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Occasional Paper 9/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. N O V E M B E R 2 0 2 4 The Inclusive Society Institute would like to thank JoAnn Kamuf Ward , who is the Deputy Commissioner, Policy & External Affairs at the New York City Commission on Human Rights, for reviewing this paper.  AH Gaum  (Advocate of the High Court) & M du Plessis  (Attorney of the High Court) Abstract   The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach reflects the country’s historical and social context. The Commission's use of ‘soft powers’ – which allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance – aligns with the country’s justice reconciliation and restoration mechanisms. However, while the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights, its findings and recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable.   In contrast, the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), provides more robust enforcement powers. This study examined the differences in legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers between the SAHRC and NYCCHR in order to consider how enforcement of human rights in South Africa can be strengthened. It highlighted their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   The study found that their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights. Establishing a tribunal, clarifying and expanding legal powers, enhancing collaboration with judicial bodies, and increasing resources and capacity could be the answer to ensuring the SAHRC remains effective and relevant in the current climate.    1. Introduction   1.1. Background   Human rights commissions are instrumental in promoting and protecting human rights. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) are two such bodies operating under different legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers. This study seeks to compare the enforcement mechanisms of the SAHRC and the NYCCHR, highlighting their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   1.2. Problem Statement   While the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights in South Africa, its ability to enforce its findings is limited. Recent court cases, such as the Agro Data judgment, have demonstrated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable. In contrast, the NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which provides more robust enforcement powers. This study aims to examine these differences and consider how enforcement of human rights can be strengthened.   1.3. Objectives   The primary objectives of this study are to:   Analyse the enforcement mechanisms employed by the SAHRC and NYCCHR. Compare the legal frameworks and enforcement capabilities of both institutions. Identify the limitations of the NYCCHR and SAHRC’s current enforcement powers.    2. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)   2.1. Constitutional and Legislative Framework   The SAHRC is established under Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution (South African Government, 1996), which outlines its role in promoting and protecting human rights. As a Chapter 9 institution, the SAHRC is mandated to function independently and impartially to support constitutional democracy in South Africa.   The powers, functions, and responsibilities of the SAHRC are defined in the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 (South African Government, 2013). This Act grants the SAHRC authority to investigate human rights violations, issue subpoenas, and make recommendations in cases of human rights violations. The specific powers include:   a)  Monitoring and Investigating:  The SAHRC is authorised to monitor human rights compliance and investigate alleged violations. This includes conducting research, requesting information, and inspecting places such as prisons to ensure adherence to human rights standards.   b)  Issuing Subpoenas:  One of the critical powers of the SAHRC is the ability to issue subpoenas to compel individuals or entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations. Although the word “subpoena” is not used in the SAHRC Act to describe this power, section 15(2)c of the Act in effect creates subpoena powers. Section 15(2)c describes how, in pursuance of an investigation, the SAHRC may “ require any person by notice in writing under the hand of a commissioner addressed and delivered by a member of staff or a sheriff in relation to an investigation to appear before it at a time and place specified in such notice and to produce to it all articles or documents in the possession or custody or under the control of any such person and which may be necessary in connection with that investigation ”.   This power is crucial for gathering evidence and ensuring thorough investigations into human rights abuses. However, the exercise of this power has faced challenges, as will be discussed in light of legal interpretations and judicial guidance.   c)  Making Recommendations:  Following investigations, the SAHRC can make findings and issue recommendations to address human rights violations. These recommendations can be directed at individuals, organisations, or government bodies and may suggest policy changes, restitution, or other remedial actions. However, these recommendations are not binding, which limits their enforceability.   d)  Public Awareness and Advocacy:  The SAHRC has a vital role in educating the public about human rights. It runs awareness campaigns, provides training, and collaborates with civil society organisations to promote a culture of human rights in South Africa.   e)  Reporting:  The SAHRC is obliged to report annually to Parliament on the state of human rights in the country and on the measures taken to address violations. These reports are critical for informing legislative and policy interventions. istockphoto.com: 499739446     2.2. Limitations of the SAHRC's Powers   Non-Binding Nature of Recommendations   One of the most significant limitations of the SAHRC is that its findings and recommendations do not have binding legal force, as established in cases such as South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC  (2022) and AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission  (2023).   In the Agro Data judgment, the High Court explicitly stated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are advisory in nature and that any enforceable relief for parties seeking redress from the SAHRC would necessitate a separate court application to issue binding orders. This requirement diminishes the immediacy and impact of the SAHRC’s role in enforcing human rights. Shortly prior to the completion of this study, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court in the Agro Data matter (Supreme Court of Appeal, 2024).   In the AfriForum judgment, the High Court ruled that the SAHRC does not have the power to make definitive determinations on whether hate speech has occurred under section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA). Instead, the SAHRC can only form an opinion about whether there is sufficient merit to bring proceedings in a competent court, such as the Equality Court. This opinion merely informs whether the SAHRC should support a complainant in pursuing a legal case; it does not serve as a binding or final judgment on the matter. This ruling reinforces the view that the SAHRC’s role is primarily investigative and advisory rather than judicial or determinative.   Reliance on Judicial Processes   To obtain binding legal relief to address human rights violations, the SAHRC cannot rely on its recommendations and must initiate litigation, effectively presenting the case de novo  (whether it has already investigated and issued recommendations or not). This sees the SAHRC stepping out of the role of an independent arbiter of human rights and into that of a party to litigation, entering the court room with its own predetermined views of the matter and handing over the role of independent arbiter to the court. In matters where the Commission has already investigated and potentially made findings and recommendations, this process involves re-arguing the facts and legal issues in court, which can lead to delays and increase the cost of securing compliance with its findings. This reliance on judicial processes was highlighted in both the AfriForum (2023) and Agro Data (2022) cases.   Subpoena Power Limitations   The SAHRC’s use of its authority to compel individuals to provide evidence has been overly cautious, as its consistent practice has been to seek consultation or permission from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing these legal orders. According to the interpretation of the relevant sections of the South African Human Rights Commission Act, such consultation is only necessary in cases where the testimony or documents could lead to self-incrimination, which might affect ongoing or potential criminal proceedings (South African Government, 2014).   This requirement is designed to safeguard the rights of individuals who may be under criminal investigation, ensuring that any compelled testimony does not unintentionally lead to self-incrimination. Additionally, it preserves the integrity of ongoing or future investigations conducted by the NPA that might overlap with those of the SAHRC. By requiring consultation in these specific cases, both institutions can coordinate their actions and maintain awareness of each other's investigative activities, thereby avoiding conflicts and ensuring that justice processes are not compromised.   The SAHRC has interpreted “self-incrimination” broadly to include statements that could show that a person has violated a human right, whether such violation would be truly criminal in nature or not, and has thus sought the permission of the NPA to proceed with subpoenas in numerous matters where doing so was not required.   By misapplying this provision and seeking approval even in situations where there is no risk of self-incrimination, the SAHRC has unnecessarily limited its investigative powers, reducing its efficiency and effectiveness in enforcing human rights protections. A correct understanding and application of these legal provisions are essential for the SAHRC to maximise its authority and impact in its human rights investigations.   Resource Constraints   Resource limitations further restrict the SAHRC’s ability to fulfil its mandate effectively. Inadequate funding and staffing can hamper the Commission’s capacity to conduct in-depth investigations, run educational programmes, and monitor compliance across the country.   2.3. Recommendations for Strengthening the SAHRC’s Powers   Establishing a Tribunal   The creation of a tribunal within the SAHRC could provide a mechanism for issuing binding orders, reducing the reliance on the judicial system to enforce recommendations. This tribunal could operate similarly to the NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (NYC Human Rights, N.d.), issuing enforceable orders that parties must comply with or challenge through appeal rather than de novo court proceedings. Establishing such a tribunal would not only require amendments to the SAHRC Act but also a careful consideration of how to balance these binding powers with the SAHRC's existing approach focused on reconciliation and dialogue. By clearly delineating the tribunal's role, the Commission can avoid undermining its soft powers, ensuring that the tribunal handles only cases where legal enforcement is essential.   Clarifying and Expanding Legal Powers   To enhance its investigative capabilities, legislative amendments are needed to clarify the scope of the SAHRC’s subpoena powers and remove unnecessary limitations. This would prevent the SAHRC from being overly cautious and enable it to utilise its full investigative potential. Empowering the SAHRC to issue binding orders directly could be another area for legislative development. However, introducing such powers must be approached cautiously to avoid diminishing the Commission’s role in fostering open dialogue and voluntary compliance. This could be achieved by making these binding powers an option rather than a standard response, reserved for cases where serious violations occur, and where reconciliation efforts have failed.   Enhancing Collaboration with Judicial Bodies     Developing protocols for better collaboration between the SAHRC and the judiciary could streamline the enforcement process. Establishing procedures for expedited judicial review of SAHRC recommendations would ensure more timely enforcement of human rights protections. This would enable the SAHRC to focus on its core functions of advocacy and education while having the support of the judiciary to enforce compliance when necessary. Such collaboration could also involve shared training initiatives to ensure that both the SAHRC and the judiciary have a common understanding of human rights issues and the best practices for addressing them.    Increasing Resources and Capacity    To fulfil its mandate effectively, the SAHRC requires adequate funding and resources. Enhanced financial support would enable the Commission to conduct more comprehensive investigations, expand public education efforts, and develop specialised units to address complex human rights issues. By increasing its capacity, the SAHRC can not only improve its investigative capabilities but also its role in public education and advocacy, further embedding a culture of human rights in South Africa.   Conclusion   The SAHRC plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach, characterised by non-binding recommendations and a focus on dialogue, reflects the country’s historical and social context. South Africa's emphasis on reconciliation and restorative justice as mechanisms for addressing both past and present injustices aligns with the Commission's use of ‘soft powers’. These powers allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance. This approach can make parties feel more comfortable engaging openly without the immediate threat of legal consequences, which might otherwise cause defensiveness or reluctance to participate. The SAHRC's role in shining a light on human rights issues, raising public awareness, and fostering societal change through dialogue and education is integral to South Africa's unique journey towards reconciliation and social cohesion.   However, there is an argument to be made for expanding the SAHRC’s enforcement capabilities to include more binding powers, especially in cases where voluntary compliance is insufficient to address serious human rights violations. Enhancing the Commission’s legal framework by establishing a tribunal could provide a means of issuing binding orders while preserving the Commission's existing soft powers. The tribunal could function separately, handling cases where legal enforcement is necessary, thereby allowing the SAHRC to maintain its advisory and reconciliatory role in other situations.   This dual approach, similar to the model used by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Tribunal (OHRC, N.d.), could prevent undermining the SAHRC’s soft powers. Without a clear separation, there is a risk that stakeholders may default to seeking binding resolutions, thereby diminishing the Commission’s ability to use its conciliatory approach effectively. A specialised tribunal within the SAHRC would enable the Commission to leverage the benefits of both soft and hard powers, providing a comprehensive toolkit for addressing human rights violations in South Africa. Such a balanced approach would ensure that the SAHRC can continue to foster a culture of human rights through dialogue and education while having the capability to enforce compliance where necessary, thus remaining a relevant and effective institution in promoting and protecting human rights.   3. The New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR)   3.1. Introduction   The NYCCHR operates under the authority of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which is codified in Title 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (NYC Human Rights, 2003). The NYCHRL was established to address and prevent discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations within New York City. The law provides a comprehensive set of protections against discrimination based on characteristics such as race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other protected classes.   One of the NYCCHR's primary roles is to enforce the NYCHRL, which specifically addresses discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas. Protected characteristics under the law include race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and more. The NYCCHR's authority is outlined in the New York City Administrative Code, Title 8, which empowers the Commission to investigate complaints, conduct hearings, issue fines, and enforce compliance with the law.   A critical component of the NYCCHR's enforcement mechanism is its Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB), which plays a central role in investigating allegations of discrimination. When a complaint is filed, the LEB conducts a thorough investigation to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that discrimination occurred. If such a determination is made, the case is then referred to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH), an independent city agency that conducts administrative hearings. OATH's involvement is mandatory for cases where probable cause is established, ensuring that the hearings are conducted impartially and separately from the NYCCHR's investigative and prosecutorial arms. The NYCHRL enforces the law, and courts are also a forum where complaints can be filed alleging violations of the Human Rights Law.  istockphoto.com: 1248523239     3.2. Administrative Hearings and the Role of OATH   The NYCCHR relies on OATH to conduct formal hearings. OATH functions independently of the NYCCHR, handling cases not only from the NYCCHR but also from other city agencies. When the LEB finds probable cause of a human rights violation within the NYCCHR, the case is automatically referred to OATH for trial, where an administrative law judge presides over the proceedings. The judge's role is to issue a report and recommendation based on the evidence presented. This recommendation is then reviewed by the NYCCHR’s Office of the Chairperson (OC), which makes the final decision. This process allows for a comprehensive and fair hearing, with the OC having the authority to accept, modify, or reject the judge's recommendations.   OATH's role in the NYCCHR's enforcement framework underscores the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the Commission's operations. This separation helps maintain the impartiality and fairness of the hearing process. While the NYCCHR is not required to use OATH for every type of complaint, its use is mandated for cases proceeding to formal hearings following a probable cause finding by the LEB. This reliance on OATH for formal hearings ensures that the Commission's actions are legally sound, and that due process is respected.   However, many cases settle and do not go to a hearing. The Commission resolved 40% of cases in FY24 through settlement. In such cases, the parties and the Commission enter into a conciliation agreement, which is an enforceable Commission order. Some cases are also resolved through a private settlement agreement, with a notice of withdrawal filed at the Commission. Finally, cases resolved through the Commission’s Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution are also included in these totals.   3.3. Specific Enforcement Actions and Powers   The NYCCHR has the power and authority to enforce its order without a final decision from the office of the Chairperson. These include imposing fines, mandating policy changes, requiring training, and taking corrective actions to address discrimination.   Issuing Binding Orders   The NYCCHR has the ability to issue binding orders following investigations. These orders can mandate policy changes, compulsory training, payment of damages to victims, and the imposition of civil penalties. These orders are considered to have immediate legal effect, and respondents are required to comply without needing additional judicial endorsement, even though such endorsement is necessary at times, as discussed hereunder.   The Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v E & E Bagels, Inc.  (2016) case exemplifies how the NYCCHR enforces its powers under the NYCHRL. In this case, Estelle Stamm, who has disabilities that require her to use a service dog, was denied service at Empire City Bagels. She filed a complaint with the NYCCHR's Law Enforcement Bureau, which, after investigating the claim and issuing a Probable Cause Determination, referred the matter to OATH for adjudication.   When the respondent failed to participate in the proceedings, the administrative law judge conducted a damages inquest, leading to a finding of discrimination. The judge recommended $7,000 in compensatory damages to Ms. Stamm for emotional distress and an additional $7,000 civil penalty against the respondent, along with mandatory anti-discrimination training for the employees. The NYCCHR adopted these recommendations, and further increased the compensatory damages and civil penalty to $15,000 each, demonstrating its ability to enforce compliance with its findings effectively.   This case displays the NYCCHR's enforcement capabilities, allowing it to not only make determinations but also impose binding penalties and corrective actions directly.   Issuing Fines and Penalties   As displayed above, the NYCCHR is empowered to impose civil penalties for violations of the NYCHRL. These fines can be substantial, with the Commission authorised to impose penalties of up to $125,000 per discriminatory act. For violations deemed wilful, wanton, or malicious, fines can reach up to $250,000 per act (NYC Human Rights, 2003). These penalties serve both punitive and deterrent purposes, underscoring the importance of compliance with human rights standards.   Corrective Actions and Remedies   Beyond imposing fines, the NYCCHR can require respondents to take corrective actions, such as adopting anti-discrimination policies, undergoing training, and ensuring public accommodations are accessible. The Commission can also mandate restorative justice processes to address and repair harm caused by discriminatory practices. These remedies aim to address the root causes of discrimination and foster a more inclusive environment.   Public Education and Outreach   The NYCCHR is also engaged in public education and outreach initiatives to raise awareness of human rights issues and ensure compliance with the NYCHRL. The Commission organises training sessions, workshops, and public campaigns to educate the community about their rights and responsibilities under the law. These efforts are designed to prevent discrimination by promoting a culture of respect and understanding throughout New York City.   Proactive Investigations and Testing   In addition to responding to complaints, the NYCCHR conducts proactive investigations and testing to identify and address discriminatory practices. These efforts are particularly directed at areas such as housing and employment, where discrimination may be less apparent. Through testing, the NYCCHR can gather evidence of discriminatory practices that might otherwise go unnoticed.    Enforcement through Courts   While the NYCCHR's orders are binding, the Commission may still need to seek court enforcement if a respondent fails to comply. Likewise, respondents have the right and have seen fit to apply to courts to have orders of the NYCCHR overturned or varied.   The NYCCHR can petition the New York State Supreme Court to confirm and enforce its orders. This judicial enforcement mechanism ensures that the NYCCHR’s decisions are respected, with non-compliance potentially leading to court-mandated penalties, including contempt charges. For example, in Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc. (2020), the NYCCHR successfully sought court intervention to enforce its orders and ensure compliance​.   An important aspect of judicial enforcement of decisions of the NYCCHR through the New York State Supreme Court is that the express purpose of such cases is not to try the matter de novo  in the court, but rather for the court to consider the decision of the NYCCHR as though the latter were a court itself, whose judgment was now on appeal or review. This allows for the appeal court to more expeditiously dispose of such matters and improve access to justice.   In the case of Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City  (2019), the New York State Supreme Court upheld the decision of the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which had found the employer liable for sexual harassment leading to constructive discharge.   The NYCCHR initially ruled that the complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment and was effectively forced to resign due to ongoing harassment. The administrative law judge at OATH found that the employer's actions were severe enough to constitute constructive discharge. When the employer appealed this decision, the Supreme Court supported the NYCCHR’s findings, including the award of $200,000 for emotional distress damages. The court's affirmation highlights the enforceability and judicial support for NYCCHR decisions.   Of course, individuals are also free to go directly to the courts, they are not required to file with the NYCCHR. However, anyone who contacts the NYCCHR and alleges a violation, must be responded to, as the Commission is a "file as of right agency".   3.4. Limitations and Challenges   Jurisdictional Scope   The NYCCHR’s jurisdiction is confined to addressing human rights violations arising from discrimination within the boundaries of New York City. While the Commission has extensive authority within the city, it cannot address general human rights violations that do not involve discrimination, nor can it address issues outside New York City. This contrasts with bodies like the South African Human Rights Commission, which can address a broader range of human rights issues beyond discrimination​.    Resource Constraints   The NYCCHR, like many governmental agencies, faces resource constraints that can affect its ability to manage a high volume of cases. Limited budgets may impact staffing, investigative capabilities, and the scale of public education and outreach efforts. These constraints necessitate prioritising cases, which can limit the Commission’s responsiveness to all complaints.   Dependence on Judicial Enforcement   Despite the binding nature of its orders, the NYCCHR may still need judicial support to enforce compliance. This results in its orders not being binding in exactly the same way a court’s orders would be, in that a person cannot be held in contempt and thus criminally liable simply for not complying with the order of the NYCCHR – the order would first need to be upheld by the New York State Supreme Court for this to happen. While judicial recourse reinforces the legal standing of the Commission's decisions, it can also lead to delays and complicate enforcement when respondents challenge orders in court. Nevertheless, the matter is not tried de novo  when it is brought for judicial enforcement, and this approach still brings the decisions of the NYCCHR very close to a court’s in respect of enforceability.   3.5. Strengths of the NYCCHR’s Enforcement Model   Robust Legal Framework   The NYCCHR’s authority under the NYCHRL provides a strong legal foundation for its enforcement actions. The power to issue binding orders, conduct thorough investigations, and impose significant penalties makes the NYCCHR a formidable force in protecting human rights within New York City.   Integrated Enforcement Mechanism   The combination of the Law Enforcement Bureau and the administrative hearing process through OATH ensures that the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions are both comprehensive and procedurally sound. This integrated approach allows the Commission to handle cases effectively from investigation through to final order, with mechanisms in place to ensure compliance.   Flexibility and Adaptability   The NYCCHR's proactive stance, including its ability to conduct testing and engage in public education, demonstrates its adaptability in addressing emerging human rights issues. This flexibility allows the Commission to respond to both individual complaints and broader patterns of discrimination, making it a comprehensive enforcer of human rights.    Conclusion   The NYCCHR is an important and effective institution equipped with significant powers to enforce the New York City Human Rights Law. Its ability to issue binding orders, conduct comprehensive investigations, and seek judicial enforcement, when necessary, makes the NYCCHR an effective guardian of human rights in New York City. Despite jurisdictional and resource limitations, the Commission’s integrated enforcement model, supported by a strong legal framework, ensures that it can effectively address discrimination and uphold the rights of all New Yorkers. By leveraging its powers and collaborating with other legal entities, the NYCCHR continues to play a vital role in promoting and protecting human rights.    4. Comparative Analysis of Enforcement Mechanisms and Recommendations: NYCCHR vs SAHRC   4.1. Jurisdiction and Scope of Mandate   A key difference between the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) lies in the scope and nature of their mandates. The NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which exclusively addresses human rights violations that stem from discriminatory practices. The NYCCHR focuses on issues like employment, housing, and public accommodations but intervenes only when discrimination based on protected characteristics, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation, is involved. This focused mandate restricts the NYCCHR from addressing broader human rights issues that do not involve discrimination​.   In contrast, the SAHRC’s mandate is far broader. The SAHRC is tasked with promoting, protecting, and monitoring all human rights, not just those related to discrimination or those that were violated as a result of discrimination. This allows the SAHRC to address a wide range of human rights issues, including socio-economic rights such as access to healthcare, water, education, and housing, irrespective of whether discrimination is involved. This broader jurisdiction reflects the SAHRC's constitutional role in supporting democracy by upholding the full spectrum of human rights​.   4.2. Enforcement Mechanisms and the Binding Nature of Orders   The enforcement powers of the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ significantly in terms of immediacy and binding authority. The NYCCHR has the power to issue binding orders following its investigations into discrimination complaints. These orders can compel policy changes, require training, award damages, and impose civil penalties. While respondents have the right to challenge these orders, they are generally expected to comply, and the NYCCHR can seek enforcement through the New York State Supreme Court. The court’s role is to confirm these orders, treating the NYCCHR’s findings with the same weight as a lower court decision, thus reinforcing their binding nature​.   The SAHRC, on the other hand, faces more limitations. Although it can issue recommendations after investigations, these recommendations are not binding. The SAHRC does not seek court approval to "convert" its recommendations into enforceable orders. Instead, its recommendations are considered advisory, with no inherent legal force. If the SAHRC seeks to address human rights violations through legal avenues, it must initiate separate legal proceedings, effectively treating the matter as a new case. This separation of the investigative and judicial processes dilutes the impact of the SAHRC's investigations and recommendations, as they do not directly lead to enforceable outcomes​. If the Commission seeks enforceable outcomes, it is required to follow an entirely different legal path within its mandate – in other words, to litigate, regardless of whether it has made recommendations or not.   4.3. Use of Subpoena Powers and Compelling Evidence   Both the NYCCHR and the SAHRC have the authority to compel the production of evidence, but their approaches and the practical application of these powers differ.   NYCCHR   The NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB) actively uses its power to issue subpoenas, which compels individuals and entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations into discrimination. This authority is crucial for the NYCCHR to conduct thorough investigations and support its enforcement actions, ensuring that it can gather all relevant evidence to substantiate claims of discrimination​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC is similarly empowered to compel evidence, but its use of this power has been overly cautious. The SAHRC has often sought permission or consultation from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing subpoenas, based on a broad interpretation of the need to avoid self-incrimination conflicts with criminal investigations. The SAHRC’s practice has been to apply this cautious approach broadly, rather than reserving it for rare cases where there is a clear risk of self-incrimination, thereby reducing the efficiency and impact of its investigations​.   4.4. Judicial Interaction and Legal Proceedings   The interaction with the judicial system is another area where the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ notably.   NYCCHR   Where the complainant has not gone directly to the Courts, the NYCCHR’s need for judicial involvement typically arises when a respondent challenges an order or when enforcement is necessary. The New York State Supreme Court reviews NYCCHR’s decisions to ensure compliance but does not retry cases. This appellate-like review process supports the NYCCHR’s authority by treating its findings as legally significant and reinforcing the binding nature of its orders. This approach reduces delays and enhances the credibility of the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions​.   SAHRC   For the SAHRC, the judicial process is more distinct and detached from its investigative functions. When the SAHRC identifies a human rights violation that requires legal intervention, it must choose whether to utilise mediation, investigation (with findings and recommendations) or litigation to address the matter. If the SAHRC decides to investigate and makes recommendations that are then not complied with, there are a number of options open to it, including the use of political pressure by approaching relevant government authorities or even Parliament for assistance. However, the only way to truly bring binding relief would be to approach the court, not for an order confirming the recommendations of the Commission necessarily, but rather to argue the case de novo  and ask the court for relief based on the law and facts, essentially restarting the process. This separate legal proceeding treats the matter independently of the SAHRC's investigative findings, undermining the direct impact of its recommendations.   The NYCCHR’s ability to issue binding orders and enforce them through a streamlined judicial review process makes it a potent enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. This direct enforcement mechanism offers immediate legal consequences for non-compliance, which can deter discriminatory practices effectively. However, the SAHRC's approach, characterised by its reliance on issuing advisory recommendations and pursuing separate legal action, if necessary, should not simply be seen as a weakness or a lack of authority.   The SAHRC's softer approach, which relies on persuasion, influence, and public awareness, aligns with South Africa's broader historical context of reconciliation and restorative justice. This model allows the SAHRC to engage with parties in a less adversarial manner, encouraging dialogue and voluntary compliance. The non-binding nature of its recommendations can foster an environment where individuals and organisations feel more comfortable participating in the process without the immediate fear of legal repercussions. This openness can lead to greater transparency, a willingness to acknowledge issues, and cooperative efforts to rectify human rights violations. By shining a light on issues and raising public awareness, the SAHRC plays a crucial role in shaping societal attitudes and behaviours, which can lead to long-term cultural and policy changes. The above also fits neatly into South Africa’s constitutional system, which provides numerous avenues through which to enforce human rights, including specialised courts and tribunals such as the Equality Court, Children’s Court and Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and numerous ombudsman services at national, provincial and local level.   While the SAHRC’s current model prioritises these softer, reconciliatory methods and has a place in the South African legal system, practical experience has demonstrated that this approach has not been very effective – for example, individuals and government departments often simply ignore the findings and recommendations of the SAHRC. And although the aforementioned challenge may speak more to the overall constitutional and human rights landscape in South Africa, than to specific weaknesses in the SAHRC’s strategical and operational model, there is still room to consider complementing its toolkit with additional enforcement options. Introducing mechanisms such as a specialised tribunal within the SAHRC, which could issue binding orders in specific cases, would provide a balance between soft power and more robust enforcement. This would allow the Commission to maintain its emphasis on reconciliation and education while having the capacity to ensure compliance when voluntary measures fail.   4.5. Structural and Resource Challenges   Both the NYCCHR and SAHRC face structural and resource constraints, but these challenges are framed by their differing mandates.   NYCCHR   Operating within the boundaries of New York City and focusing exclusively on discrimination cases allows the NYCCHR to channel its resources more effectively. However, the high demand for its services in a densely populated city poses challenges. Despite these challenges, the NYCCHR's focused mandate and structured use of its Law Enforcement Bureau enable it to respond effectively to discrimination complaints​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC’s broader mandate covers all human rights across South Africa, which presents a more significant, or at least, a very different kind of challenge. The SAHRC’s ability to conduct comprehensive investigations, monitor compliance, and engage in public education is often hampered by limited funding and staffing. These constraints necessitate collaboration with other institutions and reliance on civil society to extend its reach. The breadth of its mandate, while necessary for addressing the full spectrum of human rights, strains the SAHRC’s capacity to enforce these rights effectively​.   In addition to the above, from a broader human rights perspective, South Africa arguably has a harsher human rights landscape than the USA, both at national and more localised levels. While the USA has significant human rights challenges of its own, one must accept that the levels of poverty, unemployment, lack of state resources, and inequality in South Africa far outweigh those in the USA. This fact alone has a significant influence on the effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in South Africa to address human rights challenges as compared to nations like the USA.    5. Conclusion   The NYCCHR and SAHRC play crucial roles in protecting human rights within their jurisdictions, but their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights, while nevertheless not denying the SAHRC the ability to work for change and, as suggested in this paper, to find additional ways to enforce its mandate.    References   AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission (14370/2019; 31328/2019), ZAGPJHC 807; 2023 (6) SA 188 (GJ). 2023. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2023/807.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City, No. 162211/2015, 63 Misc. 3d 1211(A), 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 50464(U), 2019 WL 1475080. 2019. [Online] Available at: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ny-supreme-court/1989750.html [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc., Complaint No. M-H-S-17-11067, OATH Index No. 1253/19. 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Desir_D&O_SIGNED_Redacted.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v. E & E Bagels, Inc., Complaint No. M-P-D-12-1026467, OATH Index No. 803/14. 2016. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Commission%20on%20Human%20Rights%20ex%20rel%20%20Stamm%20v%20%20EE%20Bagels%20--%20Decision%20and%20Order.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Enforcement . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/enforcement.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Rules of Practice. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/title-47-index.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. 2003. New York City Administrative Code, Title 8: Civil Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/Title-8-Text-of-the-Law.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC). N.d. Litigation and inquiry strategy . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/about-commission/litigation-and-inquiry-strategy [accessed: 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 [accessed 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 2013. South African Human Rights Commission Act, Act No.40 of 2013, Government Gazette , 583(37)   South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC (1448/2021), ZAMPMBHC 58. 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAMPMBHC/2022/58.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Supreme Court of Appeal. 2024. South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC & Another (Afriforum, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Commission for Gender Equality intervening as Amici Curiae) (39/2023) ZASCA 121 . [Online] Available at: https://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/component/jdownloads/summary/94-judgements-2024/4300-south-african-human-rights-commission-v-agro-data-cc-another-afriforum-centre-for-applied-legal-studies-and-commission-for-gender-equality-intervening-as-amici-curiae-39-2023-2024-zasca-121-15-august-2024 [accessed: 25 August 2024]        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On Friday, 1 November 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a thought-provoking workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Mapenane High School, delving deep into the history, structure, and practical applications of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. This timely workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, providing a valuable opportunity to move beyond the textbook and explore the real-world relevance of this seminal document. Throughout the workshop, Morathi skillfully guided the learners through a comprehensive examination of the Constitution's Preamble, as well as the nation's revered symbols, such as the National Anthem and Flag. By fostering an engaging and interactive environment, Morathi empowered the learners to actively participate, asking insightful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues at hand. This dynamic exchange not only deepened the learners' understanding of the Constitution but also instilled in them a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. The workshops, which are currently being rolled out in schools across Gauteng's Tshwane West District, aim to teach, motivate, inspire, and encourage learners, while also building and supporting them in the areas of Values in Education and Social Cohesion. Morathi's facilitation was marked by his ability to navigate these sensitive discussions with care and sensitivity, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns without fear of judgment or repercussion. The Inclusive Society Institute extends its heartfelt gratitude to the district officials, teachers, and learners of the various high schools visited so far, for their invaluable cooperation and support. As the learners prepare for their upcoming exams, the institute wishes them the very best in their academic endeavors, confident that the insights gained from this transformative workshop will serve as a solid foundation for their continued growth and success as engaged and informed citizens of South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an impactful and engaging workshop for 168 Grade 11 learners at Setlalentoa High School on Monday, 4 November 2024. This workshop was specifically designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document – the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, the workshop provided valuable real-world context and relevance, delving into the Preamble, National Symbols like the Anthem and Flag, and the importance of key civic values and social cohesion. As the session progressed, the learners grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted. The facilitator skillfully navigated these discussions, ensuring each student felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end, the learners left with a heightened sense of awareness regarding their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. This workshop is part of a broader initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to roll out similar sessions across the Tshwane West District of Gauteng, with the ultimate goal of instilling a profound appreciation for the Constitution and fostering proud, engaged citizens. The institute has observed that many schools no longer regularly hold assemblies that include the singing of the National Anthem, the raising of the National Flag, and the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble. They are therefore encouraging all schools to reinstate these practices, as they believe these simple yet powerful acts can go a long way in cultivating a deep sense of national pride and civic responsibility among the learners. As the Inclusive Society Institute looks ahead to the new academic year of 2025, they remain committed to building on the success of this workshop and continuing to empower South Africa's youth to become active, informed, and engaged citizens who uphold the values enshrined in the country's foundational document.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, was invited to participate and speak at the 22nd Conference on International Exchange of Professionals, which was held in Shanghai from 1 to 3 November 2024.   The CEO spoke during the session on ‘Promoting Green and Low-Carbon Development in China and Africa through Scientific and Technological Innovation in Resource and Environment’. The title of his contribution was ‘How China can Accelerate Africa’s Green economy’ [Click here to view the PowerPoint presentation] .   Included in the conference itinerary was an academic exchange hosted by the Zheijiang Normal University’s Institute of African Studies (ZJNU IAS) and attendance of the 5th meeting of the Abuja Forum, a co-organised event between the ZJNU IAS and the Gusau Institute, Nigeria. The CEO participated in the panel discussion on the role of security cooperation in prioritizing devlopment.   The third element of the visit was the attendance of the forum themed ‘Exchanges and Mutual Learning, People-to-people Bond, Win-win Cooperation’, which was hosted by The People’s Government of Zheijiang Province.   And lastly, he attended the Forum on 2024 China-Africa Industrial Cooperation and Cross-borderr E-commerce Development’, which was organised by the College of Economics and Management, ZJNU.   At an appointment ceremony on 6 November 2024, Swanepoel was appointed as a Distinguished Visiting Professor of the IAS for a five year term

The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a dynamic and engaging workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Kgatoentle Secondary School on Thursday, 17 October 2024. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more nuanced understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Aligning perfectly with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this seminal document. The facilitator, Patrick Morathi, skillfully guided the learners through key aspects of the Constitution, including an in-depth look at the Preamble and the nation's official symbols, such as the national anthem and flag. This interactive exploration not only enhanced the students' knowledge but also inspired them to think critically about the Constitution's role in shaping their identities as young South African citizens. As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted by the facilitator. Morathi navigated these lively discussions with aplomb, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end of the workshop, the students left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities, better equipped to navigate the complexities of civic engagement and social cohesion. The Inclusive Society Institute is currently rolling out these transformative workshops across the Gauteng province, with a particular focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. One key observation from these workshops is that many schools no longer hold or conduct regular school assemblies, where the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag, coupled with the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble, would typically take place. The Inclusive Society Institute strongly encourages schools to reinstate these important rituals, as they play a vital role in instilling a sense of national pride and fostering a deeper understanding of South Africa's democratic foundations among the learners. By ensuring that students regularly engage with these symbolic representations of their country, the institute aims to cultivate a new generation of proud, engaged, and socially conscious citizens, who will shape the future of their beloved nation.

Occasional Paper 8/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4 THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE Pathway to a People’s Plan for South Africa     Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies     Abstract   South African society remains unjust and unsustainably unequal. For many years, voices from all corners have suggested that processes be undertaken to give rightful expression to the transformational aspirations captured in the South African constitution. With the formation of the Government of National Unity signifying a recalibration in South Africa’s political order, the time may just be right to initiate a new process towards greater peoples’ power. A process that will structurally and comprehensively address the enduring societal hardships and bring about a more just and equitable society for all. This paper discusses the potential that a comprehensive consultative national dialogue has in critically addressing South Africa’s persistent problems. It proposes that such a dialogue holds enormous potential to convene a common South African vision, and suggests the pathways and processes needed for it to bring about socio-economic transformation.   The members of the 7th administration in the Government of National Unity (GNU)         Picture: X / South African Government   Introduction   A comprehensive national consultative dialogue (national dialogue) is being advanced as a suitable pathway to equitably and justly transform South African society. The calls for such a process have grown louder following the electoral shift from single-party rule, with the Government of National Unity being an expression of where the country finds itself. In the way that negotiation and consensus brought about the Government of National Unity, so too a national dialogue can give rise to a people of national unity.   In his inauguration speech following the recent national elections, President Ramaphosa invited “all parties, civil society, labour, business and other formations to a national dialogue on the critical challenges facing the nation”. Whereas the President’s leadership should be appreciated; the national dialogue should not be led by government alone, nor should it be steered by any one sector. Instead, it must entail an extensive negotiation between all sectors of society. For the process of a national dialogue to be authoritative and for its goals and programmes actionable, it must entail the expressed will of the majority of South Africans. For it to be an effective common vision, the active participation and assent of all of society is required. It is from its democratic participation and accord that a national dialogue receives its legitimacy, and it is its legitimacy that affords it power.   To ensure its legitimacy, the processes and structures of the national dialogue are extremely significant. As with the consultative process that gave expression to the democratic state, so too will it require the consultation and consensus by comprehensive stakeholders, to recognise and understand each other, and to cohere what is needed to realise development and transformation. In appreciating that its process will be protracted and complicated, this paper nevertheless recognises the urgent need to commence the process. It thus seeks to contribute to a broader discussion about the merits, processes and structures required to make the dialogue effective.   Towards a legitimate national dialogue   A national dialogue is an inclusive and transparent negotiating mechanism that is used to influence and give shape to a new socio-political consensus. National dialogues have typically taken place in countries undergoing significant political transition (e.g. Benin, Togo, Yemen)  (Papagianni, 2016). These dialogues involve a broad range of stakeholders collectively discussing issues and proposing pathways to find common ground and resolution. National dialogues are therefore protracted social negotiations between parties with clear positions and interests.   The intention that goes into its formation and the way a national dialogue is put together is of utmost importance. In a give-and-take manner they engage the diverse views and interests of participants. The goal is then to deliver a constructive settlement. A consensual programme of action that the different parties can accept and implement. A national dialogue, therefore, offers passage through transition. Through recognising others and being recognised. Through the process of finding consensus through compromise, it embodies and directs the new (transitioned) political order. Such a new political order is often captured in a new national constitution – a basic set of laws and principles to guide the nation. Where legitimate constitutions are in place, a people’s plan of action is commensurate.   National dialogues offer a comprehensive path for all citizens to be part of the political process. This process of claiming political agency, mobilising towards a cause, is not new in South Africa. In fact, South Africa’s culture of political mobilisation is a national asset which, if rekindled can substantially advance the national project. In the manner that the Freedom Charter claimed that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, and that the people shall govern (African National Congress, 2024), so too the myriad of formations of the 1980s rallied around and then realised the concepts of people’s power and a people’s government (South African History Online, 2024). It was through claiming political agency that political agency was attained. So too it must be through inclusive measures that collectively address inequality, that a more inclusive and equal society will be engendered.   While the negotiations and consultations of the 1990s established a value-based South African national order, bringing about the settlement of disorder and separateness, no supplementary people’s driven programme of societal action was established so to ensure equitable and just transformation. Instead of an additional engagement whereby the various sectors and stakeholders convened to set out and pursue such a programme, the new government, as the authoritative representatives of the people, was singularly charged to give expression to development through the realm of governmental policy.    Today, whereas South Africa has an established and legitimate political order, much of the inequities and inequalities that were present at the turn to democracy, remain unresolved. The government’s centralised, top-heavy approach to development has neglected participative democracy, the very claim of the ‘people’s power’. The receding of the public’s political involvement in the democratic era has left the application of constitutional values and aspirations to the centralised government, supplemented by non-governmental entities and philanthropy. Instead, to give true expression to the constitution, a bottom-up, people’s programme of action is needed.    By bringing together the interests, the needs and the proposed solutions of citizens, the national dialogue will consolidate society-wide development structures. Citizens must take ownership of South Africa’s strategic transformation, giving expression to the human-centred and progressive values and principles of the constitution.   It is therefore the process of South African Constitutionalism, the responsibility of every citizen to the nation, that must be inspected and debated. To effectively bring about the resolution of the national challenges, the national dialogue must have broadly endorsed structures with inclusive programmes that are manageable and well communicated. These structures and the issues they address must find comprehensive support. Such support ensures that discussions move beyond elite-level decision-making and allows for the constructive resolution of national issues. Public participation: The bedrock of a national dialogue   It is from extensive public participation that national dialogues gain their legitimacy, giving rise to a people of national unity. The national dialogue process can take from the constitutional negotiations and the public participation programme run by the Constitutional Assembly. The South African constitution did not derive its authority from imposition, but from being the result of a participative process of constitution-making. The extensive consultation and rationalisation by a broad cross-section of South Africans over a period of two years, collectively afforded the constitution its undisputed legitimacy. The final constitution was the endpoint of a consensus. A product of the rationalisation and then legitimation of the perceptions of a diverse people (Salazar, 2008).   The same holds for the national dialogue, which seeks not only to build consensus, but through consultation to channel the society’s demands, assign responsibility and deliver on its needs. To be an expression of the people’s will, the process and undertakings must initiate a public meeting space where different stakeholders, many of whom have never met, encounter each other so to establish new meaning and a new national narrative.   The proceedings of the national dialogue must be nationally structured and clearly communicated, so to ensure broad participation. The national dialogue must therefore entail a whole-of-society undertaking. Box-ticking exercises, such as those facilitated by the Presidency at the Social Cohesion Summit and Presidential Social Sector Summit, have been insufficient (Ramaphosa, 2022). In the case of the latter, civil society was invited for a two-day event, only to be spoken to and finally rounded into groups, afforded two hours to produce suggestions to impact government. Very little can be expected to follow. Indeed, these approaches may only facilitate a further break in trust between the citizens and the elite.   The national dialogue must rekindle and restore public participation as the expression of people’s power. By engaging in the process, citizens position themselves at the centre of power. The constitution makes it clear: in a representative democracy the public shall be given the space to influence policy outcomes that give expression to the will of the people (Legislative Sector South Africa, 2013). Not only did the government capture and overly centralise political power during the last 30 years, thereby not fulfilling its constitutional mandate to facilitate and incorporate public participation, but the public has also failed to move beyond simple electoral representation. The citizenry has reneged to sufficiently give expression to the very process of democracy.   Whereas during the Constitutional Assembly where a communication strategy ensured public participation and therefore ensured the authority of its outcomes, government and the legislature have resorted to box-ticking exercises. It is imperative that the national dialogue draw from the Constitutional Assembly. That it informs while it stimulates public participation – that listening is as central as speaking. In building new mechanisms that connect to the people (much easier in today’s digital realm), the national dialogue will give meaning and direction to public participation in the contemporary age.   Establishing the structure for South Africa’s national dialogue   For years, progressives have said that to realise effective transformation, South Africans must engage in a process that ensures justice and therefore the very survival of the state. Thus far, the public discussion on a national dialogue has mostly reflected the need for it. Very little has been proposed in terms of what types of processes and structures would ensure its legitimacy and effectiveness.   This paper does not attempt to address the substantive nature of the national dialogue. This will be debated and established by its participants. It is therefore imperative that it is structured so as to allow for a protracted, open and engaging space of talking and listening. But the national dialogue cannot only be a talk-shop. Its structure must be goals- and outcomes oriented. In doing so, the very process of the dialogue will see to it that new perceptions emerge. When different actors from different cultures navigate in good faith to find each other, they will craft new meanings and, in the process, quite tangibly build the nation. They will give expression to the present moment and its’ predicaments. Much like Desmond Tutu’s claim that South Africans are the rainbow people of God (Tutu, 1996), thereby uniting black and white during the transition, so too new understandings, new rhetorical mechanisms will emerge when the different sectors deliberate about the present moment.   Thorough preparation will be central to its success. Before its commencement, the national dialogue must establish its independent relationship to the existing state institutions. It must be clear about its mandate and where it fits into the legal and political system. Its powers, decision-making ability and dispute resolution mechanisms, along with other technical aspects must be clarified before it can start its proceedings. So too, it must be determined where the process will be allocated. Which government department will fund and oversee the proceedings.   The first step would be to convene a preparatory committee to assemble all aspects required for the dialogue. Where countries are in transition, the preparatory committees are typically steered by a collective comprising a variety of factions. In the case of South Africa, a constitutional democracy, the Constitutional Court is the legitimate authority. The Constitutional Court could thus assist in the process by assembling a preparatory committee. In the way that CODESA was opened by Chief Justice Corbett, so too the court could assist in initial proceedings (South African History Online, 2024a). By doing so, it lends it legitimacy. This committee must be broadly representative, thereby averting the criticism lodged against CODESA, that it was dominated by the political elite. Once the committee is elected the court should withdraw from the proceedings.   Once established, a strategic communication team could be brought in to assist. Together they could draw up a compelling case for the national dialogue, ensuring that potential participants and the public at large comprehend the nature of the dialogue, the urgency of the proceedings and how it will be in their interest to participate.   The preparatory committee would be responsible for amongst others:    Determining the pool size of dialogue participants. Establishing the method, criteria and process whereby dialogue participants are selected. A step-by-step process should establish how to determine which groupings or constituencies (political parties, religious bodies, civil society groupings, professional bodies, interest and business groups etc.) be included. The committee would then have to agree on sub-categories and the sub-division of categories (e.g. which and how many participants from each constituency are invited). In determining the pool of participants, space should be allowed both for participants that are appointed or nominated and for self-selection. This will allow for representivity while ensuring no group has too much influence. The committee will also have to determine the basis for participation and which principles determine participation. Drafting the parameters that all constituencies must undertake to respect. Determining the time frame and the different stages of the proceedings. Establish a mechanism through which to assist the different constituencies in the process of the dialogue. Determining the logistics, including the details of the venues, support for participants to travel to the venues, use of technology, security and other considerations.  Drafting the agenda for and setting the dates for the initial series of meetings. It is from this series of meetings, whereby all participants will be included and where each will have equal representation, that the final structure and substance of the national dialogue will be established.   Sourcing, managing and allocation of funding    Whereas a preparatory committee would conceive of the broader framework of the national dialogue, the totality of participants would convene to design its structure and assign its substance. The first series of discussions must deliberate and set out the following:   Steering committee:   A representative steering committee could be democratically elected from the broad range of participants in the first sitting. The steering committee could then take over from the preparatory committee and would consist of a broad collection of parties, thereby ensuring inclusivity. It would confirm or amend the decisions of the preparatory committee. It would lead the establishment of the structure and manage the process of the national dialogue. The steering committee would oversee: The facilitation of the national dialogue Setting the agenda Where meetings are to take place, how and when Establish the decision-making process, including decision-making responsibility and how decisions are made (e.g. simple majority). How participants are to be regulated and if need be, disciplined How to keep participants accountable How funding is to be sourced and disbursed The role of outside players, such as regional bodies and international non-government entities The establishment of a secretariat, and detailing its resourcing and duties of the secretariate How the final resolution will be drawn up and implemented   It could be that when the steering committee is democratically elected from the floor, the floor then deliberates and agrees on the number of working groups. Discussing and agreeing on the topics or themes of the different working groups. Themes could be drawn from the values and aspirations set out in the Constitution.   Working groups:   How many working groups are to be established and how each will be composed so to ensure representativity. The election of working group chairs and secretaries. How much time will be afforded to deliberate before agreement or sufficient consensus is required. What sufficient consensus entails and how each group will reach sufficient consensus. Each group, due to their varied composition will establish their own understanding of sufficient consensus.    Declaration of intent   A proposed final task of the initial meetings would be to establish a declaration of intent for the national dialogue. It is critical that all parties to the dialogue collectively commit to such a shared basic programme of action.    In its Declaration of Intent, CODESA sought to establish a democratic, non-discriminatory constitution; a unitary state composed of a diversity of cultures, religions and linguistic groups; constitutional supremacy; multi-party democracy; separation of powers; and universal human rights and civil liberties. It also agreed that all proposals should be consistent with democracy, and that a mechanism would be established, in co-operation with government, to draft the texts of legislation required to give effect to its agreements (African National Congress, 2024a).   Codesa: Declaration of Intent     Picture: https://ourconstitution.wethepeoplesa.org/the-convention-for-a-democratic-south-africa/    Similarly, the current Government of National Unity is undergirded by the foundational principles, basic minimum programme and modalities that are set out in its Statement of Intent (African National Congress, 2024b). Both pledges sought to offer a guiding document that set out the policy direction and agenda. Establishing how the parties would work together, and how a common goal would bind them together. By detailing and agreeing to these details, the diverse participants were able to collectively pursue the same end from their different means and ways. The establishment of a declaration of intent, to guide its processes, will be invaluable to the successful implementation of the national dialogue.     A People’s Plan   The discussions at the working groups, whether about crime, justice, inequality etc., will inform the national comprehension of each topic. After sufficient consensus is attained, each working group would draw up their findings and proposals.   The steering committee, with the assistance of an appointed communications team, would then undertake a protracted, nation-wide consultative process. It is imperative that South African citizens not only be informed about the dialogue but that they actively take part therein. People should be able to contribute to the substantive nature of the themes, so to take ownership of the process and its outcomes. The public participation programme would be most effective when it is widely mediatised, so to ensure accessibility and transparency. Like the communication roll-out during the Constitutional Assembly process, publications, now primarily through digital media, would provide detailed insight.   After an extensive public participation programme, the accumulated views and inputs would be synchronised and brought to the final phase of the national dialogue. The plenary constituting the entire pool of national dialogue participants would meet to discuss the outputs of the working groups, in conjunction with the additional contributions of the public. In this manner, the outcomes will be a truly South African product of its people. During the final plenaries, a final People’s Plan for South Africa will be debated and then assembled.   Whereas the National Development Plan, released in 2012, involved many experts and non-governmental constituencies, it remained a product of government. A prescribed vision. As a democracy with a consultative political culture, a Plan that is visibly and audibly a product of the people, one that gives expression to their lived realities and that arose from their experiences will have the potential to be truly transformative. It will be a democratic product, one that everyone can feel that they have a say in and can take ownership over. The National Development Plan should not be discarded, but as government’s plan it should be consulted and aligned so to underpin the People’s Plan.   A People’s Pledge, undersigned by citizens, businesses, civil society organisations etc. can be developed as a summarised version of the Plan. In so doing, it will allow citizens to expressly commit to a just and transformed South Africa.   Conclusion   A comprehensive national dialogue offers a pathway to establishing a common vision and People’s Plan. A Plan that will give expression to the values and aspirations of the South African Constitution. For too long, South Africans have possessed over an extraordinarily progressive Constitution without experiencing what it is truly capable of.   For too long, economic and social inequalities have delayed the justice that was promised with the transition to democracy.   For too long effective transformation and development have been bungled or deferred.   It is time that the people’s power that was fought for is given its true expression. The national dialogue and a People’s Plan offer the opportunity to remake the nation. To move South Africa away from its unsustainable path as an utterly unequal society. To bring about Constitutional transformation that is real and felt. And to instil meaning and purpose, so as to truly give expression to a united national identity.   References   African National Congress, 2024. The Freedom Charter. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/the-freedom-charter-2/  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   African National Congress, 2024a. CODESA: Declaration of Intent. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/declarations-1991-codesa-declaration-of-intent/  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   African National Congress, 2024b. Statement of Intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/  [accessed 6 September 2024].   Legislative Sector South Africa, 2016. Public Participation Framework for the South African Legislative Sector. [Online] Available at: https://sals.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/ppf.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   Papagianni, K. 2016. Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper No. 3: National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions. Civil Society Dialogue Network . [Online] Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/National-Dialogue-Processes-in-Political-Transitions-January-2014.pdf  [accessed: 12 September 2024].   Ramaphosa, C. 2022. President to address presidential social sector summit. [Online] Available at: https://thepresidency.gov.za/president-address-presidential-social-sector-summit  [accessed: 8 September 2024].   Salazar, P-J. 2008. An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa . Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Cape Town.   South African History Online, 2024. People’s Power, 1986. [Online] Available at: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/peoples-power-1986  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   South African History Online, 2024a. Convention for a Democratic South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   Tutu, D. 1996. The Rainbow People of God: The Making of a Peaceful Revolution . Random House Publishing Group, Cape Town.        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On Tuesday, 15 October 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an engaging and enlightening workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Modiri Secondary School. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, this interactive session explored the real-world relevance and practical applications of this pivotal document, delving into its history, structure, and core components such as the Preamble and the country's National Symbols, including the National Anthem and Flag.   The workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curricula, providing a valuable opportunity to enrich their knowledge and critical thinking. As the session progressed, the students grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thought-provoking questions and sharing their own insightful perspectives on the issues highlighted by the skilled facilitator. Morathi skillfully navigated these engaging discussions, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns, ultimately leaving the workshop with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens.   This transformative workshop is part of a broader initiative being rolled out in Gauteng schools, with a specific focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. As schools across the province approach and prepare for their final exams, the Inclusive Society Institute has planned a series of additional engagements to continue this important work.   On 17 October 2024, the team will visit Kgantoentle Secondary School in Zone 2, Ga-Rankuwa, followed by sessions at Setlalentoa High School in Zone 5, Ga-Rankuwa on 4 November 2024, and finally, Mapenane High School in Zone 16, Ga-Rankuwa on 6 November 2024. Through these impactful workshops, the institute aims to inspire and empower learners, fostering a deeper understanding of the Constitution and its role in shaping a more just, equitable, and socially cohesive South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute together with Koinonia and the Athlone Parliamentary Constituency Office hosted its yearly Youth Leadership Camp, from 4 – 6 October. Under the theme Active Citizens Serving South Africa , the camp brought together more than 50 youths from across the Cape Metro and the Cape Winelands.   Over two, busy and exciting days, the youngsters were not only taught about the Constitution, leadership skills, critical thinking and effective communication, but they were also given the opportunity to share their thoughts, their passions and their concerns for South Africa.   The camp started with former Parliamentarian Faiez Jacobs, who set the scene in South Africa. He shared how South Africa is on a path of transformative change. How the government and the citizens must together build a more equal and just future for everyone. After dinner, Klaus Kotzé from the Institute introduced the participants to critical thinking and effective communication. This workshop asked participants to think about and to construct arguments for a better South Africa. It advanced the idea of active and participative democracy, assisting the youth to activate their agency constructively, through debate.   Saturday morning started with the entire camp taking part in a mental health awareness walk in the beautiful Paarl Arboretum. The outing was followed by the Institute’s flagship Constitutional training programme: Taking the Constitution to the People . Here the participants were introduced to the meaning of the Constitution, its values and aspirations. The participants were asked to critically engage with the substance of the Constitution, and to find ways where they can activate its transformational intentions in their daily lives. After an engaging session, the youngsters had a well-deserved break at the pool.   The afternoon’s workshop was hosted by Amanda Rinquest and Thandi Henkeman from Black Sash who graciously gave up their Saturday afternoon to talk about how the Constitution guides leadership and active citizenry in South Africa. The participants were taken through practical examples and thoroughly enjoyed the engaging session. After some more fun, team-building activities, Eddie Williams from Koinonia hosted the very popular Potjie-kos competition. Each group was given the same ingredients, and around a massive fire, laughter and new-born friendship welcomed in the night. The last activity of the evening saw the local filmmaker Nadine Cloete showcase some of her documentaries, shot on location in the Cape. It was a great opportunity for the youngsters to engage with films that they could relate to.   Sunday morning was spent re-capping the substance and intentions of the camp. Participants were asked to reflect on their experiences and develop strategic plans detailing how they will apply their new skills in their community as active citizens. Each group was asked to compile a list of commitments that they could pledge to and with their paint-covered hands everyone involved at the camp pledged their intentions on large papers, provided.   The very successful second Youth Leadership Camp was concluded with a certificate ceremony and a boisterous rendition of the national anthem which left this writer not only with goosebumps but with unmitigated hope for the future of South Africa.

Ms. Buyelwa Sonjica, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, recently represented the Institute at a high-level roundtable event hosted by the Centre for International Policy-Africa (CIP-Africa) in collaboration with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa. The event, which took place on September 24th, 2024 at the Johari Rotana Hotel in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, brought together a distinguished group of experts to engage in a closed-door discussion on regional peace and security, with a particular focus on the role that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can play during this pivotal time.   As Tanzania prepares to assume the chairpersonship of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, this roundtable provided a strategic platform for high-level dialogue and critical thinking. The organizers recognized the pressing need to create a forum where government representatives, think tanks, and key security sector stakeholders could come together to discuss the regional peace and security architecture and identify priority areas for Tanzania to address during its leadership tenure.   The discussions aimed to assess the current security landscape, particularly in the volatile regions of Northern Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado area, where ongoing conflicts and instability have posed significant challenges to regional stability.   By facilitating this constructive dialogue, the event sought to provide valuable insights and recommendations that could inform Tanzania's approach to strengthening SADC's role in restoring peace and security in the region, ultimately contributing to the overall well-being and prosperity of the Southern African community.

The Shaanxi (China) - Western Cape (South Africa) Economic and Trade Cooperation Negotiation Conference, held on 19 September 2024, at the Rockefeller Hotel in Cape Town, brought together key stakeholders to foster economic collaboration. Organized by the CCPIT Shaanxi Sub-Council and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with support from the China-Africa Silk Road Industry Cooperation Promotion Center, the event was a platform for discussions and the signing of agreements.   The conference began with opening remarks by Mr Li Jun, Vice Governor of Shaanxi Province, and Alderman James Vos, City of Cape Town’s Mayoral Committee Member for Economic Growth. This was followed by the signing of trade agreements between New Airline Group and VALUE Group, as well as between Shaanxi Tourism Group and Ridgemorvilla Estate, showcasing the potential for tourism and transportation sector growth.   Mr Tang Changan from the Chinese Consulate-General and Ms Erica Joubert from Wesgro, delivered speeches emphasizing the mutual benefits of China-South Africa trade partnerships. Deputy Chairperson of the ISI, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica also shared her insights. The event concluded with a business matching and negotiation session, paving the way for future investments and strengthened economic ties between the Shaanxi Province and the Western Cape.

Occasional Paper 6/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. SEPTEMBER 2024 SOUTH AFRICA’S INTEREST: PEOPLE-CENTERED AND PRAGMATIC Pursuing a progressive policy with realist considerations   Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies (Source: istockphoto.com – iStock-2113233015) “Foreign policy and national interests should be debated much more vigorously. The sad fact is that in practice there is no debate on the issues” (Le Pere and Vickers, 2004).   Abstract   The national interest is a useful concept that does not receive sufficient critical engagement in South Africa. Considered as its ambition or reason, states must perceive, articulate and pursue their national interests. Its turn to a multiparty Government of National Unity, together with the ongoing changes in international relations, present opportunities to recast South Africa’s national policy and governance.   This paper explores the meaning and purpose of the national interest, conceptually. It then assesses how it has been perceived and used in post-Apartheid South Africa. Lastly, the paper suggests that South Africa’s national interest approach be drawn from its national identity and aspirational, value-based Constitution. It should balance between a realist and idealist approach, while strategically considering domestic and international concerns. Ultimately, the national interest is more than a government concept. Its true value and power is discharged when society at large grasps its potential and participates in its actualisation.    Introduction   In a fracturing and evolving world, states must perceive, articulate and pursue their national interests. In 1994 South Africa turned from its securocrat system of maintaining control over a population, to embrace a human-centred approach guided by the value-based Constitution. This turn to non-racial democracy ushered in a new political reality and with it a new national interest.   Thirty years later, South Africa is again pivoting. For the first time in its democratic history, the African National Congress did not garner an outright majority. The formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) compromising several parties demonstrates a reboot in the national political environment. It ushers in a seminal moment to recast policy and governance. The turn from the ideological dominance of a single party to the GNU’s broadly representative pursuit of the national project, as guided by its Statement of Intent , demonstrates a reorientation of the state. The changed internal dynamics, as well as the increasingly fluid landscape between states, necessitates a revision of South Africa’s national interest.   This paper undertakes a critical assessment so to guide South Africa’s thinking about its national interest. It does so by first exploring the meaning and purpose of the concept. It then discerns how the national interest has been interpreted in democratic South Africa. This is done by analysing official documentation. Lastly, the paper looks at how the national interest should be interpreted and applied, so as to best give expression to the strategic vision and goals of the South African state. In so doing, it will show how the national interest is a useful concept for drawing in diverse stakeholders and bolstering participatory politics during the seventh administration. A way to popularise the ideals of the state. Giving personal and collective expression to both domestic and international policy and ultimately advancing the state.    Delineating the national interest   In 1949, the German American jurist and political scientist Hans Morgenthau infused the words national interest  with contemporary meaning. At a time when the world was entering a new macro political arrangement, Morgenthau spoke of the primacy of the national interest (Morgenthau, 1949). That in the grand arrangement of states, power is the goal. States, according to Morgenthau (writing particularly of the United States), must act so to maintain, enable and advance their power. His was a realist approach to politics. An approach which, while recognising that the world has no central authority and thus anarchic, political interactions are contests between self-interested states.   Power in this realist gaze is the ability to pursue one’s own ends without hindrance. It is also the ability to determine the actions and decisions of others. The pursuit of power, in this realist view, is the reason for the state. This perception is rooted in the deeply sceptical Machiavellian instincts of warring between European states over the centuries. It is, ultimately, a strategic response to the conditions on the ground. Or, what is known as the political environment. Here power entails a zero-sum game; power over, vis a vis other iterations, such as power with. The primacy of this form of power in a state’s affairs ensures a race to the top, and thus the concomitant race from the bottom. According to Morgenthau, “moral principles and the national interest have contented for dominance over the minds and actions of men throughout the history of the modern state system” (Ibid, 208).    This well-known perception of the national interest is countervailing. To maximise the significance of a state’s national interest, its conceptual approach must be recognised. The realist determination also offers meaning to its counterparts which sees the reason of the state through an idealist or moralist gaze. Here the state is guided by principles to pursue value-based ends.   A state’s national interest will differ both in meaning and substance from one state to the next. It can thus be seen as a realist, idealist or a qualified composite. It all depends on the strategic lens through which the state chooses to perceive its national interest. How a situation is interpreted will depend on the approach undertaken.   Morgenthau’s definition assists in guiding how a state should perceive its national interest. The path, or strategic approach, of any state, should be determined by what he called the political reality: “the choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality” (Morgenthau, 1951: 33).    Real governance   The distinction between real (direct) and ideal (indirect or soft) power is important within the (contemporary) exercise of international power. Foucault reminds us that “the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcomes” (Foucault, 1982). The system that has steered the global power arrangement since prevailing in the Cold War, the last contest for global power, has done exactly that. The West and particularly the United States has guided the realm of possibilities of the global governance system by providing a series of possible outcomes.   In the absence of a guiding alternative, the period since the Cold War has seen states behave more like federated provinces in a global arrangement than truly sovereign and thus independent entities. The dominance of ascendent Western power has seen to it that nations forego their strategic autonomy so as to benefit from global markets and other privileges of the international order. They have also been kept safe, whether it be direct protection or by being spared incursion. The result is thus that real and soft power has been waged by a determinist apex power which in turn has charged the global environment with a specific set of ideals. Most other states, so as not to encroach upon the superpower, have been determined by (and mostly adopted) an accorded realm of ideas: democracy, human rights, etc.   The world’s states, including South Africa, were shaped by this normative framework of global power. States followed international prescripts. Both assuming a normative framework in their interaction between other states, but tellingly also in the ways that they perceived and enacted their domestic affairs. In so doing, states such as South Africa exercised partial sovereignty.   This short period where national alignment afforded access and benevolence has come to an end. The pressure on European and Asian states away from Russia and China, respectively, and towards the interests of the United States, signals pressure and co-optation as opposed to accommodation. This is not a cold, irrational reaction but partly in response to an outward campaign of attraction (and co-optation) by these very states. Including Russia, China and Iran, states pursuing independent and increasingly active foreign policies.   In toto, these movements signal the end of the singular hegemonic moment. The United States no longer has the means nor the strategic will to charge such an international realm of ideals. This closure clarifies that instead of a period of multilateralism, the recent period has been one of privileged inclusion. Compositely, the world is returning to an unfolding period of (great) power politics.   For states to pursue their national interests, they must autonomously make sense of and articulate these perceptions. They cannot understand their ideas through external concepts or approaches. A perceptive clarity of self – a national identity - is needed. The realist vision of Machiavelli is useful here. He stressed that states and their statesmen should interpret the world as is, rather than how it should be. For a state to, therefore, have a discernible national interest. For it to put its own ideas into action, it must have a discernible identity.   Notwithstanding the dominance of a superpower or multiple vying superpowers, states are the legitimate units of power. The United Nations as the primary arrangement of international power provides states with the exercise of self-interest. Article two of the United Nations Charter clearly sets out that members of the organisation are sovereign equal members. It is thus incumbent upon states to formulate and express their sovereignty, while asserting the mandate of the charter and respecting the sovereignty of others.   While it appears contradictory to contemporary globalist perceptions, multilateralism is not when all states agree or pursue the same approach. Instead, it is when states give expression to their national interests in concert with others. Such a concert of voices has not matured beyond the ritual of the yearly United Nations General Assembly, where most states use a portion of their allotted time to recognise the primacy of the United Nations. It is incumbent on each state to claim its authority and express its own views. The formulation and articulation of its interests are important components of a successful state. It sets out meaning, purpose, orientation and direction. It defines and claims a state’s place among other states. It presents a consolidated expression of self, from which a foreign policy can be built. A state’s national interest thus emerges from its context, both domestic and international.    Towards a working definition of South Africa’s national interest   The realist / idealist axis   From the paragraphs above it emerges that a nation cannot perceive its interests using external logics or paradigms. It must consider the (comprehensive) political reality while giving expression to domestic identity and policy. Van Nieuwkerk, in his 2004 essay South Africa’s National Interest , suggests that the national interest is not sufficiently debated in South Africa. “Adeptness at identifying the national interest and pursuing it in a creative way is part of the challenge of governance and state leadership in the current global arena” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 99). For his part, the author continues the predominant realist approach, suggesting that a state’s national goals should be formulated following thorough consideration of the global strategic environment. To this consideration, one should add the local environment to which we return later.   Context matters to national interests. It is determined by an array of forces and agents. It is therefore not only insufficient but can at times also be detrimental for a state to determine its national interest only based on ideals. Ideals for their ambition seek to shape and not contend with context. In the case of early democratic South Africa, it was fortuitous that its principled Constitutionalism coincided with a world embracing a collective, idealist moment – pursuing liberal democracy guided and protected by the Western order. The end of this moment is a reason to reflect and pivot. Van Nieuwkerk warns against a purely value-based national interest. Such an ideologically driven approach is said to be insufficient and would manifest in “misperception, or an absence of means-ends calculations, that could lead to costly policy and strategy failures (Ibid: 91) …and that an “overtly pursuing a human rights-based foreign policy is a delicate balancing act at the most of times” (Ibid. 93).   The White Paper on South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions , 1998, is one of the first democratic-era documents to offer clarity on how South Africa views its national interest. The document states that “South Africa’s emerging national interest is underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution…a commitment to the promotion of human rights; a commitment to the promotion of democracy…” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). This sentimental concept is developed and gives expression to an idealist national interest in a broader domestic and international context of democratisation.   The 2012 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy presents a national interest that has matured, somewhat. The White Paper foregrounds common humanity, relationship-building and interdependence when it describes South Africa’s foreign policy as a “diplomacy of ubuntu” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). Ubuntu is the Southern African maxim of a shared humanity. That one derives one’s existence and place in the world together with others. Or as per the Zulu ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu : I am because you are. The South African approach to its national interest is collaborative and inclusive. It is pursued cooperatively and through an interdependent arrangement of states. Such an approach does not pursue a (narrow) national interest but a regional, continental and global interest.   The White Paper claims that “it is in our national interest to promote and support the positive development of others” (Ibid: 4). Throughout its democratic era, South Africa has maintained its “national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity…(and) accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent” (Ibid: 3). Regional or continental anchoring does a few things. First, as Africa’s most industrialised and developed country, South Africa’s continentalism seeks to propel itself through propelling the continent. It does this to recognise the historical debt to African states who supported the liberation movement in the anti-apartheid struggle. It also does this not to isolate, nor to elevate itself and thus assumes continental leadership without enforcing authority.   The ubuntu diplomacy, an expression of internationalism, has seen South Africa steadfastly campaign for the continent on the global stage, whether at multilateral fora such as the United Nations General Assembly or during bilateral engagements with global powers. This diplomatic entrepreneurialism has seen South Africa punch above its weight on the international stage. It has secured some significant victories. It is widely considered that South Africa was brought into the BRICS arrangement of states as a continental representative.   South Africa’s humanist, ubuntu diplomacy has given expression to the predominant global idealism. Its outward focus – promoting global ideals – has contributed to the substantiation of modern internationalism. The 2012 White Paper suggests that “since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. South Africa has risen to the challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally” (Ibid: 4). South Africa’s idealist foreign policy has actively sought to sustain and strengthen the multilateral system; by aligning and building this arrangement it advances itself.   While there may be secondary value in integrating its interests to that of a broader arrangement that supports the same ideals, a state must first be able to hold its own when the global arrangement breaks down. Recently, the increasing discord among great powers has exposed significant weaknesses in the global governance arrangement. This is best seen with the failures of the United Nations Security Council seize or prevent blatant atrocities, whether in Ukraine, Palestine and elsewhere. Power leveraging is here to stay, it will only become more recalcitrant. States with an idealist approach and no realist reinforcement will remain circumscribed going forward.   The strategic approach of the new British government proposes the use of real means to advance progressive ends. This presents a compelling path to advance national interests in the contemporary setting. “Instead of realism for transactional purposes”, the thinking goes, “we want to use it in the service of progressive goals…it is the pursuit of ideals without delusions about what is achievable…Progressive realism is not only defined by the policies we espouse, but by the approach we take to diplomacy” (Lammy, 2024). South Africa’s new government should take heed of this strategic calculation: pursuing a progressive policy with realist considerations. We return to this later.   The domestic / international axis   The 2012 White Paper makes a poignant observation. It states that foreign policy should take “into account the ever-evolving global environment in which we operate in order to respond effectively to our domestic imperatives. Effective policy development is essential for the survival and prosperity of any country in the global system” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012: 7). Though recognising the strategic importance of the domestic reality, the White Paper submits that South Africa will persist in its pursuit of a global order. Here it says that South Africa will push “towards the transformation of the global system of governance from power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order” (Ibid).   At the time of writing such an approach might have appeared as self-evident. This narrow view, held since democratic inception, responded to a singular global reality with a similarly singular approach. But by entrenching itself in a definite gauge, it neglected the strategic necessity of first attending to the domestic political environment: a state cannot only pursue its domestic ends through foreign policy.   When articulating a state’s national interest, it is unwise to rest on moral authority (soft power) to make environmental assumptions. Accordingly, it is unwise to pursue a steadfast approach in a changing global arrangement. The same holds for the domestic strategic environment. It is foolhardy to suppose that South African state will pursue people-centred development simply because the Constitution says so. The seismic decay and rampant corruption that enveloped the state in the years since 2012 proves that any policy orientation needs critical and constant consideration. The latest expression of the national interest is found in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its advancement in a Global Environment, 2022 . This document, which has its orientation established in its name, goes some way to offer a more nuanced, subjective approach in a vastly changed global and domestic environment.   The Framework Document which is a departmental and not a government-wide guide proposes the South African national interest be “premised on the values and ideals as enshrined in its Constitution and informed by the needs of the people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022: 1). It integrated ideals and needs when it recognises the three principles of inclusiveness, exclusiveness and external relevance.   “The inclusiveness principle suggests that the claim should concern the nation as a whole, or at least a substantial enough subset of its membership to transcend the specific interests of groups and factions. The exclusiveness principle refers to a state seeking the National Interest when it is not concerned with the interests of any groups outside its jurisdiction, except to the extent that it may affect “domestic interests”. This implies that the interests being pursued should at all times be related to the interests at home and not those of any group outside its jurisdiction or territorial control. According to the external relevance principle , the needs in question should significantly be affected by the international environment and, consequently, by the conduct of foreign affairs” (Ibid: 4).   The Framework goes some way reconcile the national and international through pragmatic, not only ideological, considerations. It does this when it says that “national interest is a sub-set of the public interest that is affected by external politics” (Ibid). The domestic should guide the foreign. The Framework presents an evolved perception beyond aligning to international norms to advance domestic interests. Tellingly, it extends beyond the idealist view when it refers to the views of George Kennan, the arch American realist, who proposed that states should not pursue moral considerations but tangible interests. While the Framework is more comprehensive, what is needed is a guideline where strengths are activated to give pragmatic expression to the national interest. South Africa’s ‘soft power’ execution, what the Framework calls ‘principled diplomacy’, is often limited to the policy practitioners charged with “restoring and maintaining South Africa’s image, stature, moral high ground and standing in the region, the continent and in global affairs” (Ibid: 8). Towards the end of the Framework, it makes a compelling point without developing it. It says that the “presence of civil society organisations in international affairs has become increasingly relevant. They have played a role in agenda-setting, international law-making and diplomacy and can be important voices in support of South Africa’s development agenda. Civil society, particularly its large grassroots coverage, plays an importance role in the implementation and monitoring of a number of crucial global issues” (Ibid: 19). For South Africa to connect its four axes and comprehensively pursue its national interests, it should pragmatically leverage its true potential: its human capital.    Recommendations for a South African national interest that is both people-centred and pragmatic   South Africa’s seventh administration represents a new political era which requires a concomitant new approach to national interests. The 2022 Framework advocates for as much when it says: “a review of the National Interest is therefore usually linked to the ending of a particular historical era and the beginning of another” (Ibid 5). As the new administration charts its path, it is crucial that an appropriate and strategic national interest path is charted.   The new South African government must strategically charge the orientation and pursuit of the national interest with the same cooperative and pragmatic intent as shown in the Statement of Intent  which guided the establishment of the Government of National Unity. As the British are doing with their interpretation of progressive realism , South Africa should develop its own. Giving expression to both realism and idealism, in both domestic and international considerations. South Africa’s national interest should follow the spirit of the national Constitution. It should both protect (rights) and command (responsibilities) public officials and citizens to give expression to ideals it pursues.   This position has already gained initial conceptual meaning. The new minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Ronald Lamola, has indicated that South Africa will pursue its own version of active idealism. In a speech to the South African Institute of International Affairs, Lamola said: “the evolving international world order necessitates the strengthening of the Non-Aligned Movement. South Africa, with its unique policy of active non-alignment, is not reactive but proactive in its pursuit of peace. This approach is not about being neutral or abstaining from world affairs, but about leading a unifying agenda through dialogue to achieve peace for developing countries that do not wish to take sides in great power rivalry” (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2024).   Whereas active non-alignment presents a real and ideal response to a fraught global political environment, it does not yet give expression to South Africa’s domestic concerns. To do so, the anarchic global reality and the lawed local reality should be read together so to give appropriate responses.   South Africa’s principled diplomacy of ubuntu and non-alignment does not represent the coercive assertion of power over, but rather that of a cooperative power with others. Such a formulation of power is not imposed but exalted, claimed. While the state should formulate and guide this pursuit, it is strategically expedient to extend responsibility to as a diverse and inclusive a constituency as possible. The people, the citizens of South Africa, and those committed to its ethos, have a central role in fulfilling the Constitutional ambitions. They are the means of South African power. The means of pursuing the ends of the state. To build a transformed and developmental state. Such an inclusive perception of power is not only progressive and pragmatic, but also fundamentally human-centred. It brings the pursuit of the national interest into the home of the individual citizen. With the national interest emerging from context, there is no more immediate context than the home of the citizen.   The 2012 White Paper alludes to the central and participatory role of the diversity of South Africa’s people (and its ethical allies). It remarks that: “The business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). Greater effort needs to be made to bring the national interest into the daily lives of the people. For South Africa to expediently pursue its strategic ambitions of ‘power with’, it must be clarified how citizens can best give expression to ideals and thus pursue interests. For this, the state requires representatives who are skilled in drafting, communicating and executing people-centred strategic frameworks. Such a process should not be ad hoc or issue specific. Instead, a national interest strategic framework should be initiated, and a national interest framework document should be formulated at the beginning of each new administration, so to facilitate expedient expression.   A national interest framework document can take inspiration from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. The NSS has since 1987 been a regular report. Prepared by the executive and mandated by an act of Congress. The NSS communicates the executive’s national view of and approach to power to the legislative branch. The report “is obligated to include a discussion of the United States’ international interests, commitments, and policies, along with defence capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement U.S. security plans” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America, nd.). Whereas South Africa is not the United States and does not have a similar a focus on defence matters, it should develop its own framework document to discern the strategic environment and give political effect to the nation’s interests.   Like the NSS, the South Africa’s strategic framework document should: “communicate the executive’s strategic vision”; “create internal consensus on foreign and defense policy”; and “contribute to the overall agenda of the President” (Snider, 1995).   In the South African case, a national interest framework document would give expression not to defence (hard power or power over), but to ubuntu (soft power or power with). The nation’s goals will be served by a pragmatic, human-centred approach, guided by values. Here it should be pointed out that these goals may be served in various ways and means, and that those serving the domestic, may be different and pursued differently to those serving international interests. It is the political environment that determines the ways and means; a value-based approach will not always suffice, may even be exclusionary, especially in the anarchic and increasingly fraught international arena where self-interest may be expedient.   It is important, in the South African spirit of discursive democracy, that the framework documents be debated and enacted by a wide cross-section of society. They need to be people-centred, forward looking and pragmatic. In the spirit of the Statement of Intent, the national interest framework document should respond to the current political juncture and thus the present needs of the state. The Statement which convenes the divergent parties in government recognises and commits to specific causes. Thus, giving it direction; to “ensure accountability and foster trust between the electorate and the political parties that form part of the GNU”. By listing a “basic minimum programme of priorities” and by defining “the modalities of government of national unity” (African National Congress, 2024) it defines the collective understanding and thus the strategic pursuit of government.   A national interest framework document would afford similar clarity. At its most profound and yet at its most foundational, such a framework document would marshal resources and offer direction by describing an example. The 2012 White Paper points in this direction in its prescient conclusion: “South Africa’s greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). The ultimate task of a strategic framework document would be to lead the state and its citizens in their discharge of their Constitutional charges. To reveal to them, as the assets (means) of the state, how to enact principled (ubuntu) diplomacy and active non-alignment. This expression of power is not only expedient in the context of South Africa’s assets but will increasingly be valuable in an evolving world defined by asymmetry, fluidity and relationships.     Conclusion   A regular strategic framework document would take stock of the domestic and international political realities at the commencement of each administration. In doing so it will give persuasive expression to the ideas of the state.   The 2022 National Interest Framework Document already provides some direction when it says that national interest can be “articulated as people-centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022: 8). By describing the domestic and international situation through the eyes of the Constitutional state, it will contextualise and demystify a complex global and local environment. It will give needed expression of the South African identity and by doing so it would collaboratively charge the state and its citizenry with purpose and direction.    References   African National Congress, 2024. Statement of intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity . [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/ [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998. White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions . [Online] Available at: www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/peacemissions1.pdf [accessed: 5 July 2024]   Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy - Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/white-paper-south-african-foreign-policy-building-better-world-diplomacy [accessed: 5 July 2024].   Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022. Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its advancement a global environment . [Online] Available at: https://dirco.gov.za/national-interest-framework-doc/  [accessed: 4 July 2024.   Foucault, M. 1982. The Subject and Power.  Critical Inquiry,  8(4): 777-795.   Lammy, D. 2024. Labour’s foreign policy will be realistic about us as a nation, not nostalgic about what we used to be . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/17/labours-foreign-policy-realistic-not-nostalgic-progressive-realism [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Le Pere, G. and Vickers, B. 2004. “Civil society and foreign policy”, in Nel, P. and Van der Westhuizen, J. (eds), Democratizing foreign policy? Lessons from South Africa . Lexington Books, Lanham.   Morgenthau, H. 1949. The Primacy of the National Interest, The American Scholar , 18(2): 207 – 2012.   Morgenthau, H. 1951. In Defense of the National Interest . New York: Knopf.   Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America, nd. National Security Strategy . [Online] Available at: https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/ [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Snider, D. 1995. The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision . [Online] Available at: https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf [accessed: 25 July 2024].    South African Institute of International Affairs, 2024. Address by DIRCO Minister Ronald Lamola on SA’s Foreign Policy . [Online] Available at: https://saiia.org.za/research/address-by-dirco-minister-ronald-lamola-on-sas-foreign-policy/ [accessed: 25 July 2024].   Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2004. South Africa’s National Interest. African Security Review , 13(2): 89 – 101.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute is making good on its promise to bring the Constitution to the people, conducting impactful workshops at high schools across Gauteng Province. Leading these sessions is facilitator Mr Patrick Morathi, who is working tirelessly to fulfill one of the Institute's core mandates. On 17 September 2024, learners at Theresa Park High School had the opportunity to participate in one of these transformative workshops, designed to empower young people with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal framework. The workshop content aligns perfectly with the Life Orientation curriculum, addressing critical topics like Values in Education and Social Cohesion. By delving into these areas, the sessions aim to have a lasting impact on how the learners perceive and appreciate the Constitution - the very document that underpins the country's democratic principles and national identity. Beyond just the Constitution, the workshops also explore South Africa's rich national symbols, including the flag and anthem, fostering a heightened sense of pride and connection to the nation's heritage. This particular workshop could not have come at a more opportune time, as South Africa celebrates 30 years of hard-won democracy. Moreover, the timing coincides with Heritage Month, which this year carries the theme "Celebrating the lives of our heroes and heroines who laid down their lives for our freedom." The Inclusive Society Institute is committed to educating the youth on these pivotal aspects of South African history and civic life, and more such workshops are expected to be rolled out to additional high schools in the Gauteng region in the coming months.

On Monday, 9 September 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's facilitator, Patrick Morathi, led a workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Akasia High School. This impactful session was designed to empower the students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this essential document. Morathi skillfully guided the learners through the Preamble of the Constitution, bringing to life the core principles and values that underpin South African democracy. The session also delved into the country's National Symbols, including the National Anthem and Flag, fostering a heightened appreciation for the rich heritage and identity that shapes the nation. Throughout the workshop, Morathi's engaging facilitation style encouraged the learners to actively participate, asking thought-provoking questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues at hand. As the session progressed, the learners became increasingly invested, eager to voice their opinions and concerns. Morathi navigated these engaging conversations with finesse, ensuring that each student felt empowered to express themselves freely. By the end of the workshop, the learners left with a deepened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens, inspired to become active, informed, and socially conscious members of their community. This transformative experience, aligned with the Values in Education and Social Cohesion objectives, will undoubtedly have a lasting impact on the learners' understanding and appreciation of South Africa's foundational legal framework.

Occasional Paper 5/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. AUGUST 2024 Dr Roelof Botha Economic Advisor to the Optimum Investment Group Abstract   South Africa’s first Cabinet under the government of national unity (GNU) has been met with an overwhelmingly positive response from business leaders and global capital markets alike. But, as the dust settles on these promising appointments, focus shifts to the real work: economic growth and employment creation. A most pressing obstacle is the restrictive monetary policy stance by the South African Reserve Bank. The gains made post-Covid have been wiped out by the highest interest rates in 15 years – putting the financial resilience of households, and other key indicators of economic activity, under pressure.   This paper closely examines this obstacle to growth and then finds a number of positive developments in the macroeconomy and the economic policy environment, likely due to the transition to a GNU that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution. The private sector is prepared to become more involved in repairing infrastructure, and fundamental fiscal policy is in place. A resilient rand, combined with an imminent sharp drop in interest rates and consumer inflation, heralds higher growth. And plans are afoot to clean up the state capture mess, especially the mismanagement of state-owned enterprises and municipalities. The time is ripe for a sea change, from ideological objectives to creating employment opportunities at pace. Introduction   Now that the dust has settled on South Africa’s transition to a government of national unity (GNU) and the appointment of a new, expanded cabinet, much of the focus of public debate will shift to progress with the stated intention of prioritising economic growth and employment creation. Based on government’s track record ever since the state capture era, it would require substantial assistance by the private sector in facilitating new investment in the repair, maintenance and expansion of the country’s infrastructure.   This paper examines one of the most pressing obstacles to the expansion of capital formation and household consumption expenditure, namely an overly restrictive monetary policy stance by the South African Reserve Bank and then proceeds with a discussion of a number of positive developments in the macroeconomy and the economic policy environment.   The timing for a new era where emphasis shifts from ideological objectives to creating employment opportunities at pace is good. The world economy is expected to grow at more than 3% over the next couple of years and most of South Africa’s key trading partners are likely to experience macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, due to a much larger degree of price stability, interest rates are bound to start declining during the third quarter of the year – providing much-needed debt-servicing relief to consumers and businesses alike.   The cost of restrictive monetary policy   Ever since the onset at the end of 2021 of restrictive monetary policy in South Africa, the financial resilience of households has been under pressure, with a strong (and predictable) inverse correlation between higher interest rates and the Altron Fintech Household Resilience Index (AFHRI) trend. This inverse correlation is also evident with a variety of other key indicators of economic activity, including the gross domestic product (GDP), real household consumption expenditure and retail trade sales.   The gains that were made with the post-Covid recovery have now been wiped out by the highest interest rates in 15 years, with the current real prime overdraft rate (prime minus the consumer price index – CPI) at a level of 6.7%, which is more than double the average rate that existed during the tenure of the previous Governor of the SA Reserve Bank, Gill Marcus.   Of particular concern is the fact that inflation, as measured by the CPI, has been comfortably within the Reserve Bank’s target range (3% to 6%) for the past twelve months. In a deviation from the erstwhile monetary policy approach of target range flexibility, it seems that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has now opted for the approach of the Federal Reserve in the United States, namely a target point, which the MPC has apparently set at 4.5%. Due to the permanent volatility of emerging market currencies and the strong influence on price levels of temporary currency weakness, such an approach is decidedly unwarranted for an emerging market economy that is battling with an extremely high unemployment rate and low economic growth.   The damage that has been inflicted on the economy due to the intransigent and restrictive stance of the MPC includes the following:   Since the end of 2021, the cost of credit (and of capital) has increased by 68% (measured against the nominal prime overdraft rate) Unnecessarily high interest rates have a profound negative impact on the ability of households to maintain their standard of living and on the ability of businesses to invest in new productive capacity. On the national average mortgage bond level administered by BetterBond of R1.1 million, home-owners are now paying around R4,000 per month more on the instalments. In real terms, total household credit extension, which is valued at more than R2 trillion, has declined by 5.5% since 2013, which means that there has not been any growth in this key enabling macroeconomic indicator over the past decade. It is simply not possible for the South African economy to grow at meaningful and sustained rates in the absence of real growth in household credit extension. Over the past four years, the average monthly real salary in the formal private sector has declined by 8% to a level of R18,500. Excessively high interest rates have further exacerbated the plight of South African households by a sharp increase in debt servicing costs, which, as a percentage of household disposable income, has now risen to 9.2% - the highest level in 15 years, and significantly higher than before the Covid pandemic     Inflation under control   Households and businesses with debt would have been disappointed at the decision by the MPC to maintain the official bank rate at 8.25% (and the prime rate at 11.75%) during their July policy meeting.   Fortunately, some good news filtered through less than a week later with the publication by Statistics SA of the latest inflation rate, as measured by the CPI. This rate declined marginally to 5.1% in June (from 5.2% in May). Importantly, the CPI has now been within the Reserve Bank’s target range for inflation for a full year, with two leading indicators of future expectations for inflation also pointing in the right direction.     Firstly, the food price component slowed to 4,1% in June 2024, from 4,3% in the previous month, due to moderation in price increases across most products in the food basket, except for bread and cereal products, as well as meat. According to the Agriculture Business Chamber (Agbiz), potential future price increases of wheat and rice are expected to be moderate, due to early forecasts by the International Grains Council of global wheat and rice production in the current season that are well above long-term production levels.   The sub-index for food & beverages has dropped to below the mid-point of the MPC’s inflation target range (3% to 6%). In combination, food (including non-alcoholic beverages) and alcoholic beverages comprise more than 21% of the weighting of the CPI basket and any further downward movement will almost certainly serve to lower the CPI further.   Secondly, after some nervousness with an uptick in producer prices in April, the producer price index (PPI) has declined again, with the June reading of 4.6% virtually on the nose of the mid-point of the Reserve Bank’s target range for inflation.   Price increases at the factory gate are currently lower than consumer inflation. As a rule, producer prices act as a leading indicator for consumer prices, which bodes well for a further drop in the CPI in the months ahead.  Consumer price index groups with year-on-year increases well above the CPI (in June 2024) CPI group Weight y-o-y %   %  change Electricity 3.7 15.3 Insurance 9.89 8.1 Water 3.46 7.9 Fuel 4.82 7.6 Restaurants & hotels 3.25 7.5 Note: Groups with a weighting of more than 3% Sources: Stats SA; Own calculations Scrutiny of the June CPI data reveals the negative impact of several consumption expenditure groups that are directly influenced by the public sector (usually referred to as administered prices), especially electricity, water and fuel.   With a bit of luck, the recent strength of the rand exchange rate could eventually lead to a moderation of fuel price increases. Overall, a further moderation of inflationary trends should continue in 2024, with a good chance of an interest rate cut in September.   Forward PMI at 28-month high   In June, the Absa/BER purchasing managers’ index (PMI) for business expectations in manufacturing in 6 months’ time reached its highest level since February 2022. The June reading of 68.1 represents a significant improvement on the average index value of merely 53.2 during the preceding 24 months and promises to further boost the exceptionally strong recovery of manufacturing sales since the middle of last year. Ever since the relentless rise in interest rates, confidence in the country’s key manufacturing sector has been under pressure, with the quarterly average 6-month forward PMI dropping to below the neutral 50-mark on two occasions.   Several other key economic indicators are also reflecting an improved outlook for higher growth, most likely because of the historic transition to a government of national unity that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution and the principle of private property rights.   Manufacturing sector shines   South Africa’s manufacturing sector sales performance continues to reach new record high levels, with a cumulative figure of R1.1 trillion having been achieved between January and April. It is the second successive year that manufacturing sales breached the R1 trillion level within merely four months.   When adjusted for inflation by the CPI, total manufacturing sales between January and April increased by more than 9% year-on-year. In the aftermath of the debilitating effects of the Covid pandemic, South Africa’s factories have outperformed most other key sectors of the economy, with average monthly sales values well above those that existed before 2020.   Further good news on the manufacturing front is the announcement by steel producer ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA) that it will continue to operate its longs business, the closure of which was deferred earlier this year (in steel industry terminology longs business refers to the manufacturing of steel products such as wire, rod, rail, and bars as well as certain types of structural sections and girders, mainly for use in construction).   Any closure of AMSA’s longs business would have been devastating for the 3,500 workers employed at the plant, as well as the town of Newcastle, in KwaZulu-Natal, where AMSA’s factory is located. It  would also have impacted negatively on the whole of the country’s manufacturing and construction industries.   Reasons for the decision to keep the plant fully operational include the securing of a working-capital facility of R1-billion for a 12-month period, some improvements in Transnet’s performance, and a provisional safeguard duty of 9% on certain hot-rolled steel products.   Any progress with the work being done by the National Logistics Crisis Committee will serve to enhance the efficiency of roads, railways and harbours, which, in turn, should also serve to ultimately stimulate manufacturing sector exports.   Mineral prices start to recover   The recent recovery of mineral prices is a most welcome development for the South African economy, which remains reliant on commodity exports for the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings.   Since the recent lows recorded between March and April, the prices of the top-six minerals produced by South Africa (in value terms) have all edged upwards. Manganese has been the top performer with a price increase of 36%, followed by gold, which remains in record-breaking mode. Since the beginning of the second quarter of 2024, platinum, iron ore and coal have all experienced price increases above 5%, with chromium ore also moving up slightly.   Several research agencies, including BMI, share an overall positive view on metal and mineral price forecasts for 2024, with some key commodities starting to gain on last year’s price levels, whilst remaining above pre-2020 levels. Iron ore is expected to lead gains in ferrous metals, mainly due to positive sentiment over China’s recently announced economic stimulus measures. Despite the Chinese economy being hamstrung by over-supply in its property sector, China remains the world’s largest consumer of metals.   Even a marginal uptick in the demand for minerals from the world’s second largest economy is bound to exert a positive impact on prices. The sectors for energy and construction will also continue to drive demand for a variety of metals and minerals, with a robust US economy likely to boost prices in 2024 and beyond.   Precious metal prices have already responded to the return to price stability in most key economies, with lower interest rates on the cards in the US and Europe. Gold is a shining example of the recovery of precious metal prices and has reached new record highs for several months in succession.   Rising mineral prices have a multi-faceted positive impact on the South African economy. Firstly, despite the problems still being experienced with the efficiency of transport logistics, higher prices will boost the country’s trade balance, which has been in surplus for eight successive years and is now likely to retain this feat.   A stronger balance of payments will impact positively on the rand exchange rate, which has been the strongest global currency against the US dollar since the beginning of March. Currency strength, in turn, should do its bit in easing inflation via the easing of import cost pressures. Welcome reprieve from loadshedding   During April, May and June, South Africa enjoyed three full months of uninterrupted electricity for the first time in several years, due mainly to the expansion of solar power installations. Eskom has announced that its energy availability factor has reached 65.5 percent for the first time since 2021.   According to Isabel Fick, the head of Eskom’s systems operations, the contributions of solar power plants and rooftop solar installations were allowing Eskom to replenish its pumped storage capacity during the day rather than at night. During 2023, about 2 500 MW of rooftop solar capacity was added, much of which was coupled to battery storage, increasing the overall installed base to above 5 400 MW.   An estimated 2,800 MW of photovoltaic solar is already connected to the Eskom grid. The next stage of harnessing more solar power will focus on two crucial issues, namely an expansion of grid capacity and designing a model that allows surplus solar capacity from independent power producers to also become available. Business chambers around the country have welcomed the renewed stability of electricity supply, which has raised productivity and lowered input costs.   Apart from the relentless rise in solar power generated by households and businesses, Eskom has reviewed the performance of plant managers and other senior employees at its power stations., resulting in extensive changes to the leadership at some of the utility’s worst-performing power stations.   Furthermore, a comprehensive maintenance plan was developed, targeting the worst-performing power stations, whilst also partnering with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with extensive knowledge of the equipment used at power plants.   New cabinet announced by the GNU   The appointment of South Africa’s first Cabinet under the new government of national unity (GNU) has been met with overwhelming positive response by business leaders, whilst also receiving a thumbs-up from global capital markets.   For the first time since the transition to democracy, the country’s second largest political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) has the opportunity to introduce its track record of sound governance at provincial and municipal level, zero tolerance for corruption, and pragmatic policy making at the highest level of government in South Africa. The cabinet has been expanded again, as a result of the forming of a coalition after the May election results saw an end to the ANC’s sway over the national political executive.   In the economic cluster of the Cabinet, the reappointment of Enoch Godongwana as finance minister and David Masondo as his deputy was most welcome, especially due to the steadfast way in which National Treasury has been managing the country’s public finances, which have been under pressure ever since the occurrence of state capture and the lockdowns implemented during the Covid pandemic. Commenting on the reappointment of Minister Godongwana, Business Unity South said that it demonstrates an ongoing commitment by the government to responsible fiscal policies aimed at reducing debt and freeing up spending for productive social and economic development.   The decision to establish a separate energy portfolio headed by the previous Minister of Electricity Dr Kgosientsho Ramokgopa and the DA’s Samantha Graham as Deputy Minister has been welcomed by key stakeholders and energy sector experts. Prof. Anton Eberhard from the University of Cape Town described the restructuring as a sound development, which means that all the provisions of the Electricity Regulation Act (ERA), including electricity planning and procurement, will now fall under Dr Ramokgopa.   This move is expected to facilitate more effective implementation of energy policies than was the case under a combined portfolio for mineral resources and energy. It has also received support from James Mackay, CEO of the Energy Council of South Africa, who commented that it bodes well for dealing with the country’s broader energy challenges and delivering a national energy transition.   Proof of the urgency with which the new cabinet is approaching the crucially important challenge to lower unemployment via higher economic growth has already surfaced at the Department of Transport and the Department of Home Affairs. On 15 July, Barabara Creecy, new Minister of Transport, announced the imminent formation of a specialised unit in her department, called the Private Sector Participation Unit (PSPU). This unit will be staffed by appropriately qualified and experienced experts and will aim, inter alia,  to harness private sector support for repairing and expanding the country’s transport infrastructure.   The new Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Leon Schreiber, has announced plans to resolve the visa backlog for skilled workers. This will entail a simplification of the application process and the introduction of measures like a points system for skilled workers. Research by the Reserve Bank estimates that four local jobs are created per skilled migrant.   Sterling performance by National Treasury   Over the past two years, National Treasury had made considerable progress in stabilising the country’s fiscal affairs by a conservative approach towards government spending and weaning state-owned enterprises such as Eskom and Transnet off fiscal bailouts.   The effect of improved fiscal management has resulted in South Africa achieving its first primary budget surplus in 15 years. During the year to end March 2024, state revenue exceeded non-interest expenditure by more than R31 billion (0.4% of GDP). The decline in non‐interest expenditure was driven by lower voted expenditure, largely owing to the sharp decline in payments for financial assets, reflecting government’s limited recapitalisation of State-owned companies.   National Treasury has also pressed ahead with structural economic reforms initiated by Pres Ramaphosa, aimed at implementing pro-growth and investment policies with the cooperation & participation of the private sector, especially in key sectors of the economy such as energy and logistics.   The 2024/25 national budget will mainly be remembered for its novel utilisation of a portion of South Africa’s gold and foreign exchange contingency reserve account (GFECRA), commonly known simply as the forex reserves. Most countries have foreign exchange reserves, held by their central banks, which can be used for purposes of maintaining macro-economic stability.   Specific examples include interest payments and principal repayments on external government debt denominated in foreign currencies and beefing up the public finances during times when fiscal revenue has not met budget expectations. The latter is exactly what has been implemented by National Treasury in the wake of the tax revenue shortfall experienced during the 2023/24 fiscal year.   Over the past two years, many companies in the resources sector and its supply chain were faced by weak export commodity prices, whilst sluggish world growth and weak domestic demand (due to the record high domestic interest rates) have also served to curtail turnover and profit growth.   For anyone that is concerned over the practice of resorting to foreign exchange reserves as part of fiscal stabilisation policy, it is interesting to note that the origin of the more than R1.1 trillion in gross gold & foreign exchange reserves currently held by the SA Reserve Bank (SARB) was a fiscal transfer to the SARB of (merely) R28 billion made by then finance minister Trevor Manual in 2003.   At the time, South Africa’s foreign exchange reserves were only slowly starting to recover from the disastrous attempt by the Reserve Bank to protect the rand against the fallout from an emerging market currency crisis caused initially by Thailand’s decision to decouple from the US dollar.    Global capital market approval of GNU   The decline of more than 140 basis points in South Africa’s ten-year bond yield in the aftermath of the recent elections holds the promise of hastening the imminent lowering of the Reserve Bank’s repo rate.   A positive medium to long-term relationship exists between money market rates and long-term interest rates. Should the declining trend in the long-term bond yield continue, it would serve as a clear signal that the repo rate and commercial lending rates are falling significantly behind the curve.   The chances for an easing of lending rates happening sooner rather than later have also improved for other reasons, mainly because of further declines in the producer price index and the food price index, both of which act as leading indicators of the consumer price index.     Both the PPI and the CPI have been within the inflation target range for a year and millions of indebted South Africans are eagerly awaiting a departure from a restrictive monetary policy approach, which started at the end of 2021.   Apart from the larger appetite amongst global fund managers for South Africa’s government bonds, the domestic equity market and the rand have also benefited from the historic transition to a coalition government that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution and the principle of private property rights. Between mid-April and 16 July, the JSE all share index (Alsi) rose by more than 11%.   The recent performance of the rand has also been impressive. Between the first of March and the end of June, none of the sixteen key currencies monitored by Currencies Direct  outperformed the rand against the US dollar, with even the Euro, the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen taking a hit against the world’s dominant currency.   This time around, rand strength was not based on any relative weakness in the US dollar’s value, as the dollar index (DXY) strengthened by almost 2% to 105.9 over the past four months, leaving most of the world’s key currencies floundering.   Although the rand is likely to remain volatile against the dollar, several leading financial institutions are predicting a value of below R18 by the end of the year. A stronger and less volatile rand exchange rate will place further downward pressure on inflation, which could eventually lead to a series of interest rate cuts in 2024.   Policy priorities announced by the GNU   Speaking shortly after the first Cabinet lekgotla of the new government of national unity (GNU) to determine key priorities, Pres. Ramaphosa announced that inclusive economic growth had been identified as the most important item on the national agenda. He promised that the GNU would pursue every action that contributes to sustainable, rapid economic growth and remove every obstacle that stands in the way of growth.   Reducing red tape was another priority area, with departments and public entities having been directed to reduce the undue regulatory burdens that stifle the ability of businesses to expand their operations, especially small firms.   As expected, emphasis was also placed on the just transition towards renewable energy, with the objective of South Africa creating a green manufacturing sector centred on the export of green hydrogen and associated products, including electric vehicles and renewable energy components.   The intention was expressed to turn the country into a “construction site”, as roads, bridges, houses, schools, hospitals and clinics are built, and as broadband fibre and new power lines are installed. Other sector-specific priority areas include the release of public land for social housing and redirecting housing policy to enable people to find affordable homes in areas of their choice.   Part of the plan to ensure that municipalities are financially and operationally sustainable include systems to ensure that capable and qualified people are appointed to senior positions at local government level and to ensure independent regulation and oversight of the appointment process.   The initiation of a second phase of Operation Vulindlela was also announced, which would consolidate reforms already under way in the electricity, freight logistics and water sectors, as well as to facilitate an injection of skills and tourists through visa reforms. Closer cooperation between the public and private sectors lies at the heart of these reforms. If successful, it would be a very welcome development.   A challenging task lies ahead   It is important to note that the new-found urgency in attempting to raise the country’s economic growth rate will be faced with an initial obstacle in the form of officials in the public sector that are not necessarily aligned to the non-ANC parties in the GNU. Cabinet ministers from other parties than the ANC may face some resistance from their bureaucracies and will face a huge task in fostering a spirit of cooperation with existing technocrats and policy advisors. New ministers will also face a steep learning curve in terms of the plethora of regulations that underpin public sector activity. An element of resistance towards the broad policy direction that was outlined on 18 July during the opening of Parliament can also be expected from some trade unions, who have enjoyed a long-standing alliance with the ANC, despite favouring labour market regulations that are not necessarily conducive to employment creation at scale.   It should nevertheless be comforting to the new coalition government that 2019 was the only time a trade union has de facto participated in a national election and the relevant party (the Socialist Revolutionary Workers’ Party) could not attract enough votes for a single seat in Parliament. It seems clear that trade unions with strong socialist leanings do not enjoy meaningful popular support in South Africa beyond the occasional drumming up of some members for a protest march.   In order to allay fears over the effectiveness of the GNU, it would be necessary to identify a selection of the new policy initiatives that could produce visible results in a relatively short time frame. These could include the fast-tracking of low-cost housing construction, repairs to municipal infrastructure (especially roads and sewerage and improved water provision to informal settlements) and the involvement of the private sector in new public works projects (e.g. the transformation of large illegal waste dumping sites into revenue-generating establishments).   Concluding remarks   Judging by comments from business leaders and the reaction of capital markets, South Africa’s transition to a coalition government promises to up the ante for fixing the mess of the state capture era, especially with regard to the mismanagement of several key state-owned enterprises and dozens of municipalities around the country.   One of the prerequisites for a successful infrastructure drive is the return to financial and operational stability of public sector entities that have become dysfunctional (Western Cape excluded). To this end, the proven experience in sound corporate governance at most of the local governments in the Western Cape provides the GNU with handy case studies. There is no need to reinvent the wheel – just ensure that municipalities are staffed by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel.   Fortunately, the chances of success are good – business leaders in the private sector are prepared to become even more involved in assisting the repair to the country’s infrastructure and fundamental fiscal policy is in place. A resilient rand, combined with a sharp drop in long-term interest rates and consumer inflation, have laid the table for higher growth, but this will be delayed until such time as lending rates decline to significantly lower levels. Against the background of high and rising unemployment, there is no justification for clinging to an overly restrictive monetary policy. It is perhaps time to consider a broadening of the membership of the MPC to also allow for inputs from economists in the private sector who are not political appointments.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute has been making significant strides in Gauteng schools, actively engaging students and promoting democratic values. On Monday, 2 September 2024, a total of 104 learners from Amandasig Secondary School participated in the "Taking the Constitution to the People" workshop, which was facilitated by Mr Patrick Morathi, the Institute's representative in the Gauteng Province. This workshop aimed to deepen the students' understanding and appreciation of South Africa's democratic constitution, its history, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities outlined in the Bill of Rights.   Through this interactive session, the learners were taken on a comprehensive journey, exploring the intricate process by which the current constitution was crafted, the guiding principles that shaped its development, and the pivotal role it plays in shaping the nation's governance and social fabric. The workshop delved into the Founding Provisions, which establish the foundational values and aspirations of the democratic state, as well as the Bill of Rights, which enshrines the fundamental human rights and freedoms that all citizens are entitled to. Importantly, the session also emphasized the concept of responsible citizenry, empowering the young participants to recognize their active role in upholding the constitution and contributing to the realization of a truly inclusive, equitable, and just society.   The Inclusive Society Institute's commitment to this initiative extends beyond a single event, as Gauteng Province, through its various Districts, will continue to roll out similar workshops in secondary schools across the region. By fostering a deeper understanding and engagement with the constitution, the Institute aims to cultivate a generation of informed, engaged, and civic-minded citizens who will shape the future of South Africa and uphold the democratic ideals that the country was founded upon.

On 29 August 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute, a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting civic engagement and constitutional awareness, visited Walmansthal Secondary School in the bustling township of Soshanguve. Their mission that day was to roll out an enlightening constitutional awareness program titled "Taking the Constitution to the People", with the goal of empowering the learners with a deeper understanding of the history, structure, and practical applications of South Africa's foundational legal document. This workshop was perfectly aligned with their Life Orientation curriculum, providing a valuable opportunity to go beyond the textbooks and explore the Constitution's real-world relevance.   The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated the workshop, armed with a wealth of knowledge and interactive teaching methods. He began by guiding the learners on a captivating journey through the tumultuous history that led to the creation of South Africa's democratic Constitution, highlighting the hard-fought struggles and sacrifices that paved the way for the inclusive, rights-based system the country enjoys today. With vivid descriptions and thought-provoking questions, the facilitator encouraged the learners to connect the constitutional principles to their own daily lives, sparking lively discussions on topics such as equality, freedom of expression, and access to education.   As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, eagerly raising their hands to share personal anecdotes and pose insightful queries. The facilitator skillfully navigated these conversations, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns, and left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens. By the end of the session, the once-passive audience had transformed into an energized group of constitutional advocates, eager to apply their newfound knowledge and become active participants in shaping their country's future.

Copyright © 2024   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   August 2024   Author: Klaus Kotzé Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Introduction and Background   The Global South Perspectives Network is a collective of universities, think tanks, non-profit organisations, and government institutions, brought together over three regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. The Network was co-convened in 2023 by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) and the research group Humanitarian Journalism and Media Interventions (HumanizaCom), of the Postgraduate Program in Social Communication at the Methodist University of São  Paulo.   The Network aims to constructively contribute to ensuring greater influence and equitable partnership of the states in the Global South on matters relating to effective, reformed and resilient multilateralism. Multilateralism that ensures adequate representation of the interests of the Global South.   As a whole, the Network seeks to produce research and insights mainly into the non-military threats and human security, with a particular focus on the Global South. These include environmental, economic and social issues, as well as the effects of pandemics and novel problems.   The Network offers an opportunity for amplified voices from the Global South. For broader contribution of these actors in the decision-making process relating to reforms and other actions affecting multilateralism, anchored in the United Nations system.    In light of the complex challenges facing the global governance architecture, considerations are being developed by various stakeholders to provide adequate and timely responses to contemporary, global threats.   The United Nations has recognised the need for such responses and is accordingly planning to host the Summit of the Future, in September 2024. This Summit presents a critical opportunity to chart a path for sustainable development and reformed multilateralism. Leading up to the Summit of the Future, stakeholders are introducing new or recalibrated approaches to address the world’s most pressing challenges. In so doing, they are constructively contributing to the much-needed global governance reform process.   Among the various groups, civil society groups have a central role in discussing and developing new processes that are aimed at addressing global concerns. In its preparation documents, the Summit of the Future recognises that:   “Keeping with the vision of a more networked and inclusive multilateralism enshrined in Our Common Agenda, the Secretary-General has underscored the importance of engaging diverse stakeholders from across the full spectrum of society. Their voices are essential to the preparation and success of the Summit of the Future. By tapping into their wealth of expertise and leveraging their platforms, we can support more informed policy decisions, amplify the impact of the Summit, and better tackle the challenges of today and tomorrow” (United Nations Summit of the Future, 2024: https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/stakeholders).   The United Nations’ recognition of and appeal to civil society organisations, to make representations and to propose inclusive and critical approaches to addressing global concerns, offers an opportunity for the Global South Perspectives Network to develop and present its views and policy proposals towards a better future.   Global South Perspectives Network: Towards a systemic response    In 2023 the Network produced its first collaborative report: Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform . The report seeks to amplify the voices of the Global South in their conceptualisation and direction of reformed multilateralism. It notes the need for global governance innovation not only to exist in pockets of the Global North. But that the states from the Global South have a decided and critical role to play by sharing their experiences and putting forward solutions that advance their interests.   In its inaugural report, the Network looked at ways to ensure rapid and effective response by the United Nations to the crises around the world. It placed particular attention on the multitude of non-military threats. One of the central initiatives that are discussed and advanced in the report, is the proposal of a Global Resilience Council, as introduced and actively developed by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability.   The ideation of a Global Resilience Council takes into consideration that the systemic crises the world faces have an impact on the social, economic and planetary systems that humanity and the environment depend on. To respond to systemic crises is thus more extensive and on a broader scale than the efforts to develop international cooperation and sectoral solutions. The Global Resilience Council is proposed to operate at the highest level of global governance, pursuant to non-military challenges faced by humanity. Such a Council is envisioned to function with similar authority to that of the United Nations Security Council, but without the impediments that hinder the Security Council’s effectiveness. It would be an inclusive council actively engaging assemblies representing various constituencies of state and non-state actors globally, with its central purpose being to provide these actors with a dedicated and robust platform to pursue effective global governance.   The report assessed the appetite for and thoughts on such a Council. It found that among the contributors and participants of the surveys undertaken, there was broad agreement on the need for a structure such as the Global Resilience Council. Participants also broadly agreed that such a council promises to hold a number of opportunities, and that its potential benefits generally outweigh the possible drawbacks.   The report found that further work was needed to develop the concept of a Global Resilience Council, expanding it in detail and defining its various aspects. The report concluded that the concept should be taken to scholars and practitioners, to think tanks and conferences for interrogation.   ACUNS: A platform to introduce and discuss the GRC   The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) is a significant organisation that seeks to bring together those studying and working on the practices and performance of the United Nations system. It does so to better understand the international body, and its various approaches to global issues and to provide insight and input into making it more effective. ACUNS recognises that:   “In the 21st century, it is not only war, but also climate change, pandemic disease, new weapons, displacement, inequality, bigotry and extremism that threatens global well-being. Because these challenges disregard borders, no sovereign nation will succeed in countering them alone. Solutions to improve the human condition will most likely advance with evidence-based analysis, international legal agreement, and multilateral action. As the only institution with worldwide membership, an effective United Nations is an existential imperative for the global good. ACUNS serves to foster well-studied action in the UN system” (Academic Council on the United Nations System, 2024:  https://acuns.org/purpose/ ).   With its broader, incisive view of the various global crises, with human security at its centre, and with it bringing together United Nations practitioners from across the world to find collective effective approaches, ACUNS offers an opportune platform for the Network to present its thinking and proposal of a Global Resilience Council.   ACUNS’ flagship event is its annual meeting where practitioners and scholars consider, debate and analyse the work and direction of the United Nations. Between 20 and 22 June 2024, ACUNS’ annual meeting was held in Tokyo under the theme: Global Governance and Sustainable Development: Revitalizing Research to Support Multilateral Solutions . The meeting offered the Global South Perspectives Network the opportunity to introduce its thinking on the ways that global governance can be reformed, so as to make it more equitable and effective at addressing global concerns.   A panel was accordingly held under the title: Effectively addressing Human Security Challenges: What would a Global Resilience Council bring?     The following participants took part in the panel:   Buyelwa Sonjica (Chair), Former Government Minister (South Africa) and current chair of the Advisory Council of the Inclusive Society Institute Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director: Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Harris Gleckman, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Sustainability, and Executive Board Member at the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Shabnam Delfan, associated to the Buckingham University and the Open University    Chairperson’s opening remarks   Buyelwa Sonjica   The world faces significant challenges. Historian Adam Tooze has described the state of global affairs as one resembling a polycrisis. The name describes how there exists an interplay between various crises and that due to the pervasive reality of global connection, the effects are more immediate on everyone. Emerging and critical approaches are required to effectively address this polycrisis.   When the world came together almost 80 years ago to form the United Nations, it was as a response to the immediate threat that nations inflicted upon each other during the second world war.  The response was to collectively form a body that would effectively and legitimately address the world’s most immediate crisis – war.   Today, while the United Nations stands proud, it is increasingly challenged as not being fit for purpose. Its power structures are out of date. They do not reflect the social and political realities of today’s world. Neither is the United Nations able to adequately address these realities nor is it set up to attend to the emergence of new global challenges, whether related to climate change, or what we have recently seen during the COVID-19 pandemic.   In sum, the dominant peace and security approach of the United Nations, steered by the Security Council, cannot address the increasing human security challenges as captured by the polycrisis. In fact, there is currently no coherent and effective way of dealing with global human security challenges. The predominance of the veto bearing permanent members of the Security Council (P5) compromises the United Nations’ broader power, as it does the equality of nations. Currently, the P5 involve themselves in everything, but not everything is related to peace and conflict. The ineffectiveness of the current system plays itself out as a violation of basic human rights. Civilians from around the world are suffering from a system that is unable to effectively discharge its mandate and attend to emergent issues.   What the world needs is a stronger, more representative global system. A move towards inclusive multilateralism will not only highlight but also attend to broader matters affecting the world’s population. The questions, therefore, remain: where are these changes to be brought?  How does the United Nations become fit for purpose? In other words, how does it go about changing its policy, structure and process?   This panel offered the opportunity to explore these matters. Recognising that major structural, global crises go unanswered, the panel discussed the proposal of a Global Resilience Council. An institution that will speak to systemic crises, from a human security approach.   This panel allowed for the thinking of the Council to be expanded, to look at human security aspects such as poverty, migration, climate change and the effect of pandemics. Since the thought about such a Council is still at its development stage, this panel and the discussion that followed among participants and the audience allowed for critical engagement and further development. A case for the Global Resilience Council   Georgios Kostakos The thinking behind a Global Resilience Council commenced from one main observation. It recognises that the reforms required for the United Nations system cannot be accomplished by one centralised and specialised agency. Instead, it asks: how could the whole system be brought together as a whole to address prevailing human security issues? Such an approach recognises that singular mandates, or departments only addressing internal matters, do not address the prevailing systemic problems. To address that, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability came up with the idea of the Global Resilience Council.   The reason for the focus on resilience is simply because that is what is most needed in the world today. It recognises that while there will always be crises that affect humanity, it is important that there should be effective and adequate responses. Ways for the people of the world to get back on their feet, and in a better position than before. Put in another way: get back better.   The idea is that the Council will be analogous to the United Nations Security Council for non-military threats. A Council for systemic crises that have many dimensions. Such an approach should leverage learning from the past so as to better address future events. For example, it should not get stuck in a situation akin to the Security Council, which empowers some powerful states with the veto power to stop decisions from being carried out. This results in the United Nations not being able to address big problems.   A Global Resilience Council will be more representative than the Security Council. With 15 members, the Security Council is not representative of the world’s 193 member states with different interests and concerns. The new body will supplement the Security Council. Whereas the Secretary-General has proposed something similar in his Our Common Agenda report, these suggestions have shortcomings, as he suggests the creation of emergency platforms for each shock that emerges. In such a situation, authorisation from member states would be required for each event. This would mean that the Secretary-General will decide which countries, which civil society organisations, and which private sector players to invite to best address each crisis. It is also proposed not to be permanent, but should be run on an ad hoc basis, so as to allow flexibility. Each structure will then end when that concomitant crisis ends.   Such an approach is short-sighted and will prove to be ineffective. The crises of today, such as climate change, are not ad hoc crises. They are deeply ingrained in the way the world functions, affecting how people produce and consume. How the economy and politics work. In other words, it is not possible to get rid of these systemic crises with an ad hoc structure. Such suggestions also face transparency and legitimacy concerns.   A Global Resilience Council will be an intergovernmental body; governments carry final responsibility for their citizens, and collectively for the whole of humanity. A mix of various (external) actors cannot be expected to deal with existential questions facing countries. As evidenced by the COVAX facility during the COVID-19 pandemic. This facility proved to only work for the wealthy countries that could pay the high costs. These states were the first to receive their vaccines and often other, poorer states were denied their share until the richer states had more than enough. New structures, when set up, must be more representative. This will further ensure their legitimacy.   The Global Resilience Council starts from the basis that climate change, for example, has an impact on the core planetary, social and economic systems. Its solution must therefore also bring all these components together. The world must respond to systemic crises by looking at the big picture – in terms of systems.   Such a council must be able to impose some sanctions when various actors, states or non-state actors, do not follow the rules that have been agreed to. Platforms such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would be able to bring their grievances to the Council, so as to pressure actors for their compliance. The World Health Organization could do the same for pandemics. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, or individual countries could bring issues to the Council, which will then see to it that separate organisations deal with the separate issues. The differentiated agencies are supplemented by this high-level body, which has an intergovernmental core. Governments are at the centre. They are the ones who are making decisions. But around them, they are supported by an advisory assembly of constituencies. The scientific community will be central, so too the indigenous communities and local authorities. All bringing in their wisdom and advice. And once the decision is taken by the central body, these supplementary bodies also help with implementation.     What a Global Resilience Council would look like   Harris Gleckman At the time that the current global governance system was initiated, largely following World War Two, the organisations to emerge were given discreet tasks. These tasks were economic and social. It did not attend to matters that are today topical and important, such as matters regarding the environment and gender. The significant change in the landscape suggests that a new array of tasks requires a new array of organisations. Or that a new platform is required. This is what is being suggested here with the introduction of a Global Resilience Council.   It is now imperative to rethink the fundamentals that the world has become so accustomed to. The ongoing approach, which sees specific concerns addressed by separate organisational structures, such as development and habitat, is clearly proving to be lacking. The people of the world should step back and ask: in what way could the world best address these emergent concerns through a multilateral body, given the nature of the crises? This is where the suggestion for the new Council comes in. It should be noted that additional thoughts about the structure and composition of the Council should be greatly welcomed. At its core, the idea of a Council is a challenging one. One that is open to discussion and revision where needed and deemed appropriate by the differing people who will be affected by the consequences of ongoing human insecurity.   On an institutional basis, such a Council would need a formal treaty or a change in the United Nations Charter. To get it going, it could be established as a subcommittee of the General Assembly that all other United Nations system organisations would recognise as a co-facilitated committee. In this way, it would provide a platform for all parts of the United Nations at the intergovernmental level to start to meet the diversity of its challenges. While the United Nations has an existing chief executive office, that is on the administrative side. The tough part would be to get the political side aligned with the nature of contemporary issues that they are trying to address. In time, it should be turned, in the fashion of the International Criminal Court, into a self-standing treaty organisation.   When looking at the proposed composition, the agents should be states. But perhaps it would be best for states to be represented on a regional basis. This will be an innovative way to have regional bodies such as the African Union, the European Commission and other regional bodies be part of the coordination structure of the arrangement.   Unlike the voluntary Economic and Social Council, or the voluntary Paris Agreement, the Global Resilience Council is proposed to have some obligatory powers. The suggestion is that in the startup period, it could make direct proposals to governments, international finance institutions and judicial authorities. These organisations and institutions would act under their own authority. Leveraging or addressing the blocking of issues under their own auspices. It could, in a court-like way, insist upon accessing public data from the key actors in the field.  As such it would be able to hold actors accountable.   It could further propose to international banks and financial institutions that certain actors be removed as they are undermining international financial stability. It could advise and counsel other agencies. To advise on their business and where they should take up a certain issue as a serious matter.   An outcome of such an approach will be to attend to the existing fragmented system. It will ensure that for the first time, organisations such as the World Food Council or any of the governing bodies that in practice have no authority to send a formal request to another intergovernmental body, would now be able to do so. It will assist in the partnership and collaboration between organisations, where one will be able to initiate ideas about concomitant concerns and allow different departments and organisations to make requests and to elevate issues onto the agenda of partner organisations.    The thinking behind a Global Resilience Council is thus envisioning a multilateral body that has a starting structure, a set of ways that it can exert some degree of power. Some new ways that the multiple and diverse civil society actors can be a part of and advise upon. And some structure of a platform to allow the existing organisations to have intergovernmental discussions with one another about how to address structural crises.   In conclusion, the concept of a Global Resilience Council offers to be a body that will be central to reformed multilateralism. Through its collective response capabilities to major systemic crises, it would escalate concerns from the level of individual specialised agencies to the global community at large. This would contribute to a concerted effort across various issue areas. It would function in the spirit of a ‘whole of government’ approach, but on a planetary level. Such a body bodes well for the much-needed innovations that would bring about adequate and representative global governance reform.    Building resilience against climate threats   Shabnam Delfan   Climate change has a direct impact on human security around the world. The failure to meet the maximum 1.5 degrees rise in global temperature stemming from the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement shows the imminent risk. Its concomitant disruptions pose an enormous challenge to global society. The interlinked nature of climate, disease, economic and other factors have a direct impact on human security.   Demographic trends, including migration and rapid urbanisation, are raising the threats to the most vulnerable. Climate change is also a threat multiplier. This means that food insecurity, persistent poverty, displacement and other insecurities can trigger a competition for scarce natural resources and fuel social tension and increase crime and insecurity in societies around the world. It, therefore, emerges that the imminent threat of climate change is the increase in poverty and other persisting inequalities. People with lower incomes are the most likely to depend on resources provided by nature. By disrupting natural systems and the resources they provide, dependent people and animals are directly affected.   By hitting the poorest the hardest, climate change increases existing inequalities and causes more people to fall into poverty. It is therefore critical to respond to the climate change crisis comprehensively. Human security takes this approach and United Nations member states have overwhelmingly highlighted the importance of acting on climate change. But what is happening is not enough, nor have these measures been implemented sufficiently.   There are four ways in which climate change affects human security when human security is understood as safety from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease and poverty, but also the protection from sudden and harmful destruction of the patterns of daily life.   Climate change is increasingly impacting human security when changes (such as in rainfall) trigger competition for food and water. This takes place especially in the Middle East and North Africa regions and the Global South more broadly. Declining agricultural output can lead to a loss of income for a broad segment of the population. These changes have already led to more than 20 million people being either internally or externally displaced from their places of stay. Climate change functions as a threat multiplier. It worsens the existing social and economic conditions. Climate change is thus an aggravating factor for instability, conflict and terrorism. It disrupts social relations where it pits groups against one another, such as farmers against communities. In Somalia, for instance, years of conflict have degraded the resilience of the state and have severely affected the stability of local communities. The ongoing drought has simply worsened this tension. In Iraq, the water crisis is a serious and aggravating factor that is bringing the country to a point of existential crisis. Climate change affects food production and drives up hunger. When climate disaster threatens coastal fisheries and agricultural land, food production suffers. Food crises and hunger combine with existing inequalities. Political and social exclusion can also lead to unrest. In Africa, decimated food crops have driven food prices sky-high. In some Pacific islands, increased sea levels have threatened fisheries and thereby threatened the food supply. As many as 800 million people are facing hunger and concomitant displacement due to these disruptions. Each year more than 20 million people are forced to leave their homes and move to other areas due to floods, droughts and other extreme weather events. By and large, most of the displacement of peoples takes place in developing countries, which are already overburdened by conflicts, food shortages and broader instability. All indicators point to migration becoming one of the major policy challenges of the century. This is not only the case in the Global North, where political lines are being drawn and migrants are increasingly finding passage to safety and security difficult. Migration is equally, if not more of, a policy challenge to the states of the Global South, which does not have the registry and security mechanisms of the North. And where social tensions are reaching fever pitch as groups are pitted against each other for resources and employment. Adequate planning and management is going to be critical for human security. The degradation of the ecosystems and the demand for resources can also lead to chronic poverty and hunger and a high level of communicable diseases and broader conflict. Climate change is increasing poverty and inequality. The United Nations Secretary-General has called for stimulation packages of at least 500 billion dollars per year to address the unfair global financial system, and thereby tackling the high cost of debt and exorbitant impacts of long-term financial obligations. Since 2015 there has not been adequate implementation of financial measures to tackle the crisis. The final way that climate change affects human security is the impact it has on women and girls, on gender-related inequalities. Unequal access to resources can leave women and girls disproportionately vulnerable. Women and girls face significant risks from climate change and the disruptions it causes. In Somalia, for instance, shifting rain patterns due to climate change are leading to water quality worsening and leading to higher rates of violence, particularly towards women and girls. Forced displacement due to climate change has seen rates of sexual violence increase. Women are often responsible for providing water and fuel for households, especially in the developing countries. When women and girls have to venture further from their homes in search for water and fuel, they are at an increased risk of sexual harassment and violence. It also decreases their ability to pursue paid work and negatively impacts the opportunities for girls to stay enrolled in schools and become educated. By including women in local initiatives, it reduces the tension and contributes to greater social stability.   It is seen that in relation to climate change and its key priorities, proactivity and intervention are now essential. The international community has so far acted in an essentially reactive manner. By responding to the humanitarian crisis, to assist developing countries tackle urban growth and expansion of slums, the development community and international organisations have a central role to play. The combination of widespread land degradation, food insecurity and large-scale migration are contributing to an extensive and even existential crisis. While more work is needed to be done in these areas, to identify and prioritise the hotspots for intervention, forecasts and existing information provide some indicators for particularly vulnerable areas including small and developing states.   Both humanitarian and development assistance is clearly needed. While most of the burden falls to the least developed countries, it is essential that states take ownership of their own national prerogatives. The key priorities are identified here as, first, gaining a better understanding and recognition of the main issues at hand. Second, the mitigation of the main causes. Especially through environmental management and climate change adaptations, mitigation and ensuring that the migration prospect is not emitted when strategies are developed. The third priority is better managing the environmental migration process, especially improving the carrying capacity of these areas. A fourth priority is the incorporation of these strategies and approaches into existing social structures and policy practices, guidelines and forecasts. As a last priority, it is critical to recognise that early action, planning and intervention on critical issues is needed.   Addressing all these environmentally induced matters is important. A multibillion-dollar process is needed. Yet, there exists a lack of current information and so a more accurate costing is necessary.    Finally, it is imperative for all of humanity to unite to push for practicable support for the most vulnerable countries and populations. This must be done by strengthening the capacity of the governments and all stakeholders to respond effectively to existing climate challenges.     Conclusion   The thinking towards a Global Resilience Council has both identified several failures of the existing global governance infrastructure as well as identified issues with those efforts that have been suggested to attend to these failures. These include the suggestion that ameliorative efforts be permanent, not ad hoc. That approaches must be inclusive and obligatory. Such an approach recognises the long-term and comprehensive nature of the complex polycrisis that the world faces, together.   Whereas this panel at this conference offered a wonderful opportunity to transmit the idea of the Council among decision-makers and scholars, it was concluded that much still needs to be done. The details and workings of the Council must be evolved, so as to ensure that it best addresses its targets. It is also important that its suggestions must be lobbied among influential stakeholders, so as to ensure appropriate buy-in and prominence.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Chief Executive Officers of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), the Institute for Global Governance (IGD) and Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) met at the offices of the ISI in Cape Town on Wednesday, 7 August 2024 to finalise their joint action to promote a Global Resilience Council to deal with would be focused on human security matters and the management of systemic crises of developmental sustainability and resilience such as climate change, pandemics, economic development, and systemic issues giving rise to migration. It forms part of their proposals for the reform of the United Nations and the multilateral order. Click below to few the agreed concept note: Georgios Kostakos Chief Executive Officer Foundation for Global Governance Philani Mthembu Chief Executive Officer Institute for Global Governance Daryl Swanepoel Chief Executive Officer Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) received an invitation from the China Center for Contemporary World Studies and Secretary General of the Silk Road Think Tank Association (SRTA) Secretariat to form part of a high-level delegation of Think-Tank Scholars from the African continent, to visit China. The visit commenced on 23 July 2024 and ended on 1 August 2024. The purpose of the African Think-Tank Scholars’ visit was not purely for the delegates to enjoy China’s magnificent landscape and experience its friendly culture and mouth-watering cuisine. The visit’s main objective was to further cement the China-Africa friendship, and to deepen and facilitate the China-Africa and People-to-People bond by contributing to building a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future, through dialogue. On 24 July 2024, the delegation attended the 7th Africa-China People’s Forum in Changsha, Hunan Province (in central China). The event was attended by over 200 guests from over 50 African countries. Ms Nondumiso Sithole, advisory council member at the ISI, represented the Institute and attended as a delegate. Ms Sithole formed part of a panel that led discussions on theme 2, “High-end Think Tanks Boost High-Quality Development of China-Africa Cooperation”.  She further submitted contributions at a media briefing session held at the 7th Africa-China Peoples Forum and Young Leaders Forum on Sino-African cooperation. The delegation also attended various field visits to Hunan Province in several locations and different cities, namely Chenzhou, Luoyang and Beijing (in North China), where the China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) is based. A high-level thematic seminar was held with CCCWS researchers, Dr Wang Liyong as well as Honourable Lu Kang and Honourable Hong Dayong. The focus of this intensive session was Sino-African cooperation, Belt and Road development in Africa, and the field visits between the African Think-Tank Scholars as well as the researchers from CCCWS. It is worth mentioning that most of the input from the African Think-Tank Scholars had a common thread: that the relationship between China and Africa had evolved into one in which there is respect, and common objectives in terms of empowering the African continent by transforming its economies through various methods. It was also noted that there is a negative global narrative when it comes to Africa-China relations, wherein Chinese policies in Africa are viewed by some as “debt traps”. But that it was up to the African continent as well as the People's Republic of China to not let this detract from their positive, long-standing relationship, as there is a consensus as well as evidence that the relations built thus far have been mutually beneficial and that both parties will continue to work together on the challenges raised.

The Inclusive Society Institute is truly on course with its civic education programme. This programme is aimed at promoting democratic participation, and good responsible citizenry and the values espoused by the Institute. In its quest to broaden Civic Education, the Institute is engaged in “ Taking the Constitution to the People”, with a view to bringing awareness among the learners about their rights and responsibilities, also to inspire perception about where they can become involved in the civic and public affairs. How they can apply the constitution in their daily lives and why it is important that are responsible for their environment, community and the country at large. On 30 July 2024, Patrick Morathi conducted a “Taking the constitution to the people” workshop at Elizabeth Matsemela Secondary School in Soshanguve. The Grade 11 learners were the target group, they enjoyed and openly welcomed the workshop with its relevant workshop contents and materials that were distributed to the learners. This programme will be rolled out across the Gauteng Province Secondary Schools to foster an appreciation for the Constitution and everything that it entails.