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JULY 2024
by Dr Ndiakhat Ngom
Abstract
The historical relationship between Africa and China exemplifies a successful model of South-South cooperation, marked by three critical phases: support for African independence and development, Africa's pivotal role in recognising China in global governance, and the formalisation and intensification of relations through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This paper, presented at the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) in Cape Town, reflects on the current state and future directions of China-Africa relations.
FOCAC has become the cornerstone of China-Africa cooperation, with both parties benefitting from strategic trade partnerships and shared geopolitical visions. However, this relationship also faces challenges, particularly in training, economic cooperation, environmental preservation, and global governance. The paper delves into these sectors, emphasising the importance of technology transfer, the transformation of natural resources, strengthening the African private sector, addressing environmental concerns in the mining and marine sectors, and supporting Africa's representation on the UN Security Council.
The analysis includes case studies on Senegal's local content initiatives, Guinea's bauxite industry, and West Africa's fishing crisis. It underscores the necessity of less unequal economic cooperation and the importance of industrial autonomy for Africa's sustainable development. Additionally, the paper highlights the need for inclusive consultations and stricter measures to combat illegal fishing and environmental degradation.
Recommendations for enhancing the China-Africa partnership include establishing a CATTF alert and analysis department, conducting studies on migration and jihadism, and improving crisis impact assessments for FOCAC. Ultimately, the paper advocates for a dynamic and inclusive multilateralism, fostering wisdom, listening, and anticipation to ensure a mutually beneficial and equitable relationship between China and Africa.
Keywords: FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation); South-South Cooperation; Strategic Trade Partnerships; Sustainable Development; Technology Transfer
Introduction
Africa and China have historically maintained extremely fruitful relations. They significantly reflect a fine example of South-South cooperation. This relationship was built on three essential phases:
First, China accompanied African countries in their struggle for independence and their development programme.
Then, Africa played a decisive role in the recognition of China in global governance. Its vote in 1971 allowed it to join the UN. Mao Zedong recognised this debt and expressed his gratitude.
The last act, in 2000, is the formalisation and intensification of relations within an ambitious framework, FOCAC. The China Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) is one of its branches.
More than 24 years after its creation, FOCAC has become the reference for China/Africa. For its industrial competitiveness, China sees Africa as a strategic trading partner, through the supply of raw materials, energy, fishing, agriculture, agroforestry, and mines. In return, African countries benefit from road, port, airport, and health infrastructures and from a diversification of training.
Geopolitically, both parties share the vision of a more just, equitable, and fraternal world. They support each other at the United Nations in order to influence decisions in favour of the Global South. Finally, the enlargement of BRICS to South Africa and Ethiopia in 2023 is a strong sign. We hope that other African countries will follow.
Despite these obvious successes, not everything is perfect in the relationship. Like France/Africa in the past, China/Africa raises questions, praise, fantasies, and criticism. This paper will highlight four sectors, which are training, the economy, the environment, and geopolitics, and will formulate recommendations.
Technology Transfer and Transformation of Natural Resources
During a meeting with African Heads of State invited to the BRICS summit on 23 August 2023, in Johannesburg, President Xi Jinping formulated a proposal that seemed crucial to us: "China will launch the China-Africa Talent Development Cooperation Plan. It plans to train 500 successful directors and teachers of vocational schools for Africa each year, as well as 10,000 talents who master the Chinese language and professional skills. China plans to invite 20,000 government officials and technical professionals from African countries to seminars or forums. To support the strengthening of African capacities in science, education, and innovation, China will implement the Cooperation Programme between 100 Chinese and African higher education institutions and launch 10 pilot projects between Chinese research institutes and African partners” (Xi, 2023).
Training and technology transfer are essential to the industrialisation and emergence of Africa. The African population is young, dynamic, and demanding training. It will double in 2050, from 1.4 billion inhabitants to 2.5 billion. Chinese direct investments in Africa totalled US$3.4 billion in 2022 (Agence Ecofin, 2023). China is the fourth-largest foreign investor in Africa. These investments bring growth, but they are mainly of interest in labour-intensive sectors. Africa needs less unequal economic cooperation in which China invests in industrial activities that require technology transfer. Its main sector of activity is construction and energy, an area of high demand for often low-skilled labour. Less imbalanced relationships are in high demand with China more investor than service provider and Africa more partner than customer. China is at the same time financier, service provider, customer, and supplier of goods.
Africa must step up efforts to achieve industrial autonomy. China has had a similar trajectory in the past and constitutes a perfect example for African countries. Today China has the most efficient TGVs in the world and an impressive network density, designed based on its own geographical and cultural standards. It surpasses countries such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan – which accompanied it in the 1980s. It has achieved technological feats on the naval and aeronautical levels. Its engineers are today autonomous in the design and production of innovative equipment, a guarantee of significant economic growth.
Africa dreams of this same model of cooperation. Investing in local skills in order to gradually gain autonomy is the central objective. Senegal is collaborating with the French group, Alstom, in the operation of a regional railway line. Other countries, such as Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Ghana, express the request to locally transform their natural resources.
Guinea Conakry is the second-largest producer of bauxite in the world, of which China is the leading customer for producing aluminium. The country has immense reserves of gold and diamonds, and one of the world's largest unexploited iron reserves. Unfortunately, the economic and social benefits are weak. Guinea is one of the poorest countries in the world. President Mamadi Doumbouya demanded from mining companies the local processing of bauxite, under the 1983 agreements, for the construction of aluminium smelters.
Guinea exports more than 87 million tonnes of bauxite worth US$500 billion (Bamba, 2022). Experts estimate that the installation of refineries should multiply these figures by five. The Chinese mining company TBEA GROUP had committed to building a 200,000 tonnes/year aluminium smelter in 2018. But in 2024, nothing concrete. The only positive result concerns Simandou iron for which Guinea obtained a significant stake in mines and railway and port infrastructure.
Its neighbours, Ivory Coast and Ghana, display the same ambition for autonomy. They produce 60% of the world's cocoa production, but they buy chocolate imported from Switzerland at a high price because of the big cocoa traders (Cargill, Nestlé, Olam, Callebaut) (Drout, 2023). Out of the US$100 billion generated by the chocolate sector, these two countries only earned six. It is to fight against this economic injustice that Presidents Alassane Dramane Ouattara and Nana Akufo-Addo initiated local transformation programmes targeting 100% of the production by 2050.
Only autonomy makes it possible to capitalise on the entire value chain and boost growth. In addition to the slogan "decolonising knowledge" in African universities, there is that of "decolonising industry" among activists, youth, and civil society. China's history is a great proof of autonomy, and President Xi Jinping demonstrated this well in his speech on skills. Africa cannot develop by remaining an eternal supplier of raw materials. Africa is poor with its richness; this is paradoxical. But it would be better off by valuing them itself. Progressive control of African resources would be the perfect sign of a win-win partnership between China and Africa.
Strengthening the Private Sector in Africa
The emergence of Africa depends on a strong private sector, benefitting from the trust of States and technical and financial partners. As Africa’s first partner, China has a vital role to play, since it is the world champion in foreign exchange reserves. In August 2023, the People's Bank of China held US$3,204 billion compared to US$800 billion for the Eurozone and US$150 billion for the Central Bank of the USA. Its investment skills are impressive.
In Senegal, the private sector is organising itself, helped by the government, through the promotion of “local content”. The initiative is supervised by the Public Order Regulatory Authority (ARCOP) to ensure compliance with tender standards for the execution of projects. In the execution of projects financed by development partners, 33% of the contract amount is granted to the private sector. But Eximbank and China Development Bank have infinite financing capacities, and their infrastructures are built by one of the 3000 Chinese companies in Africa.
This exclusivity weakens the local industry because the absence of tenders creates frustration. It is why the Senegalese Investors Club (CIS) was created. It is an employers' union that brings together companies in the construction, energy, banking, agri-food, and transport sectors. Its objective is to finance and execute projects in the name of economic sovereignty. The group collaborates with financial institutions and has created an investment fund of US$34 million (CIS, 2018).
Three examples demonstrate its success:
Creation of West Africa Energy, a 300 MW gas-fired power plant project which aims for the country’s energy autonomy.
At the investors forum in Paris in December 2018, the club committed to providing US$2 billion of the US$7.5 billion needed to finance the second phase of the “Sénégal Émergent” plan. It had positioned itself alongside major international financial institutions.
Creation of a modern agricultural farm of 5,000 ha in the village of Ndingler using local financing and the promotion of local agronomic expertise in order to contribute to the food sovereignty of the country.
(CIS, 2018)
China should strengthen the African private sector by granting it a significant share of contracts. For example, Henan Chine carries out most of the construction sectors in Senegal, although there are three large local groups: CDE, CSE, and TALIX GROUP. They have several subsidiaries in Africa and carried out all the roadworks during the 13th OIC summit in 2008 in Dakar, for which a budget of US$600 million has been allocated. Local companies in Senegal are today isolated in the execution of Chinese contracts.
Globally, FOCAC has considerably accelerated the commercial dynamic between the two parties. Selling turnkey infrastructure is good; it boosts growth and creates jobs. But China can do better. With the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the planet has the largest global network of integrated infrastructures whose ambition is to secure the production, transport, and distribution of natural and industrial resources between China and the rest of the world.
The BRI is an incredible opportunity for the African private sector. Africa proposes the inclusion of special clauses, in the form of quotas, in favour of the private sector in the execution of BRI mega infrastructures. To reduce the trade imbalance between Africa and China, financing from Eximbank and China Development Bank should benefit the Chinese and African private sectors. There needs to be more fairness and more confidence for the African private sector. These two aspects are crucial for creating wealth, employment for youth, and the well-being of populations.
Accentuate Efforts in the Mining and Marine Environmental Sector
Environmental preservation is an important part of China/Africa. China is the leading producer of aluminium in the world thanks to bauxite from Guinea Conakry, which represents 50% of its needs. Bauxite is valuable for the automobile, naval, and food industries. Many Chinese companies are active in Guinea on the Boké-Kindia-Fria-Boffa axis, which holds two-thirds of the country's reserves. This coastal region holds most of the country's economic and industrial activity, but it also suffers a lot of environmental damage. The air, forests, and yards around mining companies are polluted. Agricultural, livestock, fishing activities, and the health of villagers are affected.
This is why this region is regularly shaken by riots, an expression of great frustration. Between April and September 2017, extreme violence shook the city of Boké (Tchimbakala, 2017). Young people accused mining companies of only being partially involved in the community’s well-being, of destroying biodiversity, and of impoverishing populations. The absence of the State, corruption, the power of mining companies, and mismanagement are indexed. There needs to be inclusive consultations between mining stakeholders in order to avoid a breakdown in trust. The numerous complaints from young people against mining in Guinea could lead to a similar situation in the Sahel, which has put the French in a difficult position.
The second subject on which China is expected is its involvement in the regularisation of the fishing sector in West Africa. This sector is strategic; the area is one of the world’s richest in fish. It contributes to food security, income, and employment. Unfortunately, it has the highest rate of illegal fishing in the world, due to undeclared catches, weak monitoring resources, and corruption in fishing licences. Foreign vessels practise piracy and overfishing with impunity through bottom trawling, a technique that often does not comply with standards. In addition, there are national flags that belong, in reality, to foreign companies. The losses are enormous for coastal economies. Fish are becoming scarce, fishermen are becoming poorer, tensions are breaking out with foreign ships, and maritime pollution is intensifying.
And there are dramatic consequences. Today, the image of Senegal is identified with the irregular immigration of thousands of Africans, from Dakar to the Canary Islands. They are only separated by 1300 km, which is the same distance as Johannesburg to Cape Town. The canoes leave from the fishing villages along the Senegalese coast (700 km), such as Cayar, Thiaroye, Bargny, Mbour, Saint Louis, and Cape Skirring. The traffickers are former fishermen who have retrained. Not all migrants are fishermen, but it should be noted that the fishing crisis in West Africa has a major impact on the migration crisis.
According to the Spanish NGO, Caminando Fronteras (2023), sub-Saharan Africa accounts for nearly two-thirds of illegal migrants from the Canary Islands. Nearly 6,618 people died or disappeared in 2023; these figures have tripled compared to 2022. This maritime route is one of the most dangerous in the world.
China cannot ignore this crucial problem, especially since its fleet, the largest in the region, is one of the flags in question. China is contributing significantly to the implementation of alternative programmes such as fish farming, but it is important to add that it made important efforts to fight against illegal fishing. According to a press release published in February 2018, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture withdrew fishing subsidies and licences from three Chinese companies involved in illegal fishing in West Africa. Since 2016, the cancellation of subsidies is approximately CN¥700 million (US$110.5 million) for 264 vessels belonging to 78 deep-sea fishing companies (EJF, 2018: 26).
China should step up its efforts, alongside African countries, the European Union, local associations, and NGOs. It must strengthen the means of geolocation of ships and intervention of the navy, but above all crack down hard on the corruption, which is plaguing the environment.
Supporting the African Union on the Security Council
The FOCAC and BRICS are privileged spaces for the design and execution of South-South programmes. The illustration is the involvement of China, followed by Russia, Cuba, and India, to provide medical equipment to African countries to fight against Covid-19. Medical diplomacy is one of the most beautiful proofs of solidarity in the Global South. At the UN, African countries consider China a powerful ally with whom they benefit from greater attention. China can count on Africa, in its Great South project, to reform global governance.
Africa is the ideal partner for this central objective of multilateralism. With 54 independent states, it is the largest bloc in the United Nations system, with 28% of the votes, compared to 27% for Asia, 17% for the Americas, and 15% for Western Europe. Africa holds a quarter of the votes in all United Nations governing bodies. Finally, it is the most important bloc in the WTO, the Group of 77, and the Non-Aligned Movement (Nantulya, 2023). China and Africa are working together to occupy important agencies at the UN. The rebalancing of global responsibilities, an old grievance in the South, is becoming a reality.
Observations on this theme concern two points: one is a concern; the other is a request.
The concern is about the principle of “non-interference” contained in the "Global Security Initiative (GSI)”. This programme aims for the sovereignty of States in the face of external pressures (military intervention, economic sanctions), and promotes pacifism and consultation to resolve conflicts. This was at the heart of the inaugural speech President Xi Jinping gave at the opening of the annual conference of the Boa Forum for Asia (21 April 2022) and at the third China Africa Summit on Peace and Security in Beijing (19 September to 2 August 2023).
It is important to remark that the GSI responds to the desire to deculturalise the concepts of international law inherited from the West, but realistically, the political and security context in Sahel is not favourable to this. Several facts justify the fears:
The first point is that the GSI encourages the confiscation of the electoral calendar, weakens the opposition and the populations who feel helpless in the face of the omnipotence of the military and dictators.
The second point is that the GSI isolates dictatorship states from neighbouring countries and encourages the confiscation of liberties. For example, in Niger, there has been tension for several months between the military authorities and the Maison de la Presse Association, a group of 32 socio-professional media organisations. The Interior ministry suspended its activities because the group had harshly criticised the coup and the attacks on fundamental liberties.
The third point is that the GSI is a threat to regional integration and solidarity. After the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted economic sanctions and considered sending military forces to Niger, before withdrawing. But these initiatives were judged as an attack on sovereignty by these countries, which nevertheless signed the ECOWAS charter on economic integration and the free movement of goods and people (1975).
Today, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are cross-border and heavily impacted by jihadist attacks. So, they have formed a mutual defence pact, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) (September 2023) and have withdrawn from ECOWAS (January 2024). The pretexts are the injustice of economic sanctions, the loss of the fundamental values of ECOWAS, and their isolation in front of jihadist attacks. ECOWAS is in a deep crisis today.
The second point is a request for reform of the United Nations Security Council. The world has changed between 1945 and 2024. There is a tipping point towards the South. The geopolitical divide, global warming, xenophobia, zoonotic diseases, extreme poverty, migration, and artificial intelligence are significant challenges that require a redefinition of global governance.
Africa remains largely absent from the UN Security Council. Since 2005, it has expressed its desire for profound reform in order to be better heard. In the name of the fight against global warming, financial institutions refuse to finance the exploitation of its rich energy deposits, while the African Union calls for a moratorium on fossil fuels. Africa is severely affected by global warming, even though it only contributes -5% of GHGs. By failing to transform its natural resources itself, it only contributes 3% to international trade. On a medical level, Covid-19 has shown Africa’s great fragility. In terms of security, it hosts seven of the 14 peacekeeping operations and supplies most of the blue helmets. These are all important subjects on which the international community takes the place of Africa and makes decisions in its place. In order to repair this geopolitical injustice, the African Union set up a committee of 10 (C10) composed of 10 heads of state and government mandated to negotiate the reform of the UN Security Council. These are Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Uganda, Senegal, Libya, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, and Sierra Leone.
At the 10th C10 ministerial meeting in Brazzaville (12 January 2023), President Denis Sassou-Nguesso said: "A major player on the international scene, Africa must assert its rights and duties within the United Nations, hence the urgency of establishing a reformed and renovated security council, more transparent, more democratic and more representative of global cultural diversity" (Ambassade du Congo France, 2023).
He added that Africa's objective is to obtain two seats as permanent members with the right of veto, two seats as non-permanent members, and under the 2004 United Nations convention, one or two languages as a working instrument. China and Germany have expressed their desire to support Africa’s project. All the conditions are met now. China should materialise it by lobbying with partners in the South and North. It is a unique opportunity to pay off the 1971 debt, thanks to which it accessed the Security Council. The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum is facing a great challenge.
Conclusion
From 44 countries in 2000, there are 53 in addition to the African Union Commission in 2024. FOCAC has become a success. However, despite its laudable intentions and significant economic and political achievements, FOCAC’s members must remain lucid. China was admitted late into international relations. It was preceded by the former colonisers who had exclusivity in Africa. The French precinct in French-speaking countries is a great example of the power of former colonisers in Africa. But the roles are reversed today. Three factors can explain it:
The arrival of new partners, China, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, with new offers,
A more educated youth connected to globalisation, and
The tremendous mobilisation capacity of social networks, especially TikTok.
A dynamic and inclusive multilateralism has emerged and become a breath of fresh air for African countries. French economic actors were supplanted by Chinese investments, and the Sahel’s populations forced the French army to leave. However, in recent years, African youth and civil society have sent strong signals that the West has not been able to dissect. The breakup was then inevitable. This is a turning point that deserves reflection.
China/Africa must take stock after a quarter of a century of companionship. Both parties have to be reactive and anticipate trends, aspirations, and new dynamics in Africa. The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum has a pioneering role to play: that of whistleblowers. FOCAC must learn from the mistakes of former African partners in order to avoid getting confused in its strategic options.
As a contribution to the Forum’s reflection, here are four recommendations:
The CATTF must set up a department for alert and analysis.
For West Africa, it is imperative to carry out a study to evaluate the relationship between migration and the fishing crisis.
A second study must be carried out to evaluate the worsening of jihadism in the Sahel in relation to the recruitment of young people.
Reports on crises and their possible impacts on FOCAC will be given to the authority to help with decision-making.
In short, cultivating wisdom and a capacity for listening and anticipation within FOCAC is the message from Senegal and the Sahel.
Summary
Establishing the conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa, within the formal framework of FOCAC, is a highly beneficial but difficult approach. The relationship arouses hope, equitable cooperation, pooling intelligence, and prosperity in the name of a common vision of the Deep South: united and peaceful. China/Africa offers symptoms of an undeniable shift in global geopolitics towards the South.
But the intensification of exchanges also arouses criticism. Beyond the statistics, the achievements, and the good intentions, there is reason to point out aspects which appear problematic and to make recommendations on subjects related to training, the economy, the environment, and global governance.
The performances achieved over a quarter of a century plead in favour of a healthy relationship, based on trust and respect. But this should not prevent China/Africa actors from maintaining the lucidity necessary to avoid past mistakes that disadvantaged Africa with other partners.
References
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