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Occasional Paper 3/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. M A R C H 2 0 2 5 Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).      Abstract Despite evidence from climate experts that 6% of the world’s coal use must be terminated every year until 2040 to prevent a climate disaster, global coal use continues to rise. The global challenge now lies in securing a just transition from coal. Developed countries – the biggest emmitters – have made funding promises to developing countries that fall far short of what these nations need to transition and adapt, and largely take the form of loans that leave these poorer nations heavily indebted and without any power over how the transition unfolds. In South Africa, about 80% of its power is generated by coal. Mine closure will have a severe impact on millions of already poverty-stricken people. At present, South Africa has no effective plan to mitigate the transition shock on the economy, which could destabilise its financial institutions. So, how can South Africa pursue a just transition from coal that takes into consideration local realities, energy security, development and economic growth, indebtedness, and poverty, unemployment and social stability? The country has well-developed infrastructure, abundant natural resources, and critical minerals, offering opportunities to create a formidable green economy. The way forward is global funding based on grants and investment funding, a focus on technology to clean coal, a massive step-up in developing renewable energy, and a manufacturing, skills and technology revolution. But most importantly, is the need for an industrial policy based on a compact between the state, private sector, and civil society.   Introduction   Following energy shortages generated by the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Middle East conflict, many industrial and emerging powers have either returned to the use of coal for power, whether temporarily, or slowed down on decommissioning of coal plants.   A new December 2024 report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) said global demand for coal is set to hit fresh records every year through at least 2027 (IEA, 2024a). Coal demand in 2024 was about 9% higher than a forecast made a few years ago. The forecast from the IEA sees demand for coal rising to nearly 8.9 billion tons by 2027, about 1% higher than 2024 levels.   While there has been a global rise in the deployment of wind turbines and solar panels, it has not slowed down the use of coal. The IEA states: “Coal is often considered a fuel of the past, but global consumption of it has doubled in the past three decades. At the height of lockdowns related to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, demand declined significantly. Yet the rebound from those lows, underpinned by high gas prices in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has resulted in record global coal production, consumption, trade and coal-fired power generation in recent years” (IEA, 2024a: 3).   “Separate to the rise in the use of coal due to energy supply shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict, accelerating demand for electricity around the world could give coal another boost. Our models show global demand for coal plateauing through 2027 even as electricity consumption rises sharply,” Keisuke Sadamori, the IEA’s director of energy markets and security, said in a statement (IEA, 2024b).   Climate researchers have pointed out that 6% of the world’s coal use must be terminated every year until 2040 to prevent a global climate disaster (GEM, 2023).   In 2015, global nations signed the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which outlined a long-term strategy the world must adopt to keep the rise of global temperatures under 1.5C, the temperature limit compared with preindustrial times (AP, 2025; UNFCCC, 2015). The Agreement proposed that all the world’s coal plants should be closed by 2040, unless they have carbon-removal technology.   A key challenge in the energy transition is how to make renewable energy fully replace coal generation, without imperilling energy security, development, and economic growth (Dresselhuys,   2024).   G7 countries battle to reduce coal usage   In April 2024, the Group of Seven (G7) countries pledged to end what they called, euphemistically, “unabated” coal power plants by 2035 (G7, 2024). It published a pledge to “phase out existing unabated coal power generation in our energy systems during the first half of the 2030s” to curb the rise in global greenhouse gas emissions (G7, 2024).   The G7 nations – the UK, US, Canada, France, Italy, Germany and Japan –had for years struggled to reach agreement on phasing out coal. These seven countries are collectively responsible for one-fifth of global greenhouse gas emissions (Fyson et al, 2022).   The G7 left space for members to continue to use coal beyond the deadline if plants are fitted with carbon-capture technology to prevent emissions from entering the atmosphere. Many G7 and European Union member countries have transitioned from coal to natural gas, which “has acted as a lower-carbon ‘bridge fuel’” (Dresselhuys,   2024).   Germany and the UK have nine coal-fired power plants each in the list of the top 30 CO2-polluting thermal power plants in the EU, according to a July 2024 report called “Europe’s Dirty 30” released today by CAN Europe, World Wildlife Fund, the European Environmental Bureau, the Health and Environment Alliance, and Climate Alliance Germany.   Germany uses more coal to generate electricity than any other EU country, while the UK comes third in absolute coal consumption for power after Poland, according to the “Europe’s Dirty 30” report.   Germany, Europe’s largest economy, was set to phase out coal by 2030. The German statistics office Destatis reported that during July and September 2022, more than a third (36.3%) of the electricity fed into the German power grids came from coal-fired power plants, compared with 31.9% in the third quarter of 2021 (Eckert & Sims, 2022).   In October 2023, to avoid winter power shortages and to replace scarce natural gas, after a sudden drop in Russian imports to Germany, the German Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online from October 2023 until the end of March 2024. Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans.   In its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions  in the region  by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission in 2022 proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022).   That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then. However, the German government refused to accept the EU ban on new fossil fuel cars from 2035. The EU has stated ambitions to reduce carbon emissions, including a pledge to become carbon neutral by 2050 (Le Monde, 2022).   In 2023, France extended the life of its two remaining coal plants, located in Cordemais and Saint-Avold, long after they were initially due to shut down ( Cossins-Smith , 2023). Many countries only temporarily shut down coal-fired plants to be brought back online during high energy demands or crises. France brought back its coal plants “as a precaution” to “ensure reliable electricity production” during winter. The French government aims to completely phase out coal power by 2030 ( Cossins-Smith , 2023).   In March 2023, the UK called on its reserve coal capacity to manage increased demand following a colder than expected winter (Ambrose, 2024). The UK had in the past pledged to phase out coal by the end of 2024.   Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands in 2023 started up their coal power stations. Italy’s Energy Minister told the country’s Parliament that the country was committed to stopping electricity generation from coal by the end of 2025 nationwide, except on the island of Sardinia (Reuters, 2024a). Italy will move to gas-fired plants instead. It had initially targeted to abandon coal by 31 December 2025; however, Italy’s updated National Climate Energy Plan was revised to end the use of coal only between 2026 and 2028 (Reuters, 2024a). The country is trying to coordinate coal exits until it has brought on board new gas-fired power plants (Reuters, 2024a).   In 2022, Austria announced it would reopen its Mellach power plant in the southern Styria region of the country, which was closed in 2020, over Russian supply shortages because of the war in Ukraine.   The Austrian decision, taken by a “small crisis Cabinet”, was to convert the gas-fired power plant so that it can produce electricity with coal. The Mellach power plant had been shut down but kept on stand-by for coal use when needed.    Previously the Netherlands had capped coal power to 35% of the country’s power output. In 2022, the Netherlands activated an "early warning" phase of the country’s energy crisis plan when it lifted a cap on production by coal-fired power plants to reduce reliance on Russian gas following the war in Ukraine. 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster pushed Japan to increase coal   Japan is the fourth-largest economy in the world. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, when a 9 magnitude earthquake caused explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, pushed Japan to increase the amount of coal and natural gas it used. Japan has increased renewable energy capacity, like solar and wind, however, shortage of land limits the expansion. Before Fukushima, nuclear power provided one-third of Japan’s power.   Coal makes up 32% of Japan’s electricity mix. Gas-fired power stations supply 34% of the country’s power. Nuclear power accounts for 10%. The country pledged that renewable energy would account for more than a third of its power generation by 2030 and it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 (Irfan, 2024).   Japan is the world’s eighth-largest greenhouse gas emitter. It imports 98% of its natural gas in the form of liquified natural gas. The country has large gas storage capacity, the world’s largest LNG storage capacity, which allows the country to use natural gas energy during periods of power downturns (EIA, 2024).    Although in 2023 two new coal power stations came on board (Jera, 2023),  Japan’s target is to reduce the share of coal in electric generation from 32% to 19% by 2030. The country’s policies over the past two decades have focused on “clean coal”.   The government not only intends, over time, to get rid of old and inefficient coal power stations, but it is also prioritising developing technologies that reduce emissions from coal. Since 2023, new coal-fired power stations must come with emission reduction measures (EIA, 2024).   It is also working on increasing the efficiency of coal stations through “integrated-gasification combined-cycle infrastructure, carbon capture and sequestration, and fuel blending with ammonia and biomass” (EIA, 2024).    To continue to keep 12 GW of coal-fired power capacity going beyond 2030, the government has proposed “adding 20% or more ammonia to the coal supply or blending 25% or more wood pellets into the coal boilers to help lower CO2 emissions and keep the plants open” (EIA, 2024). The government is offering, for 20 years, a feed-in-tariff (FIT) paying coal-fired power stations for every kilowatt hour generated by wood pellets in a coal boiler (EIA, 2024). To qualify, coal power stations must keep greenhouse gas emissions under specified limits. Trump ascendancy to the US presidency may increase coal use   The US Environmental Protection Agency in early 2024 set new rules requiring coal-fired power plants to either shutdown before 2040 or if they stay in operation, to capture nearly all of their climate pollution. It is likely that under new US Republican President Donald Trump, who says climate change is overhype, coal use is likely to rise. Trump in his presidential election campaign promised to deregulate the energy sector, cut environmental regulations, and drill for shale gas.   Coal makes up 16% of US power generation. The US exported more than $5 billion of coal in 2023, as they shipped out more than 32.5 million metric tons of thermal coal, the second highest since 2017.   In November 2024, Texas and 10 other Republican-led states sued BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard, alleging they conspired to curtail supplies to further “a destructive, politicised environmental agenda” (Reuters, 2024b). Texas and the 10 Republican-led states said the large asset managers violated antitrust law through climate activism that reduced coal production and boosted energy prices.   The complaint was filed in the Federal Court in Tyler, Texas. Texas and the 10 Republican-led states accused the companies of exploiting their market power and involvement in climate advocacy groups to pressure coal companies to slash output and reduce carbon emissions from coal by more than 50% by 2030, driving up consumers’ energy bills (Reuters, 2024b). Republicans have used US antitrust laws since 2021 to fight what they alleged is collusion among investment managers to combat climate change.   The lawsuit cites the defendants' investments in nine coal companies, including combined respective stakes of 34.2% and 30.4% in Arch Resources and Peabody Energy, the largest publicly traded US coal producers (Reuters, 2024b). The lawsuit tries to block the companies from making any shareholder decisions that will reduce coal production. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, whose office filed the lawsuit, accused the companies of promoting an “illegal weaponisation of the financial industry in service of a destructive, politicised ‘environmental’ agenda” (Reuters, 2024b).   In January 2025, the six biggest banks in the US all quit the global banking industry’s net zero target-setting group, ahead of the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president in anticipation of pushbacks against climate change action from his government (Gayle, 2025). The banks that left the UN-sponsored net zero banking alliance included JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs.   The banking industry’s net zero banking alliance (NZBA) was established by the UN Environment Programme finance initiative but is led by banks. Members commit to align their lending, investment and capital markets initiatives with net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (Unepfi, 2024). In 2022, a number of US Republican states threatened to launch anti-trust legal action against US banks that are members of the NZBA for their commitments to reduce fossil fuels. However, the NZBA group amended the guidelines for action to soften commitments to cut fossil fuels.   In December, the Republican-led judiciary committee of the House of Representatives, the US Congress’s lower house, in a new report attacked what it called “a cartel” of global financial firms and climate activists and civil society organisations of colluding to “impose radical ESG-goals” on US companies (US Congress, 2024).   Countries faced a February 2025 deadline for updated country climate change plans. The outgoing Joe Biden administration in December 2024 proposed a climate change plan for the US in which greenhouse gas emissions will be cut by more than 60% by 2035 (Daly & Borenstein, 2025). On 21 January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed executive orders directing the United States to again withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement (Daly & Borenstein, 2025). Trump also signed a letter to the United Nations stating the US withdrawal from the 2015 Agreement. BRICS country coal consumption steady   Coal has dropped to only 4.4% of Brazil’s energy mix in 2023, with its use falling 5% between 2022 and 2023. Brazil ranks 25th in the world for coal consumption, accounting for about   2.4% of the world’s total consumption, and imports 89% of its coal.   Renewable energy sources account for 49% of Brazil’s energy mix, whereas the global national average for use of renewable energy is 15% (Argus, 2024). Natural gas has averaged around 10% of energy used.   Renewable energy – wind, solar, water, biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, green diesel, carbon capture and storage, sustainable aviation fuel and green hydrogen – is the largest energy component in Brazil’s new energy transition policy, making the country a leader in clean energy production.   Brazilian President Lula da Silva (2024) asked recently: “People respect us, because we can go anywhere and say: 80% of our electricity is renewable and 51% of our total energy matrix is already renewable and we can reach 100%. Who would have thought, 30 years ago, that we’d be talking about biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, that we are going to make the energy transition, that we are going to have wind, solar and green biodiesel?”    China enjoys new coal power construction boom   Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of China’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds. China’s share of coal power generation is around 60%, with its usage reaching an all-time high in 2024 (Slav, 2024).   Coal-fired power is enjoying a construction boom in China, the world’s biggest emitter may be turning a corner (Harvey & Hawkins, 2024). China constructed more coal-fired power plants in the first half of 2024 than any other country, presenting 90% of the world’s new coal plant construction last year (GEM, 2023).   China has been building the equivalent of two new coal plants per week, more than at any time in the past seven years, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and the Global Energy Monitor (GEM, 2023). In coal producing areas in northern China, such as Shaanxi, coal employs more than 8% of the workforce (Tridimas, 2024).   China repositioned coal as a source of continuing use following the 2022 drought the country experienced, which reduced the country’s hydroelectricity capacity, causing factory closures, and the war in Ukraine, which caused global energy shortages and price fluctuations. China sees coal as not only a backup for renewables during weather crises or high energy demand, but also as a form of energy security (GEM, 2023).   China’s grid has many inefficiencies – the country struggles to share power across regions during shortages, energy production is itself often inefficient, and it lags behind on storage capacity. However, the country has recently made big strides in building energy storage capacity (Xinhua, 2025). In China, some regions, cities and districts provide subsidies for energy storage power stations (WEF, 2024).   China’s energy strategy is based on the country’s leader Jinping Xi’s speech to the Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2022, when he said the government led by “the principle of building the new before discarding the old” (Harvey & Hawkins, 2024). This means that the Chinese government tries to reduce emissions in a way that will ensure energy security. India vowed to ensure its coal sector remains “vibrant”   Although India in recent times has expanded its renewable energy capacity, the country’s coal fleet is still the second largest in the world after China. More than 70% of India’s electricity needs are met by coal. India grew its renewable energy – wind and solar power – by 25 times in the past decade, to 195 gigawatts.   Peak electricity demand in May 2024 reached 250 gigawatts – and it is expected to rise to 300 gigawatts within two years. The Indian government wants to install 500 gigawatts of wind and solar power by 2030. However, the growth of renewable energy installation slowed after 2016. Between 2022 and 2023 the government only installed less than 15 gigawatts a year. It needs between 50 to 60 gigawatts of new wind and solar power per year to meet future demand. The decline has been due to delivery failures, policy inertia, and supply chain challenges (Arasu, 2024).   On the campaign trail in April 2024 ahead of the elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said India had achieved an “historic milestone” by reaching the production of one billion metric tons of coal and lignite. Modi said it was proof of the country’s “commitment to ensuring a vibrant coal sector” (Arasu, 2024).   India is planning to build even more coal plants. In 2023, India’s coal demand rose 10%, the biggest of any country. Coal demand in China in 2023 rose 6%, according to the International Energy Agency, and India’s electricity demand is projected to grow 6% annually.   India also suffers from a shortage of energy storage capacity to allow the country to use available energy more efficiently, with less than 4 gigawatts of power storage (Arasu, 2024). India subsidised fossil fuels to the tune of $350 billion per year, according to the IMF. The country exempted coal mining equipment from customs duty, gave knockdown rates for coal transport on long-distance rail, and provided low interest loans to build coal plants (McFarlane, 2023). South Africa’s coal use   South Africa in 2023 relied on fossil fuels for 83% of its electricity generation. The country’s coal value chain forms a large part of the domestic economy and energy generation infrastructure.   About 80% of South Africa’s power is generated by coal. Its well-developed infrastructure, abundant natural resources such as wind and sun, and critical minerals offer lots of opportunities for the country to create a formidable green economy. South Africa’s coal mining is 160 years old. It directly employs 100 000 people, and its ecosystem and indirect jobs and industries are multiples more.   Five coal-fired power plants and 15 coal mines will likely close by 2030 in South Africa, and another four plants and 23 mines by 2040. This will impact the livelihoods of 2.5 million people, most of them in Mpumalanga.    There are 66 operating coal mines in South Africa, most in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, owned by 32 private companies, with the five largest companies – Seriti, Sasol, Exxaro, Thungela and Glencore – producing 77% of the country’s coal. Coal mines produced 231 million tons of coal in 2022, which translated into earnings of R28 billion and employment of over 91 000 people. And earnings would have been higher, if not for the crisis at state-owned entity, Transnet, which has resulted in lost export revenues of R22.7 billion in 2022.   Research published in the Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy  said the closure of 15 mines by 2030 will withdraw 29.5 million tons a year (mtpa) from South Africa’s coal production, followed by a further 106 mtpa as an additional 23 mines are closed by 2040. This will have an impact on 69 mining communities and 21 municipalities.   “The impact of mine closure on the 2.5 million residents of host communities will be significant, particularly as levels of income, employment, and education are already very low and many municipalities are in financial distress,” according to the Journal of the Southern Africa Institute of Mining and Metallurgy  article authors, Megan J Cole, Mzila Mthenjane and Andrew Van Zyl.   The Journal’s authors say coal mining communities are concentrated in the western part of Mpumalanga and north-western KwaZulu-Natal, where just under 40% live below the poverty line of R19 600 annual household income, and over 39% are unemployed. Mine closures will impact on these poverty-stricken communities; and will reduce the funds for municipalities, businesses and income tax depending on income from mine companies and employees.   Renewable energy investment around the world has produced double the number of jobs compared to fossil fuels. “Many of these communities have experienced mine closures and do not have the skills and opportunities to take advantage of the inevitable transition, let alone the transition to clean energy”.   A recent South African Reserve Bank paper warned that South Africa has no effective plan to mitigate the transition shock on the economy, the drastic cut in coal production and utilisation that the country’s commitments to climate change goals requires (Monnin, Sikhosana & Singh, 2024).   Six industrial sectors are disproportionately exposed to climate change transition risks: the fossil fuel, utilities, energy-intensive, transport, housing and agriculture sectors. Around R980 billion of corporate credit loans of South African banks are tied up in sectors, called “transition-sensitive economic sectors”, which are vulnerable to the global energy transition.   The South African Reserve Bank warned that the transition shock, unless it is mitigated with adequate policies, currently absent, could destabilise South Africa’s financial institutions.   “Losses in some segments of the financial sector, even compensated by gains in others, may affect the system at large and trigger a degree of financial instability,” said the Reserve Bank researchers.   Standard Bank, Africa's biggest lender of assets, has defended its investment in fossil-fuel projects, saying the continent's energy needs have to be balanced with climate concerns (Burkhardt, 2023). Africa accounts for only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Standard Bank’s exposure to coal mining, oil and gas, and power generation from fossil fuels rose 21% in 2022. The bank’s lending to green-power initiatives rose 84% over the same period. Standard Bank’s lending to coal mining, oil and gas, and power generation from fossil fuels was still five times that of its investment in green power (Burkhardt, 2023).   “It is not possible for Africa and many of the African countries to ignore the shortage of electricity supply,” according to Kenny Fihla, Chief Executive Officer of Standard Bank’s corporate and investment banking unit, said in an interview in 2023 with Bloomberg news agency. “Today's challenges are not going to be resolved overnight and therefore a much more balanced approach is required.” Industrial countries increased fossil-fuel subsidies   Many industrial countries have also increased fossil-fuel subsidies for their domestic companies and households to reduce energy prices (Black, Parry & Vernon-Lin, 2023; IMF, 2023). The OECD (2022) found that total global subsidies for fossil fuels doubled in both 2021 and 2022.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out $7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks and price caps (IMF, 2023). The fossil-fuel subsidies increased by $2 trillion over the past two years.   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India, and the EU. Climate change funding needs to be sustainable for recipient developing countries   The UN estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need $2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change. In 2009, in the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, devised at the Copenhagen Climate Summit, developed countries promised $100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries to meet their climate change targets.   At the 2015 Paris Agreement, developed countries extended the commitment to 2025. However, developed countries only met the $100 billion yearly target in 2022. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by failure to deliver $100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025”.   If countries like South Africa are to make good on their climate target objectives, annual climate financing commitments from developed countries need to increase more than tenfold to “at least $1.3 trillion (R23.02 trillion)” annually, according to South African Forestry, Fisheries and Environment Minister Dion George, speaking at the National Stakeholder Consultation on South Africa’s negotiating mandate ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan.   At COP29 in 2024, rich countries pledged $300 billion a year for climate finance, however, the funding promises from these nations were criticised by developing and African countries as too little. The climate finance that is available often does not include funding for climate adaptation – dealing with the floods, fires and hurricanes caused by climate change.   “Without a dramatic upscaling of international support, developing country governments may not be able to implement the necessary pace and scale of emissions cuts to keep 1.5°C in reach, nor to put in place adequate adaptation measures to cope with the worsening impacts of climate change” (Fyson, 2022:5).   The G7, for example, has been criticised for the fact that “none of the G7 members are providing sufficient support for decarbonisation measures in developing countries” (Climate Action Tracker, 2021).   However, even where promised climate change funding from developed countries has been given to developing countries, it has been based on the outdated development aid model of developed country loans with conditions, including using advisors, companies and plans from donor countries, which in an overwhelming number of cases are misguided.   Such climate finance allows donors to claim they have contributed, but the donor money is recircled back to the donor countries, with high interest rates, with companies, experts and ideas – with little knowledge of local needs – from donor countries used as part of the conditions.   This is the classic development model, which has caused developing countries so much harm, with little positive impact, and with massive loans to repay, while doing hardly anything for combating climate change. Very little of the funding is fit for purpose.   An Oxfam analysis of developed country funding for climate change concluded that only a small amount of the promised funding has been delivered. And where money was given, it was mostly in the form of punishing loans, with very few grants. Not much has been provided to help developing nations with adapting to climate change. Worse, many developed nations have been dishonest in the way they report their financial contributions, exaggerating the amounts they have given.   Oxfam uncovered that many developed countries are guilty of misleading accounting, reporting funding for climate change to developing countries, when the funding never actually reached the supposed beneficiaries. Rather, the funds were being used to pay donor country consultants, agencies and plans.   Global private companies are reluctant to finance high-risk climate projects in developing countries. Firstly, private investors demand that African governments, or private companies, provide ‘bankable’ projects, often meaning low-risk projects with high or immediate returns. International funding for climate change should prioritise high-risk, low-return climate projects, for which developing countries struggle to secure funding. For another, funding should also prioritise start phase project preparation and development, as many developing countries lack project preparation capacity, resources and funding. South Africa’s climate change funding from developed countries will leave the country indebted, without a sustainable transition     South Africa received $11.6 billion in climate change funding from developed country donors to shift to renewable energy, and to prevent economic decline during the movement away from coal. Sadly, the overwhelming majority of the funds were old-style development aid-type loans, with conditions including the use of consultants, organisations and ideas from donor countries. Grants make up only $676 million of the total.   This means that South Africa will be indebted, while the ‘funding’ is recycled to donor organisations, consultants, and to generate donor-country ideas. Very little of the money is likely to go to South African organisations, expertise or South African-generated ideas, or to local communities. Furthermore, by ‘giving’ donor funding to developing countries, donor governments dictate to developing countries how they should pursue their climate change transitions – often without consideration for the context of these countries.   Yet, developing countries do not have the same power to dictate to developed countries – the major emitters – how they should pursue their climate transitions. Global climate financing from developed countries to developing countries therefore entrenches the existing skewed power inequalities in favour of developed countries.   Of the money, so far, $1.9 billion has been spent, mostly as policy-based loans to the government; the other large proportion has gone to agencies, consultants and organisations from the donor countries. Even funding that ostensibly goes to projects to revive the coal belt province, Mpumalanga, went to consultants, donor development agencies, or to support donor-originated development ideas. A planned green hydrogen hub, skills training and community development similarly went largely to consultants, donor development agencies, and donor country origin ideas.   In 2019, South Africa enacted a carbon tax, which industry has criticised as too onerous. Furthermore, Eskom, the state power utility, has been criticised for passing the cost of the transition to renewables on to customers.   It was revised recently and will come into effect in 2026. A National Treasury policy paper released in November 2024, indicated that the carbon offset allowance for combustion emissions will be increased to 25% in 2026, from 10%. This will be counterbalanced by cutting tax-free allowances from 60% to half in 2026 and by a further 2.5% annually until 2030 (National Treasury, 2024). The amended National Treasury proposal in the policy paper replaced a 3.5c/kW levy on non-renewable power with the carbon tax. The big challenge will be how to prevent Eskom from passing on the cost of the transition to renewables to customers.   Way forward for South Africa   The challenge for South Africa is to secure a just transition from coal. A just transition “is a process aimed at ensuring the benefits of a green economy shift are shared widely, while supporting those who may lose out economically, whether nations, regions, industries, communities, workers or consumers” (Teixeira, 2022).   Global funding for climate change to South Africa must be in the form of grants and concessional financing that can be allocated to create enabling environments for climate change investments. The funding for the just transition must not be in the form of loans, as is currently the case, but rather, it must be based on grant and investment funding.   South African Forestry, Fisheries and Environment Minister Dion George said that by “de-risking investments and creating new asset classes for clean technologies, we can unlock and leverage greater amounts of public and private finance” for climate change.   South Africa must either renegotiate the terms of the $11.6 billion climate change loans it received from developed countries’ donors, or change them to grants, and change the provision that says donor country agencies, staff, ideas and ideologies must be used in the design of South African just transition projects.   Countries have specific timetables to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, based on their domestic circumstances. South Africa must identify a timetable that takes into account local contexts, one which ensures energy security, development needs, and stability.   “The South African approach to the just transition needs to take local realities into account, and the narrative must support an effective transition that does not undermine energy security and economic growth,” rightly argues the authors from the Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy .   South Africa must pursue a triple energy generation strategy: coal, gas and renewables. This can be done by collaborating with African neighbours to apply comparative advantages. Sadly, many of South Africa’s neighbours are politically unstable, with autocratic governing parties and leaders mismanaging their countries, meaning their economies are also unstable, so it will not always be practical to partner with energy producing neighbours to leverage comparative advantages.    Unlike many of the G7 countries, South Africa is struggling with gas resources. Mozambique, with its gas resources, has been run autocratically for years by the liberation movement Frelimo, and the country is facing a civil war. Sasol, the petrochemical giant, for example, has said the company will have to recalculate its carbon emissions target, set in 2021, for a 30% reduction in emissions by 2030, as it may not be achievable due to gas shortages (Faku, 2024).    Given South Africa’s coal bounty, there has to be more focus on technology to clean coal. Japan is a good example of a country that prioritised a policy of producing “clean coal” over the past two decades. South Africa can also fit its coal plants with carbon-capture technology, as many G7 nations have been given the option to do, to prevent emissions from entering the atmosphere.   There are lessons to be learnt from Japan’s “clean coal” strategy (Hakko & Petersen, 2024). Japan has focused on “efficient coal power”, which gets more energy from less coal through advanced technologies and coal plants (IEA, 2020). In 2007, Japan introduced the abatement technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS), which can secure 90% emission reductions. The country also introduced co-firing coal and ammonia, to reduce emissions.   Ultimately, for South Africa, there has to be a massive step-up in the development of renewable energy, wind and solar. Brazil is a great example of how to develop the full spectrum of renewable energy – wind, solar, water, biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, green diesel, carbon capture and storage, sustainable aviation fuel, and green hydrogen.   South Africa needs a manufacturing, skills and technology revolution linked to renewable energy. Green hydrogen is a key source of renewable energy in which the country must invest. Any laws or regulations, ideologies and policies inhibiting the development of renewable energy will have to be abolished.   The South African government must provide substantial incentives to families and business to install solar technology, like Vietnam did to kickstart its renewable energy programme (Govindarajan, Bin Mohideen Batcha & Bin Abdullah, 2023). Consumers who have excess power must be able to channel it back into the power grid and get compensated for it.   Coal power stations that have been decommissioned could also become sites for renewable energy generation and energy storage (Dresselhuys, 2024). Coal power stations can be adapted for renewable energy generation.   “These legacy coal assets offer an opportunity. Instead of abandoning coal-generating sites, many are good candidates for conversion to clean energy hubs where the large tracts of land and existing grid connections can rapidly connect renewable capacity without the need for new transmission infrastructure” (Dresselhuys, 2024).   South Africa will have to establish greater energy storage capacity. Kristen Panerali and Zhang Xun write that the industrial energy storage sector offers promising opportunities (WEF, 2024). “On the one hand, the market potential is vast, with an increasing number of industrial users recognising the importance of energy storage and showing a growing willingness to install storage systems. On the other hand, industrial companies are confronted with high costs of the procurement and deployment of energy storage systems, such as land acquisition, grid connection and financing” (WEF, 2024). In China, different levels of government provide subsidies for energy storage power stations (WEF, 2024). South Africa can learn from this.   To make it all happen, there has to be an effective industrial policy to make the shift from fossil fuels to renewables that involves the state, private sector, and civil society in a compact. Corruption, cadre-deployed state managers overseeing state implementation, and giving tenders to politically connected businesses based on patronage will have to be eliminated.   The just transition policy must be put together by local expertise, entities and groups, and with local ideas, not based on the outdated development aid model where foreign funding comes with foreign companies, foreign expertise and foreign ideas.   Conclusion   The challenge for South Africa is how to pursue a just transition from coal that takes into consideration local realities, which means not undermining the country’s energy security, development and economic growth, not leaving it highly indebted to developed countries, and not multiplying poverty, unemployment and society instability.   Many G7 and emerging powers have specific timetables to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, based on their domestic circumstances. South Africa must identify a timetable that takes into account the local context.   A prerequisite for any successful just transition framework is the absolute need for an industrial policy that is not based on fundamentalist ideology, wishful thinking or state control, but rather, it must be compact driven, involving the state being in partnership with the private sector, public institutions, professionals and civil society.   References   Ambrose, J. 2024. Powering down: end times for the UK’s final coal-fired station . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/apr/21/end-times-for-the-uks-final-coal-fired-power-station [accessed: 10 March 2025].   Arasu, S. 2024. India has pushed hard for solar. But as its billions demand more power, coal always gets the call . [Online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/india-coal-climate-change-renewable-energy-storage-ff656f172c8e5dfbd0b9b0ea4ce0b6d5 [accessed: 10 March 2025].   Argus. 2024. 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China’s new energy storage capacity exceeds 70 million KW . [Online] Available at: https://www.macaubusiness.com/chinas-new-energy-storage-capacity-exceeds-70-million-kw/ [accessed: 10 March 2025].          - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Percept Actuaries and Consultants Editor: Daryl Swanepoel JANUARY 2023 This research has been enabled through the generous support of the Embassy of Denmark in Pretoria, South Africa Content Executive summary Introduction Defining youth and youth agency The youth unemployment crisis A life course approach to inequality Perinatal Early childhood Adolescence Early adulthood Transitions into post-school education Transition into the labour market The experience trap Young women’s disadvantage in the labour market Financial exclusion Social exclusion Pathway support The young workforce Young people in the informal sector Key interventions to alleviate youth inequality over the life course Perinatal Advance the Maternal Support Grant Schools must implement national policy by supporting pregnant learners and young mothers to stay in school Early childhood Government must invest in the ECD workforce and quality ECD services Adolescence: basic education Implement early warning systems Open access to psychosocial support Adolescence: post-school education Support alternative pathways to a matric qualification Improve TVET education in terms of access and quality Early adulthood: transitions into work and between jobs Employer readiness Matching Social protection The young workforce Enabling environments Public employment Youth citizenship and political participation Executive Summary Policy discourse in South Africa is preoccupied with the country’s vexing ‘triple threat’ of poverty, unemployment and inequality. What remains comparatively muted in these discussions is the reality that many South Africans have the odds stacked against them well before they reach their second birthday. Young people’s vulnerabilities rarely emerge out of a single crisis. More often, they reflect the cumulative effects of multiple events and pressures, which unfold in young people’s homes, institutions and communities, as well as in wider society. This report takes a ‘life course’ approach to youth inequality [1] that focuses on five critical life stages: perinatal, early childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and the young workforce. Young South Africans (aged 15-34) make up over a third of the country’s total population. They should be the engine of the economy, society, and democracy. But instead, nearly half of these young people are without work, education or training opportunities. While the working-age population is growing, the South African economy has struggled to keep pace. A key driver of youth inequality arises at the intersection of income levels, access to quality early learning programmes, and child outcomes. Children from contexts characterised by poor access to nutrition, inadequate living and infrastructural environments, and a lack of security and social protection have few opportunities for quality early learning and stimulation. They therefore enter school on a significantly uneven footing, vulnerable to worse health and developmental outcomes. Without the right support and intervention, this can impact their success in school, their future economic and social participation, and ultimately contributes to deepening inequality. South Africa’s inequality is intergenerational and cyclical. Despite expanded access to health, education and social security in democratic South Africa, the livelihood prospects of children often remain tied to those of their parents. Two-thirds of Black children live below the poverty line compared to 2% of White children, which illustrates the racial dimension of entrenched inequality. Hence, youth inequality is locked in place by stubborn racial and class inequalities that limit access to quality schooling, propel learner dropout, and obstruct transitions into post-school education and employability. Furthermore, gender discrimination means that women bear the brunt of social reproduction, with many young women forced to participate in unpaid care work. Regardless of their level of qualification, women also earn less than their male counterparts. The knock-on effects of these racial, class and gender inequalities show up profoundly in infant and children’s lives, which is why the recommendations propose a maternal support grant to safeguard perinatal outcomes. By improving mothers’ wellbeing and nutrition, the wellbeing and nutritional status of their children will be positively impacted too. This report draws attention to the important relationship between early influences and later outcomes in young people’s lives, while exploring their life trajectories in social, political, economic and cultural context, as youth are not a homogenous category. The analysis draws on transdisciplinary evidence to show not only how youth inequality accumulates over the life course, but also critical moments where policy and programming might intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people. This includes interventions that support pregnant women, invest in early childhood development, reduce school dropout, bolster alternative routes to matriculation and better match young people and employers. Introduction South Africa is widely regarded as the most unequal country on earth.[2] By January 2020, the top 20% of the population earned over 68% of income[3]; while the bottom 40% of the population earned just 7% of income.[4] The country’s inequality is multidimensional,[5] transcending income and wealth to include matters of land, capital, and access to quality public services. This multidimensional inequality also intersects with gender, race, and geography in ways that entrench historical fault lines. The country’s inequality is also viciously circular. It is both characterised, and reproduced, by a reality in which only four out of 10 young people have work.[6] While the working-age population has grown, job creation has not kept pace. This has given way to a backlog of young people without work, whose livelihoods are uncertain and whose opportunities of entering the labour market are narrowing. While there is stark inequality between young people and other generations in the labour market, there is also inequality between youth: young women have less access to employment, earnings and job security than men; and race and income remain tightly bound. Policy discourse in South Africa is preoccupied with the vexing ‘triple threat’ of poverty, unemployment and inequality. What remains comparatively muted in these discussions is the reality that many South Africans have the odds stacked against them, well before they reach their second birthday. This is because the inequality is intergenerational. Notwithstanding expanded access[7] to health, education and social security in democratic South Africa, the livelihood prospects of children often remain tied to those of their parents.[8] Any meaningful shift in the stark, and long-entrenched inequality will demand that we unlock the social and economic mobility of these youth. Defining youth and youth agency ‘Youth’ is a culturally constructed category, with different meanings in different places and times, and often involving contradictions[9]: The United Nations defines ‘youth’ as those aged between 15 and 24 years. In South Africa, youth consist of those aged 15 to 35 years,[10] as defined by South Africa’s National Youth Commission (NYC) Act of 1996. The essence of this categorisation, according to the act, is that because many older youth were disadvantaged by their role in the struggle against apartheid, they needed to be included in youth development initiatives.[11] Today, the extension to 35 years of age continues to speak to the ambiguity and dynamism of youth transitions in the country, where some markers of adulthood – like having stable work or attaining educational qualifications – might be delayed; while others, like parenthood or domestic responsibility may begin in early adolescence. Young men, for example, might be culturally assigned as adults while still remaining economically dependent. In South Africa, most young people in their early twenties have some work experience, and one third of women at this age are mothers. But they also move in and out of employment and education, and many continue to live with their parents, delaying marriage and cohabitation. The fluctuations between, and overlapping of, assumed ‘child’ and ‘adult’ roles is most powerfully symbolised in teenage mothers. South African youth undertake household chores, raise younger siblings, and are sometimes involved in paid labour. Yet, despite their participation in social and economic processes, they remain marginalised from the formal political and economic domain.[12] Dominant understandings of young people in South Africa have often reflected the political context of the time. In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers were preoccupied with young people as political activists.[13] Some positioned youth as irresponsible, irrational and uncontrolled opponents of apartheid, while others saw them as heroes of the liberation struggle. In both cases, ‘youth’ were treated as a homogenous entity, acting as one, with a unified set of motivations. In the early 1990s, a growing body of research sought to muddy constructions of youth as either ‘heroes’ or ‘villains’,[14] surfacing the complex range of motivations and circumstances that attracted young people to political action. Following the democratic transition, the militancy of adolescents who had boycotted against apartheid, stayed away from school, and challenged adult authority was rapidly recast as a liability. Nineties youth attracted labels like ‘the lost generation’ or ‘marginalised youth’ – a generation likely to threaten social stability. In the early years of democracy, the generation of young people who had left school to join the liberation struggle and were now seen to be ‘aimless’, provoked a sense of moral panic.[15] In the latter years of the decade, youth researchers adopted an increasingly policy-oriented focus, producing studies on ‘at-risk’ youth like AIDS orphans and street children. Some have argued that the dominant line of cleavage in post-apartheid South Africa has been that of ‘generation’, and that young people’s lives in particular have been at the heart of post-1994 change.[16] In the ‘new’ South Africa, youth are positioned amidst a range of overlaying tensions, as opportunities and constraints shift. On the one hand, democracy promises increased economic and social mobility for young Black South Africans, allowing them to aspire to possibilities previously denied to their parents. However, these new possibilities have emerged in a context of skyrocketing youth unemployment, a frequently dysfunctional education system, and other stark socio-economic inequalities that often make young people’s high ambitions unattainable. While the new constitution has protected the rights of children, especially in terms of independent access to healthcare,[17] this empowerment does not always translate into young people’s home or community lives. Instead, young people are especially vulnerable to physical, sexual and emotional abuse, and often take on a significant burden of unpaid household labour. To understand the lives of young people growing up in post-apartheid South Africa, one must appreciate both rapid change and oppressive continuity, which create stark ambivalences and contradictions in young people’s lives. [18] Post-apartheid South African policy has described the country’s youth both as the “greatest threat to social stability” and as a “demographic dividend”.[19] The former invokes a “ticking time bomb” of increasingly impatient, disillusioned and economically inactive young people. The latter anticipates the economic potential of a disproportionately large working-age population. Indeed, young people are viewed with both trepidation and tremendous expectation. These binaries have been symptomatic of political discourse for some time,[20] but fail to capture a much more ambiguous reality. By 2012, the South African Reconciliation Barometer[21] was showing that South African youth were optimistic about the future and confident in their ability to shape political decision-making, while at the same time being sceptical of political parties. Their expressions of agency and constraint were complex and varied, which was not reflecting in the dichotomies of policy discourse. Young people are all-too-often described as personifications of their circumstances – as instigators of violent service delivery protest, or as pawns in the political plays of organised labour, politicians and business. Rarely do we hear about young people as dynamic social and cultural agents. There is now a robust and growing body of ethnographic literature on the everyday lives of young people in South Africa, with the earliest antecedent being Burman and Reynolds’[22] volume, ‘Growing up in a Divided Society: The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa’. In the early 1990s, social anthropologists Mamphela Ramphele[23] and Patti Henderson[24] worked with teenagers from New Crossroads township in Cape Town. Both described young people’s everyday mediation of high ambitions and harsh structural constraints. This work has since been furthered by qualitative research on the gulf between youth ambitions and their ad-hoc plan-making in light of limited resources.[25] Acknowledging the “ambiguous agency”[26] of young people – as both vulnerable and virulent – might shift how we think about them, and how we intervene in their lives. The youth unemployment crisis South Africa is in the midst of a much-anticipated ‘demographic transition’: declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy have meant that the ratio of working-age people to dependents is changing, giving rise to a growing, economically productive youth population and associated hopes for an economic boom (see Figure 1). This lower dependency ratio is unlike other upper-, middle-, or high-income countries, and represents an economic opportunity that other wealthier regions don’t have access to. Young South Africans (aged 15-34) make up over a third of South Africa’s total population.[27] They should be the engine of the economy, society, and democracy. But instead, nearly half of young people are without work, education or training opportunities.[28] While the working-age population is growing, the South African economy has struggled to keep pace: according to Quarterly Labour Force Statistics (QLFS), for example, the number of people employed increased by just under 2 million from 2007 to 2019, while the working-age population increased by 6.5 million over the same period.[29] However, in the second quarter of 2022, the expanded unemployment rate (which includes discouraged job seekers) was over 72% for young people aged 15–24, compared to 51% for those aged 25-34 years, while the overall rate stood at around 44% (see Figure 2). This reality doesn’t shore up with the large economic opportunity presented by the lower dependency ratio. Figure 1: Old-age dependency ratio across the globe An analysis of QLFS data between Q1 2017 and Q2 2022 (see Figure 2) shows that this is not a new phenomenon. Rates of youth unemployment have been stubbornly high throughout the five-year period, increasing with the effects of Covid-19 lockdown, before returning to 2017 levels. And indeed, high youth unemployment rates long precede 2017: the earliest estimates of youth unemployment originate from the 1996 National Census, conducted just after the country’s transition to democracy and reported that 53.2% of young people between the ages of 15 and 34 were unemployed.[30] Figure 2: Unemployment rate (expanded) by age group Table 1: Unemployment rate (expanded) by age group Among the working-age population, vulnerability in the labour market seems to decrease with age: youth in the younger age group are most severely affected by unemployment. Because of this, South Africa’s unemployment crisis is often framed as a ‘youth unemployment crisis’. Yet the root of the problem is the scarcity of quality jobs, the structural constraints within the South African economy, and the challenges of industrial change, rather than with young people themselves. Undoubtedly, young people are uniquely affected, and often uniquely vulnerable. Relative to older adults, they have less work experience and financial capital, weaker social networks and are prone to higher levels of informality and in-work poverty. Young people’s vulnerability in the labour market means they are particularly affected by job and earning loss when financial shocks hit. National survey data show that, among those who lost jobs in April 2020 as a result of Covid-19 lockdown, young people were least likely to have recovered those jobs by October 2020.[31] We know that South Africa’s youth unemployment rates are significantly affected by high levels of early school-leaving which translates into low access to post-secondary education, and ultimately higher levels of unemployment.[32] More so, economic wellbeing is often an intergenerational transfer, with a large part of earnings inequality explained by the educational attainment of one’s parents.[33] But ‘youth’ are also not a homogenous group; there are significant inequalities between them. In fact, this report shows that young people’s future chances often begin articulating in early childhood, setting in motion a range of inequities that tend to widen as children move through school and into the workforce. Race, geography and gender, all of which are outside of young people’s control, continue to constrain the possibilities available to them in profound ways. In 2022, 8.8 million young people (15-34 years old) in South Africa were not in employment, education, or training (NEET).[34] The majority of this group are Black, income-poor, without a qualification, and live in households with no employed members.[35] Figure 3: Educational status attained by race Moses, van der Berg, and Rich[36] suggest that there are a few primary routes through which young people from low-income households can achieve social mobility and ultimately access the upper end of the labour market: (1) by attending either moreaffluent schools or better-performing schools in poor communities; (2) by performing well in Grade 12, despite being in a lowerquality school, and acquiring enough resources to gain entry to university; or (3) by entering the labour market at the lower end and progressing upwards. This report will show the immense challenges entailed in all three paths: from undoing historic inequalities in access to quality education, to reaching and passing matric, to gaining university access, to gaining any momentum in the labour market (Figure 4). On their journey towards quality jobs, most of South Africa’s young people have the odds stacked against them, starting as early as their first years of life. Figure 4: Road to South Africa’s youth unemployment rate This report is about how those inequities play out over young people’s life course and what strategies we might take to interrupt them, both to improve their chances of social and economic mobility, and disrupt structural patterns of inequality. A life course approach to inequality This report takes a life course approach to youth inequality.[37] This approach draws attention to the important relationship between early influences and later outcomes in young people’s lives, while also exploring their life trajectories in social, political, economic and cultural context. Young people’s vulnerabilities rarely emerge out of a single crisis. More often, they reflect the cumulative effects of multiple events and pressures, which unfold in young people’s homes, institutions and communities as well as in wider society. What happens to a child at each developmental stage is influenced by what happened at earlier stages, which means that for young people to reach their potential, we need enabling environments across the life course.[38] For the purposes of this report, a life course approach entails four levels of analysis, which have also been used in global studies of youth vulnerabilities[39]: The life course model frames development as a cumulative and continuous process and cautions against approaches to youth programming that would silo risks or particular age groups. It also implies that interventions should be tailored differently for different youth populations, given the unique combinations of risk and protective factors to which they are currently, and have previously been, exposed.[40] To see a life course framing in action, let’s imagine the journey of the average South African child (Box 1). In a recent article[41] by Percept and the Inclusive Society Institute, we called them Nation. Box 1: Nation’s story ​While pregnant, Nation’s mother will almost certainly be able to access antenatal care at her neighbourhood clinic. But she will also have a nearly 3 in 10 chance of experiencing antenatal depression.[42] Once Nation is born, important aspects of their emotional, social, and cognitive development, as well as their future health, will already start to coalesce.[43] The stimulation, nourishment and care Baby Nation receives will lay the foundations for their future learning, school performance, health and wellbeing. This, in turn, will affect their ability to participate meaningfully in social and economic life as a young adult.[44] ​If Nation is lucky, they may be one of the 6 in 10 South African children to benefit from the Child Support Grant in their critical first year of life.[45] This type of support is critical, since, as a toddler, Nation will have a 3 in 5 chance of growing up in poverty, and a 2 in 5 chance of living below the food poverty line.[46] This will reduce their chances of nutritional stunting, which is estimated to affect 27% of the country’s children, with ramifications for their future health, learning and earning prospects.[47] ​When Nation grows up, and becomes more independent, and their mother needs to find, create or return to work, Nation might be among the 32% of children (under age 4) to attend an Early Learning Programme (ELP).[48] These critical early learning services are delivered by a women-led, non-state and largely informal sector, including sole-proprietors, microenterprises and Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs). Since Nation has a less than 30% chance of their fees being subsidised by government,49 early learning will be expensive for their mother. ​By the time Nation turns five, they will have a less than 50% chance of being developmentally ready to start primary education.[50] This setback will make it harder for Nation to stay in, and succeed in school – with knock-on effects for their ability to enter the labour market and build a secure livelihood. This may sound like a deterministic outcome: how can we possibly curb inequality if it has been set in motion from the womb? But, in fact, life course research tells us that intervening at critical points in a young person’s life course can radically alter not only their own trajectory, but also the trajectory of future generations. This report draws on transdisciplinary evidence to show not only how youth inequality accumulates over the life course, but also critical moments where policy and programming might intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people. We focus on five critical life stages (see Figure 5), as described below: a. Perinatal (period in-utero) b. Early childhood (birth to 6 years) c. Adolescence/basic education d. Early adulthood/post-school transitions e. The young workforce Figure 5: Critical life stages Perinatal A healthy pregnancy is essential to safeguard the health and wellbeing of children in the critical early stages of their lives. For example, maternal stress, depression and anxiety in pregnancy can lead to lower birth-weight, increased attention and behavioural difficulties and sleep disorders for children.[51] One of the greatest victories of the post-apartheid South African public health system has been its improved access for maternal and child health. Since 1998, Demographic Health Surveys have indicated that over 92% of women access Antenatal Care (ANC) services. But the timing of the first ANC visit, as well as the number of visits, are also important for child outcomes.[52] While availability of antenatal care has improved, pregnant women are still not accessing it early enough: only 67% of women have their first ANC visit before 20 weeks in South Africa.[53,54] Despite the victories of clinic-based maternal and child health services, pregnant women in South Africa remain inordinately vulnerable. Research suggests that pregnant women in South Africa are 45.6% less likely than other women of reproductive age to earn an income.[67] In a Western Cape study, 71% of pregnant women were unemployed, and 83% of those reported no prospects of future employment.[55] The overrepresentation of women in the informal sector[56] means that many pregnant women who do earn an income will not be granted paid maternity leave. Pregnant women’s unemployment and under-employment has significant implications for the health and wellbeing of both women and children, and can deepen pre-existing inequality. Robust research has shown that many life-long patterns of illness and health, as well as emotional and cognitive development, are catalysed in a child’s first years of life, especially during pregnancy.[57] The physiological and neurological capabilities accumulated in these early years influence not only child survival, but also their growth, learning and ability to rise out of poverty.[58] Just over a quarter (27%) of South Africa’s children under five are believed to be nutritionally stunted,[59] making them more likely to drop out of school, struggle to find work, and live in poverty. More recent data suggests significantly more conservative figures among children (aged 50-59 months, or between four and five years old) attending early learning programmes, where moderate and severe stunting was found to be at 5.7%.[60] Growth deficits at a young age have long-term effects on social and cognitive development.[61] Undernutrition, with stunting being one of its more severe consequences, is not only a manifestation of poverty, but also “one of the key mechanisms by which poverty – and its consequences – are transmitted intergenerationally”.[62] Stunting is driven, in part, by mothers’ mental health and nutritional status,[63] and research indicates that pregnant women in poorer communities are experiencing high rates of food insecurity and depression.[64] Nearly four in 10 of the pregnant women surveyed between 2020 and 2021 in the Western Cape reported going to bed hungry in the previous week, while six out of 10 had felt depressed.[65] Currently, there is low uptake of the Child Support Grant (CSG) among caregivers with 0-2-year olds who meet the criteria due to lags in registration. Surveys of more than 5,000 children conducted between 2018 and 2022 in nine food-vulnerable districts in South Africa, show that 44% of children under one year old were not benefitting from a child support grant.[66] As a result, the grant is not as effective as it could be. Early childhood There are about 6.5 million children in South Africa under the age of six; 4 million of them live in the poorest 40% of households.[67] This means that the majority of children are born into contexts that make it difficult for them to realise their potential. These contexts are characterised by poor access to nutrition, inadequate living environments, a lack of security and social protection, and few opportunities for quality early learning and stimulation.[68] Far too many children experience malnutrition and toxic stress. Research shows that across all developmental domains, outcomes were worst among the poorest children, and best among the wealthiest children.[69] This means that children from poor backgrounds enter school on significantly unequal footing, with impacts on their success in school, and their ultimate economic and social participation.[70] The relationship between income levels, access to quality early learning programmes, and child outcomes, is a key driver of South African inequality. To alleviate inequality, we must find ways to reduce this gap before it is widened in later years. Although adults are still more likely than children to live in urban homes, a significant majority (57%) of South Africa’s young children (below the age of six) now live in cities and major metros, and this proportion is increasing.[71] Meanwhile, 3 million children under six still live in rural areas, primarily in the former homelands.[72] Rates of poverty for young children are highest in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.[73] Whether urban or rural, children who grow up in poor living conditions – with inadequate water, sanitation or energy – are vulnerable to worse health and developmental outcomes.[74] Poor sanitation, in particular, has strong links to rates of childhood stunting.[75] In 2019, almost a third (29%) of young children live in households without piped water on site.[76] Young children who grow up in poor households are at highest risk of being excluded from early learning and health services because they cannot afford transport to clinics or government offices, or because the fees of early learning programmes are unaffordable. Early Childhood Development (ECD) services – including nutrition, early learning, healthcare and social services – can facilitate children’s development and future chances, increasing primary school enrolment, improving academic performance and reducing school dropout.[77] Although access to early learning programmes has expanded over time, there is still stark inequality in the distribution and quality of programmes, and the level of funding from the government.[78] Deeply entrenched inequality is also illustrated by the fact that two-thirds of Black children live below the poverty line compared to 2% of White children.[79] Currently, only about 1.5% of the country’s GDP is spent on ECD, most of which goes to child support grants. A mere 6.5% of this budget is allocated for early learning, nutrition support and supportive parenting programmes.[80] While early learning in South Africa is a heterogenous and predominantly informal sector, the current institutional framework for supporting Early Learning Programmes (ELP) is geared towards formal and registered providers. This means that the vast majority of ELPs are excluded from any government oversight or support. Of the estimated 70,000 ELPs, only around 16,000 – 20,000 are formally registered.[81] ELP attendance is partly a function of age: children under the age of two are least likely to attend an ELP. But it is also a function of income – Figure 6 shows ELP attendance for children age 3-5 years old by income quintile. Figure 6: Early learning programme attendance for 3-5 year-old children by income quintile Source: Hall, K. et al. 2017. South African Early Childhood Review[82] The ability of parents or caregivers to afford ELP fees will continue to be a driving factor for ELP access – and indeed inequality – without wider and deeper public financing.[83] The first step to giving children an equal start in life is to ensure that all young children have access to quality and comprehensive early childhood development services.[84] If not, these foundational setbacks become more and more difficult to overcome as they move through school and into adult life. Adolescence Access to basic education has improved dramatically in South Africa. By the early 1990s, the country had near-universal enrolment rates at primary school level. Between 1985 and 2007, secondary school enrolment had risen from 51% to 91%.[85] Despite arriving on unequal footing, almost every young person in South Africa starts school. But, from the moment they enter a Grade 1 classroom, most will have the odds of success stacked against them. Only four out of every 10 Grade 1’s reach and pass Grade 12.[86] Rather than being a once-off event, school dropout is a process, propelled by a range of factors in young people’s schools, homes and communities that serve to either push or pull them from school (Figure 7).[87] Figure 7: Predictors of school drop-out The school environment can either be a protective or a risk factor in driving learner dropout. School is a vital space for education. But beyond learning, a quality school environment can also play other important roles in young people’s lives, offering them safety, socialisation, freedom and community. This can deepen young people’s attachment to school and make it less likely that they will drop out. However, many learners continue to feel unsafe, uncomfortable and unstimulated at school. Bullying, absent teachers, irrelevant curricula and poor sanitation are just some of the factors that make learning difficult and often drive learners from school.[88] An obstructive learning environment can contribute to learners’ academic struggles, which are another important predictor of dropout, particularly for those who start to fall behind early on. The early years of school are about building a basic understanding of words and numbers. Without the basic tools to understand what is being taught, further learning cannot take place and it becomes very difficult for learners to progress through the curriculum.[89] Robust research suggests that the South African education system is failing children in these early years.[90] By Grade 4, less than half of the learners who started Grade 1 three years earlier, are on track academically, and many are older than the expectation for their grade. In the poorest schools (quintiles 1 and 2), only one in three of these learners are on track.[91] Grade repetition is the single greatest predictor of school dropout.[92] Over 1 million school learners repeat grades each year.[93] An estimated 20% of learners in Grades 10-12 are three or more years over-age, having repeated grades.[94] In 2018, the cost of repetition to the public schooling system was estimated at R20 billion – 8% of the annual basic education budget.[95] Government progression policy does not allow learners to repeat a grade more than once per ‘phase’, whether Foundation Phase (Grade R-3), Intermediate Phase (Grades 4-6) or Senior Phase (Grades 7-9), or Further Education and Training (Grades 10-12). Instead, learners failing for a second time simply ‘progress’ to the next grade, but often without the academic support they need to succeed.[96] Learners that are struggling academically can feel alienated and inadequate, deepening their sense of disengagement from school.[97] As they fall further behind, some might feel unable to catch up, or that they don’t have the academic ability to complete their schooling. In South Africa, boys are significantly more likely to repeat grades than girls, which is undoubtedly a significant driver of their higher dropout rates.[98] National survey data over the course of 2020–2021 showed that the Covid-19 pandemic had amplified disruptions to education: deepening learning losses, reducing access to school meals, and exacerbating learner disengagement from school.[99] Outside challenges in the learning environment and academic curricula can push young people from school. Young people can also be pulled from school by pressures at home or in their communities. Given that most young people across South Africa attend no-fee-paying schools, it may come as a surprise that many don’t have the financial resources to complete their basic education. Even those enrolled in no-fee-paying schools, or supported by government bursaries, often struggle to make ends meet because of the added costs of education, which include uniforms, learning materials, transport, and stationery.[100] In rural areas in particular, barriers to schooling extend beyond finances: many must travel long distances to the classroom. In his research in the Mpumalanga province, Lawrence Mboweni[101] found that young children aged between seven and 13 years walked a total of 16km each day to and from school. Along these journeys, children face many possible dangers. In KwaZulu-Natal, children have been reported to be crossing a lake with hippos in order to reach school.[102] Many learners undertake household chores and caregiving responsibilities that, in some contexts, can pull them away from their schoolwork. Girls and young women tend to carry a greater burden of caregiving and domestic responsibilities, which can limit time for homework and even keep them from the classroom.[103] In rural areas, girls and young women carry an especially heavy load of household duties, carrying water and fetching firewood.[104] Covid-19 and lockdown also exacerbated burdens for girls: when relatives fell sick or there were younger siblings at home and in need of childcare, girls were more likely to take on caregiving responsibilities than boys.[105] South African public discourse is gripped with moral anxiety over pregnancy among adolescent girls, partly because of its perceived age-inappropriateness, and partly because of the possible impacts on the wellbeing of mothers, families, and children. Notwithstanding the recent dramatic spike in young pregnancy over the Covid-19 lockdown,[73] South Africa’s adolescent fertility rates have been steadily declining over the years, dropping by 27% over the past 50 years.[74] Although adolescent girls are more likely to fall pregnant in South Africa than in other upper middle-income countries, the country’s adolescent fertility rate is well below the sub-Saharan African average.[106] Research[107] tells us that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between pregnancy and school dropout: young women that leave school are at higher risk of falling pregnant, while pregnant youth are also at higher risk of leaving school. In addition to financial pressures, parenting learners carry the responsibility of childcare, which can affect their ability to stay in, and succeed at, school. What is often missing from the story is the role that schools, families, and policymakers play in determining whether a young mother returns to school or not. For many girls and young women, an unintended pregnancy means social stigma and isolation, along with major disruptions to schooling. Without the right type of support, the physical toll of pregnancy, regular antenatal visits, and caring for a newborn often come at the expense of young women’s schooling. Research into the effects of early childbearing on young people’s educational and economic attainment show that delaying childbearing can improve young women’s educational outcomes as well as their chances of employment.[108] In South Africa, young people without a matric year, or an equivalent qualification (Level 4 of National Qualifications Framework), are often cut off from pathways to tertiary education, employment and higher earnings. They not only struggle more than their peers to find work, they also remain unemployed for longer periods of time, and if they do find work, have less stable and lower earning jobs.[109] Figure 8: The Qualifications Hierarchy: Outcomes of the 2008 Matric Cohort Source: Spaull, N. 2016. Important Research Inputs on #FeesMustFall Levels of qualification also affect job security, which also means that in economic downtimes, those with fewer qualifications are disproportionately affected. From 2017 Q1 to 2022 Q1, overall employment decreased 8%.[110] Within that figure, employment among those with tertiary qualifications decreased 4%; matric-educated employment decreased 8%; and those with less than matric saw an employment decrease of 20%. School completion rates in South Africa are both a driver, and a reflection, of South Africa’s inequality. Dropout rates differ significantly by race. Black and Coloured youth are half as likely to complete Grade 12 as their White and Indian counterparts.[111] Young Coloured men appear to be at highest risk of dropping out: one survey showed that 29% of 16-18-year old Coloured men were not in school.[112] But across genders, it is Black youth who are at highest risk of dropout. This is certainly not for want of trying, since young Black learners also tend to stay in school for longer, repeat more grades, and leave school at an older age.[113] Because of the country’s history, race in South Africa is a proxy for other inequalities. Different races have different dropout rates because of how South Africa’s education system, together with its towns and cities, were planned under apartheid. Apartheid spatial planning gave White families privileged access to quality schools and urban infrastructure. These inequities have persisted in the post-apartheid context, such that poor, Black and particularly rural youth are disadvantaged in their access to quality education, which would otherwise improve their access to jobs and advance their social mobility.[114] In the poorest 80% of schools, only 1% of Grade 8 learners will go on to pass matric and be eligible to study maths and science at university (i.e. achieve above 60% for these subjects). In the wealthiest 20% of schools, nearly ten times as many learners will pass Grade 12 with these grades.[115] Early adulthood Transitions into post-school education Young people who leave school with a matric certificate have a labour absorption rate of 31.5% (see Figure 9 below), 13.8% percent higher than for those without one (17.8%). But chances of finding work are improved exponentially by a tertiary qualification, which increases absorption rates by a further 26.8%. Tertiary-educated youth have a labour absorption rate of 58.0%. Figure 9: Absorption rate by education status This is also borne out in the expanded unemployment rate for young people (aged 15–34) by education level (see Figure 10). While having a matric certificate marginally decreases young people’s chances of being unemployed, it is only when this certificate is used as a passport to a tertiary qualification that chances of being employed are exponentially increased. This is partly because the economy of South Africa has shifted to one in which higher levels of skills are increasingly in demand.[116] Figure 10: Unemployment rate (expanded) by education status We know that most young people who drop out of school do so between Grades 10 and 12. Despite having completed compulsory schooling, historically they have had no formal qualification to aid their transition into further training or employment. The proposed General Education Certificate (GEC)[117] is intended to address this problem, giving those who have completed Grade 9 a national certificate. While the Technical and Vocational Education and Training system (TVET) should provide young people with a Grade 9 or GEC qualification opportunities to further their education, very few young people without a matric access these institutions.[118] Among young people without a matric, only 1% have some other school certificate or diploma (from a TVET college for example).[119] Quarterly Labour Force statistics show that as many as three in 10 young people in this category (aged 15-24) are not only unemployed, but are also not enrolled in education or training.[120] TVET enrolment is low, in part because unlike university degrees, TVET qualifications are not perceived to improve young people’s employability.[121] There is further evidence that young people’s aspirations for a university degree, and for a professional career as opposed to a menial job, also contribute to them valuing university education over TVET education.[122] TVET education has therefore often carried with it assumptions of inferiority, which have been exacerbated by difficulties with the quality of teaching and learning at these institutions.[123] Research shows that, rather than acting as an alternative route to a matric-level qualification, TVETs have become ways for young people who already have a matric certificate to bide time, before qualifying for a university degree programme or finding a job.[124] Despite the important impact that a post-school qualification can have on young people’s future, most who start a tertiary level programme do not complete it: only 60% of university undergraduates, for example, complete their degrees within 6 years.[125] TVET students are even less likely to graduate.[126] Notwithstanding increased access to post-school education,[127] only 8% of 15-24-year olds attend a university or college, and even fewer complete their qualifications.[128] Culture shock, poor quality teaching, social exclusion, bullying, along with physical and mental illness can constrain young people in completing their qualifications, particularly if they are from vulnerable or rural homes.[129] In 2016, the Dell Foundation, which offers bursaries to students in two top South African universities, published a report about the types of support that students felt they most needed. 50% said psychosocial and community support made the most difference to their success.[130] Low rates of access to and completion of post-school qualifications contribute to stubborn racial and class inequities in youth employment outcomes.[131] An analysis of QLFS data between Q1 2017 and Q2 2022 shows marked, and continued, inequality in unemployment by race (see Figure 11). This illustrates the stubbornness of apartheid-era racial hierarchies, and reflects broad, historical patterns in educational attainment by race (see Table 2). Figure 11: Unemployment rate (expanded) by race In South Africa, 60% of young people either leave school before matric, or have failed their matric exam, and are left without any kind of recognised educational qualification. And yet, chances of finding work are improved exponentially by a tertiary qualification. Any meaningful shift in South Africa’s stark, and long-entrenched, inequality will demand that we unlock the social and economic mobility of these youth. Table 2: Youth education status by race, 2017 Q1 and 2022 Q2 Transition into the labour market South Africa’s fast-growing labour force presents both a tremendous challenge and an unprecedented opportunity. Over the past five years (Q1 2017 – Q2 2022), South Africa’s working-age population has continued to grow steadily: from 37.1 million in the first quarter of 2017 to 40.0 million in the first quarter of 2022. When they leave school, young people in South Africa enter a world of uncertainty, often unprotected. Many will lose the routine, daily meals, and adult mentorship that the school environment provided. When they turn 18, those who had benefited from a child support grant will stop receiving it, putting added financial pressure on their households.[132] Among those without a matric qualification, there are a variety of different pathways in terms of movement into and out of the labour market. An analysis of five waves of the National Income Dynamics Survey shows that over a 10-year period, two-thirds of young people who had not completed Grade 12 experienced some degree of churn in the labour market, with a smaller proportion remaining consistently in or out of employment and the education system.[133] But even within this group, there is significant inequality. The consequences of not having a matric certificate differ depending on young people’s connectivity to the labour market. Those from poorer households and disadvantaged schools are more likely to be long-term unemployed, which translates into poorer mental health and subjective wellbeing.[134] Between 2008 and 2021, the number of young people who had been looking for work for more than three years tripled.[135] The number who had given up entirely, tripled.[136] Figure 12 shows the composition of the working-age population across its four constituent categories over the period 2017 Q1 – 2022 Q2. Figure 12: Composition of the working-age population Table 3: Composition of the working-age population Over this time, the employed population shrunk from 16.2 million to 15.6 million despite the overall growth in the working-age population, while the other three categories all grew: unemployed from 6.2 to 8.0 million, discouraged job-seekers from 2.3 to 3.6 million, and other not economically active from 12.4 to 13.1 million. This underscores the size of the challenge for South Africa: in a period in which the working-age population has grown by over 8%, the economy was able to accommodate 4% fewer in employment. The rising number of discouraged job-seekers is a pressing concern for South Africa, reflecting not only the financial and psychosocial cost of job-seeking but also deepening chronic unemployment. Research suggests that the longer someone is unemployed, the more difficult it becomes to find work, not only because they become increasingly discouraged, but also because employers view them as riskier hires.[137] South African research[138] suggests that unemployment is also associated with stigma and shame, as well as stress, depression and anxiety, which in turn make it more difficult for people to seek and find work. Over the past five years, the number of young job-seekers (aged 15–34) who have grown discouraged (i.e. had not acted to find work in the previous four weeks) has increased by almost 40%.[139] The experience trap Part of the challenge of the job search is in how to gain, and then signal, experience as an entry-level worker. Qualitative evidence suggests that young people are frequently denied jobs or interviews on the basis of their ‘lack of experience’.[140] A Western Cape survey of middle-class youth showed that those who gained some work experience during high school transitioned more easily into the workplace than those without experience.[141] This is reinforced by national panel data, which shows that school learners and tertiary students who undertook part-time work were more likely to be permanently employed.[142] Indeed, after race and gender, being able to demonstrate some work experience appears to be the most important factor in finding work in South Africa, regardless of whether it is formal or informal, paid or voluntary.[143] But how does one gain experience if experience is often an entry-requirement for work opportunities? Indeed, part of the reason that unemployment is so high for young people is that many struggle to gain first entry into the labour market. The unemployment rate (using the narrow definition) is markedly worse (63.9%) for younger youth (aged 15-24) than older youth (aged 25-34). Some evidence suggests that, by the time they turn 24, 60% will have never had a job before.[144] Long-term unemployment, as well as an extended and unsuccessful job search, can lead to discouragement and depression among young people.[145] In 2019, the South African government relaxed requirements for prior work experience for job openings in the public sector. But the ‘experience trap’ has nevertheless remained a major barrier for young job-seekers. In a context where employers often receive large numbers of applicants, many continue to use level of experience (along with formal qualifications) as a sifting tool. Young women’s disadvantage in the labour market Young women are most likely to be stuck outside of employment,[146] owing in large part to domestic and childcare responsibilities.[147] South Africa has achieved parity in school enrolment, and although girls and women generally outperform boys and men as they move through primary, secondary and tertiary education, they continue to fare worse in the labour market. International research suggests that equity in education does not necessarily translate to workplace equity, often because of the motherhood wage penalty.[148] But women not only have worse wages, they are also less likely to be employed, despite often having higher qualifications. In the second quarter of 2022, 13.2% of women had tertiary qualifications compared to 11.2% of men, and 46.7% had completed secondary education compared to 43.5%. Yet despite being more qualified than men, women fare worse than men in the labour market. Figure 13 shows that young women (aged 15-34) are being absorbed into the workforce at a far lower rate than young men at all qualification levels. This can be partially explained by maternity, domestic and childcare responsibilities forcing women to opt out of the workforce. While their analysis was not particular to youth, Schoer and Leibbrandt[149] show that domestic responsibilities can also keep women from the job search. In the early months of the 2020 Covid-19 lockdown, women accounted for two-thirds of net job losses and have also been slower to recover employment since. This was attributed, in part, to inequities in time spent on childcare.[150] Figure 13: Youth absorption rate by gender and education status While women’s disproportionate caregiving responsibilities may be part of the story, Figure 14 shows that even for young women who opt into the workforce and are actively seeking work, young women with the same qualifications have higher unemployment rates than men, suggesting gender discrimination in the labour market. Gender discrimination in the labour market means that young women’s full economic participation remains untapped, and targeted policy and programmes are needed to redress gender disadvantage. Figure 14: Youth unemployment rate (narrow) by gender and education status This is further confirmed by looking at the proportional difference between male and female absorption and expanded unemployment rates. These statistics are calculated as female divided by male, and emphasise the magnitude of the gaps shown in the previous two graphs. In the first section, “Absorption rate”, the table shows how much less likely women are than men to be absorbed into the workforce. In the second, “Expanded unemployment rate”, it shows how much more likely women are to be unemployed. Overall, the gaps seem to be slowly shrinking over time. However, there is a long way to go. In 2022 Q2, a matric-educated woman is 20.9% less likely to be absorbed into employment than a man with the same education and 10.1% more likely to be unemployed. Table 4: Proportional gender gaps in select employment statistics by education level Financial exclusion In 2019, the Siyakha Youth Assets Study estimated that young South Africans spent an average of R938 a month looking for work[151]: about R558 for transport and an added R380 for internet access, printing, application fees, and agent’s fees.[152] The cost of job-seeking was more than young people’s monthly income (an average of R527), which meant that many could not look for work without becoming indebted. Nearly two-thirds of young people in South Africa relied on family members to help fund the cost of job-seeking.[153] Many have to weigh up the costs of job-seeking with basic necessities.[154] In 2021, a Youth Capital survey of over 2,000 young people across the country suggested that eight in 10 young people were choosing between looking for work and buying food.[155] Apartheid spatial planning exacerbates inequalities in the job search. Because poor youth typically still live either in townships on the outskirts of the cities, or in less economically-developed rural areas, they are often removed from where jobs and industry are located and lack reliable, affordable transport.[156] Ironically, it is then the poorest youth for whom work-seeking is most expensive. Even if these young people find work, the costs of getting to and from work, means that they ultimately make less income. And in fact, there are some jobs that would cost them money to accept.[157] It is perhaps unsurprising then that several studies have found that when households start receiving social grants, there is a positive association with job-seeking among working-age household members.[158] Even before Covid-19 lockdown, almost 90% of young people were using the internet to look for work, with mobile data being among their biggest expenses.[159] But with only 10% of South Africa’s population having internet access at home,[160] the majority of young people are dependent on local hotspots, internet cafés and mobile data. High data costs impact how young people access information on education and work opportunities, producing a digital divide between better-resourced and connected youth, and those with limited connectivity or resources. Given the financial and psychosocial costs of the job search, it is unsurprising that three out of four young people in a 2019 study reported having been looking for work for more than a year.[161] Nearly one in 10 had given up the job search altogether.[162] Social exclusion Most people in South Africa find jobs through friends and family, who either refer them to employers, tell them about work opportunities, offer start-up capital, or lend them money to fund the job search. Employers also often rely on employees to refer people they know and trust when there are job openings. In the early 1990s, researchers found two dairies in Gqeberha and Cape Town that had recruited all their staff from a single Ciskei village, propelled through a chain of referrals.[163] Indeed, a strong body of South African evidence[164] shows the power of social ties and social privilege in determining entry, stability and success in the labour market. This reality means that having social ties to people already in the labour market is critical to gaining entry. But as many as four in 10 young people find themselves on the margins of the labour market, living in homes with no employed members.[165] In the Eastern Cape, the proportion of young people living in homes where no one is employed increases to almost 60%, and in the poorest municipalities in the country, as much as 80%.[166] Because of the interplay between class privilege, social networks and economic power, some researchers[167] have argued that the South African labour market can be split into two camps: a wellconnected group of ‘insiders’, and a second (much larger) group of ‘outsiders’, whose social exclusion locks them out of quality work opportunities. Pathway support The South African labour market experiences a high degree of churn. This has been especially acute over the past few years as a consequence of Covid-19 lockdown. National survey data tracking employment dynamics between February 2020 and March 2021 showed that 23% of participants who had been employed in February were no longer employed the following year, while 30% who had been jobless in February 2020 had found jobs by March 2021.[168] But young people were experiencing this churn well before Covid-19 struck. Many of South Africa’s young workers will cycle through short-term training, jobs or self-employment opportunities, struggling to find a stable foothold in the labour market. Young people who do find jobs often battle to keep them. Instead, they find themselves moving in and out of training, informal work, and short-term positions, unable to translate their experience into stable employment.[169] Although chronically unemployed and transitory unemployed people in South Africa share many of the same characteristics – they tend to be Black, women and younger – transitory-unemployed people are 10 times more numerous than chronically-unemployed people.[170] This reality, coupled with the increase in part-time jobs, means that policy and programming must be designed to support those in transitory employment, bridging them to their next opportunity. The young workforce Like much of the rest of the world, wage labour has been a central economic, social, and political organising force in South Africa: first through colonial and then apartheid capitalist accumulation.[171] Both enforced the employment of Black men on the mines and attached urban residence with formal employment. Over the second half of the 20th century, the South African economy grew exponentially, shifting from agriculture to minerals, and finally to manufacturing.[172] But these structural changes in the economy were also attended with some of the widest unemployment rates in the world and deepening inequality. Since the final decades of apartheid, the economy has become increasingly capital- and skills-intensive,[173] while growth has stalled. Today, the services sector is the key to both growth and employment, while agriculture, mining, and manufacturing have contracted significantly.[174] South African youth face a future without the prospect of industrial waged work and uncertain possibilities for livelihoods in the agricultural sector. Despite skyrocketing unemployment, South African social protection is reserved for those presumed unable to work (children, the elderly, and the disabled), while there is no direct support for the young and unemployed. Structural change towards a service-oriented economy is reflected in young people’s rates of employment in key industries. Among those young people (aged 15-34) who were employed in the second quarter of 2022, 24% were employed in community, social and personal services; 24% in wholesale and retail; and 16% in financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services. In other words, the vast majority (about 64%) of young people who are employed, are employed in these service-driven industries. Between Q1 2019 and Q2 2022, the proportions of those employed in mining and manufacturing decreased across the board, but particularly for young people (see Table 5). Table 5: Youth versus overall proportion of employed across industries While some sub-sectors of the service industry are able to absorb low- and medium-skilled workers, the overall absorption capacity of the sector is severely restricted, particularly since most young job-seekers have limited formal qualifications. One diagnosis of the youth unemployment problem is a ‘supply-side problem’. Here it is argued that the primary driver of youth unemployment is that young people do not have the right qualifications, technical or ‘soft’ skills to meet the needs of a changing labour market. This includes the skills demanded by a growing digital economy, as well as the shift to a high-skill, service-oriented sector. As the economy becomes more service sector-oriented and digitisation and automation play a bigger role, some argue that South Africa will need to produce 1.7 million more tertiary graduates to take advantage of the opportunity that an increasingly digitising economy presents, and alleviate job losses.[175] Supply-side solutions work off a deficit model that positions young job-seekers as lacking the capacities that industries and employers need. In doing so, they arguably place the burden of responsibility on young people to equip themselves for work, with little guarantee that the labour market will be able to absorb them or that they will have the support, recognition and resources required to secure a job.[176] The previous section about transitions into the labour market suggests that skills deficits are not the only, or necessarily the primary, barrier to entry for young people. Indeed, young people’s experience of social and financial deficits are as, if not more, pressing. More so, young women may experience gender discrimination in the labour market regardless of their level of their qualification. While we know that more education and training generally equates to higher employment and higher earnings for youth, and demands proper investment, the relationship is not inevitable. There also must be livelihood opportunities to absorb these better-skilled young people. Young people in the informal sector Over the period Q1 2017 – Q2 2022, the proportion of young people employed in the formal sector shrunk by 16%, relative to 6.5% overall (see Table 6). While employment prospects for young people also contracted in agriculture and private households, the informal economy was the only sector in which young people experienced a growth in employment. This is all the more impressive considering the sector was also hardest hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. Among young people, informal employment increased 4% over the period, despite decreasing 23% compared to the formal sector’s 15% in South Africa’s first lockdown. Table 6: Youth versus overall proportion of employed across sectors Literature on youth employment in South Africa often falls into two camps with respect to its approach to the formal economy. For some, shrinking possibilities in the formal sector, both within South Africa and globally, compel us to think differently about work. They argue that ‘the prevalence and persistence of “informal”, “precarious”, and “non-standard” employment in so many sites around the world… requires a profound analytical decentring of waged and salaried employment as a presumed norm or telos, and a consequent reorientation of our empirical research protocols’.[177] Others argue that stimulating formal wage employment is the only way to transform the economy at the scale required to shift livelihood prospects. By looking to expand livelihoods for young people outside the formal wage job, those in the former camp might be accused of valorising ‘precarious work’ and placing the burden on young people themselves to transform their own prospects. Meanwhile, those who view job creation in the formal economy as the only solution to youth unemployment often invoke a false binary between the informal and formal sectors. Here, interventions in the formal economy are perceived as systemic and sustainable, while those in the informal economy are seen piecemeal and individualised; formal work is understood as decent and secure, while informal work is not.[178] Given the lower earnings and poor access to social protection for informal workers, we cannot romanticise the informal economy. But we also cannot ignore it. Nor can we continue to hold rigid dichotomies that fail to capture a much more complex reality. The lines between the formal and informal economies often blur, with connections and overlaps between them. Stereotypes that describe ‘decent, dignified work in the formal economy’ and ‘insecure, exploitative work’ in the informal economy often do not hold. Despite apparent job security, wage-workers in the formal economy can also be exploited, treated as ‘disposable’, and forced to work in unsafe conditions.[179] In South Africa, low-paid wage work has been coupled with colonialism and apartheid,[180] and relatedly forced migration, oppression and abuse.[181] This is part of why some young South Africans report opting for insecure selfemployment as opposed to the indignities of certain forms of wage labour.[182] Descriptions of work outside the boundaries of a formal wage job often rest on what it is not: informal, non-standard, unstable or insecure . This leaves us with far less research or description of what it is, and how we might meaningfully respond to it. In South Africa, young people in the informal economy are often understood in terms of ‘entrepreneurship’, with the assumption that young people’s innate entrepreneurial potential needs only to be unlocked through training and skills.[183] While some see young people in the informal sector as untapped vessels of entrepreneurial potential, others see them as a ‘ticking time bomb’. Outside of formal employment young people are regularly assumed to be lazy, idle and dangerous.[184] With persistently high rates of youth unemployment, post-apartheid South African has been awash with images of ‘waiting youth’,[185] pushed to the margins of society by under-employment and unemployment, and growing increasingly detached from their aspirations for their lives and livelihoods. But rarely are young people just waiting. Instead, research illustrates that young people without jobs are routinely creating new strategies to navigate changing labour markets. In a recent ethnographic study, Hannah Dawson[186] explored social connections among young men working in-and-around a car wash in Zandspruit informal settlement, Johannesburg. Rather than operating in isolation, the car wash business formed part of a web of informal business activity, connected to the taxi industry, informal mechanics and the ‘chesanyama’ (a buy-andbraai informal butchery). The car wash offered young men a place to socialise, pass time, and ‘hustle’ for work. In 2022, a survey conducted by Youth Capital[187] found that neighbourhood hubs, including train stations, schools, clinics and community centres, play a key role in linking young people to opportunity. By becoming visible to potential employers and business partners, young men at the Zandspruit car wash gained leverage in their local economy. Their livelihoods were created and sustained by “making plans with other people”.[188] Those who currently had money or work could support those who didn’t, offering a form of informal insurance that held them from one job to the next.[189] These relational and reciprocal aspects of self-employment are often muted in the literature on entrepreneurship, which has historically centred on individual agency and self-reliance.[190] As it turns out, entrepreneurship is a particularly limiting frame for the work that young people are undertaking outside the formal economy and in the interstices of formal and informal work. This work includes forms of self-employment, side-hustle and opportunism, and enterprises ranging from at-home businesses to sole-proprietors to sophisticated networks of employees. The vast majority of young South Africans will be forced, at some point in their lives, to create their own living through forms of self-employment. But only a small percentage will be able to create businesses that employ others. There is limited crossover between these two types of entrepreneur; not very many microenterprises will develop into Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs). Yet both micro-enterprises and SMEs regularly operate in hostile economic environments with limited capital or networks. Programmes aiming to ‘unlock’ entrepreneurship through business training, financial literacy, access to finance, business plan development, and mentoring are widespread. What is less common are interventions to improve key infrastructure – like electricity, broadband, transport and other infrastructure – that would allow businesses to thrive. Key interventions to alleviate youth inequality over the life course To alleviate youth inequality demands that we attend to vulnerabilities and protective factors throughout the life course. This is particularly pertinent for their economic participation, around which most of the concern about young people’s vulnerability has circulated. Equalising opportunities at birth and in early childhood, for example, sets the foundation to allow for more merit-based systems later on. Similarly, by supporting young people to stay in school and attain formal qualifications, they might gain a firmer foothold in the labour market. If we fail to support young people in their early lives, inequalities only widen as they grow older. But we also cannot afford to fail young adults, who will in turn become the parents of future generations. The recommendations listed below are by no means exhaustive. But they do suggest critical interventions at key moments of the life course that can help alleviate structural inequality and ignite young people’s potential. Perinatal Advance the Maternal Support Grant Research shows that childhood stunting, together with other aspects of children’s physical and mental wellbeing, is driven in part by mothers’ mental health and nutrition during pregnancy.[191] Research suggests that in South Africa’s most disadvantaged communities, pregnant women are experiencing high rates of mental illness and food insecurity.[192] Yet these women will not be able to access any income support from the state until their child is born, and even then, access to the Child Support Grant within the first year of life is low. By extending social protection to caregivers, before they give birth, we can safeguard the health and wellbeing of both mother and child, and take the first steps to disrupting intergenerational poverty. Income support, together with affordable antenatal care, can improve pregnant women’s nutrition and psychological wellbeing, as well as the physical and cognitive functioning of their babies.[71] Research suggests that if stunted children receive extra nutrition and cognitive stimulation, their life-time earnings potential can increase by 25-40%.[72] Schools must implement national policy by supporting pregnant learners and young mothers to stay in school Pregnancy can disrupt young women’s schooling in a range of ways. First, pregnant learners often need to take leave from school for antenatal visits, as well during and after the baby is born. This can disrupt their learning and make it difficult to catch up later. Second, in addition to the physical difficulties of pregnancy, many pregnant learners also suffer shame and bullying in their homes, schools, neighbourhoods and health facilities. The admonishment pregnant learners face both on the journey to school and from their peers can discourage their attendance. Just as judgement and bullying might cause pregnant learners to drop out of school, those who fall pregnant after having dropped out might be discouraged to return, fearing hostility from teachers or classmates. Finally, having a child puts additional responsibilities and financial pressures on parenting learners, which can come at the expense of their schooling if they are not adequately supported.[193] In light of the interplay between pregnancy and dropout, policy and programming must support pregnant learners to stay in school and young mothers to return to school as soon as possible after giving birth. This has been the driving force behind recent (2018) national policy.[194] Indeed, evidence[195] shows that the longer a new mother waits to return to school, the more at-risk she is of dropout. But, even when they want to return to school, attitudes among school staff and classmates often keep young mothers from doing so.[196] But the implementation of new recommendations has varied across schools and provinces with some places completely ignoring policy in favour of expelling pregnant learners.[197] More often, schools have chosen to follow a more outdated government policy[198] that keeps young mothers from school for the first year of their child’s life. Schools remain hostile environments for pregnant women and young mothers, and very few have baby-changing or childcare facilities. Schools can also create other barriers for pregnant learners. In some schools, learners that are more than six months pregnant must submit a doctor’s note indicating whether they are fit to learn; in others, pregnant learners must be accompanied to school by a guardian.[199] At the level of policy and implementation, we must support both expectant and new mothers to stay in school. Pregnancy and early motherhood are critical moments, both in the life course of the pregnant learner themselves, and in the life course of children born to learners, affecting the future chances of both parent and child. Early childhood Government must invest in the ECD workforce and quality ECD services In the critical first 1,000 days of a child’s life, infants and caregivers are expected to receive Early Childhood Development (ECD) services at home, from community health workers, hired as part of clinic-based outreach teams. Community health workers form part of a cadre of about 270,000, mostly Black, women delivering ECD services across the country.[200] These women, who operate largely informally, are all-too-often underpaid, under-resourced and unprotected. The achievement of minimum wage for informal care workers (now R23.19 per hour) has been an essential lever in reducing the gender wage gap at the lower end of South Africa’s wage distribution.[201] As they grow older, children are most likely to receive care through an Early Learning Programme (ELP), but with limited government subsidies, access to these services is dependent on caregivers’ ability to pay fees. Research shows that investing in early childhood accrues benefits over the life course, with returns for schooling, tertiary education, employment prospects, and ultimately national budgets. Some models suggests that the elimination of stunting, alone, could generate an additional R62 billion a year,[202] which would be enough to subsidise a national early learning programme for 0–5-year-olds, while also reducing the funding shortfall at tertiary institutions. If universal access to early learning translated into better basic education outcomes and a fully-literate working-age population, some researchers suggest the country’s GDP would be expected to grow by a quarter.[203] But investing in ECD goes far beyond a return on investment, presenting an opportunity to radically shift intergenerational inequality in South Africa. This is not only because it unlocks the developmental potential of children, but also because it means supporting quality jobs in the community and social services sector, where women are heavily represented. Community, social, and personal services is the only sector that added jobs for young people from 2017 Q1 to 2022 Q2, most of which (over 60%) have been to women. Expanding quality, affordable childcare not only has benefits for young children and young women in the early childhood sector, it also enables more caregivers (usually women) to participate in the labour market. Given that caregiving responsibilities can often delimit young women’s labour participation, this is essential to unlocking their economic potential and alleviating gender inequality in the labour market. Key levers for the government to unlock the multiplier effects of early childhood development: Unlock public financing to pay and skill the ECD workforce through Sector Education and Training Authorities or Public Employment Programmes; and Develop more inclusive regulatory frameworks that allow unregistered sites to access funding and quality support. Adolescence: basic education Implement early warning systems For young people to reap the benefits of basic education, they must be supported to complete their schooling. This starts by developing and supporting thoughtful dropout-prevention programmes. Schools can implement early warning systems[204] for school dropout by tracking signs of learner disengagement, and then delivering the right support at the right time. Research suggests that three indices are critical to identify early signs of disengagement: academic performance, behaviour change, and chronic absenteeism. Academic performance: when learners’ grades begin to drop, it may mean they are falling behind in the curriculum. Without the right support, this can put them at risk of grade repetition, which research shows is a leading predictor of dropout.[205] Behaviour change: disruptive or disengaged behaviour can be an early warning sign, especially if it appears alongside other indicators. Chronic absenteeism: absenteeism usually increases over time. Documenting this can help to trigger support to absent learners before they drop out. Open access to psychosocial support Many children in South Africa are exposed to trauma, violence, loss of family members, hardships at home, inadequate living conditions and limited access to services. This can have both short- and long-term consequences for children’s emotional wellbeing, mental health, academic performance, and ultimate ability to finish school.[206] Evidence from South African longitudinal research shows that adolescents struggling with mental illness are less likely to have completed secondary school or be formally employed, and more likely to report psychological distress.[207] Psychosocial support services for children can include role modelling, mentoring and monitoring from trusted adults and peers. It may also involve individual and group counselling, life-skills training or referral to professional state services. These support interventions are reliant on early warning systems that help trigger the right support at the right time. Adolescence: post-school education Support alternative pathways to a matric qualification Recent research suggests that, at any given time, there are as many as a quarter of a million young people pursuing a matric outside the full-time school system.[208] That equates to a third of the annual matric cohort.[209] This includes young people who are seeking to rewrite their matric exams as well as those who left school before reaching Grade 12. Government must expand and support these alternative routes to a matric qualification, which include the National Senior Certificate, the Senior Certificate and the National Senior Certificate for Adults. As a first principle, this should include easily accessible application information, academic resources, and support services that help young people navigate second-chance matric qualifications. Improve TVET education in terms of access and quality To boost tertiary education rates and equip young people for the labour market, we must increase access to quality Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVETs). Despite a radical expansion in access to tertiary education since democracy,[210] fewer than two in 10 young people who start Grade 1 will be eligible to attend university, let alone afford university fees or have enough support to finish their degrees.[211] Six out of 10 young people will not leave school with a matric certificate and will need to find pathways to further education where this is not a requirement. TVETs can help prepare young people for the labour market through targeted skills training and opportunities for workplace-based learning. When they work well, these colleges can equip young people with knowledge, skills, and professional know-how that improve their employability and open up networks to potential employers. High schools must educate Grade 8 and 9 learners about the learning pathways available, including TVET colleges and courses on offer. The Department of Basic Education’s (DBE) introduction of the General Education Certificate offers hope for a national qualification for Grade 9 graduates, but for this to serve them, the DBE must ensure that this is a meaningful benchmark qualification that is recognised by employers and tertiary institutions. More so, the DBE should work in collaboration with the Department of Higher Education and Training to help bridge learners leaving school in Grade 9 to a post-school environment. TVET colleges should build strong relationships with industry to ensure the relevance of their curricula, facilitate workplace-based training, and improve the industry reputation of TVET qualifications. These post-school approaches are about building young people’s qualifications and skills. But this, on its own, is not enough. Young people’s disadvantage in the labour market needs redress through wrap-around support, receptive employers, social security, and an enabling environment. These are addressed in the recommendations below. Early adulthood: transitions into work and between jobs As young people exit the schooling system, there are few readily accessible or reliable points of information about how to apply for jobs, how to compile a CV, or how to access further education and training opportunities. Instead, young people must often feel their way through the systems with little to no guidance, mentorship or knowledge-sharing in the process.[212] This means that many young people find themselves floundering in the job search, applying with masses of other applicants to jobs that do not match their qualifications or aptitudes, and with little knowledge of how to signal their particular skills to employers. Endless applications and trips to interviews can be time-consuming and extraordinarily costly, with little payoff, leaving many young people feeling discouraged.[213] Employer readiness Relative to the literature focused on building young people’s aptitudes and preparedness for the world of work, there is far less research about employer-driven drivers of youth unemployment in South Africa. This includes employers’ attitudes and practices with respect to hiring young people.[214] Employers can be supported and incentivised to hire young people through interventions like the Employment Tax Incentive and including youth employment as a pillar on the BB-BEE scorecard.[215] Employee hiring practices must shift from exclusionary norms that necessitate prior work experience and unnecessary educational qualifications. Instead, attention needs to be paid to alternative signals of a young person’s capability.[216] Matching Matching support is about building bridges between young people and employers, where there is often an information chasm, with both parties struggling to find the right people at the right time. Recent South African research[217] shows the impact of providing a young job-seeker with a documented assessment of their skills and capabilities, including not only their educational qualifications, but also their soft skills, experience, and learning potential. When job-seekers were able to provide employers with a summary skills report, their chances of finding work improved by up to 17% and their earning potential increased by up to 32%.[218] Matching is not only about making young people visible in the right ways to their first potential employer, it is also about linking them to their next opportunity, given the rate of churn in the South African labour market.[219] SAYouth.mobi offers one route to doing this. Through a zero-rated mobile site, SAYouth.mobi provides young people with workseeking content, from listings of available income-generating opportunities, to interview techniques and CV-building software. Because it is digital, young people can access and apply for work opportunities without incurring transport or printing costs. SAYouth.mobi also helps to directly link young job-seekers to employers seeking talent, combating inefficient work-seeking behaviours. Matching is based on a range of criteria, including socio-economic circumstances (household income and access to a social grant), geography (proximity to opportunity), capabilities (numeracy, literacy, and skills), gender, and disability. Social protection About a third of South Africans benefit from a social grant. The introduction of the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant over the past few years had added a further 10 million recipients, meaning that, by 2022, close to half of the country is supported by social welfare.[220] The rapid expansion of South African social welfare is informed by a robust body of evidence that shows the impact of social grants on poverty alleviation, labour participation, sustainable economic growth, and social cohesion. Quantitative analysis suggests that the introduction of the SRD has alleviated household poverty and inequality, while stimulating labour market participation. Access to an SRD increased the likelihood of looking for work by 25%.[221] In a 2021 Youth Capital survey of over 2,000 youth, nearly three in 10 young people said they had used grant money to support their job search.[222] Given this effect, the National Treasury is considering proposals to transform the SRD into a job-seekers support grant. However, both the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) and the Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) have slammed these proposals, arguing that the eligibility requirements currently being tabled for the job-seekers grant would exclude the vast majority of current SRD recipients, by imposing a range of unfounded conditionalities and ignoring non-financial barriers to job-seeking.[223] Welfare policy in both developed and developing countries, including South Africa, remains focused on providing social protection to those physically unable to enter the labour market: children, the elderly, the sick and the disabled. Everyone else is expected to rely on waged work or entrepreneurship, despite limited opportunities for either. The young workforce Enabling environments For young job-seekers, informal workers and entrepreneurs alike, mobile data is increasingly critical. Data-light platforms can help bridge the digital divide by functioning on low-end smartphones, slow and unreliable networks, and requiring very little data to operate.[224] Reliable electricity, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure are equally important for industry to thrive. The Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela, for example, recognises the energy shortfall[225] as a critical inhibitor to employment and growth. A number of additional key strategies have recently been identified by The Presidency to create a more enabling environment for employment.[226] These include enabling private sector employment, and small and medium enterprises, by reducing their regulatory burden, and shifting towards labour-intensive growth sectors. For young people, this will mean investing in the services sector in particular, with special focus on the social economy together with wholesale and retail. Global Business Services (GBS) is another sector showing significant growth potential in an increasingly digitised economy. Creating enabling environments for self-employed young people is particularly important in a South African context. Here, selfemployment represents just 10% of jobs, relative to 30% in most upper- and middle-income countries. Some suggest that by boosting self-employment rates, South Africa might halve its unemployment rate.[227] Public employment NIDS-CRAM survey data showed that between February 2020 and March 2021, young people experienced the largest employment-to-population ratio increase.[228] At this point industry-level data was already suggesting gains in community, social, and personal services (likely attributable to large-scale, youth-targeted public employment programmes), and wholesale and retail trade. Both industries also had a high level of youth intensity of employment. One such youth-targeted public employment programme was the Basic Education Employment Initiative (BEEI), launched in April 2020 as part of The Presidential Employment Stimulus Package, which sought to stimulate work in response to the economic effects of Covid-19. The BEEI is a large-scale public employment programme, ring-fenced particularly for young people (aged 18–35), who are recruited through the SAYouth.mobi platform and placed as education assistants or general school assistants in schools across the country, remunerated at minimum wage. Phase I of the BEEI was executed between 1 December 2020 and 31 March 2021, with the QLFS showing that the sector added some 115,000 jobs in the final quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021. According to the Presidency, 65% of those placed were young women.[229] Recruiting through SAYouth.mobi enabled scale, because of the reach of its online network. It also meant democratised opportunity beyond employers’ social networks. Evidence shows that public employment can offer short-term earnings, a funded entry into the labour market, and valuable work experience for young people that can improve their long-term stability and success in the labour market.[230] But without transferable skills and supported pathways to their next opportunity, it risks being yet another stop-gap as young people trampoline in and out of the labour market. Youth citizenship and political participation Factors beyond the control of youth can cause huge inequality. Youth today must grapple with serious social, political, and environmental problems inherited from their elders. Even though they possess the energy, creativity, and passion to take on the intractable problems they have inherited, they are systematically excluded from policy decisions. Achieving youth equality requires active participation and involvement of youth in decision-making at all levels, starting in the home and extending to the highest levels of government. Yet youth are largely excluded from formal political processes and government policy. Participation equality implies political representation at national, provincial, and municipal level. The Ladder of Citizenship Participation (LCP) holds that representation and participation of all groups in society is key and fundamental to the existence of a vibrant democracy.[231] In other words, a vibrant democracy requires that all social groups have a voice in how they wish to be governed, while institutions tasked with the exercise of this civic duty must provide spaces that allow for full and effective participation. In spite of the growth in the number of political parties, there has been a noticeable decrease in voter turnout in South African elections since 1994. The poor and disjointed participation by the youth in particular is concerning. If the process of participation is skewed and twisted to benefit only a select group, then the electorate’s disenchantment with political processes becomes a threat to democracy. Reasons for voter apathy and political disengagement, particularly by youth, include a lack of political party membership and low levels of political participation, a disinterest in electoral politics, high levels of cynicism about politics and a low level of confidence in the country’s democracy.[232] References [1] A Hardgrove, K Pells, and P Dornan, “Youth Vulnerabilities in Life Course Transitions,” Occasional Paper (UNDP Human Development Report Office, 2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089eeed915d3cfd0004ca/youth-vulnerabilities-in-life-course-transitions.pdf. [2] Based on Gini Coefficient. The Gini is useful but limited, given its exclusive focus on income inequality. Adopting a wider scope that includes access to quality nutrition, health services, housing, education, water, and caring networks within the frame of inequity can offer us a better sense of its real effects on human life and flourishing, while still recognising the centrality of money, especially in circumstances where public services and infrastructure do not function well. [3] IMF, “Six Charts Explain South Africa’s Inequality.” [4] IMF, “Six Charts Explain South Africa’s Inequality.” [5] Inclusive Society Institute. 2021. Trends in multidimensional inequality and socio-demographic change in SA during 27-years of democracy. Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/trends-in-multidimensional-inequality-and-socio-demographic-change-in-sa-during-27years-of-democracy [6] QLFS2022: Q1 [7] Access is not an indicator of the quality of these services, and in fact, access to quality services remains a key driver of South Africa’s inequality. [8] Inclusive Society Institute. 2022. Inequality & Demography; Von Fintel D, Richter L. Intergenerational transfer of health inequalities: exploration of mechanisms in the Birth to Twenty cohort in South Africa. BMJ Glob Health. 2019;4(e001828). [9] D Durham, “Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2,” Anthropology Quarterly 73, no. 3 (2000): 113–20. [10] Stats SA, “Youth Still Find It Difficult to Secure Jobs in South Africa.” [11] Juta and Company Ltd, Electoral Act 73 of 1998. [12] A Honwana and F De Boeck, “Children and Youth in Africa: Agency, Identity and Place,” in Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2005). [13] J Seekings, “Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood and Adolescence in South Africa,” Social Dynamics 32, no. 1 (2006): 1–20. 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It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Authors: Daryl Swanepoel Editor: Olivia Main FEBRUARY 2023 Content Chapter 1: Background and introduction of the study Chapter 2: The literature review 2.1 The role of political parties in a democratic dispensation 2.1.1 Why are political parties important for democracy? 2.1.2 What is the role and functions of political parties in a democracy? 2.2 The need for party-political funding 2.3 How political parties are funded 2.4 The imperative to ensure transparency through the regulation of private donations 2.5 The rationale for state funding of political parties 2.5.1 Enabling parties to fulfil their democratic responsibilities 2.5.2 State funding of political parties to combat corruption and as mitigation for anti-corruption measures 2.6 The different forms of state funding for political parties 2.7 The relationship between private donations, disclosure regulations, state funding and the viability of political parties 2.8 The post-1994 history of party-political funding in South Africa 2.9 Conclusion Chapter 3: The legislative review 3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 3.1.1 Section 19(2) 3.1.2 Section 57(2)(c) 3.1.3 Section 59(1)(a) 3.1.4 Section 236 3.2 Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 3.2.1 Direct funding of political parties 3.2.1.1 Prohibited donations 3.2.1.2 Donations from juristic persons 3.2.2 Represented Political Party Fund 3.2.3 Multi-Party Democracy Fund 3.3 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 3.3.1 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 3.3.2 Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 3.4 Conclusion Chapter 4: Research design and methodology 4.1 Research objective 4.2 Research question 4.3 Research design 4.4 Research subjects 4.5 Measurement 4.6 Data collection 4.7 Analysis 4.8 Ethics 4.9 Limitation of the study Chapter 5: Findings 5.1 The public party-funding regime of Germany 5.1.1 Public funding of German political parties 5.1.1.1 Restrictions of private donations to political parties 5.1.1.2 The various forms of public funding that German parties are entitled to 5.1.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporates to make donations to political parties 5.1.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.1.1.5 Private versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.1.1.6 Quantifiable public funding to support political parties 5.1.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations 5.1.3 Germany–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.1.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.1.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations 5.1.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the German party-political dispensation as a whole 5.1.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.2 The public party-funding regime of Sweden 5.2.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.2.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties 5.2.1.2 The various forms of public funding that Swedish political parties are entitled to 5.2.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties 5.2.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.2.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.2.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.2.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations 5.2.2.1 Quantifiable funding to support political foundations 5.2.3 Sweden–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.2.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.2.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations 5.2.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the Swedish party-political dispensation as a whole 5.2.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.3 The public party-funding regime of the Netherlands 5.3.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.3.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties 5.3.1.2 The various forms of public funding that the Netherlands political parties are entitled to 5.3.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties 5.3.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.3.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.3.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.3.2 Public funding to political foundations 5.3.3 The Netherlands–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.3.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.3.3.2 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.4 The public party-funding regime of South Africa 5.4.1 Public funding of South African political parties 5.4.2 Indirect public funding 5.4.3 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.4.4 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.4.5 Public annual-spend per person on political parties Chapter 6: Discussion of findings 6.1 Comparative analysis: The amount of public funds allocated to the political parties in selected jurisdictions Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 7.1 Conclusions 7.2 Recommendations References Cover photo credit: istockphoto.com – Jacques Kloppers Chapter 1: Background and introduction of the study Prior to 2019, donations to political parties in South Africa were unregulated. But in light of the growing scandals flowing from alleged illicit donations to parties, such as money for tenders, civil society began to agitate for private donations to political parties to be more transparent. It was, for example, alleged that the ruling African National Congress was being bankrolled by the now fugitive Gupta family and that the Democratic Alliance was captured by the so-called “white monopoly capital” (M&G, 2017). Donations to political parties, pre- and post-1994, have always been shrouded in secrecy, and therefore “it has never been possible to tell whether political parties act in the best interests of the public, or whether they act in the best interests of those who fill their pockets” (M&G, 2017). This led to the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa) lodging a legal challenge in 2004, to ensure the introduction of legislation to limit private funding to parties and compel them to make public their sources of funding (M&G, 2017). Against this background, the High Court in Cape Town, in 2017, ruled that legislation needed to be introduced to regulate the funding of political parties (De Wet, 2017). This led to the passage of the Political Party Funding Act (PPFA), Act 6 of 2018 (RSA, 2019a). The Act was subsequently assented to by the President of the Republic and came into effect on 1 April 2019 (The Presidency, 2019). Since the introduction of the legislation, private funding of political parties has, to a large degree, dried up, with many – including the ruling party – finding it difficult to meet their operational obligations. It has, for example, been widely reported in the media that the ruling party is unable to regularly pay its staff their monthly salaries (Moichela, 2022). Parties have directly linked the evaporation of private funding to the disclosure requirements contained in the PPFA. Former ANC Treasurer General, Paul Mashatile, is reported to have said that the Act “is making regular donors reluctant to give” (Letshwiti-Jones, 2022). It is recognised that, in order for political parties to effectively conduct their democratic obligations, they need adequate funding so that they can carry out their core functions, and to fund their election campaigns (Venice Commission, 2020:56). State funding for parties is essential to guarantee parties’ independence from undue influence of private donors and to ensure that they “have the opportunity to compete in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity”. But private contributions are also a form of political participation. Therefore, a balance needs to be achieved between encouraging moderate contributions and limiting unduly large contributions on the one hand, and state funding on the other (Venice Commission, 2020:56). It is evident that the South African parties are struggling to keep afloat. Whether this is due to insufficient funding or because the available funds are not being appropriately applied, is an open question. Whether the balance between private funding and state funding within the highly regulated South African dispensation is adequate, needs to be assessed. This study aims to carry out such an assessment by benchmarking the South African party-political funding regime against a selection of European democracies whose election systems are similarly based on proportional representation. Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have been chosen, since, as stated, their elections are based on proportional representation. In Germany it is a system of personalised proportional representation, where “each voter has two votes: the first for an individual constituency candidate, and the second for a party-list in a particular state” (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, N.d.). In Sweden the number of seats each party receives in the Riksdag is in proportion to the number of votes the party received in the election (Sveriges Riksdag, N.d.), and in the Netherlands citizens vote for a candidate on the candidate list, with parties represented in Parliament in proportion to the total number of votes they received in the election (Tweede Kamer. Der Staten-Generaal, N.d.). The study will attempt to settle the question as to whether our democracy is sufficiently funded. It will do so through the lens of political parties, the primary building blocks of our country’s parliamentary democracy. The theoretical motivation for the public funding for political parties is that it will have a positive impact on the role of money in politics and “ensure that all political forces have access to enough resources to reach the electorate, thereby encouraging pluralism and providing the electorate with a wider choice of politicians and policies” (International IDEA, 2014:22). However, as has been alluded to, the introduction of party-funding regulation in South Africa has led to financial instability within the political party environment. The level of public funding should therefore take into account the impact that high regulation has on party income from private sources. Should practice prove that such public funding be insufficient, the objective of bolstering democracy could very well be undermined. This study therefore aims to evaluate the South African party-funding dispensation against international best practice. It intends to make recommendations to the public-policymakers as to what adjustments are needed, if any, to ensure that sufficiently resourced political parties adequately underpin the country’s democratic dispensation. Chapter 2: The literature review The literature review aims to garner an understanding as to the role of political parties in a democratic dispensation, their need for income and how they are funded, and to understand the interaction between private and state funding of parties. 2.1 The role of political parties in a democratic dispensation Before we delve into the financing aspects of political parties, the review starts by asking two fundamental questions: Why are political parties important for democracy and what is the role of parties in a democratic dispensation? 2.1.1 Why are political parties important for democracy? The influential International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) argue that “political parties are crucial for the functioning of representative democracy”, since they produce a variety of policy options for the electorate to consider and choose from. They also provide the mechanism “through which citizens express diversity of interests and aspirations” (International IDEA, N.d.). Political parties bring people with the same political ideas together, for them to take part in elections collectively, in the hope of getting as many of those of the same ‘thinking’ as possible elected into legislatures, such as Parliament or a municipal council. And similarly, to hold as many posts as possible in the government (Government of the Netherlands, N.d.). In this vein, many prominent scholars have lamented the importance of political parties for democracy. They have said that parties are indispensable, make democracy workable, and provide a mechanism for the public to be represented in the legislatures through electoral competition (Ezrow, 2011). Political parties allow for broader societal participation in the drafting of coherent public policy, serve as an intermediary between members of society and the government, connect them and allow for the interpreted communication between government and society (Ezrow, 2011). Political parties make government accountable for its actions by helping the public identify the executives’ past performances, and by diminishing the power of dominating personalities. The existence of opposition parties also allows for non-performing incumbent governments to be challenged at the poll (Ezrow, 2011). Individuals attempting to challenge incumbent governments tend to be “fragile, fragmented and incoherent, with limited capacity to mobilise, organise and coordinate collective action”. When individuals group themselves into parties, they become more capable of overcoming coordination problems. And they create longer-term time horizons, since parties normally have long-term goals with a broader spectrum of priorities (Ezrow, 2011). They also help politicians solve these coordination problems, since they act in a collective manner and are able to present disciplined goals by keeping politicians in line with the goals of their parties, as opposed to individuals that can opportunistically manoeuvre their message as the wind blows (Ezrow, 2011). “Parties also enable the opposition to stand firm against divide and rules tactics by the incumbent regime”, something that individuals acting on their own accord will find difficult to do. So too, independent politicians may not be able to credibly commit to policies that do not coincide with their own preferences, whereas, by being a member of a party, they are put in a position where they can convincingly commit to policies that they normally would not support in order to win a larger support base (Ezrow, 2011). Furthermore, governments comprise collective leadership capable of carrying out cogent and coordinated policies. This requires likeminded individuals acting in unison. Parties play a role in creating such cohesive leadership through their internal recruitment, nomination and socialisation processes. Unlike individual politicians, parties, because of their diversified process of recruitment, are also able to create ways for individuals of diverse ethnic and economic backgrounds to rise to political power (Ezrow, 2011). And parties are more likely to be in a position to provide valuable training in negotiation, compromise and coalition building; and broader socialisation with regard to democratic practices (Ezrow, 2011). Whilst acknowledging the right of individuals to compete for political office, there seems to be broad consensus that political parties are, given their greater capacity to coordinate and function over a far wider sphere within the democratic machinations, an essential component of a functioning democracy. Ezrow (2011) quotes the authoritative American political scientist, E.E. Schattschneider, who argued that "democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”. 2.1.2 What is the role and functions of political parties in a democracy? Having, in the aforementioned section, established that political parties are indeed important for democracy to succeed, in this section we examine the role of political parties and the functions they carry out. Although somewhat dated, being written in 1950, it was then argued that political parties consist of individuals that hold common views on important public questions, and who promote their principles in order to gain control of government so that they can put their ideas into operation. These parties generally have three things: organisation, fidelity to certain principles, and they must follow constitutional means to reach their objectives (Singh & Singh, 1950). This remains true today. Similarly, the authors contended that political parties did not exist in Greek times, as citizens participated in the democratic processes in their own capacity. But in modern times, due to the complexity of government and the vast increase in the population, it is not practical for all to be directly involved in the democratic processes. Political parties now act as “brokers of ideas and carriers of government”. Indeed, they are the principal go-betweens in the constitutional process. Parties are the ‘people’ – the apex norm of all democratic constitutions – organising themselves. They therefore act as the organisational vehicle for the people, with the value proposition being that they can be better enabled if properly organised and through the sharing of resources (Kangu, 2001). Kangu affirms the 1950 assertion that political parties are in fact an “association of private citizens formed to promote certain political and economic beliefs … [with the purpose of having] … them adopted as government policy”. Political parties fulfil a range of important functions in a democracy, such as: Drawing together those people who share similar philosophies and ideas. They are vehicles through which those with broadly similar interests can organise and campaign. Since governments are composed of people who belong to political parties, political parties are in reality the way in which political power is exercised. Political parties therefore provide the government and the opposition. Parties select candidates to contest elections. It is therefore parties that provide the nation’s political leadership. Parties provide organisational support for organising and financing election campaigns, for recruitment and training of candidates, and for developing policy, all of which are crucial for the sustainability of the party’s elected members. Through the debating of issues and formulation of policies to be presented to the electorate during elections, parties articulate the shared beliefs, values and philosophies of its members. They then utilise these to determine their attitude to legislation, public policy, and the issues of the day. Parties are often an avenue for community groups to shape the decision-making process. Many civil society organisations, such as trade unions, organised business, advocacy groups, etcetera, have close ties with political parties. They interact with the parties in order to influence the development or implementation of public policy. Parties are one of the main avenues for political debate and discussion in the community. Given that statutory authority vests in the hands of government, parties are ultimately responsible for the structure of the machinery of government, in that, in practice, it is they who can make appointments to the public sector from the ranks of their members and supporters. (AustralianPolitics.com, N.d.) Parties also fulfil important ancillary roles in society that go beyond their own narrow interests. In many societies, including South Africa, they also fulfil the role of educating society on the role of politics and the political processes. For example, they provide political education for their members and broader society. This includes, amongst others, voter education – that is, the activities and processes designed to deliver a free, fair, efficient and cost-effective election, the value of democracy and human rights (Sirivunnabood, N.d.). And they contribute to the legitimisation of the political system, in that their activities help connect citizens and social groupings to the political system. In this, they anchor the political order in the consciousness of the citizens and in social forces (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). 2.2 The need for party-political funding Whilst much has been written on the shady influence of money in politics, the fact is that political parties need resources to effectively carry out their constitutional and democratic mandates. Money in politics is not a problem per se; it is whether that money has been ethically secured, legally applied, and fairly distributed amongst the political role-players. Should the nation aspire to a well-functioning and effective representative democracy, it must accept that political parties – lest the country is to slide towards authoritarianism – need to be well-resourced and that money is necessary for inclusive democracy and effective governance, for allowing candidates and parties to reach out to voters and for them to build long-term political organisations (Lee-Jones, 2019). Political parties need appropriate funding in order for them to carry out their core functions, activities and programmes, all of which involve expenses “which should be seen as the necessary and unavoidable costs of democracy”. Parties need to maintain their party organisations, employ staff, campaign in elections, and communicate with the electorate at large (Van Biezen, 2003). Political parties have at least eight spending needs (IEC, N.d.): Developing the political will of people. For this, programmes and actions need to be put in place to inform, empower and mobilise citizens. Shaping public opinion. This would, for example, include the costs attached to carrying out media and advertising campaigns, hosting public outreach programmes such as town hall meetings, etcetera. Inspiring and furthering political education, which will include activities such as voter education, informing the electorate with regard to their constitutional rights and the value of democracy and human rights. Promoting active participation of individuals in political life, for example, the identification and recruitment of young leaders, their training and equipping them for future political leadership roles. But also ‘foot soldiers’ training’ to ensure that the party has sufficient manpower to carry out campaigns, act as party agents during elections, etcetera. Exercising an influence on political trends, which could entail, for example, empirical research; policy and message development; and the carrying out of polls and surveys. Ensuring linkages between the people and organs of state, for example, through the maintenance of constituency offices to service the electorate, and to deal with their complaints. It may be necessary to arrange contact meetings with government and political leadership to engage the electorate on various issues as the need arises. Operational expenses such as staff, travel, administration, office rental, the hosting of meetings, running of programmes and publications. Election campaigns, for example, the hosting of rallies, media advertisement, posters and billboards, pamphlets, town hall meetings, etcetera. Access to sufficient funding for political parties is crucial to the overall vibrancy of an electoral and democratic system. Without funding, political parties would not be able to reach out to the electorate to explain their goals and policies, nor would they be able to maintain mechanisms for them to receive input from the electorate about their views. Similarly, they would not be able to run dynamic election campaigns capable of engaging citizens in the electoral process. Neither would they be able to maintain the democratic dialogue between elections (Ohman, 2014:1). What is therefore being inferred is that parties that lack organisational coherence and institutionalisation, and/or programmatic substance, will fail to perform. Neither will they be able to get much traction amongst the electorate (Cotón, 2008). Needless to say, poor performing political parties are counterproductive to the building of dynamic, responsive and inclusive democratic dispensations. 2.3 How political parties are funded This literature review has revealed that political parties are funded via a range of sources. Apart from passive income in the form of interest or dividends that parties may receive from investments lodged at registered financial institutions, at least six streams of funding have been identified. Direct state funding In many democracies, political parties receive funding via the national fiscus. Direct funding from the state may take on different forms, differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Similarly, there may be different streams of direct state funding within the same jurisdiction. In Germany, for example, there is no distinction drawn between campaign funds and political party funds, since campaigning is considered part of the normal duties of a party. Campaign expenditure therefore forms part of the normal operation of a political party and is included in the party's total budget (DW, 2021). Germany’s state funding of political parties is votes-based, with further contribution-based funding dependent on the extent to which they are established in society. Whilst there are preconditions for entitlement and absolute limits set, the basic tenet of the funding is that parties receive an amount for each vote received. Section 18 (3) of the Act on Political Parties states that they are entitled to state funding in the amount of €0.85 per valid vote won at the most recent European, Bundestag and Land parliament elections up to a total of four million votes, and €0.70 for every additional vote thereafter. In other words, the financial rewards given by the state vary depending on electoral success (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). These amounts may have been adjusted since 2012, the discovery of which will be made during the interviews envisaged by the research. For contributions given by natural persons, the parties receive €0.38 per euro donated per person per year up to a total of €3,300 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). Similarly, these amounts may have been adjusted since 2012. In other countries a distinction is drawn between regular annual funding of parties and reimbursement for election campaign expenditure. For example, after each federal election or by-election in Australia, the Australian Election Commission distributes money to eligible political parties, candidates and Senate groups to reimburse them for election campaign expenditure (AEC, N.d.). The current election funding rate is AU$ 3.016 for every first preference vote received. An automatic payment in the amount of AU$ 11,029 is made. Further funding of expenditure greater than the automatic payment can be claimed. The amount payable will be calculated as the lesser of the calculated election funding entitlement; or the amount of demonstrated electoral expenditure. The payment will be reduced by the amount that has been paid as an automatic payment (AEC, N.d.). Indirect state funding for parties In addition to the direct state funding to political parties, elected representatives and political groups receive varying degrees of support for their work as parliamentarians. For example, the House of Commons in the United Kingdom reimburse MPs for the costs of running an office, employing staff, and travelling between Parliament and their constituency (UK Parliament, N.d.) In South Africa, Parliament also provides allowances for the setting up of constituency offices. These payments are, however, made directly to the parliamentary party. Further administrative allowances are also made to parties to employ parliamentary support staff and to enable them to effectively perform their parliamentary function. The administrative allowances are distributed in proportion to the seats each party occupies in Parliament (Parliament of the RSA, N.d.). In addition, a feature of European democracies is the state-funded politically aligned foundations. Germany currently has, for example, six political foundations that receive funding from the government. Each foundation is associated to a party that is represented in the federal Parliament (Unmüssig, 2017). These foundations are tasked to, amongst others, promote civic participation, and support young academic talent with scholarships and support the development of democracies abroad. They offer socio-political and democratic education and provide information and policy analysis at home and abroad. Their purpose is to build on the principles of liberal democracy and to solidify the basic principles of societal solidarity, subsidiarity and tolerance (Unmüssig, 2017). Whilst the foundations act autonomously and are legally and financially independent, each foundation is “politically associated and close to a political party”. Their work therefore stimulates and indirectly underpins the work of political parties (Unmüssig, 2017). Membership fees, trade union and other voluntary contributions; and public representative levies Party membership subscriptions are normally not high, but can collectively can make up a material portion of a party’s income. In 2014, for example, membership income for parties in the United Kingdom was 23% for the Green Party, 15% for the Labour Party, 9% for the Liberal Democrat Party, but just 2% for the Conservative Party. In 2015 the Labour Party also introduced a registered supporters’ scheme by which people can pay £3 per annum, which gives them the right to vote in the leadership elections (Brit Politics, N.d.). In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress has uninitiated the Progressive Citizens’ Forum, a debit-order campaign aimed at soliciting regular contributions from its members and supporters (PCF, N.d.). So too, trade unions in the United Kingdom have been linked to the Labour Party since its foundation in 1900. Most charge their members a political levy, which can be used for campaigns, publicity on issues they are concerned with and so on. Some can affiliate to the Labour Party and pay the Labour Party for the number of members that they have. In 2014 this provided twenty-seven percent of Labour’s income (Brit Politics, N.d.). And in some countries, parties levy their public representatives a monthly contribution based on their earnings from their position as a public representative. In South Africa, for example, the ruling African National Congress collects levies from their public representatives. In 2009 they took in about R250,000 from their parliamentarians and cabinet ministers each month. MPs were then levied around R500, while cabinet members paid between R1,500 to R2,000 a month. Councillors are also levied (politicsweb, 2009). The DA public representatives pay around 2% of their salary, while the ID levies 10% per month. The IFP charged MPs R3,300 a month (politicsweb, 2009). Donations Direct donations and sponsorships from corporates and wealthy individuals also remain a feature of modern-day politics, albeit that jurisdictions are insisting on greater regulation to various degrees of late. This will be further explored later in this study. Standard Bank, for example, donated R5 million to political parties in 2009, split amongst political parties based on the IEC’s funding formula, “in terms of which funding is distributed to political parties in proportion to their representation in the National Assembly" (politicsweb, 2009). Commercial investments It is not uncommon for political parties to own companies as investments to augment their income. The SPD of Germany, for example, has a one hundred percent shareholding in German Printing and Publishing mbH (dd.vg, N.d.). Until as recently as 1997 the SDP of Sweden owned the advertising company, Folkreklam and Förenade ARE-Bolagen (Lakomaa, 2019). And in South Africa, the African National Congress set up Chancellor House as an investment vehicle to make the party self-sufficient over time (Jolobe, 2010). Fundraising events Parties also raise funds through hosting dinners, holding raffles, and so on (Brit Politics, N.d.). These events are sometimes organised on a national scale, providing a substantial stream of income. In South Africa, for example, the ruling party, under the auspices of its Progressive Business Forum, regularly hosts presidential gala dinners, business breakfasts and corporate exhibitions on the sidelines of its national conferences (Ticketpro, N.d.). In a similar vein, the UK Labour Party hosts exhibitions at their national conferences (UK Labour Party, N.d.). 2.4 The imperative to ensure transparency through the regulation of private donations It has been established that effective and functioning political parties are crucial for democracy. For them to be so, they need to be adequately resourced. This funding can be either via the fiscus or from private sources. Funding from the fiscus is open and transparent. From private sources, less so but needs to be. Why? Because a lack of information on how much money circulates in and around elections, where resources are coming from and how they are spent, makes it harder for the electorate to make informed decisions (International IDEA, 2019). Donations to political parties, be it direct or indirect, can materially impact, influence and distort both the electoral process and passage of legislation. And it has also proved to be a major motive for grand corruption (GSDRC, 2001; Bodede, 2022). Therefore, society needs to know who are funding the parties so that: The electoral process is fair and equitable. Parties need to be able to compete on an equal footing. Elections can be distorted should some parties be flooded with funds that are illicitly obtained, since it could create unfair advantage for them. In a multi-party election, there is often a spending rat race between the parties, where governing parties are often in a stronger position to solicit donations, thereby placing the opposition in a disadvantaged position (GSDRC, 2001). The passage of legislation can be unduly influenced should donors exercise financial coercion to manoeuvre certain policy and legislative outcomes, which may not be in the interest of the broader public. It may even sway elected representatives to either actively, or through inertia, go against their undertakings to the electorate (GSDRC, 2001). This is because when politicians become overly dependent on donations from a limited group of donors, the danger is that their policy programmes can be co-opted (International IDEA, 2019). It also facilitates corruption and erodes citizen trust in political institutions (International IDEA, 2019). And, as has been demonstrated in the South African context, shady donations to parties, for example cash for tenders, as has been highlighted in the Zondo Commission of Enquiry into Corruption. This led to corruption on a grand scale (Bodede, 2022). According to Webb and Drury (2020), “big political donations are intended to have political influence”. They say that there is a “sliding scale of influence” that is facilitated by such donations: Access: It can ensure the donor gets access to a public representative that ordinary citizens would not normally get. Clientelism: This is the kind of corruption where officeholders are influenced through large donations to decide issues not on the merits of the argument, or the interests and desires of their constituents, but according to the biddings of the donor upon which the officeholder may have become dependent. Quid pro quo: Where politicians make promises in exchange for donations. Pressure: The running of political parties and election campaigns has become very costly. Parties and politicians are accordingly being placed under enormous pressure to keep donors happy, lest they walk away with their support. Big money effectively builds inequality between the haves and the have-nots into the political system. There are at least four arguments in favour of transparency in party finance: The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) considers it paramount for parties to make their funds transparent in order to prevent corruption. The objective of regulations aimed at making party funding more transparent is to, in the first instance, rebuild public trust amongst those that have disengaged from politics due to the marginalisation of the voter through the dominance of money in the political environment. And secondly, to prevent affluent and illicit donors from dominating modern politics. Transparency creates a mechanism through which the adherence to party finance regulation can be monitored. Where parties receive state funding, transparency ensures that parties can be effectively monitored in order to prevent the misuse of public money. It ensures that the electorate can be better informed as to who is supporting which political parties, thereby creating for them a tool to observe whether parties’ special interests may be motivated by external influences. (Tonhäuser & Stavenes, 2020) Thus, it is safe to conclude that the only way that the electorate can hold their public representatives accountable for their actions and make an informed vote in the knowledge that their representatives have not been unduly influenced by donor monies, is for them to know how the parties (and individual public office-bearers) have been financed and by who (Essop, N.d.). In conclusion: Clearly, money is needed to stimulate, maintain and enhance political competition, an essential component of any effective democracy. But if the quantum and source of that money is not transparent, it could pose a serious challenge to the democratic dispensation – should donors, for example, channel their resources to the political elite, essentially negating the ordinary citizens’ ability to influence policies and policymakers through their vote (International IDEA, 2019). 2.5 The rationale for state funding of political parties There are two overarching reasons that motivate for the state to fund political parties. The first being a mechanism to strengthen democracy by ensuring that political parties are empowered to fulfil their constitutional and democratic roles, and that they are able to do so within a system that is fair and equitable. The second is to combat corruption. A consequence of high transparency regulation as to who funds political parties, is a loss of private funding to political parties, as private funders shy away from being publicly exposed. This creates a funding gap, which public funding needs to address. 2.5.1 Enabling parties to fulfil their democratic responsibilities There are three central arguments in favour of the state providing political parties with financial resources for purposes of ensuring that they can effectively carry out their constitutional and democratic mandates. First, as has been repeatedly argued, political parties are critical to democracy. It is implausible to suggest that a functional democracy is possible without effective parties and party organisation. For them to be effective, they must be able to mobilise the electorate, socialise the citizenry, recruit and train future leaders and party workers, research and formulate policy, and fund their operational costs, such as rent, salaries, etcetera. Their mere existence offers support to the democratic process. And the character of the modern state depends directly on the abilities of the parties serving as integrative links between state and society. State funding can contribute to this. Secondly, parties are the vehicles through which the electorate express their political views, and they are the mechanisms through which citizens can become involved in the governing of society. However, there may be vast differences between interest groups and spheres of society – financial and otherwise – that could translate into the powerful having a disproportionate ability to mobilise the electorate behind their narrow cause. The provision of state funding helps safeguard political equality. It also mitigates against the problem of private and corporate funding potentially being channelled to only some parties, since this undermines the principle of equality in the parties’ ability to be responsive apropos their linkages and interactions with the citizenry. Thirdly, the costs of running a political party in a modern democracy is costly and they are competing against far better resourced external think-tanks and interest groups, who exert significant influence. Parties need to compete with them for the public mind. For this they need to develop and present to the public coherent policy proposals on a wide range of issues, which requires highly qualified staff and institutionalised expertise. State funding can help sustain the central role of political parties in the political system by providing funding support to enable them to develop and communicate their messages to the voters. (Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt, 2000:1-24) A further strong argument in favour of funding political parties, is that it is necessary to develop strong opposing political parties so that there is capable and healthy competition within the political system. And funding by the state guards mitigates against an incumbent party misusing the programmes and resources of the state to further its own interests (Marfo, Musah & Owiredu-Amankwah, 2021). 2.5.2 State funding of political parties to combat corruption and as mitigation for anti-corruption measures Once again, to fulfil their core functions, political parties need appropriate funding. When there is inadequate funding, political parties are ‘forced’ to adapt various strategies to fund their activities and programmes, which has to pay back in cash or kind. This often leads to “corruption and kickbacks and appointment of incompetent people to hold public positions” (Marfo, Musah & Owiredu-Amankwah, 2021). To minimise the danger of corruption, in particular state capture and influence peddling, best practice suggests that the funding of political parties ought to be regulated. In this regard, article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires states to improve transparency in the funding of political parties and public office candidates (UNODC, N.d.). A growing number of countries subsidise political parties through the fiscus, or direct provision of goods and services. This is primarily meant to help the parties perform their functions, but it is generally also considered to decrease the opportunities for corruption, since, having some form of sustainable funding, parties are de-incentivised from succumbing to the interests of private donors in return for donations (UNODC, N.d.). However, a consequence of high disclosure transparency regulations appears to be that corporates and wealthy individuals become more reluctant to give to political parties where there are high disclosure requirements. In South Africa, with the introduction of the PPFA Act in 2019, parties have been crying foul of its unintended consequences, with them receiving fewer private donations. Donors have become apprehensive knowing that their donations would be open for public scrutiny, as it may lead to either reprisal or an impact on their reputation (Pasensie & Clarke, 2021). The fear of reprisal and/or reputational loss is two-directional. On the one hand, as deliberated before, private donations to governing parties could be viewed as influence peddling, whilst donors may also be fearful of disclosing donations to opposition parties, for fear of the government blocking them from tenders (Pasensie & Clarke, 2021). And as discussed in the introduction of this study, it has, in South Africa, had a devastating impact on the parties’ ability to properly fund their operations. It should, therefore, be recognised that the probability is high that elevated transparency rules aimed at combatting corruption, will negatively impact the political parties’ ability to solicit donations from private funders. It is with this in mind that regulators promote state funding as a means to mitigate against the losses parties may incur as a result of high disclosure regimes. But, as illustrated, should the state funding not be set at an appropriate level, it could have the opposite effect of weakening the parties’ operational performance. In determining the appropriate level, governments will have to accept that democracy, and for that matter the fight against corruption, comes at a price and that, accordingly, the fiscus will have to provide the necessary resources. What that appropriate level is, is an open question, and will be for each country to make its own determination. But a 2021 study into money and politics did give some indication. It was found that in countries where high levels of spending had become an equilibrium outcome due to corruption and the influence of special interests, the setting of a spending limit may increase political competition and allow for new entrants into politics. In countries where political elites come disproportionately from more affluent and well-resourced echelons of society, it may also reduce the concentration of political power in the hands of the better off. These effects might have direct and indirect consequences for a country’s policy outcomes and, might I add, the depth of democracy in the medium to long term (Avis, Ferraz, Finan & Varjão, 2021). 2.6 The different forms of state funding for political parties A complementary approach to regulating donations is to give political parties access to public funding. The purpose of providing political parties with public funding is to: Promote pluralism and to stimulate the battle of ideas – that is, providing the electorate with a wider choice of policies – by ensuring that all the “relevant political forces” are sufficiently resourced. By giving all parties access to funds for campaigning, it also serves to equal the playing field by limiting the advantage that contenders with access to significant resources have. The levelling of the playing field will, however, only be achieved if the gap between the rich and the poor is addressed by complementing public funding with spending caps. Providing the extent of state funding is significant enough, it serves to incentivise obeyance to the election rules. This is because political parties will fear losing access to public funding should they not obey the rules. (International IDEA, 2014) The International Democracy and Electoral Assistance Institute (International IDEA, 2014), in their handbook on political finance, identify two types of state funding for political parties: Direct funding, that is, providing money Whilst it may seem fair that all registered political parties should receive state funding, such an approach opens up the danger of the system being abused, where parties with little or no support are formed just to collect the funding. Therefore, in most countries, a threshold is applied for parties to gain access to the state funding. This could, in a proportional representation system, be a minimum share of the vote obtained, or in a constituency system, a minimum number of seats. Different countries also follow different allocation criteria. Here too, whilst it may seem that the most democratic way is to give all parties the same amount – national election campaigns after all could cost as much for a smaller party as for a larger party – such an approach, it could be argued, goes against the will of the people. It could also be argued that it is a waste of taxpayers’ money, in that a lot of money will be distributed to many parties who may not materially alter the shape of party politics in the country. The more common option preferred by most countries is to allocate the state funds in proportion to the votes obtained by the various parties. In some jurisdictions this is done purely proportionally, in others, a percentage is divided equally amongst qualifying parties, with the balance allocated proportionally. Then again, a different form is to match the funding that parties manage to raise out of their own initiatives from donors, with an equal amount from the fiscus. This is, for example, the position in the United States and Germany. But this too is open for criticism, with detractors arguing that it favours parties with strong business links. Thus, whilst the overarching objective remains the same for whichever system is adopted, it is for each country to decide which of the systems is most palatable for their particular circumstances and environment. Indirect funding, that is, providing goods and services Most countries also provide indirect funding to political parties. This too can take on various forms, the most common being the provision of free or subsidised access to the public media for campaign purposes. But there are other examples as well, such as tax relief for parties/candidates and their donors, access to public buildings for campaign events and subsidised postage (International IDEA, 2014). Table 2.1. below captures the rationale and considerations regarding direct public funding as developed by International IDEA. Table 2.1.: The rationale and considerations regarding financial reporting requirements (Source: International IDEA, 2014) In addition to direct and indirect funding, in its broader interpretation, alternative state assistance that can help parties develop and improve their standing in society and within the array of parties, can also include measures other than funding. It can, for example, take the form of: Legislation placing spending caps on election campaigns In many jurisdictions, there are limits as to how much parties and/or candidates are allowed to spend on their election campaigns. The purpose is not to regulate the influence of money, but to reduce the advantages that political parties and candidates with access to large amounts of money have over those that are less resourced. Whilst this does not equate to income for the party and/or candidate, it does help level the playing field so that the different parties/candidates have a more equitable chance of selling their message. It also brings less pressure to bear on party treasurers, since it reduces the overall spending on election campaigns. In the South African context, as has already been highlighted in this study, where parties are finding it difficult to stay afloat, this can play an important role in stabilising the financial fortunes of parties and contribute to their sustainability and longevity (International IDEA, 2014). Funding of politically aligned foundations In many European countries there are political foundations that receive funding from the state. Whilst each foundation is close to, and ideologically aligned with a particular party, they are autonomous and legally independent. In Germany, for example, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is associated with the Social Democrats (SPD), and Konrad Adenauer Foundation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). In fact, foundations can be formed and funded by the state for each political party that has been elected to the Bundestag for at least a second term (Unmüssig, 2017). They receive their funding from a number of ministries, such as the Federal Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministries of Education and Research and of Economic Cooperation and Development, who set and adopt the level of funding as part of the federal budget negotiations process (Unmüssig, 2017). There are similar arrangements in other European countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary, Finland, Greece and Spain, amongst others, as well as at the European level (Bértoa & Teruel, N.d.). As previously stated, they do work, amongst others, in the field of civic, democratic and socio-political education, as well as policy analysis and empirical research (Unmüssig, 2017). Whilst they are legally independent, determine their own programmes and are in no way accountable to political parties, they do do their work through the ideological lens of their associated parties. In so doing, individual political parties benefit immensely, since foundations underpin and complement the objectives of the party they are associated with (European Parliament, N.d.). As such, they should be viewed as part and parcel of the political party funding regime, in that their output motivates policy in favour of the particular party they are associated with, and they provide empirical evidence on which parties can develop policy and base their arguments on. In the absence of such foundations, such research and other activities would fall wholly to the political parties themselves. From the aforementioned, it is evident that a determination as to whether the democratic dispensation is adequately funded rests on more than just the financial income of parties, but so too the broader architecture of the particular dispensation. 2.7 The relationship between private donations, disclosure regulations, state funding and the viability of political parties Evidence suggests that many businesses and other clandestine interests support the bigger political parties with a view to influence public policy, and therefore the legitimate calls for greater transparency within the party funding regime. The public have a right to know who is funding the various parties, so that they can assess whether the donations play a role in influencing policy positions. Regulation is needed to prevent policy capture (Terracino & Hamada, 2014). However, as has already been pointed out in this review, an undeniable consequence of greater transparency is that donors become reluctant to donate to political parties. This is due to a fear of being victimised or penalised if their contributions were to be disclosed (Maphunye & Motubatse, 2017). And what the review has simultaneously revealed, is that well-functioning political parties are crucial for representative democracy. Thus, since “public funding is generally tied to stronger rules and controls”, it is argued that where disclosure regulation has been introduced, it needs to be complemented by state funding, lest the lack of sufficient funding becomes counterproductive by rendering the political parties ineffective due to them not being able to financially sustain themselves. In the process of reducing reliance on private funding to support themselves, public funding to political parties becomes necessary to sustain the institutionalisation of political parties in democracies (Terracino & Hamada, 2014). The literature implies, therefore, that there is a direct correlation between the flow of private money to political parties and disclosure regulation. The higher the regulation, the less private money will flow to political parties. The lower the regulation, the higher the prospect of parties receiving private donations. Consequently, a fair deduction would be that where the disclosure regulations of private donations to political parties are low, the necessity for public funding is reduced, whereas when the disclosure requirements are high, the need for public funding is increased. To illustrate: In a 2013 study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), it was found that political parties in Ghana successfully managed to develop and assert themselves without any public funding. In fact, the study suggests that “Ghana is one of the most competitive and relatively stable democracies with a vibrant party system in sub-Saharan Africa”. Parties are free, without limitation, to raise funds through donations. There are also no requirements for parties to disclose the identities of their donors (Magolowondo, Falguera & Matsimbe, 2013). On the other hand, political parties in Mozambique are required to annually declare their donors and the extent of each donation. In this instance they receive regular contributions from the state for both their overall functioning and for election campaigning. But the study says that the Mozambique case shows that when funds are not disbursed timeously, it has a negative impact on the competitiveness of political parties (Magolowondo, Falguera & Matsimbe, 2013). To further illustrate: Prior to the passing of the Political Parties Funding Act in South Africa, similar to Ghana, there were no funding restrictions on parties, nor any disclosure requirements. But since the inception of the Act, donors have become reluctant to donate (Letshwiti-Jones, 2022) and parties are finding it difficult to keep afloat (Moichela, 2022). Parties are now crying foul. The ruling African National Congress’ Treasurer General has, for example, bemoaned the disclosure requirements, saying that it is causing donors to steer away from contributing to the party. He has called for a greater degree of public funding to fill the gap (Friedman, 2020). The South African experience underscores the argument that the higher the disclosure requirements, the greater the need for public funding, lest the parties are neutered from effectively fulfilling their constitutional and democratic roles. 2.8 The post-1994 history of party-political funding in South Africa When ushering in the new democratic dispensation in 1994, no laws, rules and regulations were in place, nor introduced, to regulate private donations to political parties. Parties were free to solicit donations from any source and of any amount, be it local or international, and in most any form. Of course, whilst laws did not prohibit private donations, the receipt of such donations would still be subject to the normal laws of the country. It did not mean that criminal activity would be condoned. Following a number of funding scandals – which involved parties from across the political spectrum – public and civil society opinion started to form in favour of some form of regulation to be introduced. It came in the wake of allegations of corruption levied against the French arms company Thales, and various ruling party heavyweights, dominating the media headlines. It was alleged that the then Deputy President and later President, Jacob Zuma, received large sums of money as a bribe in exchange for him protecting Thales from investigations into a multi-billion rand deal for supplying weapons to South Africa (Reuters, 2021). In the early 2000’s allegations of corruption started to emerge against leaders of other political parties as well. In 2004, for example, charges were laid against New National Party leaders, who then governed the Western Cape province, for planning permission irregularities in exchange for bribes (M&G, 2004). The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, also did not escape scrutiny. In 2002 they were accused of corruption after a German businessman, Jürgen Harksen, told an official commission that he paid more than one million rand to the then Democratic Alliance mayor of Cape Town for both his party's and his own benefit (McGreal, 2002). In 2004 the first shots were fired, when the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa) filed papers in the Western Cape High Court, seeking an order that legislation should be introduced that would compel political parties to disclose the details of all funding they received (M&G, 2017). They failed, but in subsequent court challenges, the Western Cape High Court ruled in favour of a motion brought by “My Vote Counts”, who challenged the constitutionality of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) “insofar as it did not allow for the disclosure of information on private funding to political parties”. Parliament was given eighteen months to “remedy the defect in the PAIA to allow for disclosure of private funding for political parties” (Parliament, 2017). The Political Party Funding Act was introduced into Parliament in 2018. It was subsequently passed by Parliament and assented to by the President on 23 January 2019 (RSA, 2019a). Since the implementation of the Act, it has been a struggle for South African parties to survive financially. Bloomberg, in 2021, already reported that they are “in dire straits”. Most were unable to raise enough money to cover their operational costs (Cele, 2021). In a report released by the Independent Electoral Commission, it was reported that the ruling party, whose monthly wage bill amounted to R18 million, managed to only raise R10,7 million in the three months through to July 2012 (Cele, 2021). They were not alone. Of the country’s other 503 registered parties, it was only the ruling African National Congress, the Official Opposition Democratic Alliance, and ActionSA that received donations exceeding R100,000 (Cele, 2021). While the measure is aimed at curbing corruption, politicians have been complaining that corporates have been deterred from donating (Cele, 2021). The problem is that prior to the enactment of the PPFA, like other political parties, the ANC generated its revenue primarily from private donations. It has been reported that “between 2013 and 2017, the ANC collected R2.6-billion in donations” (Mahlaka, 2021). And as alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, these private donations have all but dried up. The drying up of private donations to the parties is in itself not a bad thing, for all the reasons elaborated on in the previous sections of this review. It is the fact that the public funding to political parties has not been materially adjusted pre- versus post-PPFA. Private funding has been cut off without the compensatory upward adjustment of the allocation to the Represented Political Parties’ Fund (RPPF), that is, the fund managed by the Independent Electoral Commission, out of which the public funding is paid over to the political parties. In Treasury’s Estimates of National Expenditure for the 2019/20 financial year (pre-PPFA), an amount of R157,8 million was allocated to the RPPF (Treasury, 2019:74). This rose marginally to R171,1 million for the 2022/23 financial year (post-PPFA) (Treasury, 2019:xiii), a mere R13,3 million per annum more three years on, amounting to no more than an inflationary adjustment. It seems, however, that some relief has been given in the 2022/23 Estimates of National Expenditure, which indicates an increase of around thirty percent on the previous year, to R342 million. In addition, the defunding has been exacerbated by the fact that funding to political parties by provincial legislatures needed to be cancelled as a consequence of the introduction of the PPFA. Some provinces, such as Gauteng Provincial Legislature, had such arrangements, but the legislation had to be repealed once the PPFA came into operation (Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 2021). 2.9 Conclusion This literature review gives rise to the question: Is South Africa’s democracy properly funded? It seems that whilst great strides have been made in improving the transparency regime, it has not gone hand-in-hand with the necessary concomitant increase in public funding. The improvement on the one hand, and not on the other, amounts to a defunding of the party-political environment, which may very well have damaged the democratic dispensation more than the transparency advancements might suggest. This requires serious and urgent contemplation, to which this study hopes to contribute. Chapter 3: The legislative review It is evident from the literature covered in the preceding Chapter that scholars, democrats, political analysts and experts consistently argue that the provision of public funds to political parties is a necessary part of a free and fair democratic dispensation. This matter has also been settled in South African law, which makes it clear that the provision of public funds to political parties for purposes of executing their constitutional and democratic responsibilities is not open for consideration and/or interpretation. Neither should it be considered a benevolent act of the Executive and/or Treasury. It is compulsory. In this legislative review, the two principal pieces of legislation reviewed are the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Political Party Funding Act. The review will also examine the public funding afforded to the parties via the Appropriation Bill and the Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022 – 2025. 3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 3.1.1 Section 19(2) Section 19(2) of the Constitution asserts: “Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution” (RSA, 1996). In this regard the emphasis is placed on the right of every citizen to a fair election. Law Insider defines fair elections to mean: “electoral processes that are conducted in conformity with established rules and regulations, managed by an impartial, non-partisan professional and competent Electoral Management Body (EMB); in an atmosphere characterised by respect for the Rule of Law; guaranteed rights of protection for citizens through the electoral law and constitution and reasonable opportunities for voters to transmit and receive voter information; defined by equitable access to financial and material resources for all political parties and independent candidates in accordance with the national laws; and where there is no violence, intimidation or discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, religious or other considerations” (Law Insider, N.d.). In terms of this definition, the delivery of a fair election is therefore considerably more than just the technical delivery of the election. It also envisages an environment in which ideas, policies and programmes are effectively communicated to the electorate, and that sufficient opportunities are created for them and parties to connect and communicate with each other. It also pre-supposes that sufficient finances and resources will be in place for parties to carry out their functions. And that the parties have an equitable access to such financial and material resources. It cannot be, therefore, that some parties, merely as a consequence of their incumbency or policies favoured by the business community and/or the wealthy, are advantaged. Such advantage can come in the form of using the parties’ incumbency to reach out and communicate with the electorate or relying on the favour of private funders. Thus, public funding: To level the playing field and to ensure that all participants in the election have a fair chance at putting their case forward. 3.1.2 Section 57(2)(c) Section 57(2)(c) of the Constitution says: “The rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for … financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively” (RSA, 1996). In this regard, the emphasis is placed on the enabling of parties represented in Parliament to perform their functions. Parliament of South Africa’s Policy on Political Parties Allowances is meant to give effect to section 57(2) of the Constitution. The policy’s objective is to, amongst others, assist parties represented in Parliament to perform their parliamentary duties, and to enable the parties to establish and maintain infrastructure that enables them to serve the interests of their constituents, as well as to service them (Parliament, 2005). The allowances are meant to cover the parties’ expenditure in relation to their parliamentary functioning, and include: Party leader allowances Political party administration allowances, which are based on a determination of staff and other entitlements made by the Secretary to Parliament on an annual basis. Party constituency allowances, which are paid to the parties and not the individual members of Parliament. The Presiding Officers annually determine an amount per member. Parties receive a constituency allowance equal to the annually determined amount multiplied by the number of their representatives in Parliament. 3.1.3 Section 59(1)(a) Section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution states: “The National Assembly must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes or the Assembly and its committees” (RSA, 1996). To this end, parliamentary and Provincial Legislature portfolios and select committees provide opportunities for public participation in debating the proposed policy or law (ETU, N.d.). Apart from political parties participating in the legislatures through their public representatives, they are principally civil society organisations that encapsulate the interests, views and ideas of a certain group (or groups) within society. They articulate and represent these groups by participating in democratic elections, but they also, as a civil society contestant, sometimes independently and sometimes in collaboration with other civil society organisations, present these interests to formal political representatives and institutions (Mexhuani & Rrahmani, 2017). This is necessary to ensure the timely exchange of information between the legislators, the government and the public about problems and their solutions. And for civil society to take part in the country’s public affairs, to contribute to the development of the government policy- and law-creating procedures and to exert influence on the decision-making that will affect them and broader society (Aitken, 2013:19). Given the constitutional weight afforded to public participation in the legislative and other processes of Parliament, it is fair to deduce that meaningful (as opposed to superficial) contributions are expected from the public (and civil society). The development of their contributions requires from them well-developed, consulted, and empirically researched proposals to present to the Legislatures (and might I add, Executive, who themselves follow similar consultative processes when developing policy and legislation). Well-researched legislation and policy requires accuracy (Aitken, 2013:5), certainty, predictability (Aitken, 2013:7) and detailed analysis as to the likely impact of the legislation/policy, and its ability to achieve the desired regulatory results (Aitken, 2013:6), which requires considerable participatory and transparent policy processes and (Aitken, 2013:7), might I add, research by well-qualified experts. Proper participatory processes comprise the holding of discussions, open dialogue participation, consultations, workshops and seminars, with input from government officials and agencies, parliamentarians, civil society, international advisers, independent experts, the private sector, academics and the public (Aitken, 2013:19). All of which require political parties to have adequate funding or networked collaboration, which collaborators, in turn, will require funding. 3.1.4 Section 236 Section 236 of the Constitution says: “To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis” (RSA, 1996). The legislation envisaged by this section of the Constitution is the Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018, the details of which is deliberated on in paragraph 3.2 hereunder. 3.2 Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 The Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 (PPFA), was assented to by the President of the Republic of South Africa on 21 January 2021 (RSA, 2021). With its introduction, the political party funding environment was completely changed. It introduced a new era of transparency in terms of who is funding the political parties. It will also help guard against corruption and the misuse of state resources. All of which needs to be applauded in an open and free democratic society. What was not envisaged was the spectacular collapse of private funding to political parties. This has all but dried up to the extent, as has been discussed, that the official opposition has, for example, had to retrench a significant portion of its staff, and the ruling party has run up huge debts and is not able to regularly pay its staff; indeed, its operations have been hamstrung. The celebration with regard to the ushering in of transparency, now needs to be balanced against the danger to the country of a weakening democratic dispensation due to neutering of the parties’ ability to effectively carry out the work, due to a lack of financial and other resources. What does the Act say? For purposes of this review the focus is on the three areas in the Act that impact party funding, namely, the direct funding to parties and the imposition of prohibitions, the establishment of the Represented Political Party Fund, and the establishment of the Multi-Party Democracy Fund. 3.2.1 Direct funding of political parties 3.2.1.1 Prohibited donations Political parties may no longer receive donations from foreign sources, be they foreign governments and/or agencies, foreign persons or entities. There is one exception, namely that they may accept grants for the purposes of training and skills development, and/or policy development. But this is subject to an annual cap that an entity may contribute, which currently stands at R5 million (RSA, 2021). The parties may also not receive funding from any organ of state or state-owned enterprise, albeit that this was the case prior to the introduction of this legislation as well (RSA, 2021). They may also not receive any donations that they know, ought to have known, or suspect, originated from sources of crime (RSA, 2021). 3.2.1.2 Donations from juristic persons A political party must disclose any donation it receives from a natural or juristic person that exceeds the threshold. The current threshold is R100,000 received from any single entity within a financial year (RSA, 2021). Furthermore, no entity may donate more than R15 million to a political party within a financial year (RSA, 2021). 3.2.2 Represented Political Party Fund Section 2 of the PPFA provides for the establishment of a Represented Political Party Fund (RPPF). Its purpose is to promote multi-party democracy through the provision of public funding to those parties that are represented in Parliament (RSA, 2021). Money is appropriated annually by an Act of Parliament and is distributed to the parties by means of a prescribed formula that, in part, provides for a weighted equitable distribution to parties represented in the national parliament and provincial legislatures. The second part provides for a distribution to the parties represented in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures based on their proportional strength in terms of the numbers of members represented in both the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. Currently, one-third is distributed equitably to all parties that hold seats in the National Assembly or any provincial legislature; and two-thirds is distributed in proportion to seats held by a political party in the National Assembly or provincial legislatures (IEC, N.d.). Section 7 of the PPFA spells out what parties may and may not use the monies received form the RPPF for (RSA, 2021). They may use it for: Activities aimed at developing the political will of the people Shaping public opinion Political education Promoting the active participation of citizens in political life Influencing political trends Ensuring connectivity between the citizenry and organs of state Expenditure aimed at ensuring compliance with the PPFA They may not use it for: Remunerating any person that represents the party in any legislature or municipal council, or who receives remuneration for any appointment or service rendered to the state The financing of or contributing to anything that is in contravention of any code of ethics aimed at binding members of Parliament or members of a provincial legislature Establishing a business of any kind, or to acquire or maintain a financial interest therein, except where it is for the purposes of acquiring property to be used solely by the party and for party political purposes Defraying legal costs that relate to internal political party disputes 3.2.3 Multi-Party Democracy Fund Section 3 of the PPFA provides for the establishment of a Multi-Party Democracy Fund, the proceeds of which are to be distributed to represented political parties for purposes of promoting democracy (RSA, 2021). The fund may receive contributions in any amount from any private source within or outside of the country. It may, however, not receive any money from an organ of state, state-owned enterprise, foreign government or foreign government agency. In addition, interest earned by the fund and irregular donations made to political parties which are recovered, are also distributable to the represented parties (RSA, 2021). Donors making contributions to the Multi-Party Democracy Fund may request the regulator not to disclose their identity (RSA, 2021). The funds are allocated to the parties using the same formula as that of the RPPF. Similarly, the rules in terms of what the monies can and cannot be spent on are the same as those of the RPPF (RSA, 2021). 3.3 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 The purpose of this section is to ascertain the degree of public funding given to the political parties in a financial year. It examines the Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025, with specific reference to the amounts allocated to political parties. Direct public funding is channelled to parties through these two avenues only. 3.3.1 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 In the Appropriation Bill B7-2022 (RSA, 2022), there are two allocations that bear reference to the question posed in this study. Firstly, the Bill provides an allocation to Parliament, and secondly, it provides an allocation to the Independent Electoral Commission. It is these two institutions that transfer monies to the political parties. The following allocations were made in the Appropriation Bill: For the purposes of providing support services required by Parliament to fulfil its constitutional functions, and to assist the political parties represented in Parliament with facilities and administrative support, and to service their constituents, Parliament was allocated an amount of R2,212,234,000 (two billion two hundred and twelve million two hundred and thirty-four thousand rand). For purposes of providing institutional support and transfer funds to the Electoral Commission, the Represented Political Parties' Fund and the Border Management Authority, an amount of R2,762,584,000 (two billion seven hundred and sixty-two million five hundred and eighty-four thousand rand) was allocated. Of this, R342,077,000 (three hundred and forty-two million and seventy-seven thousand rand) was allocated to the Representative Political Parties’ Fund. 3.3.2 Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 Programme 3 of Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022/23 to 2024/25 provides for the transfer in the amount of R518,572,000 (five hundred and eighteen million five hundred and seventy-two thousand rand) during the 2022/23 financial year, the application of which has been spelt out in paragraph 3.1.2. of this review. The actual net amount transferred to parties in the 2022/23 financial year amounted to R511,869,648 (five hundred and eleven million eight hundred and sixty-nine thousand six hundred and forty eight rand) (Parliament, 2022). 3.4 Conclusion Direct public funding in South Africa is allocated to political parties via three avenues: the RPPF, Multi-Party Democracy Fund (of which there has been no distribution to date) and Parliament, the quantum of which is indicated in Table 3.1. below. The number of eligible and soon-to-be eligible voters – that is, citizens over the age of 15 – number around 43,587,000 according to Statista (2022a), whereas the number of registered voters number 26,046,612 (IEC, N.d.). This means than an amount of R19,59 per annum per citizen over 15, or R32,78 per annum per registered voter, is set aside from public funds to support political parties.   Table 3.1.: Transfer of public funds to political parties per citizen over 15 and registered voter *Note: These figures are in relation to the national sphere of government. See study limitation in Chapter 4. Chapter 4: Research design and methodology As already stated, the introduction of the new party-political funding regime seems to have negatively impacted the political parties’ ability to raise funding from private sources. This has made them far more dependent on state funding, which, according to reports, seems not to be adequate, in that parties are not being able to meet their financial obligations. Consequently, they are not empowered to carry out their democratic and constitutionally imposed responsibilities and obligations properly and effectively. The introduction of regulations with regard to the private funding of political parties may have improved transparency, but at the same time it may also very well prove to disable parties from carrying out their functions effectively. In order for parties to effectively represent the constituents in Parliament, they need to have the organisational infrastructure to regularly interact with the electorate, and the capacity to do research, policy development and the marketing of their policy positions. All of which requires money. This is deployed to, for example: Develop the political will of the people Bring the party's influence to bear on the shaping of public opinion Inspire and further political education Promote active participation by individual citizens in political life Exercise an influence on political trends Ensure continuous and vital links between the people and organs of state (IEC, N.d.) 4.1 Research objective The objective of this research is to examine the South African party-funding environment in comparison to a selected group of parties from the European Union. The purpose is to ascertain how the South African political party funding regime compares to these international jurisdictions. The purpose is to provide public policymakers with benchmark information to enable them to consider the appropriateness of the current funding regime and to motivate for adjustments thereto, should it be found that the current model is wanting. 4.2 Research question Primary research question What comprises South Africa’s party-political funding regime and how does it compare with the party-funding regimes of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands? Secondary research question Compared with the public funding regimes of the other countries of this study, are the South African political parties sufficiently funded to effectively carry out their democratic and constitutional obligations? 4.3 Research design The research takes a pragmatic approach in which both qualitative and quantitative methods were deployed during the course of the research. Qualitative research – “that is, non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations” (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:646) – was, for example, deployed to discover and understand the elements and extent of state funding of the political parties in both the European dispensations chosen for the benchmarking, as well as that of South Africa. Quantitative research – that is, the numerical representation and manipulation (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:646) – was, for example, used to measure the financial variances between the different state funding models and to convert the various financial quanta to equivalent purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to equalise the purchasing power of different currencies, by eliminating the differences in price levels between the foreign countries and South Africa. It was also needed to determine the per capita cost of state funding in each of the jurisdictions. 4.4 Research subjects The research subjects were the political parties of the countries that formed part of this study. The objective was to obtain data as to all the funding streams for funding the activities of the parties, and the extent thereof. The countries were selected using matching selection – that is, by comparing the similarities between the subjects to be selected (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:213). In this study the similarities were the electoral system – proportional representation. Whilst it is also important to consider the bearing of the different socio-economic conditions between that of South Africa and the developed world, the overriding consideration was that the quality of democracy should not be undermined based purely on affordability, since such considerations could potentially undermine the democratic ethos in the country. Costs were, however, as mentioned, converted to equalise the buying power differences between the countries. 4.5 Measurement The study required three measurements. The first was to measure the extent of party funding in each of the jurisdictions. This was to ascertain all the types of funding and the financial extent of that funding in each of the jurisdictions. This called for qualitative data, given the descriptive nature of the data (OSU, N.d.). It was obtained directly from the political parties, foundations and electoral commissions interviewed. The second measurement was to determine what the differences were between the jurisdictions in terms of the various sources of funding. This too was qualitative in nature. The third measurement was to determine the comparative cost per citizen (15+) to fund the parties. This was quantitative in nature, since it required measurable numeric information (OSU, N.d.). There were two dimensions to this measurement: (i) the conversion of the quantum in each jurisdiction in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to ensure that an apples-for-apples comparison between the jurisdictions would be achieved, and (ii) to determine the per capita percentage differentiation between the various jurisdictions. This enabled an interpretation as to the adequacy of the South African funding regime compared with the practices in the benchmarked countries. 4.6 Data collection In-person expert interviews were undertaken in each of the benchmarking countries with the treasurers (or their delegated representatives) of a major political party in the particular country, and/or the electoral commission in the country. The purpose was to get a holistic understanding of the funding regimes in each country. It also served to identify all the elements of funding for parties in the particular country and the quantum thereof. To this end, both the qualitative and quantitative data were secured through open-ended questions, in order to allow for a holistic and comprehensive look at the issues being studied, since open-ended questions allowed for the respondents to provide all options and opinions related to the topic, thereby ensuring more diversity and elaboration than would be possible with a closed-question or forced-choice survey format (Allen, 2017). The questionnaire used in this regard is shown hereunder: 1) Questions to be posed to interviewees a) Are there restrictions of private donations to political parties, and if so: b) What are the laws governing those restrictions? 2) What do the restrictions entail? a) What are the various forms of public funding that parties are entitled to? b) Directly to the party c) Directly to elected representatives d) To the groups within Parliament e) Reimbursement for election expenses f) Any other 3) What is the monetary value of each of the aforementioned funding contributions? 4) How is the funding divided and distributed to the parties and/or elected representatives? 5) Are there any election campaign spending caps, and if so, what? 6) Are there any incentives in place to encourage individuals/corporates to make donations to political parties, such as, for example, tax incentives? 7) Is there any indirect funding in place, such as, for example, free media slots, and if so: a) What are the rules? b) What is the value? c) How is it divided and distributed to the parties? 8) Are there any public funds made available to institutions, foundations, etcetera, which stand independent from the political parties, but which are ideologically aligned with parties, such as the political foundations in Germany and other European countries who stimulate the public policy dialogue, democracy and human rights through the lens of the ideological orientation, and if so: a) What is the rationale behind those contributions? b) How does it work? c) From which government departments and/or institutions are the funds dispersed? d) How are the contributions divided/distributed to the various institutions, foundations, etcetera? e) What is the monetary value of the contributions from each department and/or institution? 9) In terms of private versus public funding of political parties, what is, in your estimation, the ratio between the two? Indicate by marking the correct statement: Note: Private finding includes membership fees and contributions by trade unions. (10) Are there any other factors that you believe should be taken into account? 4.7 Analysis Various multivariate tables were constructed, which comprised a number of independent variables (the different jurisdictions) and a range of dependent variables (the funding streams available in each jurisdiction) (Babbie & Mouton:435). This enabled the researcher to do a comparative analysis on the similarities and differences between the various systems. In some instances, the tables were simultaneously multiple in nature, since they, in addition to the qualitative data mentioned above, also provided for quantitative data – that is, the quantum of the various funding streams available in each jurisdiction. In the final instance, the researcher interpreted the table in terms of: the elements of state funding that are available in each of the benchmarking countries, including those elements that are not available in South Africa, together with an analysis of the amounts provided by the state to fund each of the elements the per capita cost of party funding by the state, based on PPP, for each of the countries whereafter: in that the researcher had been exposed to the implicit and explicit facts related to the various funding regimes (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:641), the researcher was able to make a determination through deduction reasoning as to the adequacy of the South African funding dispensation in comparison to the benchmarked countries the researcher developed recommendations for public policymakers to ponder. 4.8 Ethics Whereas the data, such as the types and quantum of state funding, are available in the public domain, formal ethics clearance was not required. However, since some financial information, especially that which relates to private funding or commercial activities, was confidential, the financial analysis was restricted to public funding only. 4.9 Limitation of the study This study has only examined the public funding of political parties at the national level. It has not ventured into public fund transfers to political parties at the provincial and/or municipal level of government. The assessment therefore relates to public funds transfers to the parties at the national and the national parliamentary levels only. That said, in the comparative analysis, all jurisdictions were treated in similar fashion, resulting in a like-for-like comparison. The author is therefore confident that the conclusions reached will be valid for the purposes of the study, that is, to draw conclusions as to how South Africa’s public funding of political parties compares with those of the other international jurisdictions against which it was assessed. 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Considered solutions to closing the gap on youth inequality and unemployment by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 28, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: 5 ways we can support SA’s teens to stay in school w ithout interventions along their life cycle, kids could well become the “disaffected youth” as early inequality gets compounded from birth, through school, and beyond. by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 20, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Setting the foundation for long-term learning and earning Interventions that support childhood development in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life have the potential to radically shift South Africa’s current inequality crisis. by Michelle Flowers and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2023 Op-e d: Multi-Member Constituency model trumps Single Seat Constituency model by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Coalitions must be built on trust and generosity by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair: Understanding youth inequality Youth inequality accumulates over a life course, but there are critical moments where policy and programming can intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Sustainable population and possible standards of living by Anton Cartwright Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Automatic voter registration: removing the thorn in the side of SA’s democracy by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 23, 2023 Op-e d: African Philosophy and Social Justice: The inclusiveness and limitations of a continent’s political thought by Mutshidz Maraganedzha Up Jan 20, 2023 Op-e d: Rise civil society: A new year’s resolution by Klaus Kotzé Up Jan 13, 2023 Op-ed: End the Social Compact tug-of-war: Lessons from Denmark by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 9 , 2022 Op-Ed: Parliament persists in passing an unconstitutional Electoral Amendment bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Nov 2 , 2022 Op-Ed: Democratising the United Nations by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 27 , 2022 Op-Ed: A people-driven state is required for national renewal by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 24 , 2022 Op-Ed: Contractionary fiscal consolidation versus expansionary stimulus implications for growth, employment and debt by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 16 , 2022 Op-Ed: The world is on shaky ground, with South Africa no different by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 12 , 2022 Op-Ed: UN Security Council Reform - A New Approach to Reconstructing the International Order by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 06 , 2022 Op-Ed: The need for an evidence-based response to addressing Xenophobia in SA. The importance of addressing the real drivers of Xenophobia and Xenophobic vilolence. by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 15, 2022 Op-Ed: SA must pull up its socks or tourism rebound may be short-lived by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 08, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and solutions for local economic development in the City of Ekurhuleni by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Climate change adaptation and resilience: An analysis of some Global and National Measures by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 29, 2022 Media Release: Proposals to remedy current deficiencies in the proposed NHI bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 23, 2022 Op-Ed: Grease the gears so the economic wheels can turn by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 27, 2022 Op-Ed: As long as we keep failing our youth, the cycle of inequality will remain unbroken by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 21, 2022 Media Release: Trust deficit between civil society and SAPS is flaming lawlessness in South Africa by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption by Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Up Jun 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Towards a national commitment by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Social Cohesion: Taking stock of South Africa’s socio-political strategy by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Get the basics right to reboot growth by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The preconditions for a South African welfare state by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: Leveraging ideas of hope to reduce inequality in South Africa by Anja Smith, Jodi Wishnia, Carmen Christian and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The Russia-Ukraine conflict: Impact on South Africa, fellow BRICS members and Africa by William Gumede Up Apr 07, 2022 Op-Ed: The establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 06, 2022 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a labour sector perspective by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Efficient logistics needed to keep agri-exports on the right track by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 14, 2022 Op-Ed: Back to basics to better economy - Getting fundamentals right will reverse economic woes by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 10, 2022 Op-Ed: Crisis in Europe highlights critical importance of self-sufficient, secure and stable energy production by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2022 Social Democracy: A pathway for South Africa's development by Dr Klause Kotzé Up Feb 03, 2022 WEF Global Risks Report 2022 suggests it cannot be business as usual Up Feb 02, 2022 Preventing corruption is the key by Willie Hofmeyr Up Jan 31, 2022 South Africa investing in the ICT sector is a no-brainer by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 28, 2022 The effects of corruption by Prof Pregala Solosh Pillay Up Jan 17, 2022 Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured by Prof Andrew Spalding Up Jan 13, 2022 Different types of anti-corruption agencies by Drago Kos Up Jan 12, 2022 Construction sector: A friend in need is a friend indeed. Let the private sector help Up Dec 7, 2021 Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a retail sector perspective Up Dec 3, 2021 Speech delivered by Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, to the Integritasza Conference, Wellington, South Africa Up Nov 11, 2021 ISI meets Deputy Minister of Finance - Present NHI and Inequality research outcomes Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - A SMME sector perspective Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South Africa needs an urgent national security and intelligence assessment Up Nov 2, 2021 ANC support dips, but it is still best placed to win local government election Up Nov 2, 2021 Op-Ed: SA's Jekyll and Hyde economy has investors second guessing Up Sep 16, 2021 Op-Ed: Would you choose NHI as our universal health care scheme if you knew the costs twenty years from now? Up Sep 15, 2021 Op-Ed: Local government challenges: How far have we come? Up Sep 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South African courts: Are they guilty of judicial overreach or merely upholding the rule of law? Up Sep 6, 2021 Op-Ed: Assessing crime intelligence in South Africa Up Aug 27, 2021 Op-Ed: Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden administration and its nexus with China Up Aug 26, 2021 Achieving wellbeing equa lity for South Africans: a dream that shouldn’t be deferred by the Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 13, 2021 Op-Ed: Reviving factories can fire up a much-needed growth engine Up Aug 11, 2021 South Africa's developmental model: The significance of state-owned enterprises Up Jun 23, 2021 Challenging climate change: The transition to a sustainable economy Up Jun 10, 2021 No quick fixes for SA's woes but glimmer of hope on the horizon Up May 31, 2021 Restoring faith in South Africa key to rejuvenating the economy Up May 5, 2021 Survey suggests voter support for party system in SA Up Apr 8, 2021 ISI presents electoral system proposals to IEC Up Mar 16, 2021 COVID-19: Severe blow to long-term employment prospects Up Jan 28, 2021 Speech by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute, South Africa: International Conference on Poverty Alleviation: China's rationale, Beijing, China Up Jan 25, 2021 Op-Ed: Slowing the population growth is vital for South Africa's economic recovery Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: The US-China-Africa nexus under a Biden administration Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: ISI Annual Lecture with Justice Albie Sachs Prosperity through inclusivity Up Aug 13, 2020 Op-Ed: South African and the 12th summit of BRICS Up Aug 12, 2020 Op-Ed: Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 11, 2020 Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 3, 2020 Op-Ed: COVID-19 US-China discord and its impact on Sino-South African relations Up Jul 21, 2020 LGBT+ survey findings Survey on everyday experience of the LGBT+ communicy finds inequality and discrimination still rife, and mental health potentially a crisis in the making Up Jul 14, 2020 National health insurance Bill Parliament's Portfolio Committee would be well-advised first to obtain legal clarity on constitutionality Up May 20, 2020 COVID-19 ANC members and supporters show overwhelming support for government measures and ANC leadership, but are concerned about the future of the economy Up Apr 17, 2020 COVID-19 Survey: COVID-19 and its impact on the SMME sector Up Up

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Media Coverage - 2025 Mar 18, 2025 Focus on the 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research SAfm: The Morning Brief Up Mar 17, 2025 Consul General Pan Qingjiang celebrates women's cooperation between China and South Africa IOL: Jonisay Maromo Up Mar 6, 2025 Sports as a tool for unity MP Update: Tshepang Mokoena Up Mar 6, 2025 Sports as a tool for unity Bushbuckridge News Up Mar 5, 2025 Deputy President Paul Mashatile: Social Cohesion Dialogue EinPressWire Up Mar 5, 2025 Mashatile champions sports as a unifying force in SA sanews.gov.za Up Mar 5, 2025 South Africa: Mashatile Champions Sports As a Unifying Force in South Africa All Africa Up Mar 5, 2025 Sport as a Unifying Force: Paul Mashatile Calls for Greater Social Cohesion Devdiscourse Up Mar 4, 2025 Deputy President Paul Mashatile: Social Cohesion Dialogue gov.za Up Feb 28, 2025 Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Issues Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Haberler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum canligaste Up Feb 28, 2025 “Türkiye-Africa Media Forum” was held in Istanbul Ogretmenler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum eurovizyon Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum: The model implemented by Türkiye needs to be known more across the continent Milli Iradenin Sesi Star Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum 24 SAAT Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication issues were discussed at the Türkiye-Africa Media Forum. SonDakika Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Avrupa Gazete Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Bengü Türk Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Emphasis on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Gelen Harberler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum aksiyon.com.tr Up Feb 28, 2025 Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Haberport Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication 8Sutun Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Anadolu Agency Up Feb 28, 2025 “Türkiye-Africa Media Forum” was held in Istanbul İletişim Başkanlığı Up Feb 24, 2025 A national dialogue must be people-centred for SA to thrive Mail & Guardian: Klaus Kotzé Up Feb 21, 2025 Is technology bad for social cohesion in SA? It seems so Times LIVE: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 19, 2025 Trump tariff fest poses a threat to SA exports Business Day: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 19, 2025 Make plans to secure the US market because Trump tariffs will hurt Business Day: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2025 2024 Social Cohesion Index eNCA The South African Morning: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 13, 2025 Limpopo has more social cohesion levels than KZN - Research eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Citizens Corner: Social cohesion on the decline, how do we turn things around? SAfm The Talking Point: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Indeks meet Sosiale Kohesie in Suid-Afrika vandag NG Kerk in Oos-Kaapland: Danie Mouton Up Feb 12, 2025 Being proudly South African is powerful unifying force iTWeb: Serame Taukobong Up Feb 12, 2025 Insights from the 2024 SA social cohesion index Cape Times: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 12, 2025 Insights from the 2024 SA social cohesion index The Mercury: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 12, 2025 Our pride in being South African is the glue that holds us together Engineering News Up Feb 7, 2025 Cooperative government is key to a prosperous future for SA Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Feb 7, 2025 Planning is vital to reduce climate 'transition shock' Farmer's Weekly SA: Annelie Coleman Up Feb 7, 2025 The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society Polity Up Feb 7, 2025 Planning is vital to reduce climate 'transition shock' Farmer's Weekly: Annelie Coleman Up Feb 5, 2025 Keynote address by Deputy President Shipokosa Paulus Mashatile at the launch of the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), Western Cape The Presidency Up Feb 5, 2025 Social Cohesion Index | 'Building the country together' - Paul Mashatile SABC News Up Feb 5, 2025 2024 Social Cohesion Index | 'SA compares favourably with countries like Germany': Daryl Swanepoel SABC News: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 5, 2025 Launch of 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research SABC News: Keith Khoza Up Feb 4, 2025 Deputy President Mashatile to deliver keynote address at the launch of the 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research The Presidency Up Feb 4, 2025 The annual BPI lecture TimesLIVE Up Jan 30, 2025 With the GNU comes hope, a sense of fresh energy and new talent Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Jan 26, 2025 AI will supercharge South African businesses City Press: Lars Gumede Up Jan 20, 2025 Forging a unique South African identity Mail & Guardian: William Gumede Up Jan 10, 2025 Strategies for a green economy in SA BusinessDay: William Gumede Up Jan 7, 2025 What we can learn from global public sector AI successes BusinessDay: Lars Gumede Up Up