South African government wish to regain any economic traction, it should tackle these constraints with haste. The ISI recently asked some of the industry leaders who attended the initial discussions which constraint they viewed as the most prominent in their respective sector. In addition, they were requested to give their best considered estimate of how much more their sector would be able to contribute to the country’s national GDP should the specific constraint be removed. For this paper the focus is on the following sectors: Mining SMME Manufacturing Construction Tourism Agriculture ICT The size of the South African economy in: 2020: R5,52 trillion (Stats SA, 2020b) 2021: R6,21 trillion (Stats SA, 2022e) Mining Contribution to National GDP (2021): 8% 8% applied to 2021 National GDP: R496,8 billion Employment: 459 954 (Stats SA, 2022d) (MCSA, 2022) Impediment: Inefficient railway and port systems to support exports (Eskom & Transnet) Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 4% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. The mining sector is a cornerstone of the South African economy. Due to the large endowment of resources (chrome, platinum, gold, manganese), there is much room for the industry to play a pivotal role in the country’s economic recovery (Wits, 2020). However, the industry is hampered by stringent BEE and labour legislation, policy uncertainty and intermittent energy supply (ISI, 2021a). Comment from industry leader: Transnet and Eskom are currently the two single-biggest threats to the mining sector. Both are functioning far below their available capacity, forcing mining companies to seek alternatives, which often translates to more expensive options being used (like transporting minerals by road). If export capacity is constrained, there is no incentive for mining companies to expand operations. Information shared with the ISI shows that close to zero capital formation is being spent on new mining infrastructure. The funds are mainly being spent on maintenance of existing infrastructure. This is deeply concerning for an industry that has the potential for expansion and could bring about much-needed jobs. SMME Contribution to National GDP (2020): 20%-42% (this study assumes a middle-of-the-road scenario) 30% applied to 2021 National GDP: R1,863 trillion Employment: 7,3 million (OECD, 2020) Impediment: Over-regulation, specifically stringent BEE requirements Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 7% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. Contribution if sufficient electricity supplied: A further 1,5% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. South Africa’s National Development Plan envisages an SMME sector that contributes 60-80 per cent to the country’s GDP, while employing 90 per cent of the newly created 11 million jobs by 2030. In spite of promising progress (at least before Covid-19 struck), SMME growth faces many challenges. These include numerous bureaucratic requirements, and insufficient electricity supply (ISI, 2021b). Comment from industry leader: Over-regulation together with domineering labour unions are constraining SMME growth in South Africa. According to the industry leader the ISI spoke to, BEE requirements, specifically, are hampering operations for SMMEs. For one, the accompanying administrative process is a cost that most SMMEs can ill-afford, while the system creates unnecessary obstacles for ease of doing business. Should these be removed, an estimated 20-30 million jobs could possibly be created over the next 10 years. Manufacturing Contribution to National GDP (2021): 13% 13% applied to 2021 National GDP: R807,3 billion Employment: 1,4 million (Stats SA, 2022d; Stats SA, 2022a) Impediment: Trust deficit between manufacturers and the state Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 4% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. Manufacturing has never recovered to the levels seen before the 2008 financial crash (Stats SA, 2020). This is in part due to cheap exports, mainly from China, which undercut local producers (BP, 2017). In 2021, the utilisation of manufacturing production capacity was at 78,6 per cent of total capacity. This is largely attributed to insufficient demand for local production due to higher prices relative to imported goods (AG, 2021). The manufacturing sector is constrained by red tape, onerous labour legislation, municipal dysfunction and inefficient electricity supply (ISI, 2021). Comment from industry leader: The state’s attitude is perceived by many as being hostile towards business and manufacturers. This view is supported by policies and regulations that are deemed as not business friendly. A trust deficit between business and the state makes owners reluctant to expand their manufacturing operations. It therefore removes the incentive to grow the industry, as they simply have no trust in the state to create the stable environment required to generate a sufficient future return on current investments. The financial strain brought about by the recurrent Eskom blackouts is another cause for concern in the industry. It not only takes away operating hours but also causes damage to machinery and leads to labour disputes (as some employers refuse to pay employees who are unable to work due to loadshedding). Construction Contribution to National GDP (2021): 2% 2% applied to 2021 National GDP: R124,2 billion Employment: 1 million (Stats SA, 2022d; Leshoro, 2022) Impediment: Inept public officials, which will require improved staff development programmes within the public sector Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 4% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. The construction sector is quite labour-intensive and is perfectly positioned to absorb some of South Africa’s unskilled labour (BT, 2020). A study undertaken by the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa has found the construction industry has a direct impact output multiplier of 3,21 (CAHF, 2020). Expanding the sector could then hold far-reaching benefits for the economy as a whole. It’s among the reasons why the state has embarked on a R100 billion infrastructure development plan over the next 10 years to unlock economic recovery (Magubane, 2022). The sector is, however, constrained by inadequate infrastructure (water and electricity), corruption and a lack of skills. Public sector capital projects have, by and large, come to a complete standstill. Comment from industry leader: The thick layer of bureaucratic systems facing the construction sector is made worse by incompetent staff at a local government level. Documentation, such as the conclusion of contracts and tender processes, more often takes months longer than it should, delaying the start of entire projects. This convoluted process is not attractive to large-scale investors. It further delays urgent infrastructure development and putting wages in the pockets of labourers. A recent spike in the price of fuel and inefficient electricity supply is causing further damage to the industry. Some report a decline in productivity of as much as 25 per cent due to the ongoing blackouts. The construction sector should be at the forefront of economic recovery, as it can assist in alleviating unemployment while delivering crucial infrastructure for other sectors to flourish. However, for it to play this supportive role, these simple impediments must be removed immediately. Tourism Contribution to National GDP (2019 pre-pandemic): 3,7% 3,7% applied to 2021 National GDP: R229,8 billion Employment: 1,4 million (DoT, 2020) (DoT,2022) Impediment: Policies limiting ease of access, specifically the limitations on e-Visas Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 5% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. It’s important to reflect on the performance of the tourism sector before Covid-19 lockdowns were instated, as it showcases the industry’s potential. The sector was, however, ravaged by the pandemic. Its contribution to overall economic performance tumbled to 1,3 per cent in 2020 and at least a third of all jobs in the sector had to be cut. The sector has shown signs of recovery as global travel resumes (Vollmer, 2022). Relaxing of some of South Africa’s visa regime could support the industry rebounding faster (ISI, 2022). Comment from industry leader: The tourism sector has the potential to expand rapidly and is one of the easiest to stimulate in order to expand the country’s GDP. Small policy adjustments, promoting ease of travel and aggressive marketing of South Africa as a destination can boost growth in the sector to more than double its current economic performance in the next 5 to 10 years. Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of urgency from government’s side to take the necessary steps to bring this growth spurt about. Agriculture Contribution to National GDP (2021): 3% 3% applied to 2021 National GDP: R186,3 billion Employment: 838 000 (Stats SA, 2022d) Impediment: Inefficient rail and port infrastructure Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 7,5% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. Employment in the agriculture sector represents around 5 per cent of total employment in South Africa (Stats SA, 2022a). Despite rising input costs, the industry (especially citrus) has managed to record bumper exports over the last few years. It was among the few economic stars shining even throughout the worst of the pandemic (Campbell, 2022). Inefficient infrastructure, such as ports and the rail network, and electricity as well as policy uncertainty have been identified as some of the aspects hampering growth of the industry (ISI, 2021e). Comment from industry leader: In the absence of efficient rail infrastructure, agricultural produce is forced onto our roads. This in itself is more expensive, but the state of the country’s roads, including gravel roads, is a further burden. Regular strikes that close the N3 between Johannesburg and Durban, the artery to get the produce to the port, poses another cost. Further headache awaits when the produce finally reaches the ports, as those too are operating sub-optimally. These struggles come amid external factors, like new EU export regulations, causing strain to the agricultural export market. As the global socio-economic developments continue to disrupt supply chains, South Africa is ideally located to benefit from the rising opportunities should these constraints be rectified. ICT Contribution to National GDP (2021): 8% 8% applied to 2021 National GDP: R496,8 billion Employment: 56 550 (EN, 2021) (Ica, 2021) Impediment: Lack of incentives for the private sector to deploy broadband to lower-income areas. Contribution in absence of constraint: A further 5% of the sector’s contribution to National GDP p.a. The ICT sector is made up of South Africa’s postal, telecommunications and broadcasting services. It’s an industry that continues to hold much potential for growth and employment opportunities. This is evident by the number of vacant positions in the industry (amid the country’s high levels of unemployment). According to the 2021 ICT Skills Survey, the industry is unable to fill 10 000 positions. This has been attributed to a lack of skills available in the country (Smith, 2021). A Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator study has found that the industry has spent R150 million exporting digital work and expertise to other countries (Malinga, 2020). The centre therefore suggest the immediate skills development to plug this growing gap. This skills shortage along with lagging infrastructure development and prohibitive policies are among the hurdles facing the industry. Comment from industry leader: The digital economy underpins most sectors in South Africa, yet there is a lack in the development of telecommunications infrastructure. Without adequate infrastructure the country will fail to see the necessary digital adoption, which will leave South Africa trailing global developments. Furthermore, deploying broadband to underserved communities could serve as an economic booster. For example, it could promote entrepreneurship in lower-income areas as digitisation (take banking as an example) can ease doing business. Although suggestions have been made to relax visa requirements to attract the necessary skills that South Africa lacks, the focus should rather be on developing local skills to meet the demand. Another crucial point is to reskill those whose jobs may be made redundant through automation in the coming years. Growth Potential Should government effectively remove each sectoral constraint, calculations can be done to determine what the overall impact on the national GDP may be, based on the estimations given by the Industry Leaders. Each sector’s potential contribution to national GDP is calculated based on its 2021 contribution. The difference between the two is used to determine the additional GDP growth in the absence of structural constraints. Table 1: Potential added GDP growth from structural reforms within elected key sectors This means that, based on the current (2021) GDP of R6,210 trillion, roughly 2,1 per cent per annum can be added to South Africa’s GDP just by getting the basics within the few key industries indicated in the table above, right. Add to this the impact of potential growth within the SMME sector, where industry leaders have estimated that the introduction of a few structural reforms could boost its contribution by an estimated 7 per cent. The OECD estimates that the SMME sector’s contribution to the national GDP is somewhere between 20 and 42 per cent, that is somewhere between R1,242 trillion and R2,608 trillion, which means that the structural reforms could potentially mean added GDP growth of between R86,940 billion and R182,774 billion (see table 2 below). Table 2: Potential added GDP growth from structural reforms within the SMME sector The table above therefore suggests that structural reforms within the SMME sector could add anywhere between 1,4 and 2,94 per cent to current GDP. However, one needs to caution against double counting, since many SMMEs fall within the sectors analysed in Table 1 above. For example, an SMME may fall within the manufacturing sector, the tourism sector, etcetera. A globular figure inclusive of the potential additional GDP of the SMME sector is therefore difficult to calculate precisely. It is nevertheless fair to say that the suggested structural reforms will make a material contribution to accelerated GDP growth. At 50 per cent of the midpoint of the OECD’s estimated SMME contribution to GDP (between 20 per cent and 42 per cent), that is 31 per cent, it would mean an additional 1,09 per cent growth in GDP for 2023. Note: The above estimations do not take into account potential additional growth from sectors not explored in this study, nor the additional growth that could emanate from getting the electricity supply challenges of the country sorted out. Conclusion The conversations and research have brought forward overwhelming evidence of overarching problems faced by all the sectors. Unreliable infrastructure, policy shortcomings and failures together with inept decision-makers are among the factors prohibiting sectoral growth. These are constraints that could be fixed, at least in the medium term, should the political will exist to do so. National Treasury forecasts a growth rate of 1,6 and 1,7 per cent in 2023 and 2024 respectively (Treasury, 2022). It’s not nearly enough to pull the somewhat 40 million South Africans out of poverty (Stats SA, 2019). Yet, decisive action to reverse the trajectory is seemingly lacking from government quarters. This when there is low-hanging economic fruit that can easily be reaped by a few policy adjustments. Imagining that the few structural adjustments proposed in this study were already implemented, it would be quite conceivable to expect a scenario of 3,7 per cent growth in GDP for 2023, which is more than double the current projections. Without the reforms, the GDP growth would not be sufficient to enable a systematic reduction of unemployment and other socio-economic backlogs. With the reforms, it would – especially if one takes into consideration the additional contribution of the SMME sector not included in the aforementioned 3,7 per cent. With the SMME sector included, a GDP growth of between 4 and 5 per cent is quite achievable. Table 3: It is therefore imperative that government focusses on these, and other necessary structural reforms, if it has any hope of shaping an economy with long-lasting benefits for its citizens. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the 2022 Counter-Corruption Summit, The need for Change in South Africa and the Region. Hosted by South Africa Regional Centre of Excellence (SARCOE) and The Stellenbosch Dialogue on Wednesday, 27 July 2022. The 2022 Counter-Corruption Summit was held at the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies. Roger Latchman, the Convenor of the ISI’s Anti-Corruption dialogues and Prof Evangelios Mantzaris, the ISI’s Chief Researcher on Anti-Corruption attended the Summit. The Summit was attended by other luminaries such as, Professor Thuli Madonsela the Law Trust Chair in Social Justice at Stellenbosch University, Justice Minister Ronald Lamola, Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Constitutional Court Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga, and the chairperson of the standing committee on public accounts (Scopa), Mr Mkhuleko Hlengwa, et al. The Summit discussed themes, viz, Corruption: the blight of Africa, Challenges posed in countering corruption in Africa and Towards a co-ordinated Pan-African solution.

On 16 August 2022, the Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) research team looking into the National Health Insurance (NHI) proposals of government, as contained in the draft bill currently before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Health, presented the outcomes of their research to National Treasury. The ISI team was led by the Institute’s lead researcher, Professor Shivani Ranchod, whilst the Treasury team was led by Dr Mark Belcher, their Social Services Director. The ISI did extensive research into alternative pathways to Universal Health Care, including a costing exercise into both the NHI proposals as contained in the Bill, and the alternatives put forward in the research. The Institute also raised its concerns with the Bill, which included, amongst others: Issues of governance, where the Institute maintains too much power vest in the Minister apropos the appointment of the Board and CEO. The ISI position is that the board must be selected via a public process and the CEO should be appointed by the board. The phasing out of private medical aids in South Africa. The ISI’s position is that private medical aids should be permitted to co-exist within the public health environment. Competition needs to be introduced into the NHI system through more than a single fund. The ISI’s view is that the introduction of competition through the establishment of more than one NHI fund will help drive costs down and mitigate against corruption. The pace at which the transition to the NHI is envisaged. The ISI’s position is that the initial focus should be on improving the quality of the public health system, through which public trust in government’s ability to roll-out the NHI could be built. The guiding principle should be ‘don’t break what’s working until an alternative that works is in place’. The Institute’s reports can be accessed via the following links: Towards inclusive healthcare Lessons for South Africa on transitioning to universal health coverage from the German experience Briefing document - Brief to Senior Counsel for formal legal opinion Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Reimagined pathways for UHC in South Africa: A critical policy assessment of NHI choices Trade-offs on the road to UHC: A quantitative assessment of alternative pathways for South Africa

Members of the Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) research teams into the proposed National Health Insurance for South Africa and Inequality, on Wednesday, 6 July 2022, met with the Deputy Minister of Finance at the offices of the Institute in Cape Town. The purpose of the meeting was for the ISI to present its research findings into these two themes to the Deputy Minister for purposes of broadening and enriching the search for effective and inclusive policy solutions. The reports are available using the undermentioned links: National Health Insurance Towards inclusive healthcare Lessons for SA on transitioning to universal health coverage from the German experience Briefing document - Brief to Senior Counsel for formal legal opinion Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Reimagined pathways for UHC in South Africa: A critical policy assessment of NHI choices Trade-offs on the road to UHC: A quantitative assessment of alternative pathways for South Africa Inequality Deliberations on the nature and measurement of inequality in South Africa Trends in multidimensional inequality and socio-demographic change in SA during 27years of democracy Ideas of Hope: Policy directions and recommendations for reducing inequality in South Africa

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, represented the Institute at the Presidential Social Sector Summit that was held at Birchwood Hotel and Conference Centre in Ekurhuleni in Gauteng from 4 to 5 August 2022. The purpose of the summit was to consult civil society on the Social Compact that was proposed by President Ramaphosa during the State of the Nation address earlier this year. The summit was addressed by, amongst others, President Ramaphosa, Minister of Social Development, Hon. Lindiwe Zulu, and Minister of Employment and Labour, Hon. Thulas Nxesi. Presentations were also made by Statistics South Africa and the Nedlac Community Constituency. Topics that came under discussion included: Sustainable strategies to respond to social-ills and contemporary issues The state of the social sector in South Africa and resource mobilisation A partnership between civil society and the State A South African response to poverty and unemployment International lessons on sustainable development and partnerships The impact of Covid-19 on the social sector

Public dialogue hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue: The ANC’s International Relations: Navigating a Changing International Strategic Landscape The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in the aforementioned dialogue, which was held on Monday, 25 July 2022, which sought to analyse the historical and contemporary role of the African National Congress (ANC) in shaping South Africa’s international relations. It came at an opportune moment with the Party going into a National Policy Conference (NPC) at the end of July 2022. The ANC’s approach to international relations has largely centred on the concept of progressive internationalism and solidarity, outlined in its recent discussion paper titled In Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism in a Changing World. However, beyond the Party and its Alliance Partners these concepts remain little understood, with some questioning their relevance in an evolving international landscape witnessing various disruptions in the global North and South. Whilst some trends may in fact enhance the conditions of implementing the Party’s resolutions, other changes pose challenges and even a concerted backlash towards the adoption and implementation of certain policies. The ISI’s CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, bemoaned the current dialogues between (South) Africa, the West and the developing world, which he suggested were being held in silos. He was of the view that triangular dialogue between the three sides was necessary as such inclusive dialogue would respond in a more coordinated and effective manner to the enormous challenges facing the country and the continent.

On the 4th of August 2022, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in partnership with the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), hosted a virtual workshop. ISI and CLEA host the African Thought Series which organises workshops, guest lectures, conferences, amongst others. In the first instalment of the African Thought Series, we hosted virtual workshop on Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa. The workshop was composed of two components. The first component involved a book review. Dr. Shepherd Mpofu, an Associate professor from the University of Limpopo, promoted a recent book ‘Mediating Xenophobia in Africa - Unpacking Discourses of Migration, Belonging and Othering’ (https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-61236-8). This is a co-edited volume by Drs. Moyo and Mpofu that brings together a variety of scholars from different disciplinary perspectives to reflect on the problem of Xenophobia in Africa. In promoting the book, he gave the major highlights of the book. The second component focused on the keynote lecture. Dr. William Mpofu, from Centre for Critical Diversity Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, delivered the keynote lecture on the theme. The lecture contextualised the debate around Xenophobia on a broad decolonial perspective. He argued that what we might be dealing with in South Africa may not necessarily be xenophobia but a class struggle for survival among the black-bodied vulnerable poor from South Africa and non-South Africans.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2022 Climate change and resilience: An analysis of some global and national measures by Nolubabalo Lulu Magam MA International Relations; D. Phil. International Relations Abstract In essence, climate change affects poor countries that are least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. Globally, Sub-Saharan Africa contributes the least to greenhouse gas emissions; it is however one of the parts of the world most prone to the dire consequences of the current climate catastrophe. The political language of the climate chaos is also not encouraging, as there has been a failure to reach a global agreement and commitment to limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Given that different parts of the world are affected in different ways or by different forms of climate disasters, it is pertinent for national, and subnational, entities to develop their own adaptation and resilience strategies. This study engages in a systemic analysis of policy documents to examine the current progress and forms of climate mitigation and resilience strategies, at both national and provincial levels. The review goes further to suggest that rather than a procrustean approach, adaptation and resilience strategies must be province specific, within the context of South Africa. This is due to the varying levels of the impact of climate change in different provinces. Introduction Climate change can no longer be ignored or reduced to just another day of bad weather. It is, by far, the most serious threat facing the world. Rising sea levels, global warming, widespread flooding, droughts, and the spread of tropical diseases, have devastated a lot of communities around the world, and South Africa is no exception. Most scientists and researchers studying the potential impacts of climate change posit that the African continent has the potential to face more severe conditions than other regions in the world. Africa is estimated to be likely to experience increased climate variability due to its proximity to the equator. The effects of climate change on individual countries depend on their location and attributes, although all countries are exposed to it and have reason for common cause. But Africa’s ability to adapt to these effects is lower than that of the rest of the world. Evidently, the recent heavy rainfall, flooding, and the resultant loss of life and property in KwaZulu-Natal is said to have sounded the alarm on climate change adaptation. According to Dhesigen Naidoo (2022), the floods have been “centred in the east coast metropolitan area of eThekwini and are arguably one of the most visible and deadly signs of climate change in the country to date”. Naidoo (2022) further elucidates that the floods are not an uncommon occurrence because “the Southern Hemisphere generally has had flooding hotspots very late in the rainy season. This April there have been flood events in Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines”. However, the Durban “events are the expression of climate change in the form of more frequent, high-intensity extreme weather events”. Climate change adaptation in simple terms is the other side of the coin of mitigation. While the aim and goal of climate change mitigation is to prevent the environment, the biosphere, from drastically changing, the goal of adaptation is to provide people with the tools they need to live with the ever-changing environment, due to human activity. Joe McCarthy (2021) describes adaptation as essentially meaning: ​Any measure that protects a community or ecosystem from the effects of climate change, while also building long-term resilience to evolving environmental conditions. Adaptation is open-ended and takes many forms. It can be disruptive, such as when an entire community is relocated, or discreet, such as when a shoreline is reinforced. It covers everything from helping farmers grow crops with less rainfall to making sure buildings can withstand flooding events. It includes installing early-warning systems for natural disasters and improving the management of waterways. Globally, the shift towards climate adaptation policies and measures is gaining sustained momentum. Given the devastating impacts of our ever-warming world, even the parlance has changed – from the problem of “Climate change” to “Climate crisis”. A change that critically underscores the threat to livelihoods because of rapid change in climate and the necessity of promulgating policies, developing plans, and emplacing strategies for systems to adapt to the impacts of the climate crisis (Chersich & Wright, 2019). For McCarthy (2021), in the context of the ever-present environmental catastrophe and its causal link with poverty and the displacement of people and the myriads of climate change challenges, adaptation to climate change is a matter of survival. As a global problem, global efforts and policy measures, despite falling short on an array of occasions, are commendable. They show an intention towards action, albeit not as swiftly as is necessary. According to McCarthy (2021), adaptation to climate change has become morally, economically, and environmentally obligatory. The critical issue, however, is that despite the global, ergo the West’s, culpability for the current climate crisis, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and several low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) suffer from the most severe consequences or impacts of climate change. To put it in context, in a recent report by the Economist, it is stated that the climate crisis will lead to a shrinkage of the total area suitable for growing arabica coffee beans, and even tea. A situation that threatens the stability of economies, as the arabica plants account for about 60% of worldwide coffee production and over 98% of Kenya’s coffee (the countries fourth-largest export) production (Economist, 2022). The coffee industry is said to provide a lifeline in the countryside, as it directly or indirectly provides an income for an estimated six million people. That is more than a tenth of the population of 54 million. In South Africa, the impacts of the climate crisis are rapidly increasing. Extreme weather events like the drought in the Western Cape[1], floods in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, and wildfires, are some of the overt and noticeable effects of the climate crisis. This is in addition to an increase in “vector and waterborne diseases … also gaining prominence. Global warming, which manifests as climate variability, has already been implicated in increased transmission of malaria, Rift Valley Fever, schistosomiasis, cholera and other diarrheal pathogens, and Avian influenza in South Africa” (Chersich & Wright, 2019:2). Again, some studies have documented the deleterious effects of a warming temperature in South Africa to further include a threat to food security. The world’s population is projected to grow to about 9.7 billion, however, agricultural yields are said to likely decrease by 30%, which will effectually leave about five million of the world’s people hungry and in need of water (Economist, 2020). The same is true for South Africa, as it is reported that crop yields are likely to decline in several provinces, with a consequent loss of livestock (Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017). It bears restating that given the current state of the economy and livelihoods, further negative impacts of climate change on the country’s economy will have profound implications for access to food in the country, which is largely contingent on affordability. The reality of the July 2021 riots shows how tenuous food access is, given the levels of poverty and inequality in the country. More so, ownership of arable land and the capacity to work on land is highly inequitable, reflecting the country’s history of apartheid dehumanisation (Masipa, 2017). Indeed, the impacts of climate change are ubiquitous, and everyone is bound to feel the effects – some to a higher degree than others. Against this background, the critical question now becomes: Who is responsible for fixing climate change? Arguably, the success of any adaptation or prevention strategy does require international cooperation. For instance, there is a recognition in South Africa, and in SSA broadly, that international efforts need to double down on commitments to cut emissions (RSA, 2019). While this will go a long way, it may not be sufficient to protect South Africa – a water scarce, food insecure and unequal country – from the extent of future impacts of climate change. Essentially, measures and policies should be comprehensive and context specific to allow each citizen in different parts of the country to adapt their way of life to an ever-changing climate. For instance, rainwater harvesting and storage systems for irrigation in water-stressed provinces, striving for food security through improved agricultural practices, and building storm and flood defence systems or early weather warning systems could all form part of a layered adaptation plan that can help people cope and adapt to disasters. Given the above, this review provides a succinct elucidation of current progress and forms of climate mitigation and resilience strategies, at both national and provincial levels in South Africa. The review begins with an examination of global efforts and the different stakeholders, and based on critical extrapolation, the review goes further to suggest that rather than a procrustean approach, adaptation and resilience strategies must be province specific, within the context of South Africa (the National Climate Change Adaptation strategy is analysed). Globally, COP26 takes centre stage as the most comprehensive measure towards adaptation because, relative to climate change mitigation, adaptation has been overlooked in terms of its profile and financing. There are signs that a shift in thinking is under way, however, partly as climate change is starting to impact wealthier nations as well as developing countries. At COP26, climate-vulnerable nations called for greater support to address adaptation needs and deal with loss and damage. This was one of the main points of contention during the conference. On adaptation specifically, developing countries managed to secure a paragraph in the Glasgow Climate Pact urging developed countries to collectively at least double (Aberg et al, 2021:7). COP26: An overview of Global Climate Adaptation Measures and Policies The climate emergency poses an extinctive threat to the world as we know it. From rising sea levels, widespread flooding, droughts, to an exponentially growing number of climate refugees, the impacts of the climate emergency are devastating. Sadly, Sub-Saharan Africa, which has a predominance of the world’s poor, is the more likely to suffer the deleterious effects of climate change; despite contributing the least in global emissions of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2021). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the present has become evermore troubling – with an even bleaker outlook for the future – due to the impacts of climate change. In the IPCC report, a surmise is provided that reiterates what we already experience, which is that things are getting worse. The report made extrapolations by observing increases in extreme, high temperatures: On land and in the seas, in torrential rain, in droughts and weather conducive to wildfires. The changes are affecting people, animals and plants, with widespread shifts in the timing of the seasons and with half of the species scientists have looked at moving towards higher latitudes and/or higher altitudes to cool down (though it is possible that there is some bias there: data may be gathered for species already thought to be on the move more than they are for others). With temperatures currently 1.1-1.3°C above pre-industrial levels, some natural systems are approaching, or surpassing, their capacity to adapt. Some coral reefs, rainforests, coastal wetlands and polar and mountainous ecosystems are butting up against “hard limits” (Economist, 2022). It has become necessary for climate adaptation policies and measures in Africa, and in South Africa, to be more proactive and be guided by local and context specific challenges posed and, in some cases, exacerbated by the climate crises. This can prevent maladaptation, as in the past, businesses were content with buying carbon offset credits and continuing with their level of greenhouse gas emissions irresponsibly (Masipa, 2017). The issue is not an absence of policies; the supposition is that an array of existing programmes has an indirect impact on climate change adaptation and a further explicit framing of them could significantly contribute to climate change adaptation (Thinda, Ogundeji, Belle & Ojo, 2020). It is suggested that in the early days of political action on climate change, adaptation was reduced or rather “was seen as, at best, a poor relation to cutting greenhouse-gas emissions—at worst as a distraction” (Economist, 2020). Because of such a reduction, there was a failure to agree on reduction in emissions in 2010 at the Copenhagen Summit. The world saw a steep rise in emissions post the financial crisis of 2008, and this put adaptation in its appropriate place as a topic of international concern. “The countries party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change took on a commitment to a global adaptation framework and set up a Green Climate Fund, with the goal of raising $100 billion annually by 2020 to help developing nations reduce their emissions and establish plans for adaptation” (ibid). Current projections of the climate crisis presage more extreme and erratic weather pattens. In the face of such projections, the necessity for societies and communities to adapt their systems and practices to be more resilient to a hotter climate has become paramount. It is reported that: If nothing is done to prepare for climate change, it could lower global agriculture yields by as little as 5% and as much as 30% by 2050—depending on a range of assumptions. Roughly 5bn people could suffer water shortages at least one month a year. Hundreds of millions of people may have to abandon their homes in coastal cities. Adaptation is not just a matter for poor countries. The damage which Hurricane Sandy wreaked on New York City in 2012 showed that extreme events could bring one of the world’s most important financial centres to its knees. Damages topped $19 billion. Such losses spurred a $19.5 billion urban-adaptation plan (Economist, 2020:4). Adaptation from the above also requires the building of resilience amongst the most vulnerable groups in society, as they will be the ones most faced by the impacts of climate change. The recent United Nations Climate Conference COP26, like previous such gatherings, sought to find resolutions on the reduction of CO2 emissions to stop global temperatures from rising 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and to limit and adapt to the harms of global warming. The Glasgow Climate Pact was one of the major outcomes of the COP26 Summit, however, in Quiggin et al’s (2021) view, the summit at Glasgow was a crucial opportunity for improved ambition on climate finance and a need for more attention to adaptation, as well as for finalising the rules governing the implementation of the Paris Agreement. In sum, the major outcomes of the summit include: Enhancing the ambition of national emission reduction targets (nationally determined contributions – NDCs) was a critical task for COP26. Regarding the participants in this, governments fell short; indeed, over 120 parties have tendered new or updated NDCs, but these new targets barely managed to narrow the gap to 1.5°C by 15–17 per cent. To fully implement such in their current form would result in a projected warming of 2.4°C by the end of the century. Meeting the goal of limiting warming to 1.5oC above pre-industrial levels would require stringent efforts and additional commitments towards emission reductions before 2030 – this is in addition to extant NDC pledges. Conversation and commitments to climate finance, adaptation, and loss and damage took centre stage in Glasgow, and were critical points of contention. Whilst the Glasgow Climate Pact enjoins developed countries to ‘fully’ deliver on the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge through to 2025, there is still some unclarity as to “when this sum will be raised in full – and if a total of $500 billion will be mobilised between 2020 and 2025 to make up for initial shortfalls. And while the Pact urges developed countries to double their adaptation finance by 2025, and establishes a dialogue on loss and damage finance, much more will need to be done to address the needs of climate-vulnerable developing countries” (Aberg et al, 2021:1). A panoply of plurilateral deals happened at COP26 on key issues, from reducing emissions to the phasing out of various forms of fossil fuels and putting an end to deforestation. “These initiatives have the potential to accelerate decarbonisation but monitoring their implementation and holding governments and other institutions to account will be critical. Future COPs provide a platform for doing this, and governments should seek to incorporate the pledges made outside the formal remits of the UNFCCC process in their NDCs”. Adaptation can be described as a big winner though. In the sense that at COP26, there was provision of adaptation finance by 2025 (with 2019 as the baseline). Several other pledges were also made during the conference. $356 million was raised for the Adaptation Fund, and $413 million for the Least Developed Countries Fund. “Parties also agreed to set up a two-year work programme to operationalise and implement the Paris Agreement’s ‘global goal on adaptation’, the aim of which is to drive collective action on adaptation. This is important, as it has been unclear how the global goal is to be implemented and progress against it assessed” (Aberg et al, 2021:7). National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: South Africa’s Approach To restate, adaptation and mitigation are the two critical and vital responses to climate change. They are two sides of the same coin, in the sense that mitigation deals with the causes of climate change, whereas adaptation addresses the impacts of climate. Essentially thus, adaptation encompasses changes in how we interact with the environment and changes in practices and policies designed to decrease the vulnerability of our environment to climate change and interventions intended to reduce the vulnerability of people to climate change. There are several approaches to climate change adaptation. One of the most common is the nature-based approach or solutions. Nature-based solutions – including the conservation of, or the restoration of, ecosystems – have a dual utility as mitigation, because they often remove emissions from the atmosphere while supporting adaptation goals. One example of a nature-based solution is evidenced in the replanting of mangroves along the coastlines of Java in Indonesia, which protects communities from flooding. Other examples include that “rehabilitating the Great Barrier Reef boosts the economy of Australia, and contributing to the Great Green Wall across Africa’s Sahel region improves food and water security. These efforts also create carbon sinks that, together with other initiatives, can get the world 37% of the way toward achieving the Paris climate agreement” (McCarthy, 2021). In a country like South Africa, billions of rands are lost annually to climate change induced catastrophe. The 2022 flooding in the province of KwaZulu-Natal led to damages (to critical infrastructure and livelihoods) worth about R17 billion. Adaptation could be critical in saving provinces and, overall, the country from such expenditure. “The UN estimates that $1.8 trillion invested in adaptation programmes would save countries $7.1 trillion in climate costs. Adaptation measures also lead to economic growth — investing between $250 and $500 per hectare of land in climate-resilient farming practices could more than double certain crop yields” (McCarthy, 2021). The successes or probability for success of adaptation strategies hinges on how much they are bespoke to the needs of specific populations, facing specific threats; this is the truth about adaptation. Climate adaptation must “be guided by local priorities. Some areas need help overcoming floods, while others need help coping with heat waves. Although climate change is universally felt, some countries and regions need to adapt more urgently than others. Sub-Saharan Africa is widely considered the most vulnerable region to climate shocks, whereas Scandinavian countries are relatively shielded from major disruptions” (ibid). To put it in another way, what must be done to reduce emissions is similar around the world; “providing resilience through adaptation depends on policies shaped by local needs and capacities. Sub-Saharan communities at risk of more intense droughts that threaten their food supply do not need to deploy the same toolkit as ones on the Florida coastline where the land beneath their homes is eroding” (Economist, 2022:3). South Africa’s national climate change governance is described as the product of over two decades of policy evolution. It has thus been significantly influenced by an elaborate array of stakeholders, executive policies, strategies, regulations, and institutions. The 2004 National Climate Change Response Strategy dovetailed with the National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP), gazetted, and approved in 2011, form the crux of the national climate policy. In 2012 climate change became a key element of the National Development Plan, the overarching plan for the country. Recently, the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy of 2019 now forms part of the colourful convergence of efforts to combat climate change, nationally. According to Averchenkova, Gannon & Curran (2019): While there are a number of policies that operate across multiple sectors, there are also those that are targeted at avoiding emissions or supporting more specific sectors. The development of these sectoral level policies in South Africa is skewed by the greenhouse gas emissions profile of the country, with high-emissions sectors such as energy having more developed climate policy landscapes. These strategies are cross-cutting and gave a start to several specific policy mechanisms, including the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) and the cross-sectoral carbon tax. However, since 2010/11 climate change policy overall and mitigation policies in the energy sector, have been delayed (2). The strategic vision of the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) (RSA, 2019) is to ensure that South Africa makes an effective transition to climate resilience; one which toes the line of a sustainable development path, guided by anticipation, adaptation and recovery from a changing climate and environment to achieve the country’s development aspirations (Mthembu, 2021). The following form the core strategic focus of the NCCAS: a) Build climate resilience and adaptive capacity to respond to climate change risk and vulnerability; b) Promote the integration of climate change adaptation response into development objectives, policy, planning and implementation; c) Improve understanding of climate change impacts and capacity to respond to these impacts; d) Ensure resources and systems are in place to enable implementation of climate change responses. NCCAS also has some strategic interventions, which are: Reduce human, economic, environmental, physical, and ecological infrastructure vulnerability and build adaptive capacity; Develop a coordinated climate services system that provides climate products and services for key climate-vulnerable sectors and geographic areas; Develop a vulnerability and resilience methodology framework that integrates biophysical and socio-economic aspects of vulnerability and resilience; Facilitate mainstreaming of adaptation responses into sectoral planning and implementation; Promote research application, technology development, transfer and adoption to support planning and implementation; Build the necessary capacity and awareness for climate change responses; Establish effective governance and legislative processes to integrate climate change in development planning; Enable substantial flows of climate change adaptation finance from various sources; Develop and implement an M&E system that tracks implementation of adaptation actions and their effectiveness. Discussion and Conclusion The risks that weather and climate pose to human life are in most cases specific to the particular circumstances of time and place. In more ways than one, they are also a complex function of an array of interwoven factors and on-the-ground realities. Accordingly, several identifiable important gaps in adaptation practices as recommended by global policy include a failure to prioritise local or indigenous knowledge in the building of such mitigation and adaptation measures. It is of great importance that policy and planning frameworks for climate change at all levels should prioritise context, as it can serve as an essential platform for generating local knowledge, which is invaluable for mitigation and adaptation measures. It is also important to highlight that in high-income countries, adaptation has formed a critical part of all policy measures and has been described as yielding positive results. In low-income countries, however, there is often a lack of things like “resources needed to build sea walls, improve agricultural systems, and develop storm-resistant infrastructure. This disparity both reflects and exacerbates the unjust way climate change is unfolding. Although low-income countries are the least responsible for climate change, they’re often the most affected by it. The UN estimates that developing countries currently need an estimated $70 billion annually to adapt to climate change and could need as much as $300 billion by 2030” (McCarthy, 2021). Furthermore, evidence shows that, in some developed countries adaptation is directly linked with the saving of lives. A case in point, it is estimated that about 15,000 people died in France in 2003 because of scorching August temperatures. Similarly, another heatwave in 2019 is said to have killed an estimated 1,500 people. The noticeable decrease in deaths from heatwaves in this situation is a vast improvement, “thanks to increased awareness of the threat, public policy and private investment. There is now targeted support and medical attention for the most vulnerable. Opening hours for swimming pools were extended. The authorities put air-conditioning into some public buildings. Many private citizens installed it, too” (Economist, 2022). In Africa, and in South Africa in particular, adaptation policies are fraught with several challenges. Indeed, it has been observed that amongst developing and emerging economies, South Africa has one of the most elaborate and consultative climate governance systems in place. As efforts are made to implement national climate goals and ramp up ambitions to achieve the aims of adaptation and mitigation efforts, there are still some critical challenges that the country needs to address for success to be guaranteed (Poopola, Yusuf & Monde, 2020). The challenges cited above are not only critical but also diverse. Some are a direct consequence of an overstretched, depleted and eroded human and technical capacity (Grootes, 2019). Others are a consequence of institutional or structural variables such as a historical tension between the main players, confusion about the mandate and lack of clarity in the delegation of responsibilities, lack of ownership “over implementation agendas, multiple ministries dealing with issues concurrently without sufficient coordination, and cumbersome and ineffective communication practices. These challenges have been exacerbated by a wider political context of several years of political crisis and ‘state capture’ over the past 10 years, which resulted in uncertainty over the direction of climate change and energy policy, distracted leadership and low political will to act further” (Averchenkova, Gannon & Curran, 2019:4). Further, it is important that local communities play a critical role in adaptation measures. Their involvement in adaptation initiatives within their local area holds a high chance of success. By giving priority to the context, concerns, and climate-specific challenges of a local population, we can easily evaluate the effectiveness of such measures based on the outcomes and make the adjustments to policies and strategies as required. Inherently, the effectiveness of disaster management systems hinges on the level of preparedness against erratic extreme weather patterns. While the country has led the way globally in promulgating compressive and elaborate climate change policies, it has failed at implementation and in assuming a hegemonic leadership role in this field on the continent. With increased focus, the emplacement of adaptation and resilience measures will be effective, with improved climate governance and political will. In sum, adaptation is primarily a local issue, in the sense that it must be designed in conjunction with local communities, and with cognisance of their climate change induced challenges. In so doing, adaptation is said to significantly provide benefits at the local level, both short term and long term, by reducing vulnerability. Given that South Africa is often described as a water-scarce country, the forgoing fact has an array of implications for agriculture, food security, and on the overall livelihood of the country. The reason being that in addition to being water scarce, there are other parts of South Africa that are flood prone. Consequently, adaptation should be a priority in the water and agricultural sectors and in coastal or low-lying areas – areas prone to floods and droughts. It is important to underscore that the recent floods in KwaZulu-Natal further thrust into the light the necessity for urgent action towards climate change mitigation. By implication, South Africa, as the article has briefly expressed, does not suffer from a dearth of climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. In fact, the city of Durban was one of the first (2014) to enact climate change mitigation and adaptation policy at a provincial level (Meissner, 2022). The problem, however, is the lack of implementation of extant policies. Mismanagement and lack of critical urban planning have been described as factors impeding the efficient implementation of green policies. In Richard Meissner’s (2022) view, the recent floods in Durban (eThekwini municipality) “placed the spotlight on the management of urban areas and their vulnerability to natural disasters. That homes had been built close to rivers and on floodplains indicates a shortfall in urban planning”. Given the events of the aforementioned flood, the need for provincial governments to act decisively and extensively has been accentuated. More so, there is the view held by paradiplomatic scholars like Magam (2018) that provincial government through the devolution of power, enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy, which allows them to promulgate policies that are necessary for the development of the province and the improvement of livelihoods. Similarly, Meissner (2022) concurs that “municipalities have a considerable degree of independence in South Africa. The country’s Climate Change White Paper also recognises local governments as essential actors in the climate change response. They are responsible for providing and managing water. And they can largely choose how they do this”. Indeed, the global goal of climate change mitigation is “to reduce net emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The Paris Agreement intends to limit global warming to below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels” (Szönyi, 2021). To achieve this goal, Micheal Szönyi (2021) suggests that there is a need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, industrial farming, inter alia, “as this would reduce human greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as possible and achieve a climate neutral world by mid-century – in other words, a world where we do not emit more greenhouse gases than the Earth can handle without further warming”. As such, the trajectory of climate change mitigation has developed two focus areas: “reducing emissions and increasing carbon sinks. We can reduce emissions by, for example, replacing coal-fired power generation with renewable energy sources like solar and wind. We can also change our personal behaviour by reducing our consumption or by cutting down on our flights. In the end, the goal is to transition towards a low-carbon, and eventually a zero-carbon emitting economy and lifestyle” (ibid). While the global goal for climate mitigation has been clearly articulated and planned, in a country like South Africa there are suggestions that in addition to extant policies, a province like KwaZulu-Natal, for instance, requires other specific measures to combat and adapt to the impacts of climate change. As Meissner (2022) describes it: Much of the global thinking about managing risks like flooding uses the concepts of green and ecological infrastructure. They highlight the role of “natural” infrastructure in mitigating natural and human-induced risks. Examples include open green spaces and water bodies, green roofs and walls, street trees, ponds, urban wetlands, restored watercourses and reconnected floodplains. Green infrastructure refers more to metropolitan environments and ecological infrastructure to rural locations. Both concepts come into play in South African municipalities. 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What near-term climate impacts should worry us most? Supporting the most exposed and vulnerable societies to reduce regional and global climate risks, Research Paper. [Online] Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/2021-10-19-what-near-termclimate-impacts-should-worry-us-most-quiggin-et-al_0.pdf [accessed: 20 March 2022]. Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2004. National Environmental management: air quality act No. 39 of 2004. [Online] Available at: http://www.wylie.co.za/wp-content/ uploads/NATIONAL-ENVIRONMENTAL-MANAGEMENT_-AIR-QUALITY-ACTNO.- 39-OF-2004.pdf [accessed: 20 March 2022]. Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2018. South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). [Online] Available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/South Africa First/South Africa.pdf [accessed: 18 February 2022]. Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2019. National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. [Online] Available at: https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nationalclimatechange_adaptationstrategy_ue10november2019.pdf [accessed: 18 February 2022]. Szönyi, M. 2021. Mitigation and adaption: how do they help us combat climate change? [Online] Available at: https://www.zurich.com/en/knowledge/topics/climate-change/mitigation-and-adaptation-how-do-they-help-combat-climate-change [accessed: 20 April 2022]. Vignola, R., Harvey, C. A., Bautista-Solis, P., et al. 2015. Ecosystem-based adaptation for smallholder farmers: Definitions, opportunities, and constraints. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 211:126–132. Williams, P. A., Crespo, O. & Abu, M. 2019. Adapting to changing climate through improving adaptive capacity at the local level: The case of smallholder horticultural producers in Ghana. Climate Risk Management, 23:124–135. [1] The Western Cape province experienced a devastating drought between the years 2016 and 2018. The widely reported “Day Zero” crisis, wherein the Cape Town city faced the possibility of the taps running dry presented an acute shock and highlighted major vulnerabilities in the city’s water supply system, which relies largely on six large dams that had run dry. This water scarcity was and still is associated with the increasing threat posed by climate change impacts (including changing rainfall patterns and rising temperatures) leading to increasing water demand (Fell & Carden, 2022). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2022 Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption by Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Hon Sociology, Public Administration & Economic Science, Ph.D Sociology Opening remarks Part of this article has been based on an empirical report on South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC), as identified in South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030, first announced in President Ramaphosa’s 2021 State of the Nation Address. This article was sponsored and subsidised by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), an institution that functions autonomously and independently from any other entity. The question of trust The lack of political trust in South Africa is founded principally, if not exclusively, on political acts such as corruption, lack of ethics, state capture and perpetual legal violations. These everyday realities threaten the very legitimacy of the system, leading to mistrust and non-compliance with the law by citizens. Whereas political trust is founded on good governance based on the existence of accountability mechanisms and ethical codes in all spheres of life. Citizens expect good and ethical governance at all levels of society, meaning that politicians and public administrators are obligated and expected to adhere to the principles of accountability, transparency and integrity, which are the cornerstones of anti-corruption measures such as detection, prevention and deterrence. Policies and their honest and transparent implementation are the foundation of accountable, people-based service delivery. Political trust is not won by verbose party manifestos, distribution of food parcels or pre-election promises, but by politicians’ and administrators’ actions. Once citizens realise that manifestos, policies and promises are forgotten, mistrust becomes a tangible reality and takes on a wide variety of forms – founded on a vast array of individual and community thoughts, perceptions, relationships and actions – leading to political and social outcomes that illustrate a mixture of power relations and contradictions. Trust is both a collective and an individual reality that is inevitably transformed into feelings, relationships, plans and activities – the latter two of which are, in society, determined by the government’s answers to citizens’ questions. Recently, government’s plans and activities have been negatively associated with a plethora of dirty dealings, including two of its Cabinet Ministers spending R3.5 million in hotel accommodation, and the Covid-19 supply chain and procurement-based multibillion-rand theft. The impact of such actions on the relationship between the government and its citizens hugely undermines the honesty, accountability and legitimacy upon which administrative mechanisms operate within a democracy that is healthy and corruption-free. Every time a new policy is announced, political trust is brought into question. All levels and positions in the state apparatus come under scrutiny: from the president to the provincial premier, municipal mayor, judiciary, political parties, ‘corrupt mediators’, even the politicians’ families. In fact, the whole system comes under the spotlight. In most cases, personal distrust overlaps with governmental distrust, because policy, planning and implementation is in most instances personified by a specific individual. Familiar faces in political and senior administration dominate all social media, while middle managers in the small municipalities living it up and driving the Maseratis escape detection until exposed by whistle-blowers. Political leaders are the faces of the regimes and systems they represent. Citizens’ trust in state institutions and their rulings, or opposition parties, is a serious barometer of a healthy democracy. This trust epitomises the very essence of democratic legitimacy that is both internalised and externalised by peoples’ zest for wholehearted willingness to participate and act in the building of a democratic State that rewards honesty and punishes corruption. The South African case The latest widely acknowledged and respected opinion poll by Afrobarometer has shown that trust in the country’s Parliament has declined to 27 per cent and in the president to 38 per cent. And for the first time during the existence of the opinion poll initiative trust in the courts of law has dropped to 43 per cent. Furthermore, the level of trust in the African National Congress has fallen to 27 per cent and is especially low among more educated and younger South Africans, while the opposition parties’ tally is at a lower 24 per cent. The Public Protector received a 42 per cent vote of trust, while only 36 per cent trusted the Electoral Commission of South Africa, with trust levels particularly low among younger respondents. The Department of Health recorded the highest level of trust in comparison to other state institutions (56 per cent). Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption The path to social accountability is paved through the generation and articulation of citizens’ voices, to elicit enforcement of sanctions when public service provision fails, and to promote answerability of public authorities. Therefore, effective social accountability is made up of three building blocks: voices, enforcement and answers. The fundamental initiatives consist of: The achievement of citizens’ participation in the fight against corruption and paving the way to social accountability initiatives can only be achieved through citizens’ active involvement and coordination that leads to collective action capabilities. The existing local context realities are the foundation of the successful planning, designing and implementing of social accountability initiatives to counter corruption in the delivery of public services. Deep study and understanding of citizens’ expectations and attitudes is at the root of preparing the strategic State path in the process of tailoring capacity building activities that empower citizens to counter corruption. Continuous engagement of all trusted and widely respected stakeholders and actors in their communities, enabling them to share and articulate the communities’ voices. This makes social accountability initiatives more effective. Creation and development of participatory budgeting, leading directly to the planning, formulation, decision-making and monitoring of budget execution, especially at local government level. The challenges and opportunities: Concrete answers for the way forward The focus begins and ends with empirical evidence and is based on known final results. These results point to a fundamental absence of an anti-corruption coordinating body based on concrete and well accepted and known international examples. Historically speaking, it will be nationally and internationally understood that the Zondo Commission has shown with concrete evidence many corrupt individuals in the public sector. And yet, after fair court decisions only ten of these individuals have been jailed. How then, can citizens be expected to trust their government? The answer can be found in the historical success of anti-corruption coordinating bodies in Africa instrumental in enhancing social mobilisation to combat corruption. In Rwanda, the Anti-Corruption Advisory Council is headed by the country’s Chief Ombudsman and includes nine members from the key state departments, civil society organisations and private sector. A coordinating Secretariat is responsible for a daily campaign covering the whole country and reports the corruption and anti-corruption failures and successes daily on radio, television and social media. Furthermore, all the Council members communicate daily with the media, private sector and civil society, convincing them to become actively involved against corruption and mobilise their communities and constituencies to become an integral part of the effort. The Council operates at national level but is also decentralised at district, sector and cell levels. The country’s civil society leadership has been encouraged to cooperate with the Council to sensitise the public to the consequences of corruption, research and reports of corruption to the police, National Public Prosecution Authority, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The Council’s key responsibilities are to research and report/opine on strategies against corruption; thoroughly study and research all reports that emanate from anti-corruption institutions and recommendations to advance the fight against corruption; maintain continuous channels of information exchange on corruption between institutions; research, assess and evaluate all reports that emanate from organisations regarding corruption in Rwanda and recommendations that are based on their positions; planning and implementation of all processes resulting in the approval and publication of an annual report of the achievements in the fight against corruption in Rwanda. The success towards building the foundations that will lead to social mobilisation and, ultimately, social accountability can be easily compromised by specific historical, political or cultural experiences, which can influence the communities’ behaviour and attitudes towards the government at all levels. As international and South African literature has shown, there are key common issues, such as lack of citizens’ knowledge of their rights and corruption realities as well as types and particularities of corruption. These realities could be tackled through several initiatives that are achievable at all government levels, but initially beginning in the local government terrain: Awareness and promotion of the values of honesty and integrity among all communities, with a view to prevent corruption. Organisation of classes and community-based special meetings, beginning with district and local municipalities, on all subjects dealing with corrupt acts, their types, and the role of communities in their defeat. At municipal levels, the community leaders as well as the ward committees can and should play a key role in mobilisation. Identification of the causes of corruption in the context of the area’s socio-economic conditions. Investigation of a public officer’s conduct that the community or its members have reasonable grounds to believe relates to corrupt practices. Coordination and cooperation with all known state institutions and anti-corruption entities and organisations authorised to investigate, prosecute, prevent and combat corrupt practices. Consultation, cooperation and information exchange/s with the appropriate bodies locally, provincially and/or nationally authorised to conduct inquiries or investigations in relation to corruption. Adaptation and strengthening of mechanisms for educating the public to respect the public good and public interest. Development of educational and other programmes in collaboration with civil society organisations and disseminating information and sensitising the public to the negative effects of corruption. The creation of an anti-corruption coordinating body run at its initial phase by a highly trained, knowledgeable and skilled Secretariat will have several key responsibilities, including: Research and reports/opinions on strategies against corruption. Thorough study and research of all reports emanating from anti-corruption institutions and recommendations to advance the fight against corruption. Maintenance of continuous channels of information exchange on corruption among all anti-corruption institutions. Research, assessment and evaluation of all reports that emanate from organisations regarding corruption and recommendations that are based on their positions; planning and implementation of all anti-corruption processes. Collective effort on the part of all government, civil society and communities throughout the country to become aware of and active about reports and existing government strategies and plans against corruption; Secretariat-planned reports and initiatives emanating from anti-corruption institutions and entities in the effort to advance the fight against corruption; continuous exchange of all channels of information on corruption between all anti-corruption institutions and communities and all varieties of media; all reports and results of anti-corruption cases undertaken by anti-corruption agencies and institutions; monthly anti-corruption reports distributed to all national, provincial and local state departments and institutions, including the cases and successes in the corruption and anti-corruption efforts. All these initiatives, plans, designs, and their implementation will take place under the auspices of the Project Management Office. The entity’s main objective is to operationalise the existing policies, strategies and procedures together with the existing multilateral initiatives on governance and anti-corruption; identify the dynamics and realities for risk analysis and institutional assessments; governance and anti-corruption project design measures and supervision monitoring, and evaluation and similar operational matters. The following little-known case points to the need for the next unit, the Whistle-Blower Protection Unit: Grishen Bujram (43) was an underground MK fighter and a UDF activist in the 1980s. Later, as a whistle-blowing ANC councillor in the Endumeni Local Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, Bujram was gunned down in Sibongile Township near Dundee on 15 June 2007. He had reported the unlawful sale of 17 RDP houses by then-ANC Mayor Thandeka Nukani – who had also acquired one for herself – to the police, the council, and all ANC structures. The two men implicated in the murder used the mayor’s car during the crime. Both were convicted and jailed, one for life and the other for 20 years. The mayor was also charged and appeared in court, but the charges were eventually withdrawn due to insufficient evidence. Whistle-blower protection is crucial for the success of anti-corruption detection and enforcement and should be a key aspect of any whistle-blowing system. Indeed, it will be one of the most important duties and responsibilities of the Secretariat. This is due to the nature of the corrupt individuals involved: those parties who stand to reap substantial benefits through their corrupt activities also stand to be arrested and seriously punished if they get caught out. Politicians and administrators who risk reporting these corrupt activities therefore put themselves and their families, co-workers and managers in potentially serious danger. The Whistle-Blower Protection Unit is responsible for considering the circumstances under which suspicions of wrongdoing can be reported inside and outside the organisation; has the knowledge and means to provide legal and physical protection to whistle-blowers; ensures that existing reporting channels, such as information hotlines, also exist for individuals working in the private sector; encourages positive attitudes towards whistle-blowing among citizens by promoting whistle-blowing policies and publicising post-reporting follow-up; ensures that individuals considering reporting suspected cases of wrongdoing have access to advice that is confidential and free of charge; forms part of external bodies such as NGOs and national associations; and introduces periodic assessments of the effectiveness of rules and regulations on the protection of whistle-blowers. It needs to be understood that as insiders, whistle-blowers have unique knowledge, access and expertise with regards their organisations and, therefore, also with regards the functions and dysfunctions of their institutional realities. This information allows them to detect corruption or other matters of concern that might otherwise remain hidden. However, this knowledge often places them in a difficult position, owing to loyalty to colleagues and supervisors, contractual confidentiality obligations, and the risk of retaliation. This scenario pinpoints the challenges associated with the distinction between the three different types of reporting: anonymous, where a report or information is received, but no one knows the source; open, where individuals openly report or disclose information, or state that they do not require their identity to be kept secret; and confidential, where the identity of the informant is known to the recipient, but will not be disclosed without the individual's consent, unless required by law. The staff of the entity should be enabled to negotiate with and guide everyone connected to such circumstances as well as the ant-corruption units of the specific institutions. While legislation exists that provides protection from occupational detriment for employees who disclose information of unlawful or corrupt conduct by their employers or fellow employees, more needs to be done. There are a number of initiatives that could be introduced – such as proper training, which will have a positive effect on the workplace structure, or the introduction of much stronger policies with severe consequences for the corrupt. The Research and Policy Unit is responsible for researching anti-corruption initiatives. Its key function is to facilitate and conduct research and analytical studies on issues pertaining to the development of anti-corruption initiatives locally, regionally and internationally. Researchers employed in the unit can also be directly involved in staff training throughout the anti-corruption institutional terrain; contacts, meetings and digital conferences can connect staff with colleagues and academic researchers on the African continent for exchange of ideas, research and insights. Potential staff members of such a unit should be university graduates with at least a master’s degree in the social, law or economic sciences, preferably with knowledge of and/or exposure to the anti-corruption genre. The Education Office operates at two levels: the institutional and the public. The institutional focuses on training all members of NACAC as well as those in all other anti-corruption agencies. The foundation is an ‘induction training programme’ providing basic training to new employees, all of whom spend the first few months of their service in the Research and Policy Unit to improve their knowledge on corruption and anti-corruption scenarios, investigations, successes, processes, structures and challenges, before being considered for their final posting. The new recruits’ training could last at least a year, while the trainees work and learn at the Research and Policy Unit. During the process the courses will include corruption prevention, communication skills, rules of evidence, law, computer forensics, financial investigation skills, and cognitive interview techniques, among others. Throughout the period of employment, the training continues at higher levels. On the other hand, is the public pillar, which will be reserved for awareness campaigns and educational programmes to mobilise society in the fight against corruption. Conclusion From 1994 until 2022, the South African government has enacted and implemented a vast number of laws, official rules and regulations, and introduced a populous and widely diversified group of organisations, institutions and entities to fight corruption, including Chapter 9 entities. All the existing laws, rules and regulations have been rigorously amended, so they are extremely detailed and thorough, and the anti-corruption agencies, organisations and entities have had successes and failures. But while the National Development Plan has accepted that all this effort has, for the most part, not worked, it has done so without providing reasons for the failure. The South African transition and the theory and practice of the National Democratic Revolution are still in process for many – if we believe the theorists still praying for the success of the French students’ powerful slogan from May 1968: ‘Be realistic, strive for the impossible’. This transition has been given a variety of names, including the ‘deferred revolution’, ‘first transition’, ‘second transition’, ‘second phase of the transition’. The prophets of the African revolutions, from Thomas Sankara to Oliver Tambo and from Patrice Lumumba to Samara Michel, are gone. The Africanisation of university curricula following the much debated but still misunderstood ‘Fees Must Fall’, is still in the long unveiling process. The late Claude Ake’s 1978 prophetic book, Revolutionary pressures in Africa, comes to two key conclusions. First, the revolution will be televised – as has been seen in Polokwane, Mangaung and the Expo Centre. And second, the National Democratic Revolution against corruption, greed and avarice cannot take place in stages – this is the key message of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030. It can only succeed if it is a continuous and un-interrupted process, coordinated efficiently, professionally and honestly. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended the ANC National Policy Conference, which was held from 29 – 31 July 2022 at NASREC in Johannesburg. The ISI has as its objective the promotion of public policy based on social and national democratic values. As such it is important to be intricately involved in the broader public policy dialogue in the country; more so with the policy processes of the ruling party with whom it broadly shares the same ideological orientation. It is also through the ruling African National Congress that the Institute could best promote the policy positions it puts forward to advance the ISI’s vision of an equitable, socially just, free and democratic South Africa. The ISI advances a policy framework working towards a modern welfare state using the development state as a vehicle to achieve its objective. The Institute will over the coming months and in the run-up to the ANC’s National Conference scheduled for December 2022, develop a number of papers contributing to the national policy dialogue in response to the policy positions emanating from the ANC Policy Conference.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2022 Social cohesion: Taking stock of South Africa's socio-political strategy by Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Introduction This paper discusses the meaning and significance of social cohesion in South African democracy. Social cohesion, vis-à-vis the social division or exclusion that formed the basis of historical South Africa, is foundational to South Africa’s constitutional project. It presents a national standard; a useful lens through which to analyse national progress and the achievement of the national ends. With South Africa’s persistence as being one of the world’s most unequal countries[1], social cohesion as a concept can become trite. Instead, it deserves candid examination. This paper will briefly probe and explain how social cohesion forms part of the constitutional project, before looking at factors that are impeding it. This work then draws on existing investigations undertaken by the Inclusive Society Institute (the Institute)[2], with the purpose of assessing and advancing social justice and cohesion. Instead of discarding it as a quasi-conceptual or unproductive term, it is the belief of the Institute, that social cohesion holds an important place in national transformation. A critical approach is required to ensure that it evolves as a term of transformative consequence. Social cohesion: Setting the scene Conceptual social cohesion differs from place to place. Whereas other countries see social cohesion reactively as an adaptation to increasing multi-culturalism, in South Africa the concept occupies a strategic quality. Here, it should not be assessed simply as a response to fears of xenophobia or social dominance. Instead, the advance of social cohesion and nation-building lie at the heart of the post-apartheid South African project. It has deeply contextual significance. It is shaped by history. Whereas distinction and discrimination were the modalities of governance under colonialism and apartheid, the transformation towards a cohesive and just society has been the overarching national strategy since the accord between political opponents gave rise to the democratic and constitutional order. Driving unity in diversity, advancing a single, legitimate national society from where before there was a divided, illegitimate pseudo nation, is the central strategic function in South Africa. The drive towards social cohesion, therefore, forms the basis for overcoming a past where people were divided, excluded primarily on their race, but also on their religion, gender and other social features. Social cohesion is a term with both descriptive and prescriptive meaning. It is understood as “the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity … based on a sense of hope, trust, and reciprocity”[3]. A socially cohesive society is one where there is an absence of conflict based on race, gender, ethnicity and other social markers. It is one where there is no great discrepancy based on wealth or access to education, health and other services. Instead, there are social bonds that create the experience of a shared reality. A society where people “feel a sense of belonging, that they perceive the whole society as greater than the parts, and when differences develop, they can be dealt with peacefully”[4]. The emphasis on “shared” suggests that such a society must take a singular form; either becoming united or advancing an existing social unison. Social cohesion is therefore a prescriptive term that achieves its end by promoting values and policies that reduce difference. According to the OECD, a cohesive society is one that advances the well-being of everyone in society, “fights (all forms) of exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility”[5]. From the previous research conducted by the Institute, we see that there are several determinants that drive or obstruct social cohesion. These determinants include racial diversity, economic inequality and historical events[6]. In all of the above, there are clear divisions whereby trust, identity and social cohesion are determined. The group subjugated to the conditions or policies listed above, are either locked out or experience long-term negative impacts. This results in a rejection of the existing social values and institutions. They experience social conditions as benefiting others, not them. Or they simply reject social cohesion as assisting in the pursuit of their needs. This rejection can take the form of protests among populist formulations. We return to this later. The South African story Historically, South Africa’s social organisation is marked by division. Before social cohesion could be pursued, the socio-political structure had to be fundamentally changed. Installing non-racial democracy in 1994 conjured the proverbial rainbow nation. The concept of the rainbow nation has recently received considerable rebuke. Its use, as an appeal, is however misplaced. The rainbow nation, or the rainbow people of God, as introduced by Desmond Tutu, did not suggest socio-economic equality between different groups, therefore that transformation had been achieved. Instead, by installing a social arrangement where for the first time all people were politically and legally equal, it allowed for the potential to transform. Social cohesion was central to enabling transformation. The ending of apartheid did not summarily achieve social cohesion. Instead, equal rights, for the first time, created a shared reality whereby everybody would not only be enfranchised, but also tasked with the role of continuously overcoming the various divisions of the past. The Constitution, as the foundational text of the emergent South Africa, serves as the guide, as well as the infrastructure, towards the transformed society. It does so through its programme of aspirational norms and principles. In its preamble and with its first words, ‘We, the people of South Africa’, the Constitution both presents the foundational argument towards building something new and surmounts the divided past by establishing a singular ‘We’ that comprises all peoples. The past as well as the future not only belongs to but is also established by all people in their collective ways. The Constitution provides a normative as well as structural guide for this social development. It is the bedrock for transformation. A technology of and towards social cohesion. The Constitution deftly delegitimises any path for social discord based on racial or other divisions. By rejecting the means and ways that measure and partition according to difference, something new is built. The Constitution calls on all South Africans to “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”[7]. In addition to establishing unison between all people, the phrases of the preamble also instruct all of those who comprise the ‘We’, to “recognise the injustices of our past … believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity”[8]. Social cohesion – and by extension, social justice – is set up to be achieved through an active rejection of the former national strategy. According to Former Chief Justice Pius Langa, the Constitution presents “a space between an unstable past and an uncertain future”[9]. It is thus a technology that connects and coheres a society which before was forced apart. This technology is referred to in the Interim Constitution of 1993 as a bridge: “This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans”[10]. The Constitution plays an important role in formalising much of the myth upon which South Africa is founded – including the myth that South Africa is somehow special, a democratic miracle, where the indignity of apartheid was replaced by a rainbow nation. The bridge functions as a system of meaning making. It does not coldly separate from the past, thereby denying or forgetting, but instead, it maintains the past as reference, connecting it with the future. In doing so, it establishes a singular normative pathway that binds everyone in society. All people must cross the same bridge, must take ownership of and pride in the national symbols, the national myths and the national heroes. Enacting the vision of a singular nation, and thereby arriving in a shared future. Social cohesion as the method to transcend divisions has a deeply political grounding in South Africa. It is useful to note that the apartheid government tried for some time to maintain power under the promise of reform. It sought, through various political manoeuvres, to legitimate its maintenance of power in a new, reformed political reality. Its plan required “a (conservative) black middle class that could be co-opted into ‘managing’ urban black townships within the envisaged consociational model”[11]. This co-option of a credible, yet pliant black leadership, as embodied in the titular representation of coloureds and Indians in the Tricameral Parliament, alongside black leaders in homelands, was a tactic that recognised the power and importance of cohesion or acceptance between different social groupings. A tactic to maintain legitimacy. “While government motioned to legitimate representation, achieving a new political normalcy was prevented by its own mechanisms, which denied authoritative black input and therefore real negotiation”[12]. The governing party failed to persuade that it could reform into one, a system it essentially held apart. Its approach of division fundamentally rebuffed real social cohesion, thereby leading to its fundamental delegitimation. It was only when the National Party’s strategy fundamentally changed, when instead it sought to advance the effective participation of all in a singular political regime, that the political settlement became conceivable. At the time of the political negotiations, the political basis was racial division. The significant pressure from both white conservative and radical black groupings sought to maintain this order. Neither of these groupings advanced a shared national project. It was, therefore, on the grounds of accepting a shared future, in a single country (as motioned in the future Constitution), that the opposing political forces of the erstwhile government and the liberation movement led by the African National Congress coalesced and agreed on a political settlement. The pursuit of a single, coherent nation became the measure on which South African political legitimacy would be based. Under the brokered political settlement, the party controlling the political arena would be the vanguard not only of a specific group, but of all people. Central to sustained legitimacy would be their commitment to social cohesion. This pursuit embodies government’s fulfilment of the social contract. Under the Constitution, the government is tasked with formulating and implementing policies that transform South Africa towards marked equality. At the turn to democracy, social cohesion lay at the heart of political decision-making – appeasing different social groups and bringing all into the Constitutional ‘We’, so as to maintain order and political legitimacy. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) presented the foremost programme of transitioning from the past. Through legislation, confessing perpetrators of the apartheid regime were afforded clemency and crossed the proverbial bridge. The TRC, together with various government programmes, such as the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) and the Social Cohesion Framework, all rely on citizens to enact the transformed nation. The approach of government is clear: it proposes the plans, it details what social cohesion and nation-building means[13], while the act of cohering resides with the populace. The rhetoric around the social compact, the citizenry’s activation of social cohesion, has returned to the spotlight under the Ramaphosa administration. The current South African president is perhaps the loudest proponent of a renewed and emboldened social compact[14]. Encouraging public participation in enacting the constitutional vision is central to his strategy, which he has said is the same strategy as President Mandela. Under Mandela, as is the case under Ramaphosa, the governing party “frames the measurement of social cohesion as the demonstration or enactment of a unitary South African identity, the persistent move to instantiate the centrality of liberation heroes and the liberation movement through place renaming, for example, appears rational and even necessary”[15]. The command of this strategic narrative has narrowed to be one overly associated with ANC as political party and its leaders. Instead of having direct bearings on the lives of people, social cohesion has arguably become a rehashed buzzword. According to Abrahams, the academic and commentator Raymond Suttner has suggested that the “social cohesion framework can be seen as an extension of the completed yet rehearsed narrative of liberation. Seen in this way, Suttner suggests that social cohesion continues the historic mission of the liberation movement in South Africa, causing the political party – the ANC – to become the vanguard of ‘nation’”[16]. The control or dominance of the South African project as exhibited by the governing party’s ideology propounds that the citizenry adopts the same liberationist position that it does. The ANC so construed dominates the national vision, it “does not envisage much space for independent identities”[17]. There are many contradictions in the ANC today. The tension between dominating the national vision and seeking citizen command is one such contradiction. The pursuit of the Ramaphosa administration, to attain endorsement from the country’s people, suggests that the tensions in the ANC and the weaknesses of the state are too great. While the Ramaphosa administration seeks broad contribution to building the state, another part of the ANC pursues total control in line with the party’s belief that it is the vanguard of the (ongoing) liberation. This approach, while purporting to champion the constitutional prerogative of social cohesion, does so in a manner which measures transformational progress according to strictly ideological terms. This pursuit of representation according to quantity and not quality, often appeases ideology while not having a direct bearing on national transformation in terms of social justice. According to Abrahams, concepts such as nation-building have been more about the pageantry of governmental power than the empowerment of people. Instead of a truly transformative social agenda, South African social cohesion has been rather superficial. “Social cohesion as a concept needs to be redeemed from the tropes of nation-building; the wider value of the concept is at stake, as is the actual practice of a truly socially cohesive country by all members of society, all political parties and all ideologues”[18]. The NDP clearly states that “social cohesion needs to anchor the strategy. If South Africa registers progress in deracialising ownership and control of the economy without reducing poverty and inequality, transformation will be superficial. Similarly, if poverty and inequality are reduced without demonstrably changed ownership patterns, the country’s progress will be turbulent and tenuous”[19]. Accordingly, social cohesion is equivocal to the realisation of socio-economic transformation. “Unless there is real material transformation in the lives of those who have been apartheid’s victims”, warned Desmond Tutu, “we might just as well kiss reconciliation goodbye. It just won’t happen without some reparation”[20]. Rejections of social cohesion From what has been discussed here, there is clearly a tension between the power, ideological and tactical purposes of social cohesion in South Africa. Furthermore, the concept, and the aspiration towards it, has been damaged by what is seen as the pageantry of nation-building and its failure to correspond to material concerns. People do not actively cohere with others when others benefit without them or benefit at their expense. In South Africa, the rejection of social cohesion as foremost strategy has taken several pathways. One such pathway is broadly considered as xenophobic nationalism. This has various components; its rejection of social cohesion has historical, political and economic foundations. The following description is brief and by no means comprehensive. In South Africa, xenophobic nationalism sees locals taking their socio-economic grievances out on migrants from other African countries. Africans who reside in or operate businesses in proximity to South Africans have been targeted. Whereas black South Africans traditionally have a deep history of solidarity with and appreciation for the role that Africa played in South Africa’s liberation, it is this group that has become most vocal and violent towards migrants. There have been various waves of xenophobic attacks, with the most lethal taking place in 2008 when 62 people lost their lives[21]. These xenophobic attacks have been suggested to be caused by people taking violent action to protect their interests. Suggested reasons why African migrants are the victims include their cultural difference to the in-group where they live. They are seen as taking lower paid jobs and are accused of criminal activities, including the drug trade. But the central reason for xenophobic nationalism is poverty[22]. The people undertaking xenophobic attacks are seen as turning to these actions out of desperation. Instead of seeing the desperation of their victims, they blame them of illicit undertakings or for simply being in South Africa illegally[23]. Their antagonism to coherence is based on their own poverty; their dissatisfaction of their socio-economic reality is passed down the line and onto another victim. The recent rise of the Operation Dudula movement and the anti-constitutionalist Radical Economic Transformation (RET) segment aligned to the governing party are illustrations of an evolving socio-political situation in South Africa. Operation Dudula is a South African nationalist movement that undertakes protest and active citizenry measures against illegal foreign nationals and their perceived illicit behaviour. The movement has been accused of vigilantism, whereas they say that they are taking action where government has failed. Their rise stems from unaddressed frustration and worsening conditions. The movement introduces a new dynamic to modern South Africa, one where fringe groups do not wait for the political establishment to lead but does so themselves. Theirs is not first an unwillingness to adopt social cohesion, but a re-articulation of its meaning. Not a denial of the social contract but giving up on the previous order, so as to establish something new. As there are various factors playing into this re-articulation of the social contract, it is still too early to see what kind of role it will have on the broader political establishment. In a related but different development, there has been an increasing movement from within the political establishment, and particularly the ANC, to reject the political settlement of the early 1990s in favour of radical economic transformation. The strategy of this grouping is to realign the governing party to more aggressive redistribution and away from norms and values that underpin cohesion. The radical revolutionary approach sees the constitutional order more as an obstacle than a conduit towards equality. According to some reports, this grouping has turned away from its earlier strategy of blaming white people[24] for the poverty and inequality in South Africa. With slogans such as “put South Africa first” channelling Trumpist ethno-nationalism, there has been a shift towards attributing responsibility for the nation’s ills to African migrants. The overarching motive here is not only to find a scapegoat, but to denounce social cohesion as the foundation to the national project. It seeks to dislocate equality and a rights-based order, subjugating social ends to the deeply material ends of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) grand strategy. The NDR seeks to bring about a national democratic society characterised by: “the resolution of antagonistic contradictions between the oppressed majority and their oppressors; as well as the resolution of the national grievance arising from the colonial relations”[25]. The advance of these economic resolutions does not require social cohesion, nor do these resolutions have to abide by legal or normative prescriptions. The populist claim of these revolutionaries, of which former President Jacob Zuma and his coterie are central, suggests that the “constitutional order is ineffective in achieving the revolutionary ends of the liberation movement … To Zuma, the constitutional state was always a means towards the ends of the revolution. Unconstrained political power, where the ends justify the means, is therefore the superior and legitimate approach”[26]. Those advancing this view have increasingly sought to equate the democratic state to the unjust, illegitimate apartheid state – seeking to break down its foundational legitimacy and subvert order to disorder. The looting and destruction that took place a few days after Zuma’s incarceration, in July 2021, exemplifies the subversion of the constitutional order to the materialist ends of the NDR. The populism manifested here was calculated. Looters did not have to be Zuma acolytes to act as foot soldiers of this strategy. Looters became agents of sedition, subverting the ends of the state to that of the revolution. “Amid the destructive plunder, where lives were lost and infrastructure and property were decimated, thousands of poor people returned home with items they would otherwise not ordinarily have had access to. It was under these conditions, the juncture between order and disorder, that thousands of South Africans gained materially and saw the ends of the political power of radical economic transformation”[27]. Measuring social cohesion in South Africa: Some findings The grievances detailed above are substantial. While these grievances take different forms and perform different motives, the mission of social cohesion remains central to the national strategic interest. To get a more detailed and more nuanced understanding of the broad nature and impact of social cohesion in South Africa, it is important to undertake analyses among diverse groups. Since social cohesion is an active exercise involving the building of shared values or shared enterprise, one can get a better idea by measuring these relationships between peoples. The following section draws from the ongoing research undertaken by the Institute. First, social cohesion is here understood as “the notion that relationships among members and groups in society are sufficiently good and that all feel a sense of belonging, that they perceive the whole society as greater than the parts, and when differences develop, they can be dealt with peacefully”[28]. The Institute has identified certain dimensions and factors that are central to its research on the field. The key dimensions regarding social cohesion, as first defined by Langer et al.[29] in their Social Cohesion Index, include inequality, trust and identity. Inequality refers to the extent of perceived inequalities within and across groups, which can manifest itself in various forms, such as economic, social, political, or cultural disparities. Social cohesion is threatened when there are high levels of inequalities within a society because it erodes the relationships within that society, which, in turn, may cause conflict. One often-used reference to inequality is the Gini coefficient, which measures national inequality. According to the World Bank, South Africa ranks as the most unequal country in the world. Trust is the ‘glue’ that holds societies together. When trust is missing between members of society, it weakens the ability of individuals and groups to cooperate peacefully and to collaborate in order to achieve inclusive economic growth. Mistrust towards state institutions may, for example, fuel violent protests, and similarly, mistrust between individuals and/or groups may cause aggressive behaviour towards each other. South Africans have relatively low trust in the state. Identity relates to whether people have a stronger adherence to their national identity vis-à-vis their group or ethnic identity. This is particularly applicable in multi-ethnic communities, more so in countries with a colonial history, such as South Africa. Its fractured history has made the forging of a united, common identity a difficult task. Some of the Institute’s findings on social cohesion in South Africa include[30]: South Africans remain committed to social cohesion as encapsulated in the national motto, ‘Unity in Diversity’. But nearly half of the South African population doubts whether the different groups in South Africa would be able to form a single nation. Instead, they believe that they can unite, live and work together, as fellow South Africans. 47,96 percent (nearly half) of South Africans either agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that it is not possible to form one nation out of all the different groups in the country. This finding held true across all race groups, with whites being slightly more inclined to believe it possible, and coloured people being the most doubtful. 42,7 percent of white South Africans thought is not possible to form one nation, whilst 47,45 percent of black South Africans, 54,55 percent of Indians and 55,77 percent of coloured South Africans also thought so. There was little differentiation between age and gender groupings. It is encouraging that most South Africans agree that there is reason and need to unite as a nation. Most were of the opinion that it was important for all South Africans to unite. 70,53 percent of South Africans either agreed or strongly agreed with this notion, whilst only 13,15 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 2,75 percent did not know. More people agree than disagree that reconciliation is moving in the right direction. 44,97 percent of South Africans agree or strongly agree that it is moving in the right direction, as opposed to 27,54 percent who disagree or strongly disagree. 21,27 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and 6,22 percent did not know how they felt about it. A significant degree of racial integration exists in everyday life. The survey suggests that there is a relatively high level of integration between the various race groups in the country when it comes to everyday life activities. Moreover, the integration appears to not be forced integration, but rather of a voluntary nature, where there was a high level of enjoyment flowing from such integration and friendships being formed. The statistics indicate that the black community is slightly lagging in terms of integration. This should be understood within the socio-economic context of South Africa, where the majority of the poor and jobless are black and, thus, not within the workplace or able to participate in extra-mural social activities to the same extent as the employed and socially mobile. What the statistics do tell us, is that the majority of South Africans have commenced the journey towards reconciliation, nation-building and social cohesion. Though it may be declining, racial bias is still prevalent in society. Nearly a third (33,44%) of adult South Africans still do not like associating themselves with people from other population groups. This would suggest that the country has still some way to go before it can consider itself to be fully reconciled. Racial political narrative differs from reality. There is a disconnect between the general negative political racial narrative which drives division, and the realities of everyday South Africans going about their daily business. While many in the political establishment seem to be fuelling division, citizens, in turn, are finding each other at the human level. The trust needed to underpin social cohesion is largely absent in South Africa. While they have high levels of trust in their families and neighbouring communities, South Africans do not sufficiently trust their compatriots from outside their lived environment. The lack of trust runs across most dimensions, be it race, gender, age, education, or income. South Africans do not trust at first sight. Across the board, there exists distrust between races. Instead, trust only develops after relationships are built. The more people integrate, the more trust will develop. In general, South Africans do not trust people from Africa or other overseas countries. This is particularly important in relation to xenophobia in the country. The lack of trust runs across most dimensions, be it race, gender, age, education, income, or political party. Overall, only 31,23 percent of South Africans said they completely trusted or somewhat trusted immigrants from African countries, with only a slight differentiation between men and women. 62,62 percent of male and 62,63 percent of female South Africans either did not trust immigrants very much or at all. Trust between South Africans is at a low level. This is the case with all demographic groups, be it race, gender, age, education, income, political party, or province, and immigrants. This does not bode well for social cohesion and presents a socio-political risk within an environment which is prone to xenophobic confrontation. South Africans deeply distrust fellow compatriots who do not belong to the same political party as their own. This undermines social cohesion, and points to a high level of political naïveté, in that in a mature democracy people should be able to associate freely at the personal, workplace and societal levels without overt hostility towards those who differ politically. This is particularly unsettling given the country’s past racial divisions, and party support that remains largely divided along racial lines. All of the political parties enjoy significant trust from their own supporters. There is a strong sense of community within groups. Social cohesion requires a high sense of community. It is when a community is socially invested in each other that they will come to the defence of its people, its institutions and infrastructure in times of need, threat or tragedy. Furthermore, economists find a positive relationship between social cohesion and economic growth, on the basis that social cohesion improves formal and/or social institutions, which causally drives economic growth. Conclusion: The centre holds, but for how long? The various challenges that have been shown to undermine social cohesion suggest that programmes that do not have a direct bearing on material concerns, such as nation-building, will increasingly be used to undermine the advance of social cohesion. Whereas social cohesion and nation-building receive increasing criticism as soft issues, this perception is made without sufficient historico-political regard. It is not seen for the strategic foundation it lays; the transformation put forward in the Constitution. There is, however, sufficient reason to criticise what has become the customary approach to social cohesion – the cursory, yet dominant, approach adopted by the governing alliance. The gaps in the returns on investment are clear; socio-economic inequality persists. The rich and historically privileged have maintained that privilege, whereas the poor, while being asked to uphold their side of the social contract, have not seen appropriate returns. Though there remains the wish for equity and cohesion among the different groups, the trust required is diminished. All groups feel that they deserve more, they share the mistrust – that government cannot strategically improve the lives of all. Whereas the rich can install security or leave for perceived greener pastures, some among the poor have turned to mobilising around populist and xenophobic programmes. Persistent poverty and inequality demand interventions that ensure greater material benefit. Though movements such as Operation Dudula and RET advance different objectives, their appeal to the man on the street is the same: the status quo does not serve them, it must be disrupted. Furthermore, while it is concerning to see vigilantism and sedition, there is broad proof that the majority of South Africans respect the constitutional norms and values. Though the riots last July were disastrous, they did not spread throughout the country. And when they calmed down, there was an enormous response from South Africans across racial and other divides to condemn these actions and to stand in solidarity with the victims. Further proof can be drawn from the recent municipal elections and especially from the national elections in 2019. The election results show that, unlike some nations around the world, particularly those in Europe, the extreme parties failed to draw significant support. Despite the enormous challenges faced, South African politics appear to mature towards the middle. The threat of splintering towards radical fringe parties has not materialised. As indicated above, social cohesion remains the foundation to a united and prosperous nation. Most South Africans believe this to be true. Though there is significant mistrust among people and in the government, the people in South Africa agree that the country should cohere. It is, however, clear that social cohesion without social justice can only be temporary. While social cohesion might have been foundational to the formation of democratic South Africa, social justice will be foundational to its continued existence. [1] Inclusive Society Institute. 2022. ‘Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa: Results from the Inclusive Society Institute’s 2021 GovDem survey’, Forthcoming [2]Ibid [3] Human Sciences Research Council. 1998. ‘Social Cohesion and Social Justice in South Africa’ [4]Langer, A. et al. 2017. ‘Social Cohesion Index’ [5]SFRI, n.d. ‘What is Social Cohesion?’ [6]Ibid, 1 [7] South African Constitution [8]Ibid [9]Langa, P. 2006, ‘Transformative constitutionalism’, Stellenbosch Law Review 351 at 354 [10] Interim Constitution (n 10) [11]Louw, E. 2004. ‘The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid’, London: Praeger, p94 [12] Kotzé, K. 2018. ‘Strategies of White Resilience: From Apartheid to installing democracy’, African Yearbook of Rhetoric, 8, p55 [13]Chapter 15 of the NDP is titled ‘Nation Building and Social Cohesion’ [14] Kotzé, K. 2019. ‘Cyril Ramaphosa’s strategic presidency’, Defence Strategic Communications, 7 [15]Abrahams, C. 2021. ‘Social Cohesion as Imposition of National Identity’, Lesedi, 24, p25 [16] Abrahams, C. 2016. ‘Twenty Years of Social Cohesion and Nation-Building in South Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 42(1): 95 – 107 [17]Suttner, R. 2011. ‘Revisiting the National Democratic Revolution (NDR): The national question’ [18]Abrahams, Twenty years of Social Cohesion, 107 [19]National Development Plan, p17 [20]Tutu, D. 2000. ‘No Future Without Forgiveness’, p182 [21]Matunhu, J. 2011. ‘Re-visiting the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa’, African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 5(2) [22]Ibid [23]Ibid [24]The term ‘White Monopoly Capital’ has infamously been adopted to pin responsibility for the nation’s ills on white people [25]African National Congress. ‘Umrabulo’, National Policy Conference, July 1997 [26] Kotzé, K. 2021. ‘Jacob Zuma’s treasonous strategy’, Daily Maverick, 12 July [27]Ibid [28]Langer et al. [29]Ibid [30]Inclusive Society Institute. ‘Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa’ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2022 African philosophy and social justice by Dr Mutshidzi Maraganedzha MA Philosophy Ph.D. in philosophy Abstract This paper investigates whether African political thought can embody robust theories of social justice. To assess African thought, I consider two influential African theories of social justice: radical and moderate communitarianism. In evaluating these theories, I use the case of people living with serious cognitive disabilities and that of the environment. The underlying assumption is that a robust political theory must include people living with severe mental disabilities and must include the environment in the political community. In the final analysis, I argue that both theories offer a limited place for people living with serious cognitive disabilities, and that the theories do not have a place for the environment in the political community. Introduction Amongst many, one of the central tasks of political philosophy is to construct accounts of a good or just society, or simply put, social justice[1]. These theoretical constructions of social justice have at least two functions. On the one hand, they specify a set of intuitions and values for the ‘just’ in our conceptualising a just society or the ‘good’ in our envisaging a good society. At this level, the debate is both meta-ethical and normative, as it essentially involves deep assumptions about the language and nature of morality and the kinds of prescriptions that flow from such a moral system (Kymlicka, 1990). If, for example, utilitarians do believe that welfare is at the heart of our moral system, then it should follow that we need socio-political systems that would maximise this value (MacNaughton & Rawling, 1992). On the other hand, these theoretical constructions provide us with a normative standard against which to evaluate our political conditions and realities, to ascertain the extent to which they converge or diverge from the ideal that captures social justice. That is, should our political conditions, if we use welfare as a standard, not be generally characterised by them, then we will be living in a less than just or good society. Much of the philosophical work on social justice has emerged from the global north, where much of what we imagine that counts as just or good in relation to an ideal society is framed in light of what the West imagines it to be. One of the crucial ways to assess if an account of social justice is plausible, is in terms of the scope of its inclusivity. That is, who it accommodates as entitled to be a member of the political community and to the political goods – whether understood as rights, primary goods, or capabilities – due to them. The concern of inclusivity should make a strong intuitive appeal given a vast lived experience of discrimination in politics, which is the hallmark of what theories of social justice aim to avoid, address or redress. For example, most leading Western theories of social justice have been criticised for manifesting one form of unjustified discrimination or another. Kant, and Kantian political thought, has been accused of failing to include those living with serious mental disabilities, and animals from the political community. This exclusion means that the interests of such entities do not count when we distribute important goods for survival or a meaningful existence (Carlson, 2009). John Rawls (1971), famous for his book A Theory of Justice, has been criticised for excluding the disabled from his social contract. His account of a good society excludes those with serious mental disabilities from the political community (Kittay, 2011). Much of Western political thought has also been criticised for failing to include people of colour, women, and the LGBTQ communities in their political models of social justice. Furthermore, many social justice theories have been criticised for failing to include animals and the environment in their scope of whom counts in our political reckoning (Singer, 1978). This paper emerges for two important reasons. Firstly, to contribute to discourses on politics and social justice in light of African thought. By ‘African thought’, I have in mind the literature on African philosophy, and possibly African studies, as the basis for constructing a philosophical conversation about social justice. The reader would surely appreciate that this is an extensive and complex body of work. To facilitate a meaningful philosophical engagement on social justice, I focus on Ifeanyi Menkiti’s and Kwame Gyekye’s theoretical visions of social justice[2]. The literature in African philosophy describes Menkiti’s approach to social justice in terms of radical communitarianism. The central thesis of this theory is that the state’s and citizens’ primary duty is the promotion of the common good (Famanikwa, 2010; Menkiti, 1984; Ikuenobe, 2017a). Gyekye describes his account of social justice in terms of moderate communitarianism. The central thesis here is that the state (and its citizens) has the duty to respect human rights and promote the common good (Gyekye, 1992; Matolino, 2009). In the global literature on philosophy and political theory, radical and moderate communitarianism are largely underexplored as theoretical constructs to imagine good societies beyond the scope of African philosophy. In my view, these two theories promise to add a mostly uncharted African perspective on considerations relating to social justice. Secondly, this paper emerges because these two theories have not been directly evaluated in terms of their inclusiveness as models of social justice, at least directly so. The major focus in relation to radical and moderate communitarianism in the literature has been on whether they can deliver a robust African account of human rights. But many philosophers have often concluded that these two theories are poor instances of accounts of human rights (Matolino, 2009; Metz, 2012a; Oyowe, 2014). A theory needs to be a rights-based one for it to be inclusive in terms of whom it accommodates in the political community (Molefe, 2019). Recently, an attempt has been made to construct these as political theories of needs rather than rights, where basic needs are posited as the basis of African political thought in terms of accounting for social justice (Molefe & Allsobrook, 2021; Hamilton, 2021). The problem with this is that a theory might be needs-based but could still fail to embody a sufficiently inclusive political model. This paper reorients the debate between radical and moderate communitarianism, as accounts of social justice, in the direction of inclusivity. The purpose of the paper is to ascertain if these theories of social justice can shun unjustified discrimination or exclusion of potential members of the political community, particularly those members our intuitions and common sense of justice suggest ought to be included in the political community. For the sake of focus, I use the case of people living with serious mental disabilities and that of the environment as the basis for evaluating the inclusivity of a political theory[3]. The central question that this paper seeks to answer, therefore, is whether radical and moderate communitarianism can accommodate these two cases in its construction of social justice. To evaluate the inclusiveness of radical and moderate communitarianism as accounts of social justice, this paper proceeds as follows. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section explains radical communitarianism as a theory of social justice. The second section extracts an account of inclusivity that can be associated with radical communitarianism and continues to evaluate the plausibility of this account of inclusivity in light of the case of people living with serious mental disabilities and of the environment. The third explains moderate communitarianism as an account of social justice. The final section extracts an account of inclusivity that can be associated with moderate communitarianism and continues to evaluate the plausibility of this account of inclusivity in light of the case of people living with serious mental disabilities and of the environment. Radical Communitarianism as a Theory of Social Justice Radical communitarianism, as a theory of social justice, emerges in the context of giving a proper account of the relationship between the community and the individual in African thought. Menkiti thinks this clarification is important because it gives an African perspective on socio-moral and political imagination. The basic point of departure for Menkiti, in constructing an African theory, in any context, is the centrality of the community, which he captures in terms of ‘I am because we are’ (Mbiti, 1970). The ‘we’ represents the primacy of the community in cultural, moral, and political thought. For example, Menkiti (1984: 172) explains how personal identity, a function of the individual, is “first knowing this community as a stubborn perduring fact of the psychophysical world that the individual also comes to know himself”. It is in relation to and in the context of a community and its collective social resources that the individual can navigate their personal and social identity. Menkiti goes further to assert that subjectivity and/or even agency is ultimately possible because the individual is a direct beneficiary of “a community gene pool” that is responsible for them acquiring a language or the mental abilities required for being a part of and participating in the world through culture (ibid). The importance of community is not limited to the cultural matter of social identity. The importance of the community spans over the moral and political. The moral, according to Menkiti and much of African thought, pivots on the concept of personhood. For Menkiti, it is one thing to be human and quite another to be a person. A human being is required or even expected to be moral, which expectation involves the agent acquiring excellence or virtue – a desirable state of character. Menkiti is unequivocal that personhood is a moral achievement where the agent becomes decorated with moral discernment and wisdom, which works itself out via a consistent display of excellence (Menkiti, 1984: 174). The development of this moral identity of excellence of character and deportment, personhood, is impossible outside and without the assistance of the community. In one place, Menkiti (1984: 172) explains the importance of the community in relation to attaining personhood in this manner: We must also conceive of this organism as going through a long process of social and ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man. And during this long process of attainment, the community plays a vital role as catalyst and as prescriber of norms. In another essay, Menkiti (2004: 326) captures the same sentiment as follows: Since triumph and failure have their consequences, and the consequences cut beyond the life cycle of the assignable individual, affecting others in the community as well, it follows that societies, both large and small, are in need of recognising that they are caught up in an inextricable dance with their component individuals. And one of the ways to act on that recognition is to join the task of transforming the individual into a true person, in other words, a moral being or bearer of norms. Menkiti is very clear that the community plays an important role in ensuring that the individual attains personhood. The community serves as a moral enabler through the provision of moral resources required for the agent to morally succeed. In light of the importance of the community, Menkiti (2004: 324) notes that in African thought “morality demands a point of view best described as one of beingness-with-others”. In the absence of others or positive engagement with others personhood, or moral excellence, is impossible. The importance of the community also emerges in the political domain, which is the sphere of social justice. In this context, Menkiti observes that African thought has its own distinctive way of conceptualising a robust political community. He comments in this fashion in relation to this conception of a community: When Mbiti says that the African says to himself, "I am because we are”, the we referred to here is not an additive 'we' but a thoroughly fused collective 'we'. It is possible to distinguish three senses of human grouping, the first of which I shall call collectivities in the truest sense … what I have called ' collectivities in the truest sense' there is assumed to be an organic dimension to the relationship between the component (1984: 179). The view of a community that Menkiti associates with African thought operates on the assumption that it is natural and necessary for human beings to form and belong to a community. Community is not a mere human convenience or artificial construction that individuals can dispense with as they please, which is consistent with his commitment to communitarianism. Rather, existence essentially requires and is about living in and with others in the community. This appreciation of a community is a deeply ontological one, where a human being is understood essentially in terms of their relationality – I am because we are. This deep relationality is a feature of our human make-up and embodies the political consequences that Menkiti explains in this fashion: African societies tend to be organised around the requirements of duty, while Western societies tend to be organised around the postulation of individual rights. In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their duties (Menkiti, 1984: 180). Human beings are understood naturally to require community – culturally, morally, and politically. Culturally, it is impossible to develop as a human being, in terms of socialisation, outside of the human community (Wiredu, 1996). Morally, it is impossible to achieve virtue outside of the community where one learns, acquires, and practices morality. Politically, a social organisation of the state that prioritises the provision of the common good, which goods are crucial for the achievement of personhood, is at the heart of the radical communitarianism conception of social justice. It is not that rights are not important. The idea seems to be that a normative framework associated with the relational features of human nature – such as generosity, altruism, empathy, and so on – provides a framework that renders rights almost unnecessary, all things being equal. In what follows, I articulate radical communitarianism’s vision of inclusion and proceed to evaluate if it is satisfactory. Evaluation of Radical Communitarianism Radical communitarianism imagines a political community that operates based on dispensing duties in the context of creating an environment for the possibility of achieving personhood. The question remains, however, who forms part of the political community? To be an object of political duties or a member of the political community, Menkiti’s communitarianism posits personhood as a necessary and sufficient condition. All and only those who can participate in personhood are members of the political community. There are two ways one can participate in personhood: directly or indirectly. Direct participation involves actually possessing the requisite capacity to acquire personhood. Indirect participation involves being able to benefit from virtuous acts. Being a member of the political community involves receiving political goods, the so-called common goods, which the agent requires to achieve personhood (Wiredu, 1992; Molefe, 2020). A just society is one that provides these goods and an unjust one denies or deprives individuals of these goods. Typically, the common good is understood in terms of basic needs that the agent requires to develop and exercise their agency. Without the development and exercise of agency, the agent cannot participate in personhood. Menkiti is very clear that it is capacities associated with personhood that grounds membership. He captures the criterion for inclusion in the political community in this fashion: If it is generally conceded, then, that persons are the sort of entities that are owed the duties of justice, it must also be allowed that each time we find an ascription of any of the various rights implied by these duties of justice, the conclusion naturally follows that the possessor of the rights in question cannot be other than a person. That is so because the basis of such rights ascription has now been made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense, a capacity, which though it need not be realised, is nonetheless made most evident by a concrete exercise of duties of justice towards others in the ongoing relationships of everyday life. Here, Menkiti limits the scope of those we owe justice to, to persons. By ‘persons’, Menkiti is not merely referring to human beings, he is using this notion technically to refer to those individuals that can be objects of justice. These are the kinds of individuals we can think of ourselves as owing rights to, if we were to use the language of rights as Menkiti does. Menkiti is very clear that for one to be a member of the political community one must have the capacity for moral sense. It is the capacity, not its realisation, which is the basis for one to count as a member of the political community. Why the capacity for moral sense? It is the basis for inclusion because it makes it possible for the agent to pursue the goal prescribed by the African thought of personhood. The idea of the capacity for moral sense refers to all those psychological and agential abilities required and associated with the task of participating or attaining personhood (Ikuenobe, 2017). In this light, we observe that any entity which has the capacity for moral sense is a member of the political community. As members of the political community, we have duties to relate positively with and empower these entities in their journey towards personhood. To further clarify and justify that Menkiti connects the idea of the capacity for moral sense with the acquisition of personhood, notice how he theoretically relates animals with the political community. After clarifying the basis for political membership in terms of the capacity for moral sense, he makes the following comment: “The foregoing interpretation would incidentally rule out, I believe, some dangerous tendencies currently fashionable in some philosophical circles of ascribing rights to animals” (Menkiti, 1984: 177). Animals are excluded from the moral community because they cannot acquire personhood. Animals cannot acquire personhood because they do not have the capacity for moral sense. Alternatively, as Menkiti explains it, “The danger as I see it is that such an extension of moral language to the domain of animals is bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person” (ibid). Here we are confronted by two senses of personhood, which are intertwined. One sense underlies the capacity for moral sense, which is a criterion for political membership, and the other sense refers to the consequence of the positive use of the capacity for moral sense to achieve virtue. Animals lack both senses of personhood because they do not have the requisite moral capacities and, therefore, cannot develop them to reach desired moral qualities or virtue; hence, they are outside of the political community. Considering the above, we notice that Menkiti defends a personhood-based account of political membership. Those that cannot participate in personhood are excluded from the political community. One candidate that is excluded from the community is animals. In Menkiti’s view, since animals cannot participate in personhood, they are outside of political concern. The question that might arise here in relation to animals is whether this means that Menkiti would be comfortable with animal cruelty. It would seem that Menkiti might have the resources to theoretically argue against cruelty towards animals. His defence, I suspect, might revolve around the idea of personhood, which embodies a complex of virtues such as kindness, generosity, love, friendliness, and so on. The idea of personhood surely ought then to be opposed to animal cruelty, as cruelty itself is a vice that is inimical and not compatible with the idea of personhood. Though animals do not directly have membership in the political community, this does make provision for them, in that those in pursuit or possession of personhood may not be cruel towards animals. It is contrary to personhood to exercise the vice of cruelty towards any sentient being and such emotional and moral insensitivity ought to be shunned. The question that follows might be about the environment in general. Can Menkiti’s theory of social justice consider the environment as part of the political community? It would seem that in Menkiti’s view the environment cannot be a member of the political community, or we cannot conceive of it as an object of justice. Does this mean that radical communitarianism implies that we have no duties to protect and preserve the environment from degradation and unnecessary damage? Theoretically, radical communitarianism might not have the resources to explain our duties towards the environment. The environment obviously lacks the capacity for moral sense. The environment cannot suffer and, therefore, we cannot speak meaningfully about being cruel towards much of it except, at least, towards animals. At best, the environment can be protected for reasons associated with creating conditions conducive to the possibility of personhood. After reaching that threshold, radical communitarianism might not have a basis to forbid environmental degradation. What about in the case of those living with serious mental disabilities? Do they have a place in the political community? If personhood is the standard of inclusion, it is difficult to see how Menkiti’s theory might include them. The reason being that individuals with serious mental disabilities often do not have the capacity for moral sense or the capacity for agency, and therefore cannot directly participate in personhood. In view of this, they cannot be considered members of the political community. If this is the case, then it means we do not have duties towards them. Menkiti might want to include them on the basis that we have duties not to be cruel to any sentient being, and on those grounds consider them to be indirect beneficiaries of our political systems – though I am not sure that that is a satisfactory way to accommodate those with serious cognitive disabilities. The next section considers moderate communitarianism. Moderate Communitarianism as a Theory of Social Justice Moderate communitarianism emerges as a critical response to the supposed inadequacies associated with radical communitarianism (Gyekye, 1992). The charge against radical communitarianism can be expressed in terms of the place of human rights. An account of communitarianism that fails to appreciate the relevance and primacy of rights is flawed in two important ways. On the one hand, it operates with the wrong view that the community may not pose a danger or threat to individual autonomy, self-expression, creativity, and difference. In other words, the valorisation of the community, on the part of Gyekye, may imagine a political order compatible with violating human dignity. A plausible conception of communitarianism must reckon with this individualistic aspect of human existence. The individualistic aspect requires us to recognise the individual, the agent, in their own right with all their abilities, uniqueness, creativity, and so on (Gyekye, 1997). On the other hand, it is flawed as far as it considers rights secondary. A robust political theory, according to Gyekye, ought to reckon with the indispensable and foundational status of human rights. In Gyekye’s view, rights serve as a crucial protective political instrument that any robust political scheme ought to have. According to Gyekye (1984), radical communitarianism gets it wrong by relying on an erroneous conception of human nature, which portrays the individual as entirely constituted by communal relations. Remember, Menkiti (1984) draws a distinction between a minimalistic and maximalistic conception of human nature, and he prefers the latter. The former focuses on the psychological features of the self as crucial for thinking about personal identity, morality, and politics. It is the mere possession of some psychological property, be it memory, consciousness, or even rationality, as the basis for personal identity, morality, and politics. Whereas the latter requires more than possession; it requires the actual exercise of these properties as the basis for personhood (Ikuenobe, 2017). The problem with the maximalist approach, according to Gyekye, is that it fails to appreciate the individual and the attributes possessed by individuals, such as autonomy, volition, and so on as the basis for their valuable state, morally speaking. When we reckon with the individualistic features alongside the communal ones, what Gyekye (1992: 127) calls the “dual features” of human nature, we are now approximating a robust political system. The individualistic features, specifically the human capacity for autonomy, serve as the basis for human dignity (Gyekye, 1997). Human beings are bearers of inherent worth because they possess the capacity for autonomy. This capacity explains why human beings can be unique, assert themselves, set their own ends, be creative, and so on, which abilities and expressions are important for a robust sense of self. Gyekye also recognises and endorses communalistic features of human existence, though does not want to exaggerate their importance. Gyekye is well aware that individuals require the community in order to develop and use their abilities. Equally, the community requires the autonomy of individuals to amend and revise some of its problematic aspects – it requires the agency and creativity of individuals to continuously create a thriving culture, industries, and generally appreciable conditions of existence. The approach is moderate as it finds a place for individuality through autonomy, and community through membership and sharing in the communal contributions towards the common good. Moderate communitarianism embodies a dualistic theory of social justice. It is firstly a political theory that appreciates the primacy of human dignity, which human beings possess because they have the capacity for autonomy. It is in virtue of possessing human dignity that individual human beings have human rights. Hence, Gyekye (1992: 121) opines, “A person (human being) … must be held as of intrinsic value, an end in himself, worthy of dignity and respect”. He understands a human being to be a bearer of intrinsic value. Human rights are essential and indispensable because they are a function of an important feature of human nature: autonomy. Gyekye proposes to ground the “conception of human dignity and, hence, individual rights … on the qualities that will dispose of the human being to function at his best in human society and realise his full potentialities as a person”. The denial or refusal of rights, which are grounded on the human quality for autonomy, thwarts the human individual from realising their full potential in society. These rights, I suspect, serve as a political instrument to protect the individual – their freedom, creativity, and personal goals – from the overreach of the community. The second aspect of moderate communitarianism revolves around the common good. According to Gyekye (1992: 116), the common good embodies the state’s and citizens’ duty to create “the social conditions which will enable each individual person to function satisfactorily in a human society”. These conditions encompass largely the macro-ethical value of duty and/or responsibility that the state has, to ensure the provision of the minimum conditions of well-being that will enable each agent to live satisfactorily. The common good embodies the requirement for things like public health, subsistence, and education without which individuals would be left in less than decent conditions for a meaningful existence (Chimakonam, 2019). Gyekye (2010) captures the ethical orientation associated with the common good in this fashion: The ethical values of compassion, solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, interdependence, and social well-being, which are counted among the principles of the communitarian morality, primarily impose duties on the individual with respect to the community and its members. He imagines a state whose institutions and citizens operate on these communitarian values, with the goal to create decent conditions for human beings to thrive. Roughly, we can summarise moderate communitarianism as requiring rights as instruments to ensure that human beings’ inalienable value is protected from harm and interference. Moderate communitarianism also requires the state to ensure the provision of social conditions that are necessary for human beings’ to excel in the cultural and moral domains. A just social order is one that is compatible with human dignity and provides the social conditions for the development and expression of human dignity, whereas an unjust social order is one that undermines human dignity and/or fails to provide a reasonable threshold of social conditions for a satisfactory existence. Evaluation of Moderate Communitarianism Considering the above sketch of moderate communitarianism, the question is: Who, according to moderate communitarianism, counts as a member of a political community? It appears that moderate communitarianism comes across as a stubbornly humanistic political theory. A humanistic political theory is one, at least in the context of moderate communitarianism, “that is preoccupied with human welfare” (Gyekye, 2010). Morality and politics, in a humanistic orientation, revolve around the human good, which is measured relative to human dignity and the common good. The conclusion is inescapable; political membership is open only to human beings because they possess dual features, i.e., they have dignity and belong to a community. Only those with these capacities can be included in the political community. We might start our evaluation by considering what place people living with serious mental disabilities have in the political community. To answer this question, we must ask another: whether people living with serious mental disabilities have the dual features of autonomy and communal abilities. In relation to autonomy, it occurs to me that people living with serious mental disabilities lack the feature that is central to a person organising their entire existence around certain ideals and plans in pursuit of a certain project. In terms of the first component for inclusion, it appears that people with serious mental disabilities do not meet the threshold. In terms of community, which involves creating conditions for the general welfare of everyone, there might be a basis to include them. Though people with serious mental disabilities in many cases may not be able to contribute to the common good, they can still benefit from it. The mere ability to benefit from general conditions of welfare might be sufficient to include those with serious mental disabilities in the political community. Surely, even though such an inclusion might not have the full-scale benefits of those that possess the dual feature, the partial possession of one of the dual features must count for something, no matter how limited. At the very least, the idea seems to be that we have some duty, although limited, towards those with serious cognitive disabilities. In relation to the environment, it seems that moderate communitarianism does not consider it to have a place in the political community. In other words, given the humanistic orientation of this political theory, it is difficult to imagine how it can accommodate much of nature in the political community. In fact, so extreme are the implications of this political theory that it seems to entail the exclusion of animals altogether from the moral community. The unmitigated humanism associated with moderate communitarianism explains why it seems to exclude animals and the environment in general from the political community. In other words, moderate communitarianism does not appear to have theoretical resources that might help the world in its quest to address climate and environmental challenges. Conclusion The paper explored the question of political inclusion in light of African political thought. The paper looked at people living with serious mental disabilities, and the environment, to evaluate the plausibility of radical and moderate communitarianism. In relation to radical communitarianism, its personhood criterion offers a partial consideration of people living with cognitive disabilities, but it excludes animals and the environment at large from the political community. Moderate communitarianism appeals to the features of dignity and community as the basis for inclusion. We noticed that it only offers a partial inclusion of people living with serious cognitive disabilities, because these people possess only the feature of the community as far as they can be beneficiaries of it. The major takeaway from the above analysis of African political theories of justice is that they need to incorporate thought on how values associated with personhood, dignity, and community can be interpreted in ways that imagine inclusive polities, where we can have a stronger basis to protect people living with serious cognitive disabilities and protect the environment, amongst others. References Carlson, L., 2009. Philosophers of Intellectual Disability: A Taxonomy. Metaphilosophy, 40: 552–566. Famanikwa, J. 2010. How Moderate is Kwame Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism? Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, 2: 65–77. Gyekye, K., & Wiredu, K. 1992 (ed). Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1. Washington DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. 2010. African Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Online] Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/ [accessed: 15 September 2021]. Hamilton, L. 2021. Needs, Representation and Institutional Change in Africa. In Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, edited by M. Molefe & C. Allsobrook, 169–181. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Ikuenobe, P. 2017. The Communal Basis for Moral Dignity: An African Perspective. Philosophical Papers, 45: 437–469. Kymlicka, W. 1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Matolino, B. 2009. Radicals versus Moderates: A Critique of Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy, 28 (2): 160–170. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Mbiti, J. 1970. African Religions and Philosophy. New York, NY: Doubleday. McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. 1992. Honoring and promoting values. Ethics, 102: 835–843. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, edited by R. Wright, 171–181. Lanham: University Press of America. Menkiti, I. 2004. On the Normative Conception of a Person. In Companion to African Philosophy, edited by K. Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Molefe, M. 2019. An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M., & Allsobrook, C. 2021. Introduction to African Political Theory of Needs. In Towards an African Political Philosophy of Needs, edited by M. Molefe, & C. Allsobrook. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Nussbaum, M. 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Oyowe, A. 2014. An African Conception of Human Rights? Comments on the Challenges of Relativism. Human Rights Review, 15: 329–347. Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wiredu, K. 1992. Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, edited by K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wiredu, K. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. [1]This paper benefitted from extensive analysis and comments from the editor and an anonymous reviewer. I have to the best of my abilities engaged their suggestions and comments. [2] I focus on this literature because it is the most influential moral and political debate on social justice, human rights, needs and duties in the tradition of African philosophy. Given this debate’s historical and contemporary influence on African thought, it makes it an obvious choice as the basis for political reflection on the problems associated with discrimination and exclusion. [3] I use these two cases because they are largely under-theorised in the African context. If there is a growing awareness that we have duties towards people living with serious mental disabilities and towards the environment, then these two cases offer a useful heuristic device to assess political theories. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the zoom debate: Anti-Migrant Sentiment in South Africa. Hosted by the friends of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung on Thursday, July 28th. Ms Melanie Lue, our researcher on Xenophobia attended the debate. The panellists were Mr Tawanda Matema, Project Manager, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Ms Busi Ntini, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, South African Council of Churches and Ms Lily Hlope, Project Manager, The Democracy Development Program (DDP) Migration Project. Presenters shared work they were doing with immigrant communities. A key focus of discussion was on stereo types and bias of communities towards foreigners.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. Author: Percept Actuaries and Consultants Editor: Daryl Swanepoel JULY 2022 Content List of figures List of tables List of information boxes Acronyms and abbreviations 1. Introduction 1.1 The relationship between population growth and inequality 1.2 Demography and inequality in South Africa 1.3 Core principles of this report 2. Demographic change in South Africa 2.1 The ‘demographic transition’ 2.2 Where is South Africa in the demographic transition? 2.3 Why are we not realising the demographic dividend? 2.3.1 Unemployment 2.3.2 Educational attainment 2.3.3 Intergenerational wealth transfer and social mobility 3. Policy scenarios for realising the demographic dividend 3.1 Elevating women 3.1.1 Policy strategies to elevate women 3.2 Taking care of the elderly 3.2.1 A picture of South Africa’s elderly population 3.2.2 Leveraging the longevity dividend 3.3 Investing in people-centred, high-quality universal health coverage 3.3.1 The demographic impacts of Anti-Retroviral Therapy 3.3.2 Health interventions to tackle inequality and harness population dynamics 4. Conclusion References Appendices List of Figures Figure 1: Population pyramids for South Africa showing demographic transition Figure 2: Stages of demographic transition in Sweden, 1750-2010 Figure 3: South Africa’s age dependency ratios, 1960-2020 Figure 4: South Africa’s demographic transition, 1960-2050 Figure 5: Young, working-age, and elderly population share for South Africa, 1960-2050 Figure 6: South African unemployment rates, 1991-2021 Figure 7: Changes in working-age population compared to total employment in South Africa Figure 8: Average earnings by age and level of education completed (five -year moving average) Figure 9: The Great Gatsby Curve for a set of developed and developing countries Figure 10: Education consumption by race, 2015 Figure 11: Health consumption by race, 2015 Figure 12: Private net transfers by race, 2015 Figure 13: Gender Inequality and Income Distribution as estimated by Gonzales et al. (2015) Figure 14: Policies which support women and leverage the demographic dividend Figure 15: Life expectancy of South Africans from 1985 to 2020 Figure 16: Roll-out of Anti-Retroviral Therapy in South Africa from 1985 to 2020 Figure 17: Number of new HIV infections compared to deaths in South Africa from 1985 to 2020 Figure 18: Trends in the under-five mortality rate in South Africa Figure 19: Components of the lifecycle deficit by race, 2015 Figure 20: Private versus public transfers by race, 2015 List of Tables Table 1: Comparison of dependency ratios, 2020 Table 2: Estimated shifts in South African inequality measures with improved GII score List of Information Boxes Info Box 1: What is demographic transition? Info Box 2: Measuring inequalities in intergenerational transfers between racial groups Info Box 3: Quantifying the impact of empowering women Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Introduction South Africa is widely regarded as the most unequal country in the world, ranking at the top of the global Gini index.[1] More than half of the nation’s income is concentrated among the richest 10% of the population, while the poorest 40% share just 7.2% of the country’s wealth.[2] Over the past 30 years, South Africa has seen significant gains in access to education, healthcare and social security, and a dramatic recovery in life expectancy following the public roll-out of HIV/AIDS treatment.[2] However, profound structural inequality has meant that the impact of these gains is not evenly distributed: far too few South Africans have realised the promise of democracy. Instead, distributions of power and privilege continue to trace and reproduce centuries-old fault lines of gender, race, and geography – trapping millions of South Africa’s poor in cycles of multi-dimensional, intergenerational poverty. The fact that South Africa’s population growth has outpaced projections in the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) might, for some, suggest an added challenge to reducing inequality and achieving the country’s development goals. This report explores and complicates the relationship between South Africa’s inequality and its demography. It outlines the nature, drivers, and implications of the country’s demographic change, and then suggests a range of policy options for how we might harness population dynamics for greater equality. The report’s overarching argument is that while understanding, and paying attention to, population dynamics is critical for South Africa’s development planning, we cannot rely on demography alone to shift inequality. Although slowed population growth might seem to have a common-sense and immediate relationship with improved equality, particularly in Africa, the reality is a lot more complex. Instead, the flourishing, wellbeing, and prosperity of a country’s people hinge in large part on the shape (and not just the size) of their population, their intergenerational dynamics, and most especially, investment in their human capital. 1.1 The relationship between population growth and inequality In a 2017 paper on income inequality trends, Ayodele Odusola and his co-authors summarise the channels through which changes in population growth impact income inequality[3]: Fertility rate: declining fertility rates increase women’s labour market participation, improving their incomes and reducing both income and gender inequality.[4] Smaller families are also often able to invest more in the education of their children, which enhances human capital accumulation in the next generation, allowing them to earn higher incomes and thus reducing inequality.[3] As such, the positive effects of declining fertility hinge on quality jobs for women, and expanded access to early education, healthcare and nutrition. Dependency ratio: although declining fertility is often associated with the alleviation of inequality, the relationship between slowed population growth and reduced inequality is not straightforward. Indeed, declining fertility rates can also be associated with an ageing population, and thus higher old-age dependency ratios, which, in turn, can exacerbate inequality.[5] So, the gains of slowed population growth depend on whether the health, wellbeing and contribution of older persons is supported. Share of the working age population: an increase in the share of the working-age population is associated with improvements in per capita income, household income, and national output,[3] all of which are expected to reduce overall inequality. However, this is assuming that a growing working-age population translates into more people being gainfully employed. Reduced mortality in adults and children[6]: lower child mortality rates often reduce the incentive to have large families, and enables families to invest more resources in their children’s education.[6] Meanwhile, lower adult mortality rates, improve overall labour productivity, supporting economic prosperity.[3] While extended longevity might increase the older-age dependency ratio, it also means increased returns on human capital investment over a lifetime,[6] complicating the effects on inequality. In other words, there is robust evidence that we cannot rely on demography alone to shift inequality. 1.2 Demography and inequality in South Africa Understandings of the relationship between population dynamics and human development in South Africa have been significantly shaped by neo-Malthusians, who dominated the discourse on population and development in the 1960s and 70s, and whose views are again gaining traction amid the climate crisis.[7] Traditionally, neo-Malthusians have warned about the negative impacts of population growth on poverty, arguing that expanding populations inevitably put pressure on natural and national resources. Many have called for proactive population control, including highly coercive birth control practices targeted particularly at the poor.[8] When South Africa’s state-sponsored family planning programme was instituted in 1974, it too was widely interpreted as a strategy by the apartheid state to curb Black population growth.[8] By the early 1990s, a more nuanced consensus on demography and development was gaining traction. Moving away from alarmist neo-Malthusian discourse, the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development emphasised the socio-economic structures that drive both fertility and poverty.[7] Since Cairo, global policy has sought a more inclusive approach to population dynamics, promoting reproductive rights, empowering women, and advancing maternal and child health.[7] In contemporary South Africa, questions about population dynamics often sit uncomfortably with justice and rights-based approaches to combat poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, the country is presently undergoing several complex and intersecting demographic shifts, each of which is entangled with the past, present and future of South African inequality: In contrast to wider trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa’s population growth is slowing along with a steady decline in fertility: total fertility has more than halved since the 1980s.[9] Despite the fact that fertility rates have been slowing for nearly a century, poverty, unemployment, and inequality in South Africa have continued to deepen, suggesting a much more complex relationship between fertility and development than Malthusians might argue. Declining overall fertility has meant that the proportion of the population that is of working-age is growing. This is anticipated to offset inequality by driving economic growth and reducing dependency ratios. Yet this is by no means a given: realising the advantages of South Africa’s demographic dividend will hinge on the extent of investment in the children and young people that are forming, or will in future form, this working age population. A dividend is a type of gain one receives when one invests; the so-called “youth dividend” is no different. Improved longevity has produced a growing elderly population in South Africa. Older people (particularly women) are frequently household lynchpins, providing essential care to children and grandchildren, and in many instances, serving as primary breadwinners (through their pensions). Their care contribution can offer a critical safety net to South Africa’s poorest, thereby alleviating inequality. However, if the elderly themselves are not cared-for through quality healthcare and social support, this benefit will not be realised and households with elderly dependents may find themselves worse-off. South Africa is urbanising rapidly, with nearly two-thirds of the population already living in towns and cities. This proportion is expected to increase to 77% by 2050.[10] Urbanisation can be a boon for development, improving access to schooling, healthcare, and higher wages. However, it can also expose populations to pollution, heat-stress (as a result of building materials holding heat), violence, and overcrowding. More so, urbanisation and urban-focused development can widen the gap between rural and urban livelihoods, thereby deepening inequality. In South Africa, many households are ‘stretched’ across urban and rural locations, with children and youth most likely to move between them. This complicates how we think about the relationship between urbanisation and inequality, and indeed how we classify households. Children remain less urbanised than adults and many grow up without a co-resident parent. Central to the relationship between demography and inequality in South Africa (and elsewhere) is the question of generations, i.e. how inequality is reproduced or undone across and between generations. South Africa has low levels of intergenerational mobility, which means that the livelihood prospects of the country’s children are all-too-often tied to those of their parents. Yet it is possible that key interventions at critical life points could change the path, not only for that generation, but for all those with touchpoints to that person, as well as all future generations. 1.3 Core principles of this report Demographic variables like fertility, mortality and migration are closely connected to how socio-economic vulnerability, and indeed the benefits of economic growth, are distributed. As such, this report articulates a bi-directional relationship between inequality and demography. Demography is not destiny. Instead, demographic processes are mutually constituted by social, economic, and political processes to shape the nature of global and local inequality. Justice-oriented policies can help address or harness population dynamics. The Gini Coefficient is useful but limited, given its exclusive focus on income inequality. Adopting a wider scope that includes access to quality nutrition, health services, housing, education, water, and caring networks within the frame of inequity can offer us a better sense of its real effects on human life and flourishing, whilst still recognising the centrality of money, especially in circumstances where public services and infrastructure do not function well. Understanding the relationship between demography and inequality demands that we not only pay attention to population quantity (i.e. its size and shape), but also to quality of life and human potential, i.e. to what extent is said population able to participate in social, civic, and economic activity? Realising the benefits of certain population dynamics, like a youth dividend for example, hinges on these questions of ‘quality’. Indeed, a growing youth dividend (that is, a large, young working-age population) can become a significant risk to social stability if the potential and wellbeing of young people are not adequately invested in. Seeing this requires a more holistic view of a person rather than simply looking at headcounts of people in different parts of the population – the term “demography” needs to be viewed with this depth. While we can observe, analyse, and model trends in population dynamics, our ability to predict future population trends is limited by the complexity of factors shaping demographic change, unanticipated shocks (like new epidemics, recessions, or natural disasters), and the possibility of powerful policy interventions. The public-sector rollout of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) in South Africa, for example, had an astounding impact on longevity, saving and extending millions of lives. At the time, many doubted South Africa’s ability to implement ART at the necessary speed and scale and questioned the level of uptake and adherence to medication they would be able to achieve. The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the speed, shape, and implications of South Africa’s ‘demographic transition’, relative to other countries. It highlights stubborn, structural drivers of inequality that, despite demographic change, have limited our ability to reap so-called ‘demographic dividends’. In Section 3, we explore three policy scenarios through which South Africa might better harness its population dynamics to alleviate inequality. A summary of findings and recommendations is provided in the Conclusion (Section 4). 2. Demographic change in South Africa As of the most recent mid-year population estimates for 2021, South Africa’s population is currently estimated to be around 60.1 million people.[11] This is almost 1.6 million higher than the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP)’s – somewhat ambitious –projections for 2030.[12] In a more conservative projection, The 2019 United Nations World Population Prospectus estimated that South Africa’s population would be closer to 66 million by 2030.13 How should we read these demographic changes? 2.1 The ‘demographic transition’ South Africa is currently undergoing a (much awaited) ‘demographic transition’. As fertility rates decline and life is extended, the ratio of working-age people to ‘dependents’ is shifting, producing a swell in the economically productive youth population and associated hopes for an economic boom. Already 34% of the population are between the ages of 14 and 34 years,[14] with the dependency ratio set to drop by a further 14% by 2050.[13] This is often described as a demographic or youth ‘dividend’. South Africa’s demographic transition is illustrated in the three population pyramids shown below in Figure 1.[15] Lower fertility rates are depicted by the shrinking of the base of the pyramid (the under-15 population) and the widening of the middle of the pyramid (the working-age population aged 15 to 65).[16,17] Figure 1: Population pyramids for South Africa showing demographic transition South Africa is currently experiencing a bulge in its working-age population and can expect to see growing elderly and shrinking child populations as it approaches 2050. Source: PopulationPyramid.net, 2021 Growth in the country’s working-age population relative to the dependent population can be leveraged to generate improved economic productivity, incomes, and social welfare.[16,17] These benefits, which accrue from the dynamics of the demographic transition, are defined as the ‘demographic dividend’, which is estimated to last approximately 50 years.[16] South Africa’s population pyramids (above) show that some of these dynamics are at play in South Africa. Over the last 30 years, the share of young children has declined, and the working-age and elderly population share has grown, resulting in a narrowing of the population pyramid which is projected to continue over the next 30 years and beyond. Figure 3 (next page) shows how this translates in terms of dependency ratios. The Age Dependency Ratio (ADR), indicated by the blue line, is the proportion of the dependent population – those under the age of 14 and over 65, to the working-age population – those aged between 15 and 64.[20] The higher the ADR, the higher the level of dependency on the working-age population. The ADR gives us a sense of the age structure of our population and can help with informing how policies and services need to account for a relatively young or older population. Figure 3: South Africa’s age dependency ratios, 1960-2020 South Africa’s age dependency ratio is steadily declining, driven largely by a decrease in the youth dependency ratio. Source: The World Bank, 2022 South Africa’s ADR is estimated to be 52.2%,[21] which means that for every 100 economically active (working-age) South Africans, there are on average 52.2 people that are economically dependent on them. The Youth Dependency Ratio (YDR), indicated by the red line in Figure 3, is the percentage of people 14 years of age or younger that are dependent on the working-age population, and the Old-Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) is the percentage of people aged 65 years and older that are dependent on the economically active population.[20] In 2020, the YDR was 43.8% and the OADR was 8.4% for South Africa.22,23 The country’s ADR has been declining since the late 1960s and this decline has been largely driven by the declining YDR. Meanwhile, the country’s OADR has been increasing steadily since the early 1980s, linked to improved longevity. It declined slightly in the early 2000s but has continued to steadily increase again since 2007. In addition to impacting OADRs, population ageing has also been shown to increase income inequality due to its impact on labour supply.[24] It is theorised that since population ageing leads to a larger share of elderly people and a decline in labour supply, this results in reduced labour productivity overall and thus lower national income.[24](See Luo et al. (2018) “Aging and inequality: The link and transmission mechanisms” for a detailed decomposition of the transmission mechanism) However, this is not yet a major concern for South Africa, because despite the ageing of the country’s population, the decline in the fertility rate has not yet resulted in a decline in labour supply. Table 1 provides a comparison of South Africa to other countries in the African region, as well as to higher-income countries and regions. South Africa’s ADR is more similar to that of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as opposed to other countries in East and Southern Africa (ESA). However, due to South Africa’s relatively young population compared to that of OECD countries, the split between ADR, YDR and OADR is more similar to other countries in the region.[22,23,25] Japan and Uganda are highlighted separately in this table to indicate the stark difference between the dependency ratios of an ageing country, such as Japan, compared to a youthful country like Uganda. Table 1: Comparison of dependency ratios, 2020 South Africa’s age dependency is significantly lower than others in the East and Southern African region. Source: The World Bank, 2022 Given what has been described above and in Box 1, population growth – which could be driven by increased longevity – is not necessarily a problem in and of itself, but rather a natural process of demographic transition, where the second and third stages of this transition are characterised by rapid population growth. This implies that it is not the size of the population that is most important for realising equality, but rather its shape. Whether population growth bears positive economic dividends is predicated on whether the shape and composition of the population changes favours more working-age people relative to dependents (children under 15 and the elderly over 64 years), and whether people in this working-age population can find meaningful employment. 2.2 Where is South Africa in the demographic transition? Figure 4 shows the total population size, crude birth and death rate trends, and projections for South Africa from 1960 to 2050.[26] The graph shows that South African birth and death rates have shown a declining trend since 1960. The crude birth rate has fallen by more than half from 41.1 live births per 1,000 people in 1960 to 19.8 in 2020, and is projected to almost half again to 10.6 by 2050.26 South Africa’s death rate per 1,000 people fell consistently from 17.4 to 8.04 from 1960 to 1991, after which it began to rise again due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and peaked at 13.99 deaths per 1,000 people in 2005.[26] Due to the widespread roll out of Anti-Retroviral Therapy for people living with HIV, the death rate has since continued to fall since then and is projected to continue to do so until 2025.[26] The country’s population is projected to continue to increase to over 75.5 million people by 2050.[26] Figure 4: South Africa’s demographic transition, 1960-2050 While South Africa’s population continues to grow (perhaps faster than anticipated), both birth and death rates are steadily declining. Source: The World Bank, 2022 In a 2017 paper, demographer Tom Moultrie argues that South Africa’s demographic transition is almost complete, yet the “youth bulge” which the demographic dividend requires to deliver economic growth has not materialised.[27] According to a narrower definition of the demographic dividend put forward by the United Nations (UN), the window to reap the benefits of a demographic dividend opens when the dependent population aged 0-14 falls below 30% and before the elderly dependent population aged 65 and older is above 15% of the total population.[27] Figure 5 shows that South Africa’s youth dependent population fell below 30% in 2009 and the elderly dependent population will not have crossed the 15% threshold by 2050. Figure 5: Young, working-age, and elderly population share for South Africa, 1960-2050 South Africa’s demographic change is being driven by a declining child population and a growing elderly population. Source: The World Bank, 2022 However, Moultrie (2017) argues that, despite this, South Africa’s fertility decline has been slow, meaning that the rate at which the structure of the country’s population has changed has not created the required “youth bulge”, since the population under 15 years is still relatively large.[27] The high death rates during the height of the country’s HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1990s and early 2000s also greatly reduced the number of people in the working-age population.[27] These factors, Moultrie argues, have meant that this “youth bulge” is unlikely to materialise for South Africa and that the opportunity to capture the first demographic dividend has already passed, making the second dividend all the more unlikely.[27] It should be noted that the economic benefits of a demographic dividend have not been observed in all countries.[27] In fact, East Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand experience demographic transition between 1960 and 2015, along with high rates of economic growth.[17]) and Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela also went through demographic transitions between 1960 and 2015, but their growth rates were not as strong as the above mentioned Asian countries.[17]) seem to be the only regions where the two demographic dividends have materialised in observable positive effects on GDP per capita for developing countries.[17,27] They have not materialised in the rest of Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, or the transitional economies of Eastern Europe.[27] In sub-Saharan Africa, the first demographic dividend has been negative and the second has been marginally positive.[27] This is because, as Moultrie puts it, “the benefits of the demographic dividend do not mechanically translate into economic benefit.” Rather, they depend very much on health, education, social, and economic policies that precipitate and leverage changes in the country’s population structure.[27] Comparing ADRs for South Africa and other Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) – as we did in Table 1 – illustrates the importance of the relationship of the young and working-age population in leveraging the demographic dividend. The bulk of South Africa’s dependent population are young people that will eventually graduate into the working-age population. To fully reap the demographic dividend, this young population needs to be adequately equipped with the tools to maximise their productive potential. These tools include human capital in the form of education which boosts their productivity, and jobs which are well matched to these skills. 2.3 Why are we not realising the demographic dividend? “Although statistically South Africa is in a position to cash in on a demographic dividend, the challenges of joblessness and HIV/AIDS are a burden on those who are working. If not managed, the perfect window could become the perfect storm.” Source: South African National Planning Commission (NPC), 2012 As described in Box 1, one of the necessary conditions for realising the demographic dividend is that there must be sufficient livelihood opportunities for the larger working-age population; this is essential to increase household and national incomes, and to further invest in the education of the (smaller) cohort of children. 2.3.1 Unemployment Figure 6 shows that South Africa’s unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high for decades[17,28–31] and, due to weak economic growth,[32] the economy has struggled to create enough jobs to absorb the number of young people entering the labour market every year. This graph also shows that people with lower skills find it more challenging to find work than their higher-skilled peers; the unemployment rate for those with only basic education is 35.5% compared to those with advanced education at 14.7%. However, South Africa’s unemployment rate overall has been trending upward since 2008, and more recent estimates for the fourth quarter of 2021 place it at 35.3%.[33] This translates to 7.9 million people under the official definition of unemployment, but according to the expanded definition, 12.5 million South Africans of working age (46.6%) are unemployed.[33] Figure 6: South African unemployment rates, 1991-2021 Between 2007 and 2019, the working-age population increased by 6.5 million (This number is calculated by subtracting the total number of people who left the working-age cohort (those aged 65 or older) between 2007 and 2019 from the total number of people who entered the working-age cohort (those aged 15 to 64).), while the number of people employed increased by just under 2 million.34 Source: The World Bank, 2021 & 2022 The South African economy has also struggled to create jobs. Figure 7 below compares the changes in the working-age cohort to the changes in total employment. The solid blue line shows that the working-age population has been increasing, with on average 600,000 people added to this cohort annually between 1990 and 2021. However, it is increasing at a lower and lower rate each year; this rate is shown by the grey dashed line which has declined from 3.4% growth in the working-age cohort in 1993 to 1.4% growth in 2021.[26] This decline in growth is projected to continue to the furthest projection of 0.3% in 2050.[26] This is in line with declining fertility rates, and increasing life expectancy, therefore fewer people are being added to this cohort over time relative to the people that are living past the age of retirement and graduating out of this cohort. The solid green line in Figure 7 represents the year-on-year increase or decrease in the total number of people employed and the dashed blue line reflects what this means in terms of the percentage year on year change in total employment. Statistics South Africa’s (Stats SA) quarterly employment statistics from 2007 to 2019 show that the number of people employed increased by just under 2 million (from 8.2 to 10.2 million),[34] however the working-age population increased by 6.5 million (This number is calculated by subtracting the total number of people who left the working-age cohort (those aged 65 or older) between 2007 and 2019 from the total number of people who entered the working-age cohort (those aged 15 to 64).) over the same period.[26] It should also be noted that during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced economic downturn, 594,000 jobs were lost in 2020, as shown by the sharp drop in the number of net annual change in employment in Figure 7.[33] Figure 7: Changes in working-age population compared to total employment in South Africa The South African economy has not been able to create enough jobs to keep up with the growing working-age population. The number of people employed increased by just under 2 million between 2007 and 2019, but the working-age population increased by 6.5 million over the same period. Source: Stats SA, 2008-2022. Quarterly employment statistics; The World Bank, 2022 Although it should be noted that South Africa’s labour force participation rate has averaged about 50% for the last 30 years,[35] the economy has only been able to create jobs for about half of its economically active adults. More so, this jobs shortfall has only deepened pre-existing inequalities, concentrating unemployment among young, Black women (in particular). Even when they are employed, this cohort of workers is less secure, earns less, and often remain stuck in the unskilled labour bracket.[36] Today, South Africa has the second highest youth unemployment rate in the world, standing at 59.6% in 2020, with most recent estimates placing it at 64% due to the job losses caused by the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.[32,37] This means that rather than driving South Africa’s social and economic flourishing, many young people are trapped outside the labour market, excluded from circuits of social and economic capital. Without the right support, long-term unemployment can impact young people’s mental well-being, self-confidence, social relationships, and physical health, which reproduces cycles of social exclusion. Alcinda Honwana (2014) has described this period as one of ‘waithood’ – waiting for adulthood – as a way of articulating young people’s lived experience of social immobility.[38] Because poor, Black youth make up the largest proportion of those without work, patterns of youth unemployment in South Africa are reinforcing decades of structural inequality. These have also concentrated disadvantage among poor, Black women, reproducing cycles of racialised, gendered and class inequality. Graham and Mlatsheni (2015) describe the youth unemployment problem as having its roots in the shift in government policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s to support a “high productivity, technology led growth path”.[39] The aim of this was to promote investment in skills development and boost wages.[39,40] However, this policy was implemented at a time when the size of the lowerskilled labour force was increasing and there was a decline in the labour-intensive agricultural industry. This resulted in a decline in the employment of lower-skilled workers.[39] At the same time, workers with higher skills were needed to drive technological development, which resulted in an increased demand for them; meaning that people with tertiary qualifications found it much easier to find work.[39] Therefore, the 20% gap between the unemployment rates of those with advanced versus basic education, shown in Figure 5, can be partially explained by a mismatch between the skills which the majority of workers have versus the skills needed by the labour market. As discussed in ISI’s previous report, “Ideas of Hope: Policy directions and recommendations for reducing inequality in South Africa”, although there is much anxiety around the growth prospects for the South African economy in the medium term, growth in GDP does not always translate into a reduction in inequality – what matters is what types of jobs are created by GDP growth.[41] Recent labour market statistics published by Stats SA for the fourth quarter of 2021 show a recovery in the job market with a 1.6% increase in total employment, with job growth in the trade, community services, and manufacturing industries.[42] However, this increase is driven by growth in part-time employment and hides the 0.5% decline (44,000 jobs lost) in full-time employment, with the construction, transport, business services, mining, and electricity sectors all shedding jobs in the last quarter of 2021.[42] Although this gradual improvement in job creation is welcome given the significant job losses during the pandemic, the quality of jobs created also impacts the ability of young people to improve their life outcomes. In their study of transitory (The transitory unemployed are defined as those who reported being unemployed in one or two of the four NIDS survey waves.[43]) and chronic (The chronically unemployed are those who are in three to four of the NIDS survey waves.[43]) unemployment in South Africa, Wakefield and Swanepoel (2022) found that although those who were defined as the transitory unemployed are relatively more educated than the chronically unemployed, these two groups share many of the same characteristics.[43] Both groups tend to urbanised, Black females between the ages of 25-44 years old and living in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.[43] The chronically unemployed also tend to be younger.[43] The authors found that the transitory and chronically unemployed people who were recorded as employed in the most recent data were predominantly employed in low-skill occupations and were earning on average one-third of what people in consistent employment were.[43] Wakefield and Swanepoel find that although the transitory and chronically unemployed share characteristics, particularly that they are young, transitory-unemployed people outnumber the chronically unemployed by a factor of 10.[43] This, coupled with the increase in jobs in the part-time sector, mean that policies should be geared towards ensuring that those in transitory employment find entry-level work with more ease that allows them to be employed with more intensity.[43] 2.3.2 Educational attainment Although education is often quoted as “the great equaliser”, in highly unequal societies, wealthier parents tend to spend more of their private income on education for their children than poorer parents. More financial resources mean that the wealthy can afford to spend more on education and other human capital investments than poor people, which widens the income attainment gap. In turn, high levels of income inequality mean that poorer people have fewer educational opportunities, and therefore fewer chances of earning higher incomes and achieving upward social mobility. As a result, they invest less in the education of their children, further reinforcing the attainment gap and intergenerational inequality. In South Africa, only half of children who start school complete all 12 years of education, which the National Planning Commission (NPC) justifiably describes as “wasting significant human potential and harming the life-chances of many young people”.[17] In describing South Africa’s higher education landscape, the NPC goes further: “The South African post-school system is not well designed to meet the skills development needs of either the youth or the economy… Though some institutions perform well and have the academic expertise and infrastructure to be internationally competitive, many lack adequate capacity, are under-resourced and inefficient… The data on the quality of university education is disturbing… The need to improve quality is demonstrated by the reports of graduates who are unable to find employment.”[17] Despite the variable quality of education in South Africa, it is still an important mediator of inequality across generations.[44] As mentioned before, in order to fully leverage the youth dividend, one needs to ensure that they are equipped with the requisite skills and opportunities for employment to maximise their productive potential. Figure 8 shows estimates by Taylor Salisbury (2016) that illustrate the differences in average lifecycle earnings by level of education in South Africa.[45] It shows that for those with no schooling or some lower secondary education, earnings remain relatively flat on average and peak at about double early career earnings.[45] For those with complete upper secondary education, their starting monthly earnings are already much higher and increase by three-five times by the time they reach their peak.[45] Figure 8: Average earnings by age and level of education completed (five -year moving average) The returns to education in South Africa are high, approximately 18.7% for each additional year of schooling. Those with the most education (complete matric or more) see their earnings increase by higher magnitudes throughout their lives compared to those with less schooling (incomplete secondary education or less). Source: Salisbury, 2016 Salisbury also estimates that the return to an additional year of schooling is approximately 18.7%. Therefore, in order to level the playing field, more investment is needed in improving equality of access to and the quality of basic and higher public education. This education also needs to match the skills required by the labour market, so that graduates can find meaningful employment. How do we leverage demographic change in our efforts to alleviate inequality? The policy scenarios explored in this report suggest that answers to this question are necessarily intergenerational. The flourishing of current and future generations rests heavily on our ability to build and harness multi-dimensional forms of intergenerational wealth: the health, education, financial security, and social ties of one generation have indelible consequences for the next. At the heart of South Africa’s inequality challenge is whether its citizens can escape long-held patterns of social exclusion and deprivation. Inequality meets demography in the ways it is reproduced or undone across and between generations. 2.3.3 Intergenerational wealth transfer and social mobility When considering the tools that young people need to maximise their opportunities for employment and increased earnings, one can divide these tools into two categories. The first category are those which are afforded to them by society or the state, in the form of public education institutions, such as schools and universities, and public health facilities. The second are those that are “inherited” from their parents or family; these may include literal inheritances of wealth or “softer” inheritances in the form of social capital. In theory, the first category of tools should be equal for all children, but they are not. Due to the history of racial oppression and segregation in South Africa, the quality of education and healthcare that South African children have access to varies by race and the geographic location where these children live, which is also still largely a function of race. This is also true for the second set of inherited tools; due to generations of privileged and exclusive access to better schooling, healthcare access, and labour market protections, White South Africans are on average born into wealthier families with more social and financial capital to bequeath to their children. For almost every country where there is available data, the income of parents is found to be a determinant of the future earnings of their children.[46] One of the major challenges created by income inequality is that it limits social mobility, producing an inequality of opportunities. This means that upward social mobility is challenging even for talented, hardworking people who are born into poverty.[47] Therefore, countries with higher levels of income inequality also tend to have very low levels of social mobility; this relationship is known as the Great Gatsby Curve (GGC).[47] Figure 9: The Great Gatsby Curve for a set of developed and developing countries Countries with high levels of inequality, measured by the Gini Coefficient on the x-axis, tend to have low rates of social mobility, measured by Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity on the y-axis (where values close to zero represent high social mobility and values close to one represent low or no social mobility). Source: Corak, 2012 In the inequality literature, two measures are used to quantify social mobility – Intergenerational Elasticity (IGE) and the index of Inequality of Opportunity (IOp). The IGE is the most widely-used measure of intergenerational inequality and measures the degree of association between the incomes of parents and their children, whereas the IOp estimates how much total inequality can be explained by a set of predetermined circumstances outside of one’s control (such as parental education, parental occupation, and race).[46,47] Lower IGE measures mean that the income of parents has less of an association with the income of their child, and a higher IGE means that parental income is a stronger determinant of their child’s income.[48](p1) Similarly, a low IOp measure indicates that predetermined circumstances have little bearing on overall inequality, and a high IOp measure implies that the opposite is true.[46] Using three waves of NIDS panel data, Patrizio Piraino (2015) estimates that the IGE and IOp for South Africa are 0.6 and 0.241, respectively.[46] This means that in South Africa, 60% of one’s earnings can be explained by the earning of one’s parents and 24.1% (almost a quarter) of income inequality can be explained by predetermined circumstances, in this case parental education and race.[46] According to Piraino, these measures indicate that “inherited circumstances explain a significant fraction of South Africa’s earnings inequality” and “the inequality of opportunity index is high in view of the limited set of circumstances (parental education and race) included in the analysis.”[46] Piraino’s findings are congruent with Oosthuizen’s analysis described in Box 2. Wealthier families invest significantly more resources in their children; this inevitably translates into better health, education, and other factors which contribute to human capital development, and thus higher earnings. Also, given the legacy of South Africa’s history of segregated and inferior education, health services, urban planning, and “colour bar” policies in the labour market, it is not surprising that intergenerational resource transfer follows the patterns described by Oosthuizen, and that parental education and race are still major determinants of inequality in South Africa. 3. Policy scenarios for realising the demographic dividend In the remainder of this report, we present three policy strategies for harnessing South Africa’s demographic dynamics to advance greater equality and prosperity. As already demonstrated, realising the dividends of the country’s youthful population hinges on our ability to invest in their potential, create opportunities, and support them throughout the life course. Investments in children – which determine whether or not they have an equal start – are made in the context of homes and families, and inherited by older generations. Similarly, as young people enter working-age, their labour participation and social mobility often hinges on financial and social support afforded by generations above them. This is where intergenerational inequality is made or broken. In the first two scenarios presented below, we take a view of demographic change from the perspective of women and older groups. These two populations are not only particularly vulnerable to the effects of inequality, but can offer critical support to children and working-age adults. Indeed, realising dividends from future generations rests on our support of the existing generations caring for them. In the final scenario, we suggest that investments in healthcare not only support demographic change, but also propel demographic dividends by alleviating inequality, bolstering social and economic life, and improving the future chances of children. 3.1 Elevating women “Parents suffer, children suffer, and they also suffer for each other” Source: ATD Fourth World, 2019 Achieving the benefits of a youthful population rests (in part) on our ability to elevate women and their work. Today, more than one in three of South Africa’s young people (aged 15-34) are not in employment, education, or training (NEET)[50]: most of them are women. While ‘waithood’ aptly reflects the powerlessness, and ‘stuck-ness’, that many defined as NEET may feel, it risks underplaying the agentive and aspirational forms of unpaid and/or unseen labour that young people undertake during this time, including job-seeking, domestic chores, and various forms of entrepreneurial hustling, chance-taking and volunteering. Women, for example, rather than ‘waiting’, often undertake intensive caregiving responsibilities, performing the bulk of household work and unpaid care (including for children, the elderly and the sick) that drives social reproduction. Women’s underemployment is entangled with their disproportionate care burden, which makes it difficult to look for, and keep, a job. From an early age, disproportionate caregiving and domestic responsibilities can also shape young women’s future employability by making it difficult for them to stay, and succeed in, school.[51,52] When relatives fall sick or there are younger siblings at home and in need of childcare, women and girls are more likely to take on caregiving responsibilities, again illustrating the interdependency of thriving and well-being across generations. Despite having made great strides in expanding women’s education and labour participation since the early 1990s, women continue to fare worse than men in the South African labour market. Women are more likely to complete school and more likely to achieve a tertiary qualification, but the irrefutable benefits of these human capital gains seem to nevertheless be capped for women. At present, women remain less likely to be employed than men[53]; are concentrated in low-skilled and less secure positions[36]; and earn lower wages for work of equal value (75% of what their male peers earn).[54] The overall gender wage gap has widened significantly since 2007.[55] In the early months of the 2020 COVID-19 lockdown, women accounted for two-thirds of net job losses[56] and have also been slower to recover employment since.[56] Female-headed homes are often caring for multiple generations of children and grandchildren. The higher dependency ratio, coupled with lesser employment and earnings, means that female-headed households are poorer than those headed by men,[36] despite women being the primary recipients of state social support. NIDS data (waves one-five) suggests that about 15% of household entries into poverty are associated with the household head shifting from male to female.[57] Children inherit the effects of this gender inequity, reproducing cycles of intergenerational poverty, in which their own prospects are limited by those of their caregivers. Even with expanded access to health and social services post-democracy, health and economic outcomes of children remain strongly tied to the conditions of previous generations.[58] Women are more likely than men to invest a higher share of their household income on educating their children (See Luo et al. (2018) “Aging and inequality: The link and transmission mechanisms” for a detailed decomposition of the transmission mechanism.), meaning that realising demographic dividends, both now and in the future, is critically dependent on elevating women.[60] 3.1.1 Policy strategies to elevate women Policies which empower women are also policies which enable the demographic dividend to be realised. Figure 14 below, from the United Nations Population Fund, illustrates policies which can be used to empower adolescent girls to leverage the demographic dividend; these include sexual and reproductive health policies, strengthening institutions, and providing social safety nets and support.[64] More specific policy recommendations are described below. Figure 14: Policies which support women and leverage the demographic dividend Policies which promote education, sexual and reproductive health, and economic empowerment of women and girls also increase the likelihood of achieving the demographic dividend. The absence of these policies result in a missed demographic dividend. Source: Herrmann, 2017. Demographic transitions, demographic dividends, and poverty reduction. United Nations Population Fund. Boost women’s labour participation Even with a generous social grants system, labour market income makes up 85% of household income in South Africa.[55] As such, improvements in employment are critical to alleviating poverty and inequality. Boosting women’s economic participation not only reduces gender inequality in the labour market but is also particularly effective in alleviating overall poverty and inequality because of how women’s assets are distributed among household members, with knock-on effects for children. Amid the COVID-19 lockdown in South Africa, for example, food insecure women were more likely to shield children from hunger.[65] By increasing paid work among women, remunerating and supporting care work, and closing gender gaps in the labour market, countries are expected to be healthier and more productive both now and in the future. Some describe these benefits as ‘gender dividends’.[60] This is the responsibility of all employers, be it state or private. Invest in the care economy In addition to providing the bulk of household care, women also constitute the vast majority of most of the care economy (healthcare workers, teachers, early childhood practitioners, domestic workers etc.), in which care providers are notoriously overworked and underpaid. Lay and informal care work, performed predominantly by Black women, is particularly undervalued and insecure. The achievement of minimum wage for these care workers has been critical to reducing the gender wage gap at the lower end of the wage distribution.[55] The minimum wage is currently R23.19 per hour.[66] Because of the benefits for both care providers and care beneficiaries, investing in the care economy represents a multi-pronged strategy to securing demographic gains and reducing inequality. By improving skills-building, remuneration, working conditions and rates of employment in the care economy, we are driving women’s labour-force participation, advancing gender equality, and supporting the health, well-being, and education of millions of care beneficiaries. Through investments in care, we disrupt preexisting distributions of care, power and privilege that have kept (particularly Black) women on the margins of social and economic life and thwarted the future chances of their children. The multiplier effects are particularly pronounced when investing in affordable and accessible early learning programmes. Expanding early learning programmes not only expands jobs for historically marginalised women and stimulates women-led micro-enterprises, but also improves access to childcare, which frees women to enter the workforce and unlocks the future potential of their children. Support pregnant women Research suggests that there is often a bi-directional relationship between poverty and fertility. Relative to other women of reproductive age, pregnant women in South Africa are 45.6% less likely to have an income.[67] Among those receiving an income, those employed in the informal sector will not receive maternity leave. This has significant implications for the health and wellbeing of both women and children and can deepen pre-existing inequality. Research, by the National Scientific Council on the Developing Child 2007, over the past two decades has shown that many life-long patterns of illness and health, as well as emotional and cognitive development, are calibrated in the first years of life, especially during pregnancy.[68] The physiological and neurological capital accrued in these early years influences not only a child’s ability to survive, but also to grow, learn and rise out of poverty.[69] At present, a quarter (27%) of children under five are nutritionally stunted, making them more likely to drop out of school, struggle to find work, and live in poverty. Stunting is driven, in part, by mothers’ mental health and nutritional status,[58] yet studies suggest that pregnant women in South Africa’s disadvantaged communities are experiencing high rates of food insecurity and depression.[70] Income support and access to affordable antenatal care could improve the nutrition and psychological well-being of pregnant women, as well as the physical and cognitive functioning of their children.[71] If stunted children receive extra nutrition and cognitive stimulation, their life-time earnings potential can increase by 25-40%.[72] Extending support to pregnant women should include supporting both expectant and new mothers to stay in school. South African public discourse is gripped with concerns about teenage pregnancy, partly because of its perceived age-inappropriateness, and partly because of the potential effects on the well-being of mother and child. From a demographic perspective, earlier childbearing is also associated with higher fertility rates. Notwithstanding the recent dramatic spike in young pregnancy over the COVID-19 lockdown,[73] South Africa’s adolescent fertility rates have been steadily declining, dropping by 27% over the past 50 years.[74] Adolescent fertility now falls well below the regional (sub-Saharan African) average.[74] However, adolescent girls are still far more likely to fall pregnant in South Africa than in most other low- and middle-income countries.[74] Research tells us that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between pregnancy and school dropout (Stoner et al. 2019): young women who leave school are more likely to fall pregnant, and young women who fall pregnant are more likely to leave school. What is often missing from the narrative is the role that schools, households, and policymakers play in determining whether a young mother returns to school or not. For many girls and young women, an unintended pregnancy means social stigma and isolation, along with major disruptions to schooling. Without the right type of support, the physical toll of pregnancy, regular antenatal visits, and caring for a new-born often come at the expense of young women’s schooling. If we are to leverage declining fertility and a growing working-age population to reduce inequality, we cannot afford to back-track on the gains made in women’s education and employment. Keeping young mothers in school will improve their chances in the labour market, and improve the future health, education and earning potential of their children. Both are likely to have the added consequence of reducing future childbearing. All the above advocate for supporting and elevating women, particularly at critical life points – points that can powerfully determine each woman’s path as well as those of the many that depend on women, thereby aiming to drive a way out of poverty and inequality. 3.2 Taking care of the elderly Declining fertility and improved longevity mean that South Africa’s population growth rate is slightly slower than the global average, and significantly slower than other countries in the region. In 2015, people over the age of 60 constituted an estimated 8% of South Africa’s total population,[17] with this proportion expected to increase to 15.4% by 2050.[75] A growing elderly population has a range of potential implications for poverty and inequality. Older persons are often positioned as ‘dependents’ in need of care, which can translate into significant costs for the state and for households. While the ‘demographic dividend’ of a growing working-age population is often associated with a decreasing dependency ratio, a growing elderly population (which is an inevitable consequence of current demographic shifts) attracts greater ambivalence because of its ability to increase the dependency ratio. In South Africa, the link between old age and chronic illness will likely contribute to a growing burden of chronic multi-morbidity and disability in the country.[76] Moreover, high levels of poverty and unemployment might thwart South Africans’ ability to save for old age. While income support coverage, through the state-provided old-age grants or pensions, is very high (92.6%), an estimated 40% of the elderly are poor.[77] The maximum pension rate, as of 2022, is R2,000 per month.[78] More so, 46% of older persons are considered functionally illiterate, which risks compounding their vulnerability.[17] Age malleability means that there is significant diversity in how people age. The vulnerability of South Africa’s elderly population is exacerbated by inequalities experienced over a life course. Health, function, and survival among elderly people are therefore unequally distributed across the population, with the poor more likely to be disabled or in ill-health.[77] 3.2.1 A picture of South Africa’s elderly population Older persons in South Africa are participating in the labour market By 2035, people over the age of 50 are expected to be about 25% of the workforce.[17] At present, the majority (55%) of older persons (aged 50-64) are in the labour force.[17] Even after retirement (age 60), more than 10% of South Africans continue to work.[17] Old age in South Africa is feminised 60% of people over age 60 in South Africa are women,[17] owing in part to their significantly longer life expectancy. These women are also more likely to be living with high blood pressure, diabetes, or arthritis.[17] Longevity is unevenly distributed South Africa’s population is ageing at different rates, reflecting patterns of structural inequality. Black South Africans have the lowest proportions of older people to children. Older Black South Africans are most likely to live in extended (as opposed to nuclear) households and less likely to have completed schooling.[17] Older persons are more urbanised than we think Gauteng experienced a 38.6% growth in the older (60+) population between 2011 and 2016[17]; with rural provinces like Limpopo and the Eastern Cape facing out-migration. This might reflect older persons’ own labour-related mobility, or their support of migrating working-age children. While the old-age grant constitutes 81% of older persons’ income in rural areas, those in urban areas earn 33% of their income from salaries, wages and commissions.[17] Urbanisation can enhance the wellbeing and productivity of older people, improving access to healthcare and employment. But it can also expose them to pollution, heat-stress, violence, and overcrowding. Older persons are household lynchpins Older persons in South Africa play a critical role, both as care providers and often as household breadwinners, bolstered by the state old-age pension. As working-age South Africans migrate from lesser-resourced areas in search of work, some will leave their children in the care of elderly kin. In previous decades, HIV/AIDS-related death and illnesses among working-age adults contributed to older people assuming the role of caregiver for their co-resident grandchildren. As a result, skip generation households are more prevalent (above 10%) amongst households headed by the elderly than among South African households in general.[17] One in three older persons lives in a triple-generation household.[17] Nationally, the ratio of children to older persons was visibly higher amongst females (1,37) than males (0,75).[17] This indicates that households headed by older women were more likely to reside with or care for children than men. Widespread unemployment and the impact of HIV/AIDS on families have left many older adults with significant care and financial responsibilities, as they use their pensions and their time to support their children and grandchildren. This financial and caregiving burden can impact their well-being. Older persons rely heavily on the public health system Only 18% of older South Africans (above the age of 60) have medical aid, meaning that the remaining 82% rely on the public health system for healthcare.[17] 3.2.2 Leveraging the longevity dividend Policy responses to a growing older population have often emphasised the direct costs of ageing, overlooking the significant and growing contributions that older people make to social and economic thriving. As critical sources of childcare support, South Africa’s older persons unlock the potential of younger generations, supporting working-age children to participate in the labour market, and providing the nurturing and nourishment essential to children’s development. If we are to leverage demography to alleviate inequality, we must build public systems that will support older persons to thrive and allow us to reap the benefits of a longevity dividend. These systems should empower older persons to continue to live meaningful lives in a society that recognises them as important sources of enrichment, expertise, and community building and support. Continue and bolster the old-age pension Not only is the old-age pension critical for supporting the health and wellbeing of older persons themselves, research demonstrates that it also has knock-on benefits for their households, with whom older grant recipients regularly share their income. The South African social protection system has historically not provided income support to unemployed persons of working-age, with the recent Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) being landmark in this respect. As a result, old-age pensions and other grants are often redistributed informally to unemployed relatives of the beneficiary. More than half of older persons in South Africa are living in households in which no-one is employed.[17] This redistribution creates an implicit subsidy for unemployed persons, but also risks minimising the potential benefit to older persons themselves.[80] Research suggests that living in a household with an old-age pension boosts members’ chances of employment. Women (aged 20-30) living in recipient households are reported to be up to 15% more likely to be employed, and 9% more likely to participate in the labour market than those in nonrecipient households.[80] Overall, those living in a household with an old-age pension recipient report even better labour market and poverty outcomes than those living with a child support grant recipient, most likely because of its higher value, and the role that a well-supported older person can play in providing childcare for working-age adults.[80] Compared to non-recipient households, those receiving an old-age pension also report higher shares of expenditure on food and education.[80] Children also experience improved health outcomes, including better height-for-age and weight-for-height.[80] Align health services with the needs of older populations To start, we must begin to think about ageing before people get old, strengthening preventative healthcare interventions. Our health systems must also be strengthened to deliver chronic and long-term care that is affordable and accessible to older people. Research shows that in countries that spend more on health, older people work and volunteer more, bolstering society’s social and economic systems.[79] Rather than being a demographic drain, older persons in South Africa can provide a critical lever to unlocking the potential of younger generations and maintaining nurturing homes and communities. Recognising this and acting accordingly can create a powerful impact on poverty and inequality. 3.3 Investing in people-centred, high-quality universal health coverage Leveraging population dynamics to achieve a more equal society depends largely on the health of its population. As this report has illustrated, the health of children is often entangled with that of their parents, and their parents’ parents. Caregivers (whether children, adults, or elderly) can also compromise their own health in their attempt to care for others. As such, ill-health not only impacts the well-being of the individual, but can also burden families, drain public resources, weaken communities, and squander human potential. Because poor health is an impediment to intergenerational mobility, it holds significant implications for our ability to realise demographic dividends and alleviate poverty and inequality. Ill-health is often a poverty trap, placing significant financial burdens on households, with already-vulnerable households most likely to experience health-related shocks. Many people in poverty also cannot practice preventative care because they are unable to access healthy food, work under risky conditions, or live in polluted areas. As such, the relationship between ill-health and poverty is bi-directional. Despite expanding health and social services since democracy, South Africa remains among the sickest nations on earth.[81] Relative to other middle-income countries, it has worse age-adjusted death rates, years of life lost to premature death and life expectancy at birth.[82] The country’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the subsequent (though unjustly delayed) roll-out of Anti-Retroviral Therapy, illustrates not only the staggering toll of HIV, but also the radical possibilities of expanding access to affordable, quality healthcare. 3.3.1 The demographic impacts of Anti-Retroviral Therapy Over a period of less than 20 years, post-apartheid South Africa saw a dramatic and unprecedented rise and fall in mortality because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and subsequent ART roll-out. These effects were not evenly distributed, with those in the poorest municipalities more likely to die of AIDS-related illness and less likely to benefit from subsequent treatment programmes. As a consequence, both mortality and absolute mortality inequality by income spiked (for 18–59-year-olds) in the lead-up to 2006[83] and dropped rapidly thereafter as South Africa’s ART programme was scaled. By the time the HIV/AIDS epidemic peaked, in 2004, 10 years had been cut from South Africa’s 1990 life expectancy.[84] Over the same period, the under-five mortality rate had risen to 79.2 per 100 000 births.[85] Many who were dying were doing so at the prime of their lives: homes and communities lost their most economically and biologically productive generation. Often it was close relatives, especially grandmothers, who assumed care for the orphaned children of their dead, bringing emotional and material resources to bear on AIDS illness with little assistance from the state. Indeed, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has contributed to a series of generational anomalies: the elderly have buried their young, small children have nursed their parents, and adolescents have headed households. It has also amplified and necessitated intergenerational reciprocity, as grandmothers and grandchildren step in to complete the work of their ailing children or parents. Figure 15: Life expectancy of South Africans from 1985 to 2020 The HIV epidemic caused a dramatic decline in the life expectancy of South Africans, but since the roll-out of ART, the life expectancy has recovered and now exceeds the pre-HIV epidemic level. Source: MacDonnell and Low, 2019 Figure 16: Roll-out of Anti-Retroviral Therapy in South Africa from 1985 to 2020 Source: MacDonnell and Low, 2019 The HIV/AIDS epidemic took a serious, but also uneven, death toll. Death was concentrated among the poor, and although HIV infection rates were higher among women, men were disproportionately more likely to die of AIDS.[83] While the country has made significant inroads in curbing mortality since 2006, poor, Black men continue to have the lowest chances of survival. Having reached a low of 53.2 in 2004, life expectancy has since recovered dramatically – to an estimated 66.5 by 2019.[84] Meanwhile, under-five mortality has reached a low of 32.2.85 Research tells us that child health and survival also have knock-on effects for fertility, as mothers of healthy children tend to have fewer children.[86] Almost all these changes in mortality occurred among Black South Africans. Figure 17: Number of new HIV infections compared to deaths in South Africa from 1985 to 2020 The rapid roll-out of ART has resulted in the rapid decline of new HIV infections and AIDS related deaths. Source: MacDonnell and Low, 2019 These staggering gains in life expectancy have been attributed to the widespread roll-out of Anti-Retroviral Therapy across the country. South Africa now has the largest HIV treatment programme in the world: in 2020, 5.1 million people (age 15 and older) were receiving ART.[84] As the death toll has plummeted, so too has the likelihood of new infections, with consistent ART radically reducing the infectiousness of those living with HIV. Curbing the HIV/AIDS epidemic will depend on the rate at which people are starting ART relative to the rate of new infections. In 2009, the rate of treatment initiation surpassed the rate of new infections for the first time – a trend that the country must work to maintain.[84] Figure 18: Trends in the under-five mortality rate in South Africa Under-five mortality has declined dramatically over the last 30 years, with the 2020 rate at almost half of what it was in 1990. Source: MacDonnell and Low, 2019 Some researchers suggest that poorer municipalities benefited more from ART during the first five years of the roll-out, despite reports of poorer provinces lagging.[83] Widespread ART availability has also been associated with larger decreases in AIDS-mortality for women than men, in part because of higher infection rates among women, but also because of poor testing and delayed health-seeking among men. ART has had a dramatic impact on recovering mortality in South Africa: between 2000-2014, ART is estimated to have saved 1.72 million lives, and 6.15 million life years.[87] However, the delay in rolling out treatment constituted a devastating loss of life. Researchers suggest that as many as 8.8 million life years might have been saved if South Africa had more readily taken up WHO guidelines and moved more quickly in scaling ART uptake.[87] 3.3.2 Health interventions to tackle inequality and harness population dynamics People-centred, high-quality universal health coverage South Africa’s health system is starkly unequal: a small proportion (27%) of South Africans is enabled, through medical scheme contributions and those who pay out of pocket, to access expensive private healthcare services. Meanwhile, the majority (71%) is reliant on the public health system, which is notoriously under-resourced and under-staffed.[88] To advance health equity, and expand access to affordable quality care, South Africa has initiated a pathway to universal health coverage. Because of the bi-directional relationship between poverty and ill-health, removing the financial burden of accessing quality care is critical to alleviating poverty and facilitating social mobility in South Africa. Universal health coverage must include: Non-judgemental, accessible sexual and reproductive health services South Africa’s population is constituted by a growing proportion of young people. Safeguarding the Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) rights of these young people is a prerequisite to them achieving their potential, and the country’s ability to reap the benefits of their contribution. Expanded SRH services should empower young people to make choices in their sexual lives. They should enable them to avoid, delay or space pregnancies and seek out healthcare. Young people who are empowered to stay healthy also do better in school, acquire more skills, and take on a life course that is both more productive, and more fulfilling. With expanded access to SRH, young people usually delay their first birth, and choose to have fewer children, which can contribute to a demographically induced economic upswing.[89] More so, because they are more likely to stay healthy, and in school, the children they do have also inherit greater human capital. Despite high contraceptive prevalence rates (64.6%), contraceptive service delivery, choices, access, and contraceptive counselling are relatively weak.[90] Affordable and comprehensive SRH (including family planning options) are not widely available in the South African public health sector and many women who try to access these services experience stigma and punitive treatment. Despite an overall decline in fertility rates, South Africa saw a slight increase in unwanted births between 1998 and 2016 (i.e. births to women who did not want any more children).[54] Improving men’s access to primary healthcare The story of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic illustrates worse mortality outcomes, and poorer treatment access for men. This reflects a more generalised challenge in the health system, in which men frequently delay or avoid health seeking, and health facilities are perceived as feminised spaces. This has implications for their own physical and psychosocial well-being as well as that of their families and workplaces. Men and adolescent boys in South Africa experience higher rates of premature mortality and are more likely to die from preventable causes.[91] Men are also less likely to know their HIV status or access treatment; and are at greater risk of mortality from injuries or suicide.[91] The health outcomes of men and women are interdependent, which means that as South Africa moves towards universal healthcare, our interventions must be responsive to the varied needs and risks of all genders. 4. Conclusion This report has explored the shape and pace of South Africa’s demographic transition and the complex implications for inequality. At the crux of the country’s inequality problem is the reality of a large unemployed working-age population, with no secure income and few footholds in the labour market. As this young population grows faster than the growth in employment, so too does the back-log of young people ‘in waithood’ (Figure 7). We cannot expect reducing fertility rates to do the work of shifting inequality: future demographic change does little to address the scale of the historical problem that we face. Indeed, even if South Africa were to realise the same level of gender equality as Sweden, for example; it is estimated that our Gini index would not fall by more than 3.8% (see Box 3) – which is not to say that the change in gender equality would not have other profound effects and is desirable in and of itself. As further evidence of the intractability of the Gini: our previous report[92] shows little to no effect on the Gini Coefficient if one were to remove the top 1% of earners, or even the elderly (over age 65) population from calculations. A radical shift in the Gini means that we must find ways to absorb our growing working-age population into the labour market. Economic growth, alone, will not be enough to secure the livelihoods of young people. Economic growth must translate into jobs and livelihoods; and young people must be resourced, equipped and connected enough to take up these opportunities. More so, these opportunities must translate into transferable skills and quality work to break existing patterns of youth ‘churn’ in the economy. Realising ‘demographic dividends’ and advancing equity hinge on education, jobs, intergenerational support and quality healthcare. There is no escaping the urgent need to address the jobs shortfall. But policy must also drive resources to the people and programmes that will have the most impact, both on overall inequality, and young people’s future chances. To this end, this report has explored South Africa’s demographic change through the youth, through the increase in the working-age population; the lens of women, due to the declining birth rate; and the lens of the elderly, who are living longer and are becoming an increasing share of the total population. The report also considers the importance of the health system in both supporting this demographic shift, and sustaining the well-being and economic productivity of South Africans. Equity in quality health access is also an important lever for reducing inequality overall and reaping demographic dividends. The discussion on the youth dividend shows how inequality of opportunity is an inheritance. In South Africa, parental income and, still, race are important determinants of the opportunities one is afforded for social mobility. Despite this, education is still shown to be an important mediator of inequality. Therefore, empowering the youth with access to quality education maximises their opportunities to find work in an economy which favours highly qualified employees. Economic policies also need to focus on not only driving growth but creating employment, opportunity and livelihoods for the many young people who do not complete school or have access to higher education, and thus have lesser qualifications. In exploring inequality through the lens of women, the role of policies which support women’s labour force participation and protect pregnant women and girls is crucial. We provide analysis illustrating that gender inequality has been empirically shown to exacerbate overall income inequality. Given that women are also more likely to invest higher shares of their income in educating their children, investing in the elevation of women is also an investment in the next generation. Considering the elderly, we challenge certain assumptions of this population. The over 60 population is not a homogenous group. Although many rely on the state old-age pension, 33% of those who live in urban areas earn their income from salaries. The elderly are also the lynchpins of South African households. They are an important source of childcare support which enables women to find and retain work. Their pensions together with incomes earned through work support their working-age children to look for work and participate in the labour market. The livelihoods, social mobility, and contribution of all three of these groups – youth, women and children – rests on their wellbeing – their being able to afford and access healthcare, and prevent health shocks that risk plunging them and their families into financial crisis. Given the nature of South Africa’s demographic change, all three groups will also be living longer, with potentially more chronic illness, and thus reliance on the health system. Therefore, moving towards equity in access to quality healthcare must form part of the policy tool kit for reducing inequality. South Africa has a declining fertility rate, a youthful population, and steadily decreasing infant and adult mortality. We have also seen a radical expansion in post-apartheid access to education, healthcare and social services. At this level, we appear to have all the ingredients for social and economic flourishing. Yet, we are failing dismally to realise the promises of democracy. As illustrated in our first Inequality Report,[92] access to public services has not translated into quality services, nor meaningful gains in equity, wellbeing and social mobility. Primarily, we are failing our young people, the majority of whom have the odds stacked against them well before they reach school. These inequalities compound as they make their way through the schooling system, and finally into the labour market. 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PLOS Med. 2017;14(12):e1002468. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002468 Statistics South Africa. General Household Survey.; 2018. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182018.pdf#page=37 Berlin Institute. Accelerating Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights for Demographic Dividends.; 2021. https://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen/PDF/Food_for_Thought_Paper_4.pdf Harries J, Constant D, Wright V, Morroni C, Müller A, Colvin CJ. A multidimensional approach to inform family planning needs, preferences and behaviours amongst women in South Africa through body mapping. Reprod Health. 2019;16(1):159. doi:10.1186/s12978-019-0830-6 National Department of Health. The South African National Integrated Men’s Health Strategy 2020-2025.; 2020. https://www.knowledgehub.org.za/system/files/elibdownloads/2021-02/Men%26%23039%3Bs%20Health%20Strategy.pdf Institute for Social Inequality. Trends in Multidimensional Inequality and Socio-Demographic Change in South Africa during 27 Years of Democracy.; 2022. https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/trends-in-multidimensional-inequality-and-sociodemographic-change-in-sa-during-27years-of-democracy Appendices Figure 19: Components of the lifecycle deficit by race, 2015 Source: Oosthuizen, 2019 Figure 20: Private versus public transfers by race, 2015 Source: Oosthuizen, 2019 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za