Occasional Paper 1/2025
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J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5
Prof William Gumede
Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).
Abstract
One of the main reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and peace has been the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation. Colonial and apartheid governments insisted that South Africa is a country with vastly different ethnic communities always on the verge of communal conflict, unless they are separated and run by one group or by a strong central state. Yet, after 350 years of this approach, South African communities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, with ‘interconnected differences’. The fact that the country is so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should be the central element of a unique South African identity. The starting point must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African or one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.
The best way forward then is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but rather “civic nationalism”, building a shared citizenship around a common civic identity, trumping individual or group ethnic-based identities. The glue that holds diverse societies together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism. However, this necessitates political leaders who govern and deliver at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group. And citizens who support leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture. Herein lies the challenge of building a common South Africanness and a successful nation.
Introduction
South Africa’s bitter history of more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid – with its accompanied ethnic division, conflict and state-sponsored economic inequalities – makes the challenge of cobbling together a new South Africanness, from our divided past, so much harder, yet so much more urgent.
Almost three decades after apartheid, it appears that the ethnicisation and Balkanisation of South Africa along ethnic lines set by apartheid continues. Although, this time not by official state policy, but because of the failure of the state to deliver public services equitably; the failure of the democracy to deliver economic dividends. However, some governing party leaders, populist opposition leaders, parties, groups, public figures and online influencers, blame state, economic and democracy failures on ethnic groups different to them (Malema, 2018; Tandwa, 2019; Gumede, 2021).
Former President Jacob Zuma’s mobilisation of specifically isiZulu-speakers in order to become leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in 2007 and South Africa in 2009, the perception, in the period before the 29 May 2024 general elections of rising exclusion of minorities within the then governing ANC and, as a direct result of this, new ethnic-based opposition political parties forming, have contributed to undermining a common South Africanness (Gumede, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013).
There has been a rise in incidents where one ethnic, colour or regional group has often been scapegoated for the lack of advancement of another community. A typical example is Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema attacking South Africans of Indian ancestry for allegedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private sector (Malema, 2018).
Persistent institutional racism, “the systematic distribution of resources, power and opportunity in our society to the benefit of people who are white and the exclusion of people of colour”, undermines a common South Africa that cuts across race, ethnicity and colour (Dyer, 2002). Racial solidarity, where black and white South Africans support others solely on the basis of their ethnicity or colour, not only undermines a common South Africa, but also undermines common nationhood (West, 1993).
South Africa has no choice but to build a common South Africanness. If the country does not, there will be no future for any single community – or for the country’s collective communities – as South Africa will be plunged into ethnic strife, which will make economic growth, development and prosperity impossible, whether at the individual, community or collective community level (Réaume, 1988; Mason, 2000; Appiah, 2005).
Diverse countries with divided pasts need a “civil religion” as an alternative model for common nationhood
Diverse developing countries with a politically divided past, such as South Africa, obviously cannot find a solution in a nationalism based on shared culture or common citizenship or living in a shared space, alone – often assumed in Western models of nationhood (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1995).
One of the great African scholars of ethnicity, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) observed how the Achilles heel of many African post-independence and liberation movements has been their difficulty in constructing citizenship as an inclusive concept.
Like India, both colonial and apartheid governments have insisted that South Africa is a “society of self-enforced communities, always potentially – and in the absence of the (colonial or apartheid) state, actually – in gruesome conflict with one another” (Khilnani, 2003).
Yet, more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid has meant that South African identities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value (Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2012). Our modern South Africanness therefore cannot be but a ‘layered’, plural and inclusive one, and one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’ (Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2010, 2012).
The fact that South Africa has a multiple identity should be the basis of its shared South Africanness. The country is a melting pot of people with their roots in Africa, the East and the West (Gumede, 2018). On the face of it, in many cases, at the end of colonialism and apartheid there may have remained distinctly different communities, despite centuries of intermixture.
The challenge for any South African leader or governing party is how to build a common sense of South Africanness and “shared responsibility for a common destiny”, on the basis of our ‘interconnected differences’ (Khilnani, 2003). The fact that we are so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should then be the central building block of a unique South African identity. The country’s democracy is based on a compromise between the diverse political groups and acceptance of our differences (Gumede, 2005). A common South African identity and the future will have to be built as a mosaic of the best elements of our diverse pasts and present, histories and cultures.
The best way forward for South Africa is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but what Michael Ignatieff (1993) described as “civic nationalism”, which aims to build a shared citizenship around a common civic identity (Stilz, 2009), where such a civic identity trumps individual or group ethnic-based identities.
In “civic nationalism” the glue that holds communities together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism, whether Zulu, Indian, Afrikaner or coloured group identities (Gumede, 2012a). In civic nationalism, a nation “need not be unified by commonalities of language or culture [where ‘culture’ refers to the traditions and customs of a particular national group]” (Stilz, 2009: 257). Citizens of all ethnic, race and religious groups must embrace democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic values and behaviour.
This means the state does not favour one ethnic group, culture or language, but instead, embraces the multiple ethnic groups, cultures and languages within the borders of the country (Habermas, 1998: 228). Jürgen Habermas argues that the different political cultures and identities within a country must be superseded by a shared national democratic political culture (Habermas, 1998: 118). The political culture that becomes the national political culture is not that of one political party or tradition, but is a shared political culture built on democracy, values and an inclusive state.
To do so, a country with South Africa’s diversity has no other alternative but to build what the US sociologist Robert N. Bellah (1967) described – when referring to the US common democratic values, institutions and rituals – as a “civil religion”, which he argues has been crucial to that country’s national identity. Bellah built his case for a “civil religion” – and expands on it beautifully – based on Rousseau’s original description of it, being “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance” (Rousseau, 2003: Chapter 8, Book 4).
Clearly, in the South African case, the central tenet of a common South Africanness must be a “civil religion” – based on inclusive democracy, ethnic, colour and political diversity, core shared values, and empathy for the vulnerable – that cut across the racial, colour and political divide (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).
Crisis of South Africa’s inclusive non-racial nation-building project
South Africa’s nation-building project has hit a crisis, with many seeming to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle to development, growth and peace. Some wrongly say that the country can prosper if led by only one group, excluding others, whether based on ethnic, colour or political lines, while others say that some communities are not African enough (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018; PTI, 2021).
Increasingly there have been public criticisms of a rise in ethnic-based appointments at national, provincial and local government level, and in state-owned entities (Gumede, 2021). Until the establishment of the Government of National Unity, which includes representatives of 11 parties, after the 29 May 2024 general elections, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities (SOEs) have increasingly been criticised for lacking racial diversity.
Furthermore, many Cabinet ministers have often been accused of appearing to only appoint members from their ethnic community to senior positions in their departments and SOEs reporting to them – making some government departments appear to be Bantustans (Gumede, 2021).
Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande is just one senior government leader who has been accused of favouring individuals from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) in appointments to his department and its entities – an accusation which he has denied (Head, 2021). There are many SOEs and agencies where there are boards and executives made up of individuals of only one colour, or one ethnic group, making a mockery of South Africa’s diversity, and constitutional obligations to ensure diversity and representation in public appointments (Gumede, 2021).
The appearance of the ethnicisation of the ANC at some levels has led to many of the excluded communities not feeling psychologically safe, meaning they do not believe their interests will be looked after by the party (Delizonna, 2017; Van der Loo and Beks, 2020; Gumede, 2021). Many who feel excluded by the ANC because of ethnicity or colour, find the new ethnic-based and minority parties that have mushroomed appealing – these parties have done well in the 1 November 2021 local government elections (Gumede, 2021) and the 29 May 2024 national and provincial elections, with parties such as the Patriotic Alliance and Cape Coloured Congress gaining significant footholds.
The lack of diversity in national, provincial and municipal governments, and state entities robs the country of ideas, skills and capacity – because the full spectrum of the country’s talents is not used to foster growth, development and public services. It is therefore one of the main reasons for lack of equitable development, poor public services delivery, and failure of the state.
There has been rising scapegoating of minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF, and online populists, blaming minorities for all South Africa’s complex problems. Although many of the country’s problems stem from its apartheid past, many have also been created or exacerbated by current government incompetence, corruption and irrational policies.
For example, as mentioned above, EFF leader Julius Malema in a press conference verging on hate speech, attacked South Africans of Indian ancestry for supposedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private and public sectors (Malema, 2018). In 2002, playwright Mbongeni Ngema wrote a song in isiZulu that incited South Africans of Indian ancestry (PTI, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela had to step in to calm tensions between the communities following the song (PTI, 2021).
One of the standouts of the 1 November 2021 local elections has been the dramatic rise and success of ethnic-based parties at the municipal level. Many communities, feeling excluded by the ANC and the state, and frightened by the anti-diversity politics of the EFF, find parties promoting their excluded ethnic group or who defend the cause of minorities in general, appealing (Gumede, 2021).
The ANC’s increasing exclusion of minorities within the party, the rising attacks on minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF and the Patriotic Alliance, and the failure of the state to provide public services, benefits and jobs to South Africans of all ethnic communities, have resulted in many communities retreating into ethnic laagers, seeking comfort in clan, tribe and colour kinship (Gumede, 2021).
New parties such as the Cape Coloured Congress, the Patriotic Alliance repositioning itself to appeal to disillusioned coloured voters, the Al Jama-ah party targeting Muslims, and the Freedom Front Plus refashioning itself as a party not only for whites, but also for other minorities, have made significant electoral inroads (Gumede, 2021).
Many politicians have increasingly opportunistically used the race or ethnic card for self-enrichment or to cover up wrongdoing, which undermines the building of a common South African identity (Molefe, 2016; Mantashe, 2016). Others, again, support individuals who are corrupt, do wrong or are incompetent, solely on their colour (Gumede, 2018). On occasions when there are incidents of blind racial solidarity, where groups support individuals solely on the basis of their colour, even these individuals undermine the democratic constitution, institutions and values, or behave violently (Gumede, 2018).
In 2021 the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) found that Western Cape Judge President Hlophe was guilty of gross misconduct and should be impeached by Parliament (JSC, 2021). The JSC found that Judge Hlophe tried to influence Justice Bess Nkabinde and Justice Chris Jafta in the case they presided over, in which former President Jacob Zuma was accused of corruption with French armaments company Thint. In 2021, the Black Lawyers Association nominated Judge Hlophe to become Chief Justice, based partially on his blackness, while ignoring the impropriety he was found guilty of by the JSC (Thamm, 2021).
When former President Jacob Zuma was arrested for contempt of court for refusing to answer questions about corruption under his presidency at the Zondo Commission, many of his supporters called on isiZulu-speakers to rally behind him, to defend him in Zulu solidarity, ignoring the poverty, unemployment and public service failures caused by Zuma’s corruption, incompetence and unresponsiveness to all South Africans, including Zulus (Gumede, 2012b).
Zuma explicitly mobilised voters in KZN to support him on the basis of his Zuluness during past elections for the ANC and the country’s presidency (Gumede, 2018). In fact, during the Zuma presidency, the ANC transformed into a party made up of something almost akin to ethnic provincial blocs. In ANC provincial branches, the ethnic community that dominated the province often also dominated the leaders and government of the province, to the exclusion of other communities (Gumede, 2021).
Some South Africans doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these leaders are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against their personal, financial and future interests (Gumede, 2018). This includes black individuals, political organisations that are predominantly black, and civil society organisations established to focus on issues affecting black communities often supporting leaders, viewpoints and leadership just because they are black, even if they are corrupt, incumbent and dishonest (Gumede, 2021).
Some white South Africans think that competence is reserved for whites, and thus also undermine a common South African identity (Gumede, 2018). Instances of white incompetence cannot be ignored, either. When blacks do well, it should not be dismissed as being because of their ‘political connections’, and so on.
In March 2021, during a session of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Higher Education, Science and Technology, ANC MP Jane Mananiso said that black vice chancellors of universities appear to be less competent than their white peers (Mananiso, 2021). Such blanket statements attributing competence or incompetence based on colour are wrong. Afterwards, Ahmed Bawa, chief executive officer of Universities South Africa, rightly said it is unfair to “lump all black vice chancellors together and simply say that they are all incompetent” (Naidu, 2021).
The American scholar of race, Cornel West (1993), warns against the pitfalls of what he calls a resort to black ‘authenticity’ politics, whereby every issue is reduced to ‘racial reasoning’. He argues rightly that we must “replace racial reasoning with moral reasoning, to understand the black-freedom struggle not as an affair of skin pigmentation and racial phenotype but rather as a matter of ethical principles and wise politics” (West, 1993).
South Africa’s Covid-19 economic downturn has and will continue to increase racial tensions (World Bank, 2021). Some white South Africans who fall into economic difficulties will be tempted to blame a black-dominated ANC government for being ‘against’ them. Poorer black South Africans may also be seduced to turn their anger solely on whites in general, rather than seeing it as a combination of the legacy of apartheid inequities and misguided policies by black-dominated democratic governments.
The ethnicisation of South Africa’s politics undermines social inclusion, common nationhood, and integration of all ethnic communities in the life of the country. It leads to the Bantustanisation of the country. The truth is, no single ethnic community, colour or political group in South Africa can develop by excluding others.
No one single definition of who is African or South African
The starting point for fostering a common South Africanness must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African. The obvious basic building block is identifying oneself as South African. The definition of being South African can never be narrow, it must be inclusive, embracing and democratic (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).
The ethnic, language and regional diversity bequeathed by both colonialism and apartheid must mean that modern South Africanness cannot be but a ‘layered’, interwoven mosaic (Gumede, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela’s 1962 statement in the dock during his political trial for inciting resistance against the apartheid government neatly put it, saying South Africanness cannot be defined in relation to a majority community (Mandela, 2013). At the same token there cannot be one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.
Being African, within South Africa’s plural South Africanness, cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse. Retreating into “nativism”, wanting to seek an exclusive definition of South Africanness or who is an African – which over-rides the Constitution’s core definition arguing for multiple identities, diversity and inclusivity as the pillars of South Africanness – undermines the idea of an inclusive South African identity.
Alarmingly, increasingly, but wrongly, many perceive who or what is African in South Africa very narrowly, either only based on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forbearers or level of suffering (Quintal, 2006; SAPA, 2011; Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018). This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as supposedly not African or black enough, because of their skin colour, language or historical ethnic background. This for many South Africans leads to unnecessary trauma and questioning of their sense of identity and sense of belonging.
Africanness or an African identity in the South African context cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be the same as in, say, a Nigerian, Zimbabwean or Ghanian context.
South Africa was not colonised in the same way that many other African countries were colonised. South Africa was colonised in the 1600s by European powers as part of what became known in mainstream history as the “New World”, in a similar way to countries like Brazil, the US and Cuba (Lloyd and Metzer, 2013).
In this New World type of colonialism, indigenous people inhabited these countries prior to colonialism, which brought settlers from colonial countries. In many cases colonialism also brought subjected peoples from other parts of the world, whether as slaves or subjects. These societies over time became ethnically, culturally and pigmentationally mixed.
Even the indigenous communities who were present before colonialism often had mixed to one degree or another. The apartheid project was largely based on preventing any further intermixing of colours, languages and communities.
An African identity in the South African context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is also the overwhelming character, uniqueness and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror unto itself, and its face to the world.
An African identity in the context of South Africa’s African identity is its diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.
Accepting diversity also crucial for growth, inclusive developmental and societal peace
Embracing, building on and leveraging South Africa’s diversity is crucial to lifting economic growth, inclusive development and maintaining societal peace (Raz, 1986; Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019). In fact, one of the reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and societal peace trajectory has been the rejection of diversity – the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation (Barry, 1993; Laitin and Fearon, 2003; Goodin, 2007).
Many South Africans, whether in the ANC, EFF or among black political parties on the populist left, appear to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle and that one ethnic, colour or political group could successfully drive the country’s development, lift economic growth levels and bring societal peace on their own (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018).
But growth, development and peace will not come from one group controlling South Africa at all levels, at the exclusion of others who are different from the dominant group (Goodin, 2007; PTI, 2021).
More recently, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities increasingly have low levels of diversity, which is one reason for the persistent poor performance of these entities. Some South Africans will doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against personal, financial and future interests (Malema, 2018).
Of course, the reality is that extreme poverty among many of South Africa’s previously disadvantaged communities often prevents them from seeking closer relations with communities from different ethnic, colour or even political affiliations. Having lost political power, fearing black resentment of their apartheid accrued social capital, and black populists often blaming white South Africans for sometimes self-inflicted government failure, have also driven many white South Africans into white laagers.
More importantly, the stunning failure by the ANC government to govern honestly, make decisions in the best interests of the largest number of South Africans, and provide quality public services to all has driven many communities into tribal laagers, seeking safety among those with whom they share ethnicity, language or colour.
Many South African ethnic, language and colour communities wrongly fear that embracing those communities who appear different from them will erode their own ethnic, cultural and language identity. Moreover, some leaders regularly exhort their supporters to marginalise others based on ethnicity, colour and political affiliation; claiming that only if “their” group is in charge, will South Africa see development, growth and societal peace. They are sorely mistaken (Shivambu, 2018).
Former President Jacob Zuma, in 2012, reflected the wrongheaded notion that some South African ethnic communities have more rights than others. “Sorry, we have more rights here because we are a majority. You have fewer rights because you are a minority. Absolutely, that’s how democracy works. So, it is a question of accepting the rules within democracy and you must operate in them” (Zuma, 2012).
The apartheid government tried to have one colour group control South Africa, but that racist experiment failed, because it was not sustainable; the economic growth, development and societal peace was temporary. The inevitable explosion was only postponed. The more ethnically, colour and politically polarised a society, the worse its economic, development and peace performance.
A country is fortunate to be able to draw on the vast networks, social capital, and knowledge of diverse communities (Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019). In fact, a prerequisite for South Africa to foster a common nationhood is for the vast talents of all South Africans, not only those of the same colour, party or faction, to be used. If the opposite case prevails, it will undermine nation-building, as it leaves those deliberately marginalised or excluded, whether black or white, shut out.
South Africa has, up to now, not been able to reap the growth, development and peace benefits of its diversity. Its diversity should be South Africa’s competitive advantage, not its curse (Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019).
However, this does not mean a national identity based on a singular shared culture, language or ethnicity. As Nelson Mandela stated from court docks in 1962, it also should not be defined solely in relation to one majority community (Mandela, 2012).
In times of crisis, whether based on economic collapse, corruption or state failure, in the post-colonial or post-apartheid period, citizens, in countries with diverse roots such as South Africa, may fall back on historical self-identities, groups and divisions of the past – making the forging of a shared new identity much harder, yet so much more urgent. Crucially, building a shared South African common identity must therefore involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.
South African common identity based on democracy
Because the nation, termed the ‘imagined political community’ by the scholar of nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1991), is so diverse, creating a new South Africanness will have to be based on politics. What then is the basis of our common political identity? A common South Africanness will have to be weaved around the idea of an inclusive democracy.
South Africa’s founding myth – based on politics – is the fact that the country managed to rise out of the ashes of a civil war, peacefully construct a democratic dispensation based on a new democratic constitution, anchored in South Africa’s ethnic diversity, and a new set of democratic values, rules and political culture. The founding document of our political settlement that ended apartheid and ushered in non-racial democracy is our constitution.
South Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, Afrikaner, coloured or Indian – or narrow colour or political identities – to a broader South Africanness, which is vested in democracy, democratic values, and ethnic and racial inclusivity. Altogether these would be the basis for common interests and a ‘national consensus’ across the ethnic, political and colour divide. Our common ambition should be to mould a new democratic identity for South Africa.
Because South Africanness is a political construct, there are some obvious pitfalls. Since democracy and the new Constitution are at the heart of South Africa’s new identity, undermining both cannot but undermine the formation of a new South Africanness. Yet, increasingly, the Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by some political leaders.
As Larry Diamond, the American democracy scholar, argues, once a departure from the democratic rules and behaviour becomes a ‘recurring and defining feature’ (it does happen to some degree in all democracies), it will remain a hollow democracy. And for our purposes, if the democracy is of low quality, it will be impossible to foster a ‘new national democratic identity’ (Diamond, 1997).
A new democratic South African identity necessitates widespread public trust in the Constitution, democratic institutions and democratic system overall. A prerequisite for developing a common South Africanness is absolute loyalty – not to a party, leader or tribe, but to the country’s Constitution.
The South African Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by many ANC leaders and members. In many cases, the ANC’s constitution is seen as above the country’s Constitution. But “to survive, a constitution must have more than philosophical or logical appeal; it must be viewed by most citizens as worth defending” (Weingast, 1997).
Because South Africa’s common identity is built on politics, its constitution will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone, but rather, it will rely on constantly having a quality democracy, inclusive democratic institutions, and a capable state delivering services equitably (Dahl, 1989, 1990).
South Africa cannot have competing governance systems to the democratic Constitution
There cannot be competing governance systems to the Constitution, either. The organisational culture of the ANC has increasingly also become the national political culture of the country, upstaging the democratic Constitution (Gumede, 2018). The ANC’s seminal March 2007 discussion document on organisational renewal acknowledged there is tension between the “imperatives of the ANC as a national liberation movement with a distinct culture and revolutionary traditions”, and the “demands and obligations” of the government overseeing a democracy (ANC, 2007).
Since it took power in 1994, the more secretive, intolerant and centralised decision-making aspects of its exile, underground military wings, appear to have come to dominate the party’s culture. There is a wrong belief among many ANC leaders and members that the party laws are above those of the country’s Constitution, laws and individual conscience (Mthembu, 2018).
For example, former President Jacob Zuma some time ago warned that ANC MPs should serve the ANC first, before the Constitution, which of course devalues the Constitution (Makinana, Stone and Nhlabathi, 2016). For another, many ANC leaders and members reckon that the ANC and its leadership are above democratic institutions, such as parliament; and that the rules of the party have preference over the Constitution, democratic laws or democratic institutions such as parliament. An ANC leader or member of parliament may do something illegal – but it only becomes illegal if the party says so.
Former President Zuma said: “ANC leaders in government should not regard South Africa’s Constitution as being ‘more important’ than the ANC because this would land them in trouble.” The leader of the Congress of the People, Patrick Lekota, responding to Zuma’s anti-Constitution statement said that elevating the ANC above the country’s Constitution “is an absolute disaster” for democracy and will “reduce to nil whatever gains of democracy we have cherished and continue to hope will become” (Van Onselen, 2008).
South Africa has other parallel governance systems competing with the Constitution. The governance system of traditional chiefs, leaders and structures, with its guiding ideology of patriarchy, directly challenges and competes with South Africa’s democratic Constitution, laws and values. Pockets of many rural areas have turned into parallel states, where either traditional kings, chiefs or leaders have turned these areas into their quasi-states, which run parallel to South Africa’s constitutional state (Mnisi Weeks, 2015).
South Africa’s former homelands, in particular, have been entrenched, as they were during the apartheid era, with unelected kings, chiefs and traditional leaders and their councils ruling without democracy, controlling communal land and mining rights, with citizens having little rights and where gender equality is a foreign concept.
The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished or, if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democratic norms, to ensure social, gender and age equality and promote individuals’ freedom of choice.
Former President Jacob Zuma shored up the power of traditional kings, chiefs and leaders, just like many leaders of other African independence and liberation movements, in return for these individuals to compel their “subjects” to vote for the ANC (Gumede, 2012; Mnisi Weeks, 2015; Stoddard, 2017). Although customary law is recognised in democratic South Africa, it is meant to be subject to the Constitution, democratic institutions and laws, not above these.
Organised criminal groups are in some cases also operating as parallel states, handing out their own justice, providing “services” and employment. In many townships, gangs form parallel states, controlling resources, setting “laws” and forcing ordinary citizens to pay “taxes” to them in their “jurisdictions” (Kinnes, 2017; Imray, 2020; Cruywagen, 2021). In these areas the Constitutional rules, values and laws do not apply.
An accountable democratic state crucial for a common democratic South African identity
Because a democratic state is so central in building a new common South Africanness, the legitimacy of the state will hinge on whether it delivers. Herein lies the danger for nation-building, which is premised on an effective, inclusive and caring state.
The nature of South Africa’s transition to a democracy meant that it was always going to be difficult for any democratic government in South Africa to build a national consensus centred on a new democratic state – unless the state delivers.
Because of South Africa’s negotiated compromise, the apartheid state that many black South Africans saw and fought against as illegitimate, was taken over by the new democratic government. The failure of the democratic state to deliver services to black South Africans has undermined many black South Africans’ confidence in the democratic state, just as they lacked confidence in the apartheid state, which did not deliver to them.
A combination of lack of public service delivery, a seemingly indifferent democratic state, and the perceptions that only a few blacks connected to the top ANC leadership and whites, who by virtue of education and pre-1994 policies benefit economically from the democracy, undermine any nation-building efforts.
Trust in the state, public leadership and democratic institutions, and in democracy itself, depends on these institutions being accountable, honest and effective.
Public corruption that appears to go unpunished or only with selective punishment (the perception is that if the person is closely connected to the right faction of the ANC, then wrongdoing is often not punished or the person is just given a slap on the wrist), undermines the democratic legitimacy, credibility and trust of the state.
Leadership that strengthens a common South Africanness
Leadership style matters very much. There is going to be a premium on South Africa’s political leaders to govern at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group.
Good public leadership is a pillar of good democratic governance, the way the values of the country, as encompassed within the Constitution, are embedded. Leaders can either foster the underlying values – inclusive nationhood and peaceful co-existence – set out in democratic constitutions, or undermine these.
A case in point is the fact that former President Nelson Mandela, like India’s Mohandas Gandhi, purposefully tried to evoke through his own personality a symbol of all-South African patriotism around which all South Africans could rally, no matter their colour, ethnicity or political allegiance.
People often say South Africa lacks leadership. What they mean is that we need leaders that would govern in the best interests of all. Leadership that is in the widest public interest, aligned with the values of the Constitution and which is compassionate, promotes democratic governance. Leaders must follow the rules applicable to everyone else. Flagrant ignorance of the new democratic laws by post-apartheid leaders won’t do.
Leadership is at a higher premium in societies that are ethnically diverse, have high levels of inequality, and where democratic rules, institutions and governance are not fully embraced by all. Poor leadership prevents the institutionalisation of democratic constitutions, laws and racial inclusivity. It will mean ordinary citizens supporting leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture.
Solidarity, social justice and caring for the vulnerable
Building commonality on the basis of difference presents a unique challenge. In the South African type of colonial and apartheid history, white skins were bestowed with more social, political and economic power. Power was further dispersed based on skin pigmentation.
Race, and the continued legacy of apartheid inequalities, where most blacks are poor and whites better off, is one of the fault lines in the country’s efforts to build a common South Africanness.
Therefore, building a shared South African common identity must involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.
A common South Africanness must be built on solidarity for the vulnerable across ethnicity, colour and political affiliation. This means that social justice must underpin governing.
It will be critical that economic development policies focus on genuinely uplifting not only the poor, but the widest number of people at the same time, whatever their race, colour or political affiliation – rather than a small elite, whether white or black or both. If the poor black majority is left out of prosperity, a common South Africanness will remain a fading dream.
Conclusion
The lack of grown-up elected and public leadership, lack of rational thinking in public discourse and lack of knowledge of the diversity, complexity and varied history by many of their own country beyond their immediate village, social and political setting, has contributed to the often-despairing limited view of South Africanness (Gumede, 2012). We need deeper, better-quality discussions, debates and information on what constitutes a new post-apartheid South African identity at the individual, communal and national level.
Nevertheless, a common South African identity cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse.
The post-apartheid collective identity-building project has to be building a ‘layered’, plural one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’. A common South African identity in the context of South Africa is the country’s diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.
This means that South Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, coloured or Indian, to a more inclusive South Africanness. Being born into the Zulu, white, coloured or Indian “community” should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness, and not the only one – as it alarmingly is, in many instances, the case now.
A South African identity would be taking parts of all communities, adding to those ones born into, and discarding aspects that are discriminatory, impinging on human rights and dignity of others. A common South African identity is partially based on politics. And because of this, South Africanness will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone.
South Africanness must be based on self-identities that are vested in the common constitution, democracy, democratic institutions and democratic values. These together with an inclusive state and acceptance of diversity must be the central pillars of a common South Africanness.
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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute
The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.
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